Book: NO LOGO



Naomi Klein

NO LOGO

the first scan spell-check by fnark, (forgive me Naomi).

Note: this text is stripped of notes, photos, graphs, appendix and the index.

It is recommended that you buy the paper- or hardback, if you can afford it.

Preface

Born in Montreal in 1970, NAOMI KLEIN is an award-winning journalist and bestselling author. Her articles

have appeared in numerous publications including the Nation, New Statesman, Newsweek International, the

New York Times, Vil age Voice, Ms., The Baffler, and Saturday Night. She writes a weekly column in the

Globe Mail, Canada's national newspaper. She is a frequent media commentator and has guest lectured

at Harvard, Yale and Mew York University. Naomi Klein lives in Toronto. No Logo was shortlisted for the

Guardian First Book Award 2000.

Reviews:

'Naomi Klein bril iantly charts the protean nature of consumer capitalism, how it absorbs radical challenges

to its dominance and turns them into consumer products.' MADELEINE

BUNTING, Guardian

'The bible for anti-corporate militancy.'

Select

'This entertaining exposure of corporate culture resonates with disil usion.'

CHRISTOPHER HIRST,

Independent

'Personable and well-informed, prescient, necessary and ultimately optimistic, No Logo paints a vivid picture


of spirited, creative rebellion.'

WILLIAM GEORGIADES, Literary Review

'Naomi Klein catches the anticapitalist mood so well it seems unbelievable that No Logo was written before

the "Battle of Seattle". She expresses bril iantly the rage that so many people feel about what is going on in

the world, giving us ammunition against the bosses and governments.' JUDITH

ORR, Socialist Review

'Zipping between corporations, countries and human rights violations with al the self-assured effortlessness

of a multinational transferring capital between currencies, Naomi Klein's convincing analysis of the rise of

the superbrand -Starbucks, Nike, Ikea, Gap, Blockbuster et al -reveals a world where labels are hungry for

every inch of space.'

The Face

'A touchstone of sanity' 'A bril iant book'

Red Pepper PETER YORK, The Times

Packed with facts and arguments and gratifyingly cross with not just corporate culture, but our own

eagerness to buy into it, No Logo couldn't have been better timed.' Independent on Sunday

'No Logo should be read by anyone who thinks that the Seattle demonstrations were an aberration.'

Economist

'Athletic, expansive and an antidote to sloppy thinking . . . It's impossible not to notice the prescience of her

argument.'

AUSTIN BUNN, Sunday Herald


'A bril iant account of how Nike, Starbucks, McDonalds etc. branded the industrialised world, and how the

most exciting strand of radical politics is now bound up with resisting their kulturkampf. . . Fantastic and

inspiring.' Select

'Unerring and serious . . . This is a juicy, salty book.'

FERDINAND MOUNT, TLS

'No Logo is a comprehensive account of the potential monster that the global economy has created and the

actions to thwart it. So brands watch out, there is a loud and strong message here!'

Ann PARKER, Marketing

'A passionate, well-written and thoroughly researched book.'

JIM DUNNE, Sunday Business

'No Logo is a siren going off.'

Overload

'Just when you thought multi-nationals and crazed consumerism were too big to fight, along comes Naomi

Klein with facts, spirit, and news of successful fighters already out there. No Logo is an invigorating call to

arms for everybody who wants to save money, justice, or the universe.' GLORIA STEINEM

'What corporations fear most are consumers who ask questions. Naomi Klein offers us the arguments with

which to take on the superbrands.'

BILLY BRAGG

'Essential mil ennial reading.' RICHARD BENSON, Limb by Limb American and Canadian reviews:


'Klein is a gifted writer; her paragraphs can be as seductive as the ad campaigns she dissects.' New York

Times Book Review

'Naomi Klein's trenchant book is the perfect introduction to and explanation of those stunning events [in

Seattle] . . . this book is the very essence of cool.' Globe Mail To understand how branding drives the global market, you couldn't ask for a better guide than Naomi Klein.'

Toronto Star

'A dense, fact-fil ed publication that makes plain the jargon spouted by all who put profit before basic human

needs. . . with its far reaching vision and clear presentation. A well-conceived primer on the machinations of

the modern consumer world, No Logo is required reading for anyone who thinks people should not be

treated like machines.' Eye Weekly

'Nothing short of a complete, user-friendly handbook on the negative effects that

'90s uberbrand marketing

has had on culture, work, and consumer choice ... an encyclopaedic compilation of the decade's fringe and

mainstream anti-corporate actions and mind-sets.'

Vil age Voice

'A powerful and passionate book.'

National Post

'An incredibly important, timely read and a powerful call to arms.'

Calgary Straight

'No Logo finally puts in perspective what the newest generation of fed-up consumers and anti-corporate

activists have been trying to verbalize for the past 10 years.' Ottawa Express


'Generation-X intellectual Naomi Klein could become the next Douglas Coupland with her No Logo. She

anticipates a revolt against corporate power by younger people seeking brand-free space. Even if the revolt

is not in the works yet, her tart writing might inspire one.'

Report on Business

'At once an impressive journalistic analysis and an impassioned rallying cry.' New Brunswick Telegraph

You might not see things yet on the surface, but underground, it's already on fire.

-Indonesian writer Y.B. Mangunwijaya, July 16, 1998

========================================================

NO SPACE

NO CHOICE

NO JOBS

NO LOGO

NAOMI KLEIN

For Avi

First published in Great Britain by Flamingo 2000

Copyright ® Naomi Klein 2000

Naomi Klein asserts the moral right to be identified as the author of this work ISBN 0 00 653040 0

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The four-year process of taking No Logo from an idea to a finished book has been exhilarating. It has not,

however, been painless and I have relied heavily on the support, understanding and expertise of those

around me.

It has been my great honour to have as my editor Louise Dennys, whose intellectual rigor and personal


commitment to freedom of expression and human rights have sharpened the arguments in this book and

smoothed my rough edges as a writer. She transformed this book in magical ways.

My research assistant, Paula Thiessen, has tracked down many of the most obscure facts and sources. For

more than two years she worked tirelessly collecting the statistics that make up this book's many original

charts, extracting facts from cagey retail chains and cajoling government agencies around the world to send

unpublished reports. She also conducted the book's photo research and has been a calming influence and

supportive colleague during what is often lonely work.

My agents at the Westwood Creative Artists, Bruce Westwood and Jennifer Barclay, took on what many

would have seen as a risky project, with boundless enthusiasm and determination.

They searched the

international book world for kindred spirits who would not just publish No Logo, but would champion it:

Reagan Arthur and Philip Gwyn Jones.

The exceptional team at Knopf Canada has been warm-hearted and cool-headed no matter what the crisis. I

am grateful to Michael Mouland, Nikki Barrett, Noelle Zitzer and Susan Burns, as well as to the talented and

dedicated team of editors who have strengthened, polished, trimmed and checked this text: Doris Cowan,

Alison Reid and Deborah Viets.

I am deeply indebted to John Honderich, publisher of The Toronto Star, who gave me a regular column in


his newspaper when I was far too young; a space that for almost five years allowed me to develop both the

ideas and the contacts that form the foundation of this book. My editors at The Star-Carol Goar, Haroon

Siddiqui and Mark Richardson-have been enormously supportive through leaves of absence and even

wished me well when I left the column to focus my full attention on this project.

The writing for No Logo

began in earnest as a piece for The Vil age Voice on culture jamming and I am indebted to Miles Seligman

for his editorial insights. My editor at Saturday Night, Paul Tough, has supported me with extended

deadlines, research leads, and No Logo-themed assignments, including a trip to the Roots Lodge, which

helped deepen my understanding of the Utopian aspirations of branding.

I received valuable research assistance from Idella Sturino, Stefan Philipa and Maya Roy. Mark Johnston

hooked me up in London, Bern Jugunos did the same in Manila and Jeff Ballinger did it in Jakarta.

Hundreds of individuals and organizations also cooperated with the research, but a few individuals went far

out of their way to ply me with stats and facts: Andrew Jackson, Janice Newson, Carly Stasko, Leah

Rumack, Mark Hosier, Dan Mil s, Bob Jeffcott, Lynda Yanz, Trim Bissell, Laird Brown, and most of all,

Gerard Greenfield. Unsolicited juicy tidbits arrived by post and E-mail from Doug Saunders, Jesse Hirsh,

Joey Slinger, Paul Webster and countless other electronic angels. The Toronto Reference Library, the


International Labour Organization, the Corporate Watch Web site, the Maquila Solidarity Network, The

Baffler, SchNEWS, Adbusters and the Tao Collective list serves were all invaluable to my research.

I am also grateful to Leo Panitch and Mel Watkins for inviting me to speak at conferences that helped me to

workshop the thesis early on, and to my colleagues on the This Magazine editorial board for their generosity

and encouragement.

Several friends and family members have read the manuscript and offered advice and input: Michele

Landsberg, Stephen Lewis, Kyo Maclear, Cathie James, as well as Bonnie, Michael, Anne and Seth Klein.

Mark Kingwell has been a dear friend and intellectual mentor. Sara Borins was my first and most

enthusiastic reader - of both the proposal and the first draft —and it was the ever-fabulous Sara who insisted

that No Logo must have a design that matched the spirit of its content. Nancy Friedland, John Montesano,

Anne Baines and Rachel Giese stood by me when I was nowhere to be found. My late grandfather, Philip

Klein, who worked as an animator for Walt Disney, taught me a valuable lesson early in life: always look for

the dirt behind the shine.

My greatest debt is to my husband, Avi Lewis, who for years greeted me every morning with a cup of coffee

and a stack of clippings from the business section. Avi has been a partner in this project in every possible


way: he stayed up late into the night helping to evolve the ideas in this book; accompanied me on numerous

research escapades, from suburban monster malls to Indonesia's export factory zones; and edited the

manuscript with centurion attention at multiple stages. For the sake of No Logo he allowed our lives to be

totally branded by this book, giving me the great freedom and luxury to be fully consumed.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

INTRODUCTION

NO SPACE

ONE New Branded World

TWO The Brand Expands:

How the Logo Grabbed Centre Stage

THREE Alt.Everything:

The Youth Market and the Marketing of Cool

FOUR The Branding of Learning:

Ads in Schools and Universities

FIVE Patriarchy Gets Funky:

The Triumph of Identity Marketing

----

NO CHOICE

SIX Brand Bombing:

Franchises in the Age of the Superbrand

SEVEN Mergers and Synergy:

The Creation of Commercial Utopias

EIGHT Corporate Censorship:

Barricading the Branded Vil age


----

NO JOBS

NINE The Discarded Factory:

Degraded Production in the Age of the Superbrand

TEN Threats and Temps:

From Working for Nothing to "Free Agent Nation"

ELEVEN Breeding Disloyalty:

What Goes Around, Comes Around

----

NO LOGO

TWELVE Culture Jamming:

Ads Under Attack

THIRTEEN Reclaim the Streets

FOURTEEN Bad Mood Rising:

The New Anticorporate Activism

FIFTEEN The Brand Boomerang:

The Tactics of Brand-Based Campaigns

SIXTEEN A Tale of Three Logos:

The Swoosh, the Shell and the Arches

SEVENTEEN Local Foreign Policy:

Students and Communities Join the Fray

EIGHTEEN Beyond the Brand:

The Limits of Brand-Based Politics

CONCLUSION Consumerism Versus Citizenship:

The Fight for the Global Commons

READING LIST

INTRODUCTION

A WEB OF BRANDS


If I squint, tilt my head, and shut my left eye, all I can see out the window is 1932, straight down to the lake.

Brown warehouses, oatmeal-colored smokestacks, faded signs painted on brick walls advertising longdiscontinued

brands: "Lovely," "Gaywear." This is the old industrial Toronto of garment factories, furriers

and wholesale wedding dresses. So far, no one has come up with a way to make a profit out of taking a

wrecking ball to these boxes of brick, and in this little eight- or nine-block radius, the modern city has been

layered haphazardly on top of the old.

I wrote this book while living in Toronto's ghost of a garment district in a ten-story warehouse. Many other

buildings like it have long since been boarded up, glass panes shattered, smokestacks holding their breath;

their only remaining capitalist function is to hoist large blinking bil boards on their tar-coated roofs,

reminding the gridlocked drivers on the lakeshore expressway of the existence of Molson's beer, Hyundai

cars and EZ Rock FM.

In the twenties and thirties, Russian and Polish immigrants darted back and forth on these streets, ducking

into delis to argue about Trotsky and the leadership of the International Ladies'

Garment Workers' Union.

These days, old Portuguese men stil push racks of dresses and coats down the sidewalk, and next door you

can stil buy a rhinestone bridal tiara if the need for such an item happens to arise (a Halloween costume, or


perhaps a school play...). The real action, however, is down the block amid the stacks of edible jewellery at

Sugar Mountain, the retro candy Mecca, open until 2 a.m. to service the late-night ironic cravings of the club

kids. And a store downstairs continues to do a modest trade in bald naked mannequins, though more often

than not it's rented out as the surreal set for a film school project or the tragically hip backdrop of a

television interview.

The layering of decades on Spadina Avenue, like so many urban neighbourhoods in a similar state of postindustrial

limbo, has a wonderful accidental charm to it. The lofts and studios are full of people who know

they are playing their part in a piece of urban performance art, but for the most part, they do their best not to

draw attention to that fact. If anyone claims too much ownership over "the real Spadina," then everyone else

starts feeling like a two-bit prop, and the whole edifice crumbles.

Which is why it was so unfortunate that City Hall saw fit to commission a series of public art installations to

“celebrate” the history of Spadina Avenue? First came the steel figures perched atop the lampposts: women

hunched over sewing machines and crowds of striking workers waving placards with indecipherable slogans.

Then the worst happened: the giant brass thimble arrived - right at the corner of my block. There it was:

eleven and a half feet high and eleven feet across. Two giant pastel buttons were plopped on the sidewalk


next to it, with wimpy little saplings growing out of the holes. Thank goodness Emma Goldman, the famed

anarchist and labour organizer who lived on this street in the late 1930s, wasn't around to witness the

transformation of the garment workers' struggle into sweatshop kitsch.

The thimble is only the most overt manifestation of a painful new self-consciousness on the grid. Al around

me, the old factory buildings are being rezoned and converted into "loft-living"

complexes with names like

"The Candy Factory." The hand-me-downs of industrialization have already been mined for witty fashion

ideas - discarded factory workers' uniforms, Diesel's Labour brand jeans and Caterpil ar boots. So of course

there is also a booming market for condos in second-hand sweatshops, luxuriously reno-ed, with soaking

tubs, slate-lined showers, underground parking, sky lit gymnasiums and twenty-four-hour concierges.

So far my landlord, who made his fortune manufacturing and selling London Fog overcoats, has stubbornly

refused to sell off our building as condominiums with exceptionally high ceilings.

He'l relent eventually, but

for now he stil has a handful of garment tenants left, whose businesses are too small to move to Asia or

Central America and who for whatever reason are unwil ing to follow the industry trend toward home

workers paid by the piece. The rest of the building is rented out to yoga instructors, documentary film

producers, graphic designers and writers and artists with live/work spaces. The shmata guys stil selling


coats in the office next door look terribly dismayed when they see the Marilyn Manson clones stomping

down the hall in chains and thigh-high leather boots to the communal washroom, clutching tubes of

toothpaste, but what can they do? We are al stuck together here for now, caught between the harsh realities

of economic globalization and the all-enduring rock-video aesthetic.

JAKARTA —"Ask her what she makes-what it says on the label. You know-label?"

I said, reaching behind

my head and twisting up the collar of my shirt. By now these Indonesian workers were used to people like

me: foreigners who come to talk to them about the abysmal conditions in the factories where they cut, sew

and glue for multinational companies like Nike, the Gap and Liz Claiborne. But these seamstresses looked

nothing like the elderly garment workers I meet in the elevator back home. Here they were all young, some

of them as young as fifteen; only a few were over twenty-one.

On this particular day in August 1997, the abysmal conditions in question had led to a strike at the Kaho

Indah Citra garment factory on the outskirts of Jakarta in the Kawasan Berikat IMusantar industrial zone.

The issue for the Kaho workers, who earn the equivalent of US$2 per day, was that they were being forced

to work long hours of overtime but weren't being paid at the legal rate for their trouble. After a three-day

walkout, management offered a compromise typical of a region with a markedly relaxed relationship to


labour legislation: overtime would no longer be compulsory but the compensation would remain il egally low.

The 2,000 workers returned to their sewing machines; all except 101 young women who-management

decided—were the troublemakers behind the strike. "Until now our case is stil not settled," one of these

workers told me, bursting with frustration and with no recourse in sight.

I was sympathetic, of course, but, being the Western foreigner, I wanted to know what brand of garments

they produced at the Kaho factory - if I was to bring their story home, I would have to have my journalistic

hook. So here we were, ten of us, crowded into a concrete bunker only slightly bigger than a telephone

booth, playing an enthusiastic round of labour charades.

"This company produces long sleeves for cold seasons," one worker offered.

I guessed: "Sweaters?"

"I think not sweaters. If you prepare to go out and you have a cold season you have a..."

I got it: "Coat!"

"But not heavy. Light."

"Jackets!"

"Yes, like jackets, but not jackets-long."

You can understand the confusion: there isn't much need for overcoats on the equator, not in the closet and

not in the vocabulary. And yet increasingly, Canadians get through their cold winters not with clothing

manufactured by the tenacious seamstresses stil on Spadina Avenue but by young Asian women working in


hot climates like this one. In 1997, Canada imported $11.7 mil ion of anoraks and ski jackets from

Indonesia, up from $4.7 mil ion in 1993.' That much I knew already. But I stil didn't know what brand of long

coats the Kaho workers sewed before they lost their jobs.

"Long, yes. And what's on the label?" I asked again.

There was a bit of hushed consultation, and then, finally, an answer: "London Fog."

A global coincidence, I suppose. I started to tell the Kaho workers that my apartment in Toronto used to be a

London Fog coat factory but stopped abruptly when it became clear from their facial expressions that the

idea of anyone choosing to live in a garment building was nothing but alarming. In this part of the world,

hundreds of workers every year burn to death because their dormitories are located upstairs from firetrap

sweatshops.

Sitting cross-legged on the concrete floor of the tiny dorm room, I thought of my neighbours back home: the

Ashtanga yoga instructor on two, the commercial animators on four and the aromatherapy candle

distributors on eight. It seems the young women in the export processing zone are our roommates of sorts,

connected, as is so often the case, by a web of fabrics, shoelaces, franchises, teddy bears and brand names

wrapped around the planet. Another logo we had in common was Esprit, also one of the brands

manufactured in the zone. As a teenager I worked as a clerk in a store that sold Esprit clothes.


And of course, McDonald's: an outlet had just opened near Kaho, frustrating workers, because this so-called

bargain food was squarely out of their price range.

Usually, reports about this global web of logos and products are couched in the euphoric marketing rhetoric

of the global vil age, an incredible place where tribes people in remotest rain forests tap away on laptop

computers, Sicilian grandmothers conduct E-business, and "global teens" share, to borrow a phrase from a

Levi's Web site, "a world-wide style culture." Everyone from Coke to McDonald's to Motorola has tailored

their marketing strategy around this post-national vision, but it is IBM's long-running "Solutions for a Small

Planet" campaign that most eloquently captures the equalizing promise of the logo-linked globe.

It hasn't taken long for the excitement inspired by these manic renditions of globalization to wear thin,

revealing the cracks and fissures beneath its high-gloss facade. More and more over the past four years, we

in the West have been catching glimpses of another kind of global vil age, where the economic divide is

widening and cultural choices narrowing.

This is a vil age where some multinationals, far from levelling the global playing field with jobs and

technology for all, are in the process of mining the planet's poorest back country for unimaginable profits.

This is the vil age where Bil Gates lives, amassing a fortune of $55 bil ion while a third of his workforce is


classified as temporary workers, and where competitors are either incorporated into the Microsoft monolith

or made obsolete by the latest feat in software bundling. This is the vil age where we are indeed connected

to one another through a web of brands, but the underside of that web reveals designer slums like the one I

visited outside Jakarta. IBM claims that its technology spans the globe, and so it does, but often its

international presence takes the form of cheap Third World labour producing the computer chips and power

sources that drive our machines. On the outskirts of Manila, for instance, I met a seventeen-year-old girl

who assembles CD-ROM drives for IBM. I told her I was impressed that someone so young could do such

high-tech work. "We make computers," she told me, "but we don't know how to operate computers." Ours, it

would seem, is not such a small planet after al .

It would be naive to believe that Western consumers haven't profited from these global divisions since the

earliest days of colonialism. The Third World, as they say, has always existed for the comfort of the First.

What is a relatively new development, however, is the amount of investigative interest there seems to be in

the unbranded points of origin of brand-name goods. The travels of Nike sneakers have been traced back to

the abusive sweatshops of Vietnam, Barbie's little outfits back to the child labourers of Sumatra, Starbucks'

lattes to the sun-scorched coffee fields of Guatemala, and Shell's oil back to the polluted and impoverished


vil ages of the Niger Delta.

The title No Logo is not meant to be read as a literal slogan (as in No More Logos!), or a post-logo logo

(there is already a No Logo clothing line, or so I'm told). Rather, it is an attempt to capture an Anticorporate

attitude I see emerging among many young activists. This book is hinged on a simple hypothesis: that as

more people discover the brand-name secrets of the global logo web, their outrage wil fuel the next big

political movement, a vast wave of opposition squarely targeting transnational corporations, particularly

those with very high name-brand recognition.

I must stress, however, that this is not a book of predictions, but of firsthand observation. It is an

examination of a largely underground system of information, protest and planning, a system already

coursing with activity and ideas crossing many national borders and several generations.

Four years ago, when I started to write this book, my hypothesis was mostly based on a hunch. I had been

doing some research on university campuses and had begun to notice that many of the students I was

meeting were preoccupied with the inroads private corporations were making into their public schools. They

were angry that ads were creeping into cafeterias, common rooms, even washrooms; that their schools were

diving into exclusive distribution deals with soft-drink companies and computer manufacturers, and that

academic studies were starting to look more and more like market research.


They worried that their education was suffering, as institutional priority shifted to those programs most

conducive to private-sector partnership. They also had serious ethical concerns about the practices of some

of the corporations that their schools were becoming entangled with — not so much their

On-campus activities, but their practices far away, in countries like Burma, Indonesia and Nigeria.

It had only been a few years since I left university myself, so I knew this was a rather sudden change in

political focus; five years earlier, campus politics was al about issues of discrimination and identity — race,

gender and sexuality, "the political correctness wars." Now they were broadening out to include corporate

power, labour rights, and a fairly developed analysis of the workings of the global economy. It's true that

these students do not make up the majority of their demographic group — in fact; this movement is coming,

as all such movements do, from a minority, but it is an increasingly powerful minority. Simply put,

anticorporatism is the brand of politics capturing the imagination of the next generation of troublemakers

and shit-disturbers, and we need only look to the student radicals of the 1960s and the ID warriors of the

eighties and nineties to see the transformative impact such a shift can have.

At around the same time, in my reporting for magazines and newspapers, I also started noticing similar

ideas at the centre of a wave of recent social and environmental campaigns. Like the campus activists I was


meeting, the people leading these campaigns were focused on the effects of aggressive corporate

sponsorships and retailing on public space and cultural life, both globally and locally. There were small-town

wars being waged all over North America to keep out the "big-box" retailers like Wal-Mart. There was the

McLibel Trial in London, a case of two British environmentalists who turned a libel suit McDonald's launched

against them into a global cyber platform that put the ubiquitous food franchise on trial. There was an

explosion of protest and activity targeting Shell Oil after the shocking hanging of Nigerian author and anti-Shell activist Ken Saro-Wiwa.

There was also the morning when I woke up and every bil board on my street had been "jammed" with

anticorporate slogans by midnight bandits. And the fact that the squeegee kids who slept in the lobby of my

building all seemed to be wearing homemade patches on their clothing with a Nike

"swoosh" logo and the

word "Riot."

There was a common element shared by all these scattered issues and campaigns: in each case, the focus

of the attack was a brand-name corporation —

Nike, Shell, Wal-Mart, McDonald's (and others: Microsoft, Disney, Starbucks, Monsanto and so on). Before I

began writing this book, I didn't know if these pockets of anticorporate resistance had anything in common

besides their name-brand focus, but I wanted to find out. This personal quest has taken me to a London


courtroom for the handing down of the verdict in the McLibel Trial; to Ken Saro-Wiwa's friends and family;

to anti-sweatshop protests outside Nike Towns in New York and San Francisco; and to union meetings in the

food courts of glitzy malls. It took me on the road with an "alternative" bil board salesman and on the prowl

with "adbusters" out to "jam" the meaning of those bil boards with their own messages. And it brought me,

too, to several impromptu street parties whose organizers are determined to briefly liberate public space

from its captivity by ads, cars and cops. It took me to clandestine encounters with computer hackers

threatening to cripple the systems of American corporations found to be violating human rights in China.

Most memorably, it led me to factories and union squats in Southeast Asia, and to the outskirts of Manila

where Filipino workers are making labour history by bringing the first unions to the export processing zones

that produce the most recognizable brand-name consumer items on the planet.

Over the course of this journey, I came across an American student group that focuses on multinationals in



Burma, pressuring them to pull out because of the regime's violations of human rights. In their

communiqués, the student activists identify themselves as "Spiders" and the image strikes me as a fitting

one for this Web-age global activism. Logos, by the force of ubiquity, have become the closest thing we

have to an international language, recognized and understood in many more places than English. Activists


are now free to swing off this web of logos like spy/spiders — trading information about labour practices,

chemical spil s, animal cruelty and unethical marketing around the world.

I have become convinced that it is in these logo-forged global links that global citizens wil eventually find

sustainable solutions for this sold planet. I don't claim that this book wil articulate the full agenda of a global

movement that is stil in its infancy. My concern has been to track the early stages of resistance and to ask

some basic questions. What conditions have set the stage for this backlash?

Successful multinational

corporations are increasingly finding themselves under attack, whether it's a cream pie in Bil Gates's face

or the incessant parodying of the Nike swoosh-what are the forces pushing more and more people to

become suspicious of or even downright enraged at multinational corporations, the very engines of our

global growth? Perhaps more pertinently, what is liberating so many people -

particularly young people —to

act on that rage and suspicion?

These questions may seem obvious, and certainly some obvious answers are kicking around. That

corporations have grown so big they have superseded government. That unlike governments, they are

accountable only to their shareholders; that we lack the mechanisms to make them answer to a broader

public. There have been several exhaustive books chronicling the ascendancy of what has come to be


called "corporate rule," many of which have proved invaluable to my own understanding of global

economics (see Reading List, page 479).

This book is not, however, another account of the power of the select group of corporate Goliaths that have

gathered to form our de facto global government. Rather, the book is an attempt to analyze and document

the forces opposing corporate rule, and to lay out the particular set of cultural and economic conditions that

made the emergence of that opposition inevitable. Part 1, "No Space," examines the surrender of culture

and education to marketing. Part 11, "No Choice," reports on how the promise of a vastly increased array of

cultural choice was betrayed by the forces of mergers, predatory franchising, synergy and corporate

censorship. And Part 111, "No Jobs," examines the labour market trends that are creating increasingly

tenuous relationships to employment for many workers, including self-employment, McJobs and

outsourcing, as well as part-time and temp labour. It is the collision of and the interplay among these forces,

the assault on the three social pil ars of employment, civil liberties and civic space, that is giving rise to the

Anticorporate activism chronicled in the last section of the book, Part IV, "No Logo," an activism that is

sowing the seeds of a genuine alternative to corporate rule.

NO SPACE

[IMAGE]


Two faces of branded comfort. Top: Aunt Jemima from Quaker Oats' early packaging, humanizes

production for a population fearful of industrialization. Bottom: Martha Stewart, one of the new breed of

branded humans.

CHAPTER ONE

NEW BRANDED WORLD

As a private person, I have a passion for landscape, and I have never seen one improved by a bil board.

Where every prospect pleases, man is at his vilest when he erects a bil board.

When I retire from Madison

Avenue, I am going to start a secret society of masked vigilantes who wil travel around the world on silent

motor bicycles, chopping down posters at the dark of the moon. How many juries wil convict us when we

are caught in these acts of beneficent citizenship?

— David Ogilvy, founder of the Ogilvy Mather advertising agency, in Confessions of an Advertising Man,

1963

The astronomical growth in the wealth and cultural influence of multinational corporations over the last

fifteen years can arguably be traced back to a single, seemingly innocuous idea developed by management

theorists in the mid-1980s: that successful corporations must primarily produce brands, as opposed to

products.

Until that time, although it was understood in the corporate world that bolstering one's brand name was


important, the primary concern of every solid manufacturer was the production of goods. This idea was the

very gospel of the machine age. An editorial that appeared in Fortune magazine in 1938, for instance,

argued that the reason the American economy had yet to recover from the Depression was that America

had lost sight of the importance of making things:

This is the proposition that the basic and irreversible function of an industrial economy is the making of

things; that the more things it makes the

bigger wil be the income, whether dollar or real; and hence that the key to those lost recuperative powers

lies... in the factory where the lathes and the dril s and the fires and the hammers are. It is in the factory and

on the land and under the land that purchasing power originates [italics theirs].

And for the longest time, the making of things remained, at least in principle, the heart of all industrialized

economies. But by the eighties, pushed along by that decade's recession, some of the most powerful

manufacturers in the world had begun to falter. A consensus emerged that corporations were bloated,

oversized; they owned too much, employed too many people, and were wired down with too many things.

The very process of producing-running one's own factories, being responsible for tens of thousands of fulltime,

permanent employees —began to look less like the route to success and more like a clunky liability.

At around this same time a new kind of corporation began to rival the traditional all-American manufacturers


for market share; these were the Mikes and Microsoft’s, and later, the Tommy Hilfiger’s and Intel’s. These

pioneers made the bold claim that producing goods was only an incidental part of their operations, and that

thanks to recent victories in trade liberalization and labour-law reform; they were able to have their products

made for them by contractors, many of them overseas. What these companies produced primarily were not

things, they said, but images of their brands. Their real work lay not in manufacturing but in marketing. This

formula, needless to say, has proved enormously profitable, and its success has companies competing in a

race toward weightlessness: whoever owns the least has the fewest employees on the payroll and produces

the most powerful images, as opposed to products, wins the race.

And so the wave of mergers in the corporate world over the last few years is a deceptive phenomenon: it

only looks as if the giants, by joining forces, are getting bigger and bigger. The true key to understanding

these shifts is to realize that in several crucial ways - not their profits, of course -

these merged companies

are actually shrinking. Their apparent bigness is simply the most effective route toward their real goal:

divestment of the world of things.

Since many of today's best-known manufacturers no longer produce products and advertise them, but rather

buy products and "brand" them, these companies are forever on the prowl for creative new ways to build


and strengthen their brand images. Manufacturing products may require dril s, furnaces, hammers and the

like, but creating a brand calls for a completely different set of tools and materials.

It requires an endless

parade of brand extensions, continuously renewed imagery for marketing and, most of all, fresh new spaces

to disseminate the brand's idea of itself. In this section of the book, I'l look at how, in ways both insidious

and overt, this corporate obsession with brand identity is waging a war on public and individual space: on

public institutions such as schools, on youthful identities, on the concept of nationality and on the

possibilities for unmarketed space.

The Beginning of the Brand

It's helpful to go back briefly and look at where the idea of branding first began.

Though the words are often

used interchangeably, branding and advertising is not the same process.

Advertising any given product is

only one part of branding's grand plan, as are sponsorship and logo licensing.

Think of the brand as the core

meaning of the modern corporation, and of the advertisement as one vehicle used to convey that meaning

to the world.

The first mass-marketing campaigns, starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, had more to do

with advertising than with branding as we understand it today. Faced with a range of recently invented

products — the radio, phonograph, car, light bulb and so on - advertisers had more pressing tasks than


creating a brand identity for any given corporation; first, they had to change the way people lived their lives.

Ads had to inform consumers about the existence of some new invention, then convince them that their

lives would be better if they used, for example, cars instead of wagons, telephones instead of mail and

electric light instead of oil lamps. Many of these new products bore brand names

—some of which are stil

around today —but these were almost incidental. These products were themselves news; that was almost

advertisement enough.

The first brand-based products appeared at around the same time as the invention-based ads, largely

because of another relatively recent innovation:

The factory. When goods began to be produced in factories, not only were entirely new products being

introduced but old products — even basic staples -were appearing in strikingly new forms. What made early

branding efforts different from more straightforward salesmanship was that the market was now being

flooded with uniform mass-produced products that were virtually indistinguishable from one another.

Competitive branding became a necessity of the machine age — within a context of manufactured

sameness; image-based difference had to be manufactured along with the product.

So the role of advertising changed from delivering product news bulletins to building an image around a


particular brand-name version of a product. The first task of branding was to bestow proper names on

generic goods such as sugar, flour, soap and cereal, which had previously been scooped out of barrels by

local shopkeepers. In the 1880s, corporate logos were introduced to mass-produced products like

Campbell's Soup, HJ. Heinz pickles and Quaker Oats cereal. As design historians and theorists El en

Lupton and J. Abbott Mil er note, logos were tailored to evoke familiarity and folksiness (see Aunt Jemima,

page 2), in an effort to counteract the new and unsettling anonymity of packaged goods. "Familiar

personalities such as Dr. Brown, Uncle Ben, Aunt Jemima, and Old Grand-Dad came to replace the

shopkeeper, who was traditionally responsible for measuring bulk foods for customers and acting as an

advocate for products... a nationwide vocabulary of brand names replaced the small local shopkeeper as

the interface between consumer and product." After the product names and characters had been

established, advertising gave them a venue to speak directly to would-be consumers. The corporate

"personality," uniquely named, packaged and advertised, had arrived.

For the most part, the ad campaigns at the end of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth used

a set of rigid, pseudoscientific formulas: rivals were never mentioned, ad copy used declarative statements

only and headlines had to be large, with lots of white space - according to one turn-of-the-century adman,


"an advertisement should be big enough to make an impression but not any bigger than the thing

advertised."

But there were those in the industry who understood that advertising wasn't just scientific; it was also

spiritual. Brands could conjure a feeling —

think of Aunt Jemima's comforting presence —but not only that, entire corporations could themselves

embody a meaning of their own. In the early twenties, legendary adman Bruce Barton turned General

Motors into a metaphor for the American family, "something personal, warm and human," while GE was not

so much the name of the faceless General Electric Company as, in Barton's words, "the initials of a friend."

In 1923 Barton said that the role of advertising was to help corporations find their soul. The son of a

preacher, he drew on his religious upbringing for uplifting messages: "I like to think of advertising as

something big, something splendid, something which goes deep down into an institution and gets hold of the

soul of it.... Institutions have souls, just as men and nations have souls," he told GM president Pierre du

Pont. General Motors ads began to tell stories about the people who drove its cars

— the preacher, the

pharmacist or the country doctor who, thanks to his trusty GM, arrived "at the bedside of a dying child" just

in time "to bring it back to life."

By the end of the 1940s, there was a burgeoning awareness that a brand wasn't just a mascot or a


catchphrase or a picture printed on the label of a company's product; the company as a whole could have a

brand identity or a "corporate consciousness," as this ephemeral quality was termed at the time. As this idea

evolved, the adman ceased to see himself as a pitchman and instead saw himself as "the philosopher-king

of commercial culture," in the words of ad critic Randall Rothberg. The search for the true meaning of

brands - or the "brand essence," as it is often called - gradually took the agencies away from individual

products and their attributes and toward a psychological/anthropological examination of what brands mean

to the culture and to people's lives. This was seen to be of crucial importance, since corporations may

manufacture products, but what consumers buy are brands.

It took several decades for the manufacturing world to adjust to this shift. It clung to the idea that its core

business was stil production and that branding was an important add-on. Then came the brand equity

mania of the eighties, the defining moment of which arrived in 1988 when Philip Morris purchased Kraft for

$12.6 bil ion-six times what the company was worth on paper. The price difference, apparently, was the cost

of the word "Kraft." Of course Wall Street was aware that decades of marketing and brand bolstering added

value to a company over and above its assets and total annual sales. But with the Kraft purchase, a huge

dollar value had been assigned to something that had previously been abstract and unquantifiable -a brand


name. This was spectacular news for the ad world, which was now able to make the claim that advertising

spending was more than just a sales strategy: it was an investment in cold hard equity. The more you

spend, the more your company is worth. Not surprisingly, this led to a considerable increase in spending on

advertising. More important, it sparked a renewed interest in puffing up brand identities, a project that

involved far more than a few bil boards and TV spots. It was about pushing the envelope in sponsorship

deals, dreaming up new areas in which to "extend" the brand, as well as perpetually probing the Zeitgeist to

ensure that the "essence" selected for one's brand would resonate karmically with its target market. For

reasons that wil be explored in the rest of this chapter, this radical shift in corporate philosophy has sent

manufacturers on a cultural feeding frenzy as they seize upon every corner of unmarketed landscape in

search of the oxygen needed to inflate their brands. In the process, virtually nothing has been left unbranded.

That's quite an impressive feat, considering that as recently as 1993 Wall Street had pronounced

the brand dead, or as good as dead.

The Brand's Death (Rumours of Which Had Been Greatly Exaggerated) The evolution of the brand had one scary episode when it seemed to face extinction. To understand this

brush with death, we must first come to terms with advertising's own special law of gravity, which holds that

if you aren't rocketing upward you wil soon come crashing down.


The marketing world is always reaching a new zenith, breaking through last year's world record and planning

to do it again next year with increasing numbers of ads and aggressive new formulae for reaching

consumers. The advertising industry's astronomical rate of growth is neatly reflected in year-to-year figures

measuring total ad spending in the U.S., which have gone up so steadily that by 1998 the figure was set to

reach $196.5 bil ion, while global ad spending is estimated at $435 bil ion.

According to the 1998 United

Nations Human Development Report, the growth in global ad spending "now outpaces the growth of the

world economy by one-third."

This pattern is a by-product of the firmly held belief that brands need continuous and constantly increasing

advertising in order to stay in the same place. According to this law of diminishing returns, the more

advertising there is out there (and there always is more, because of this law), the more aggressively brands

must market to stand out. And of course, no one is more keenly aware of advertising's ubiquity than the

advertisers themselves, who view commercial inundation as a clear and persuasive call for more-and more

intrusive-advertising. With so much competition, the agencies argue, clients must spend more than ever to

make sure their pitch screeches so loud it can be heard over al the others. David Lubars, a senior ad

executive in the Omnicom Group, explains the industry's guiding principle with more candour than most.


Consumers, he says, "are like roaches —you spray them and spray them and they get immune after a

while."

So, if consumers are like roaches, then marketers must forever be dreaming up new concoctions for

industrial-strength Raid. And nineties marketers, being on a more advanced rung of the sponsorship spiral,

have dutifully come up with clever and intrusive new selling techniques to do just that. Recent highlights

include these innovations: Gordon's gin experimented with fil ing British movie theatres with the scent of

juniper berries; Calvin Klein stuck "CK Be" perfume strips on the backs of Ticketmaster concert envelopes;

and in some Scandinavian countries you can get "free" long-distance calls with ads cutting into your

telephone conversations. And there's plenty more, stretching across ever more expansive surfaces and

cramming into the smallest of crevices: sticker ads on pieces of fruit promoting ABC sitcoms, Levi's ads in

public washrooms, corporate logos on boxes of Girl Guide cookies, ads for pop albums on takeout food

containers, and ads for Batman movies projected on sidewalks or into the night sky. There are already ads

on benches in national parks as well as on library cards in public libraries, and in December 1998 NASA

announced plans to solicit ads on its space stations. Pepsi's ongoing threat to project its logo onto the

moon's surface hasn't yet materialized, but Mattel did paint an entire street in Salford, England, "a


shriekingly bright bubblegum hue" of pink-houses, porches, trees, road, sidewalk, dogs and cars were all

accessories in the televised celebrations of Barbie Pink Month. Barbie is but one small part of the ballooning

$30 bil ion "experiential communication" industry, the phrase now used to encompass the staging of such

branded pieces of corporate performance art and other "happenings." That we live a sponsored life is now a

truism and it's a pretty safe bet that as spending on advertising continues to rise, we roaches wil be treated

to even more of these ingenious gimmicks, making it ever more difficult and more seemingly pointless to

muster even an ounce of outrage.

But as mentioned earlier, there was a time when the new frontiers facing the advertising industry weren't

looking quite so promising. On April 2, 1993, advertising itself was called into question by the very brands

the industry had been building, in some cases, for over two centuries. That day is known in marketing circles

as "Marlboro Friday," and it refers to a sudden announcement from Philip Morris that it would slash the price

of Marlboro cigarettes by 20 percent in an attempt to compete with bargain brands that were eating into its

market. The pundits went nuts, announcing in frenzied unison that not only was Marlboro dead, al brand

names were dead. The reasoning was that if a "prestige" brand like Marlboro, whose image had been

carefully groomed, preened and enhanced with more than a bil ion advertising dollars, was desperate


enough to compete with no-names, then clearly the whole concept of branding had lost its currency. The

public had seen the advertising, and the public didn't care. The Marlboro Man, after all, was not any old

campaign; launched in 1954, it was the longest-running ad campaign in history. It was a legend. If the

Marlboro Man had crashed, well, then, brand equity had crashed as well. The implication that Americans

were suddenly thinking for themselves en masse reverberated through Wall Street. The same day Philip

Morris announced its price cut, stock prices nose-dived for all the household brands: Heinz, Quaker Oats,

Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Procter and Gamble and RJR Nabisco. Philip Morris's own stock took the worst

beating. Bob Stanojev, national director of consumer products marketing for Ernst and Young, explained the

logic behind Wall Street's panic: "If one or two powerhouse consumer products companies start to cut prices

for good, there's going to be an avalanche. Welcome to the value generation."

Yes, it was one of those moments of overstated instant consensus, but it was not entirely without cause.

Marlboro had always sold itself on the strength of its iconic image marketing, not on anything as prosaic as

its price. As we now know, the Marlboro Man survived the price wars without sustaining too much damage.

At the time, however, Wall Street saw Philip Morris's decision as symbolic of a sea change. The price cut

was an admission that Marlboro's name was no longer sufficient to sustain the flagship position, which in a


context where image is equity meant that Marlboro had blinked. And when Marlboro-one of the

quintessential global brands -blinks, it raises questions about branding that reach beyond Wall Street, and

way beyond Philip Morris.

The panic of Marlboro Friday was not a reaction to a single incident. Rather, it was the culmination of years

of escalating anxiety in the face of some rather dramatic shifts in consumer habits that were seen to be

eroding the market share of household-name brands, from Tide to Kraft. Bargain-conscious shoppers, hit

hard by the recession, were starting to pay more attention to price than to the prestige bestowed on their

products by the yuppie ad campaigns of the 1980s. The public was suffering from a bad case of what is

known in the industry as "brand blindness."

Study after study showed that baby boomers, blind to the alluring images of advertising and deaf to the

empty promises of celebrity spokespersons, were breaking their lifelong brand loyalties and choosing to

feed their families with private-label brands from the supermarket - claiming, heretically, that they couldn't

tell the difference. From the beginning of the recession to 1993, Loblaw's President's Choice line, Wal-Mart's Great Value and Marks and Spencer's St. Michael prepared foods had nearly doubled their market

share in North America and Europe. The computer market, meanwhile, was flooded by inexpensive clones,


causing IBM to slash its prices and otherwise impale itself. It appeared to be a return to the proverbial

shopkeeper dishing out generic goods from the barrel in a prebranded era.

The bargain craze of the early nineties shook the name brands to their core.

Suddenly it seemed smarter to

put resources into price reductions and other incentives than into fabulously expensive ad campaigns. This

ambivalence began to be reflected in the amounts companies were wil ing to pay for so-called brandenhancing

advertising. Then, in 1991, it happened: overall advertising spending actually went down by 5.5

percent for the top 100 brands. It was the first interruption in the steady increase of U.S. ad expenditures

since a tiny dip of 0.6 percent in 1970, and the largest drop in four decades.

It's not that top corporations weren't flogging their products, it's just that to attract those suddenly fickle

customers, many decided to put their money into promotions such as giveaways, contests, in-store displays

and (like Marlboro) price reductions. In 1983, American brands spent 70 percent of their total marketing

budgets on advertising, and 30 percent on these other forms of promotion. By 1993, the ratio had flipped:

only 25 percent went to ads, with the remaining 75 percent going to promotions.

Predictably, the ad agencies panicked when they saw their prestige clients abandoning them for the bargain

bins and they did what they could to convince big spenders like Procter and Gamble and Philip Morris that

the proper route out of the brand crisis wasn't less brand marketing but more. At the annual meeting of the


U.S. Association of National Advertisers in 1988, Graham H. Phil ips, the U.S.

chairman of Ogilvy Mather,

berated the assembled executives for stooping to participate in "a commodity marketplace" rather than an

image-based one. "I doubt that many of you would welcome a commodity marketplace in which one

competed solely on price, promotion and trade deals, all of which can easily be duplicated by competition,

leading to ever-decreasing profits, decay and eventual bankruptcy." Others spoke of the importance of

maintaining "conceptual value-added," which in effect means adding nothing but marketing. Stooping to

compete on the basis of real value, the agencies ominously warned, would spell not just the death of the

brand, but corporate death as well.

Around the same time as Marlboro Friday, the ad industry felt so under siege that market researcher Jack

Myers published Adbashing: Surviving the Attacks on Advertising, a book-length call to arms against

everyone from supermarket cashiers handing out coupons for canned peas to legislators contemplating a

new tax on ads. "We, as an industry, must recognize that adbashing is a threat to capitalism, to a free press,

to our basic forms of entertainment, and to the future of our children," he wrote.

Despite these fighting

words, most market watchers remained convinced that the heyday of the valueadded brand had come and

gone. The eighties had gone in for brands and hoity-toity designer labels, reasoned David Scotland,


European director of Hiram Walker. The nineties would clearly be all about value.

"A few years ago," he

observed, "it might have been considered smart to wear a shirt with a designer's logo embroidered on the

pocket; frankly, it now seems a bit naff."

And from the other side of the Atlantic, Cincinnati journalist Shelly Reese came to the same conclusion

about our no-name future, writing that "Americans with Calvin Klein splashed across their hip pocket aren't

pushing grocery carts full of Perrier down the aisles anymore. Instead they're sporting togs with labels like

Kmart's Jaclyn Smith and manoeuvring carts full of Kroger Co.'s Big K soda.

Welcome to the private label

decade."

Scotland and Reese, if they remember their bold pronouncements, are probably feeling just a little bit sil y

right now. Their embroidered "pocket" logos sound positively subdued by today's logo maniacal standards,

and sales of name-brand bottled water have been increasing at an annual rate of 9 percent, turning it into a

$3.4 bil ion industry by 1997. From today's logo-quilted perch, it's almost unfathomable that a mere six

years ago, death sentences for the brand seemed not only plausible but self-evident.

So just how did we get from obituaries for Tide to today's battalions of volunteer bil boards for Tommy

Hilfiger, Nike and Calvin Klein? Who slipped the steroids into the brand's comeback?

The Brands Bounce Back


There were some brands that were watching from the sidelines as Wall Street declared the death of the

brand. Funny, they must have thought, we don't feel dead.

Just as the admen had predicted at the beginning of the recession, the companies that exited the downturn

running were the ones who opted for marketing over value every time: Nike, Apple, the Body Shop, Calvin

Klein, Disney, Levi's and Starbucks. Not only were these brands doing just fine, thank you very much, but

the act of branding was becoming a larger and larger focus of their businesses.

For these companies, the

ostensible product was mere fil er for the real production: the brand. They integrated the idea of branding

into the very fabric of their companies. Their corporate cultures were so tight and cloistered that to outsiders

they appeared to be a cross between fraternity house, religious cult and sanatorium. Everything was an ad

for the brand: bizarre lexicons for describing employees (partners, baristas, team players, and crew

members), company chants, superstar CEOs, fanatical attention to design consistency, a propensity for

monument-building and New Age mission statements. Unlike classic household brand names, such as Tide

and Marlboro, these logos weren't losing their currency; they were in the midst of breaking every barrier in

the marketing world —becoming cultural accessories and lifestyle philosophers.



These companies didn't

wear their image like a cheap shirt —their image was so integrated with their business that other people


wore it as their shirt. And when the brands crashed, these companies didn't even notice —they were

branded to the bone.

So the real legacy of Marlboro Friday is that it simultaneously brought the two most significant

developments in nineties marketing and consumerism into sharp focus: the deeply unhip big-box bargain

stores that provide the essentials of life and monopolize a disproportionate share of the market (Wal-Mart ct

al.) and the extra-premium "attitude" brands that provide the essentials of lifestyle and monopolize everexpanding

stretches of cultural space (Nike et al.). The way these two tiers of consumerism developed

would have a profound impact on the economy in the years to come. When overall ad expenditures took a

nosedive in 1991, Nike and Reebok were busy playing advertising chicken, with each company increasing

its budget to outspend the other. In 1991 alone, Reebok upped its ad spending by 71.9 percent, while Nike

pumped an extra 24.6 percent into its already soaring ad budget, bringing the company's total spending on

marketing to a staggering $250 mil ion annually. Far from worrying about competing on price, the sneaker

pimps were designing ever more intricate and pseudoscientific air pockets, and driving up prices by signing

star athletes to colossal sponsorship deals. The fetish strategy seemed to be working fine: in the six years

prior to 1993, Nike had gone from a $750 mil ion company to a $4 bil ion one and Phil Knight's Beaverton,


Oregon, company emerged from the recession with profits 900 percent higher than when it began.

Benetton and Calvin Klein, meanwhile, were also upping their spending on lifestyle marketing, using ads to

associate their lines with risqué art and progressive politics. Clothes barely appeared in these high-concept

advertisements, let alone prices. Even more abstract was Absolut Vodka, which for some years now had

been developing a marketing strategy in which its product disappeared and its brand was nothing but a

blank bottle-shaped space that could be fil ed with whatever content a particular audience most wanted from

its brands: intellectual in Harper's, futuristic in Wired, alternative in Spin, loud and proud in Out and "Absolut

Centrefold" in Playboy. The brand reinvented itself as a cultural sponge, soaking up and morphing to its

surroundings.

Saturn, too, came out of nowhere in October 1990 when GM launched a car built not out of steel and rubber

but out of New Age spirituality and seventies feminism. After the car had been on the market a few years,

the company held a "homecoming" weekend for Saturn owners, during which they could visit the auto plant

and have a cookout with the people who made their cars. As the Saturn ads boasted at the time, "44,000

people spent their vacations with us, at a car plant." It was as if Aunt Jemima had come to life and invited

you over to her house for dinner.


In 1993, the year the Marlboro Man was temporarily hobbled by "brand-blind"

consumers, Microsoft made its

striking debut on Advertising Age's list of the top 200 ad spenders-the very same year that Apple computer

increased its marketing budget by 30 percent after already making branding history with its Orwellian takeoff

ad launch during the 1984 Super Bowl (see image on page 86). Like Saturn, both companies were selling a

hip new relationship to the machine that left Big Blue IBM looking as clunky and menacing as the now-dead

Cold War.

And then there were the companies that had always understood that they were selling brands before

product. Coke, Pepsi, McDonald's, Burger King and Disney weren't fazed by the brand crisis, opting instead

to escalate the brand war, especially since they had their eyes firmly fixed on global expansion. They were

joined in this project by a wave of sophisticated producer/retailers who hit full stride in the late eighties and

early nineties. The Gap, Ikea and the Body Shop were spreading like wildfire during this period, masterfully

transforming the generic into the brand-specific, largely through bold, carefully branded packaging and the

promotion of an "experiential" shopping environment. The Body Shop had been a presence in Britain since

the seventies, but it wasn't until 1988 that it began sprouting like a green weed on every street corner in the

U.S. Even during the darkest years of the recession, the company opened between forty and fifty American


stores a year. Most baffling of all to Wall Street, it pulled off the expansion without spending a dime on

advertising. Who needed bil boards and magazine ads when retail outlets were three-dimensional

advertisements for an ethical and ecological approach to cosmetics? The Body Shop was all brand.

The Starbucks coffee chain, meanwhile, was also expanding during this period without laying out much in

advertising; instead, it was spinning off its name into a wide range of branded projects: Starbucks airline

coffee, office coffee, coffee ice cream, coffee beer. Starbucks seemed to understand brand names at a

level even deeper than Madison Avenue, incorporating marketing into every fibre of its corporate conceptfrom

the chain's strategic association with books, blues and jazz to its Euro-latte lingo.

What the success of

both the Body Shop and Starbucks showed was how far the branding project had come in moving beyond

splashing one's logo on a bil board. Here were two companies that had fostered powerful identities by

making their brand concept into a virus and sending it out into the culture via a variety of channels: cultural

sponsorship, political controversy, the consumer experience and brand extensions. Direct advertising, in this

context, was viewed as a rather clumsy intrusion into a much more organic approach to image building.

Scott Bedbury, Starbucks' vice president of marketing, openly recognized that

"consumers don't truly


believe there's a huge difference between products," which is why brands must

"establish emotional ties"

with their customers through "the Starbucks Experience." The people who line up for Starbucks, writes CEO

Howard Shultz, aren't just there for the coffee. "It's the romance of the coffee experience, the feeling of

warmth and community people get in Starbucks stores."

Interestingly, before moving to Starbucks, Bedbury was head of marketing at Nike, where he oversaw the

launch of the "Just Do It!" slogan, among other watershed branding moments. In the following passage, he

explains the common techniques used to infuse the two very different brands with meaning:

Nike, for example, is leveraging the deep emotional connection that people have with sports and fitness.

With Starbucks, we see how coffee has woven itself into the fabric of people's lives, and that's our

opportunity for emotional leverage.... A great brand raises the bar-it adds a greater sense of purpose to the

experience, whether it's the challenge to do your best in sports and fitness or the affirmation that the cup of

coffee you're drinking really matters.

This was the secret; it seemed, of all the success stories of the late eighties and early nineties. The lesson

of Marlboro Friday was that there never really was a brand crisis - only brands that had crises of confidence.

The brands would be okay, Wall Street concluded, so long as they believed fervently in the principles of


branding and never, ever blinked. Overnight, "Brands, not products!" became the rallying cry for a

marketing renaissance led by a new breed of companies that saw themselves as

"meaning brokers" instead

of product producers. What was changing was the idea of what -in both advertising and branding-was being

sold. The old paradigm had it that all marketing was selling a product. In the new model, however, the

product always takes a back seat to the real product, the brand, and the selling of the brand acquired an

extra component that can only be described as spiritual. Advertising is about hawking product. Branding, in

its truest and most advanced incarnations, is about corporate transcendence.

It may sound flaky, but that's precisely the point. On Marlboro Friday, a line was drawn in the sand between

the lowly price slashers and the high-concept brand builders. The brand builders conquered and a new

consensus was born: the products that wil flourish in the future wil be the ones presented not as

"commodities" but as concepts: the brand as experience, as lifestyle.

Ever since, a select group of corporations has been attempting to free itself from the corporeal world of

commodities, manufacturing and products to exist on another plane. Anyone can manufacture a product,

they reason (and as the success of private-label brands during the recession proved, anyone did). Such

menial tasks, therefore, can and should be farmed out to contractors and subcontractors whose only


concern is fil ing the order on time and under budget (ideally in the Third World, where labour is dirt cheap,

laws are lax and tax breaks come by the bushel). Headquarters, meanwhile, is free to focus on the real

business at hand — creating a corporate mythology powerful enough to infuse meaning into these raw

objects just by signing its name.

The corporate world has always had a deep New Age streak; fed-it has become clear —by a profound need

that could not be met simply by trading widgets for cash. But when branding captured the corporate

imagination, New Age vision quests took centre stage. As Nike CEO Phil Knight explains, "For years we

thought of ourselves as a production-oriented company, meaning we put all our emphasis on designing and

manufacturing the product. But now we understand that the most important thing we do is market the

product. We've come around to saying that Nike is a marketing-oriented company, and the product is our

most important marketing tool." This project has since been taken to an even more advanced level with the

emergence of on-line corporate giants such as Amazon.com. It is on-line that the purest brands are being

built: liberated from the real-world burdens of stores and product manufacturing, these brands are free to

soar, less as the disseminators of goods or services than as collective hallucinations.

Tom Peters, who has long coddled the inner flake in many a hard-nosed CEO, latched on to the branding


craze as the secret to financial success, separating the transcendental logos and the earthbound products

into two distinct categories of companies. "The top half-Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Disney, and so on - are pure

'players' in brainware. The bottom half [Ford and GM] are stil lumpy-object purveyors, though automobiles

are much 'smarter' than they used to be," Peters writes in The Circle of Innovation (1997), an ode to the

power of marketing over production.

When Levi's began to lose market share in the late nineties, the trend was widely attributed to the

company's failure — despite lavish ad spending — to transcend its products and become a free-standing

meaning. "Maybe one of Levi's problems is that it has no Cola," speculated Jennifer Steinhauer in The New

York Times. "It has no denim-toned house paint. Levi makes what is essentially a commodity: blue jeans. Its

ads may evoke rugged out-doorsmanship, but Levi hasn't promoted any particular life style to sell other

products."

In this high-stakes new context, the cutting-edge ad agencies no longer sold companies on individual

campaigns but on their ability to act as "brand stewards": identifying, articulating and protecting the

corporate soul. Not surprisingly, this spelled good news for the U.S. advertising industry, which in 1994 saw

a spending increase of 8.6 percent over the previous year. In one year, the ad industry went from a near


crisis to another "best year yet." And that was only the beginning of triumphs to come. By 1997, corporate

advertising, defined as "ads that position a corporation, its values, its personality and character" were up 18

percent from the year before.

With this wave of brand mania has come a new breed of businessman, one who wil proudly inform you that

Brand X is not a product but a way of life, an attitude, a set of values, a look, an idea. And it sounds really

great - way better than that Brand X is a screwdriver, or a hamburger chain, or a pair of jeans, or even a

very successful line of running shoes. Nike, Phil Knight announced in the late eighties, is "a sports

company"; its mission is not to sell shoes but to "enhance people's lives through sports and fitness" and to

keep "the magic of sports alive." Company president-cum-sneaker-shaman Tom Clark explains that "the

inspiration of sports allows us to rebirth ourselves constantly."

Reports of such "brand vision" epiphanies began surfacing from all corners.

"Polaroid's problem," diagnosed

the chairman of its advertising agency, John Hegarty, "was that they kept thinking of themselves as a

camera. But the '[brand] vision' process taught us something: Polaroid is not a camera-it's a social

lubricant." IBM isn't selling computers, its selling business "solutions." Swatch is not about watches, it is

about the idea of time. At Diesel Jeans, owner Renzo Rosso told Paper magazine,

"We don't sell a product;


we sell a style of life. I think we have created a movement.... The Diesel concept is everything. It's the way

to live, it's the way to wear, it's the way to do something." And as Body Shop founder Anita Roddick

explained to me, her stores aren't about what they sell, they are the conveyers of a grand idea — a political

philosophy about women, the environment and ethical business. "I just use the company that I surprisingly

created as a success — it shouldn't have been like this, it wasn't meant to be like this —to stand on the

products to shout out on these issues," Roddick says.

The famous late graphic designer Tibor Kalman summed up the shifting role of the brand this way: "The

original notion of the brand was quality, but now brand is a stylistic badge of courage."

The idea of selling the courageous message of a brand, as opposed to a product, intoxicated these CEOs,

providing as it did an opportunity for seemingly limitless expansion. After all, if a brand was not a product, it

could be anything! And nobody embraced branding theory with more evangelical zeal than Richard

Branson, whose Virgin Group has branded joint ventures in everything from music to bridal gowns to airlines

to cola to financial services. Branson refers derisively to the "stilted Anglo-Saxon view of consumers," which

holds that a name should be associated with a product like sneakers or soft drinks, and opts instead for "the

Asian 'trick'" of the keiretsus (a Japanese term meaning a network of linked corporations). The idea, he


explains, is to "build brands not around products but around reputation. The great Asian names imply

quality, price and innovation rather than a specific item. I call these 'attribute'

brands: They do not relate

directly to one product — such as a Mars bar or a Coca-Cola — but instead to a set of values."

Tommy Hilfiger, meanwhile, is less in the business of manufacturing clothes than he is in the business of

signing his name. The company is run entirely through licensing agreements, with Hilfiger commissioning all

its products from a group of other companies: Jockey International makes Hilfiger underwear, Pepe Jeans

London makes Hilfiger jeans, Oxford Industries make Tommy shirts, and the Stride Rite Corporation makes

its footwear. What does Tommy Hilfiger manufacture? Nothing at al .

So passé had products become in the age of lifestyle branding that by the late nineties, newer companies

like Lush cosmetics and Old Navy clothing began playing with the idea of old-style commodities as a source

of retro marketing imagery. The Lush chain serves up its face masks and moisturizers out of refrigerated

stainless-steel bowls, spooned into plastic containers with grocery-store labels.

Old Navy showcases its

shrink-wrapped T-shirts and sweatshirts in deli-style chrome refrigerators, as if they were meat or cheese.

When you are a pure, concept-driven brand, the aesthetics of raw product can prove as "authentic" as loft

living.


And lest the branding business be dismissed as the playground of trendy consumer items such as sneakers,

jeans and New Age beverages, think again. Caterpil ar, best known for building tractors and busting unions,

has barrelled into the branding business, launching the Cat accessories line: boots, backpacks, hats and

anything else calling out for a post-industrial je ne sais quoi. Intel Corp., which makes computer parts no

one sees and few understand, transformed its processors into a fetish brand with TV ads featuring line

workers in funky metallic space suits dancing to "Shake Your Groove Thing." The Intel mascots proved so

popular that the company has sold hundreds of thousands of bean-fil ed dolls modelled on the shimmery

dancing technicians. Little wonder, then, that when asked about the company's decision to diversify its

products, the senior vice president for sales and marketing, Paul S. Otellini, replied that Intel is "like Coke.

One brand, many different products."

And if Caterpil ar and Intel can brand, surely anyone can.

There is, in fact, a new strain in marketing theory that holds that even the lowliest natural resources, barely

processed, can develop brand identities, thus giving way to hefty premium-price mark-ups. In an essay

appropriately titled "How to Brand Sand," advertising executives Sam I. Hil , Jack McGrath and Sandeep

Dayal team up to tell the corporate world that with the right marketing plan, nobody has to stay stuck in the


stuff business. "Based on extensive research, we would argue that you can indeed brand not only sand, but

also wheat, beef, brick, metals, concrete, chemicals, corn grits and an endless variety of commodities

traditionally considered immune to the process."

Over the past six years, spooked by the near-death experience of Marlboro Friday, global corporations have

leaped on the brand-wagon with what can only be described as a religious fervour. Never again would the

corporate world stoop to praying at the altar of the commodity market. From now on they would worship only

graven media images. Or to quote Tom Peters, the brand man himself: "Brand!

Brand!! Brand!!! That's the

message... for the late '90s and beyond."

CHAPTER TWO

THE BRAND EXPANDS

How the Logo Grabbed Centre Stage

Since the crocodile is the symbol of Lacoste, we thought they might be interested in sponsoring our

crocodiles.

— Silvino Gomes, commercial director of the Lisbon Zoo, on the institution's creative corporate

sponsorship program, March 1998

I was in Grade 4 when skin-tight designer jeans were the be-all and end-all, and my friends and I spent a lot

of time checking out each other's butt for logos. "Nothing comes between me and my Calvins," Brooke

Shields assured us, and as we lay back on our beds Ophelia-style and yanked up the zippers on our


Jordache jeans with wire hangers, we knew she was telling no word of a lie. At around the same time, Romi,

our schools own pint-sized Farrah Fawcett, used to make her rounds up and down the rows of desks turning

back the collars on our sweaters and polo shirts. It wasn't enough for her to see an alligator or a leaping

horseman —it could have been a knockoff. She wanted to see the label behind the logo. We were only eight

years old but the reign of logo terror had begun.

About nine years later, I had a job folding sweaters at an Esprit clothing store in Montreal. Mothers would

come in with their six-year-old daughters and ask to see only the shirts that said

"Esprit" in the company's

trademark bold block lettering. "She won't wear anything without a name," the moms would confide

apologetically as we chatted by the change rooms. It's no secret that branding has become far more

ubiquitous and intrusive by now. Labels like Baby Gap and Gap Newborn imprint brand awareness on

toddlers and turn babies into mini-bil boards. My friend Monica tells me that her seven-year-old son marks

his homework not with check marks but with little red Nike swooshes.

Until the early seventies, logos on clothes were generally hidden from view, discreetly placed on the inside

of the collar. Small designer emblems did appear on the outside of shirts in the first half of the century, but

such sporty attire was pretty much restricted to the golf courses and tennis courts of the rich. In the late


seventies, when the fashion world rebelled against Aquarian flamboyance, the country-club wear of the

fifties became mass style for newly conservative parents and their preppy kids.

Ralph Lauren's Polo

horseman and Izod Lacoste's alligator escaped from the golf course and scurried into the streets, dragging

the logo decisively onto the outside of the shirt. These logos served the same social function as keeping the

clothing's price tag on: everyone knew precisely what premium the wearer was wil ing to pay for style. By

the mid-eighties, Lacoste and Ralph Lauren were joined by Calvin Klein, Esprit and, in Canada, Roots;

gradually, the logo was transformed from an ostentatious affectation to an active fashion accessory. Most

significantly, the logo itself was growing in size, ballooning from a three-quarter-inch emblem into a chestsized

marquee. This process of logo inflation is stil progressing, and none is more bloated than Tommy

Hilfiger, who has managed to pioneer a clothing style that transforms its faithful adherents into walking,

talking, life-sized Tommy dolls, mummified in fully branded Tommy worlds.

This scaling-up of the logo's role has been so dramatic that it has become a change in substance. Over the

past decade and a half, logos have grown so dominant that they have essentially transformed the clothing

on which they appear into empty carriers for the brands they represent. The metaphorical alligator, in other

words, has risen up and swallowed the literal shirt.


This trajectory mirrors the larger transformation our culture has undergone since Marlboro Friday, sparked

by a stampede of manufacturers looking to replace their cumbersome product-production apparatus with

transcendent brand names and to infuse their brands with deep, meaningful messages. By the mid-nineties,

companies like Nike, Polo and Tommy Hilfiger were ready to take branding to the next level: no longer

simply branding their own products, but branding the outside culture as well—by sponsoring cultural events,

they could go out into the world and claim bits of it as brand-name outposts. For these companies, branding

was not just a matter of adding value to a product. It was about thirstily soaking up cultural ideas and

iconography that their brands could reflect by projecting these ideas and images back on the culture as

"extensions" of their brands. Culture, in other words, would add value to their brands. For example, Onute

Mil er, senior brand manager for Tequila Sauza, explains that her company sponsored a risqué photography

exhibit by George Holz because "art was a natural synergy with our product."

Branding's current state of cultural expansionism is about much more than traditional corporate

sponsorships: the classic arrangement in which a company donates money to an event in exchange for

seeing its logo on a banner or in a program. Rather, this is the Tommy Hilfiger approach of full-frontal

branding, applied now to cityscapes, music, art, films, community events, magazines, sports and schools.


This ambitious project makes the logo the central focus of everything it touches -

not an add-on or a happy

association, but the main attraction.

Advertising and sponsorship have always been about using imagery to equate products with positive cultural

or social experiences. What makes nineties-style branding different is that it increasingly seeks to take

these associations out of the representational realm and make them a lived reality. So the goal is not

merely to have child actors drinking Coke in a TV commercial, but for students to brainstorm concepts for

Coke's next ad campaign in English class. It transcends logo-festooned Roots clothing designed to conjure

memories of summer camp and reaches out to build an actual Roots country lodge that becomes a 3-D

manifestation of the Roots brand concept. Disney transcends its sports network ESP1M, a channel for guys

who like to sit around in sports bars screaming at the TV, and launches a line of ESPN Sports Bars,

complete with giant-screen TVs. The branding process reaches beyond heavily marketed Swatch watches

and launches "Internet time," a new venture for the Swatch Group, which divides the day into one thousand

"Swatch beats." The Swiss company is now attempting to convince the on-line world to abandon the

traditional clock and switch to its time-zone-free, branded time.

The effect, if not always the original intent, of advanced branding is to nudge the hosting culture into the


background and make the brand the star. It is not to sponsor culture but to be the culture. And why shouldn't

it be? If brands are not products but ideas, attitudes, values and experiences, why can't they be culture too?

As we wil see later in the chapter, this project has been so successful that the lines between corporate

sponsors and sponsored culture have entirely disappeared. But this conflation has not been a one-way

process, with passive artists allowing themselves to be shoved into the background by aggressive

multinational corporations. Rather, many artists, media personalities, film directors and sports stars have

been racing to meet the corporations halfway in the branding game. Michael Jordan, Puff Daddy, Martha

Stewart, Austin Powers, Brandy and Star Wars now mirror the corporate structure of corporations like Nike

and the Gap, and they are just as captivated by the prospect of developing and leveraging their own

branding potential as the product-based manufacturers. So what was once a process of selling culture to a

sponsor for a price has been supplanted by the logic of "co-branding" - a fluid partnership between celebrity

people and celebrity brands.

The project of transforming culture into little more than a collection of brandextensions-in-waiting would not

have been possible without the deregulation and privatization policies of the past three decades. In Canada

under Brian Mulroney, in the U.S. under Ronald Reagan and in Britain under Margaret Thatcher (and in


many other parts of the world as well), corporate taxes were dramatically lowered, a move that eroded the

tax base and gradually starved out the public sector. As government spending dwindled, schools, museums

and broadcasters were desperate to make up their budget shortfalls and thus ripe for partnerships with

private corporations. It also didn't hurt that the political climate during this time ensured that there was

almost no vocabulary to speak passionately about the value of a non-commercialized public sphere. This

was the time of the Big Government bogeyman and deficit hysteria, when any political move that was not

overtly designed to increase the freedom of corporations was vilified as an endorsement of national

bankruptcy. It was against this backdrop that, in rapid order, sponsorship went from being a rare occurrence

(in the 1970s) to an exploding growth industry (by the mid-eighties), picking up momentum in 1984 at the

Los Angeles Olympics.

At first, these arrangements seemed win-win: the cultural or educational institution in question received

much-needed funds and the sponsoring corporation was compensated with some modest form of public

acknowledgment and a tax break. And, in fact, many of these new public-private arrangements were just

that simple, successfully retaining a balance between the cultural event or institution's independence and

the sponsor's desire for credit, often helping to foster a revival of arts accessible to the general public.


Successes like these are frequently overlooked by critics of commercialization, among whom there is an

unfortunate tendency to tar all sponsorship with the same brush, as if any contact with a corporate logo

infects the natural integrity of an otherwise pristine public event or cause. Writing in The Commercialization

of American Culture, advertising critic Matthew McAl ister labels corporate sponsorship "control behind a

philanthropic facade." He writes:

While elevating the corporate, sponsorship simultaneously devalues what it sponsors.... The sporting event,

the play, the concert and the public television program become subordinate to promotion because, in the

sponsor's mind and in the symbolism of the event, they exist to promote. It is not Art for Art's Sake as much

as Art for Ad's Sake. In the public's eye, art is yanked from its own separate and theoretically autonomous

domain and squarely placed in the commercial.... Every time the commercial intrudes on the cultural, the

integrity of the public sphere is weakened because of the obvious encroachment of corporate promotion.

This picture of our culture's lost innocence is mostly romantic fiction. Though there have always been artists

who have fought fiercely to protect the integrity of their work, neither the arts, sports nor the media have

ever, even theoretically, been the protected sovereign states that McAl ister imagines. Cultural products are

the all-time favourite playthings of the powerful, tossed from wealthy statesmen such as Gaius Cilnius


Maecenas, who set up the poet Horace in a writing estate in 33 B.C., and from rulers like Francis I and the

Medici family, whose love of the arts bolstered the status of Renaissance painters in the sixteenth century.



Though the degree of meddling varies, our culture was built on compromises between notions of public

good and the personal, political and financial ambitions of the rich and powerful.

Of course there are some forms of corporate sponsorship that are inherently insidious - the tobacco

industry's corralling of the arts springs to mind. But not all sponsorship deals should be so easily dismissed.

Not only are such broad strokes unfair to worthy projects but, perhaps more important, they can prevent us

from seeing changes in the field. If all corporate sponsorship arrangements are regarded as equally

compromised, it becomes easy not to notice when the role of the corporate sponsor begins to expand and

change — which is precisely what has been happening over the past decade as global corporate

sponsorship has ballooned from a $7-bil ion-a-year industry in 1991 to a $19.2

bil ion one in 1999.

When sponsorship took off as a stand-in for public funds in the mid-eighties, many corporations that had

been experimenting with the practice ceased to see sponsorship as a hybrid of philanthropy and image

promotion and began to treat it more purely as a marketing tool, and a highly effective one at that. As its

promotional value grew — and as dependency on sponsorship revenue increased in the cultural industries


— the delicate dynamic between sponsors and the sponsored began to shift, with many corporations

becoming more ambitious in their demands for grander acknowledgments and control, even buying events

outright. Molson and Mil er beer, as we wil see further on in this chapter, are no longer satisfied with having

their logos on banners at rock concerts. Instead, they have pioneered a new kind of sponsored concert in

which the blue-chip stars who perform are entirely upstaged by their hosting brand. And while corporate

sponsorship has long been a mainstay in museums and galleries, when Philip Morris-owned Altoids mints

decided in January 1999 that it wanted to get into the game, it cut out the middleman. Rather than

sponsoring an existing show, the company spent $250,000 to buy works by twenty emerging artists and

launch its own Curiously Strong Collection, a travelling art exhibition that plays on the Altoids marketing

slogan, "Curiously strong mints." Chris Peddy, Altoids brand manager, said, "We decided to take it to the

next level."

These companies are part of a larger phenomenon explained by Lesa Ukman, executive editor of the

International Events Group Sponsorship Report, the industry's bible: "From MasterCard and Dannon to

Phoenix Home Life and LaSalle Bank, companies are buying properties and creating their own events. This

is not because they want to get into the business. It's because proposals sponsors receive don't fit their


requirements or because they've had negative experiences buying into someone else's gig." There is a

certain logic to this progression: first, a select group of manufacturers transcend their connection to their

earthbound products, then, with marketing elevated as the pinnacle of their businesses, they attempt to alter

marketing's social status as a commercial interruption and replace it with seamless integration.

The most insidious effect of this shift is that after a few years of Molson concerts, Pepsi-sponsored papal

visits, Izod zoos and Mike after-school basketball programs, everything from small community events to

large religious gatherings are believed to "need a sponsor" to get off the ground; August 1999, for instance,

saw the first-ever private wedding with corporate sponsorship. This is what Leslie Savan, author of The

Sponsored Life, describes as symptom number one of the sponsored mindset: we become collectively

convinced not that corporations are hitching a ride on our cultural and communal activities, but that

creativity and congregation would be impossible without their generosity.

The Branding of the Cityscape

The expansive trajectory of branding revealed itself to Londoners in a 1997

holiday season morality play. It

began when the Regent Street Association found itself without enough money to replace the dimming

Christmas lights that normally adorned the street during the season. Yves Saint Laurent stepped in and


generously offered to split the cost of new decorations in exchange for seeing its logo up in lights. But when

the time came to hang the Christmas lights, it seemed that the YSL logos were much larger than the

agreed-upon size. Every few steps, shoppers were reminded by il uminated signs 5.5 meters high just who

had brought them Christmas. The logos were eventually replaced with smaller ones, but the lesson

remained: the role of the sponsor, like that of advertising in general, has a tendency to expand.

While yesterday's corporate sponsors may have been satisfied merely propping up community events, the

meaning-seeking brand builders wil never accept this role for long. Branding is, at its core, a deeply

competitive undertaking in which brands are up against not only their immediate rivals (Mike vs. Reebok,

Coke vs. Pepsi, McDonald's vs. Burger King, for example) but all other brands in the mediascape, including

the events and people they are sponsoring. This is perhaps branding's crudest irony: most manufacturers

and retailers begin by seeking out authentic scenes, important causes and cherished public events so that

these things wil infuse their brands with meaning. Such gestures are frequently motivated by genuine

admiration and generosity. Too often, however, the expansive nature of the branding process ends up

causing the event to be usurped, creating the quintessential lose-lose situation.

Mot only do fans begin to


feel a sense of alienation from (if not outright resentment toward) once-cherished cultural events, but the

sponsors lose what they need most: a feeling of authenticity with which to associate their brands.

That's certainly what happened to Michael Chesney, the hip-hop adman who painted Canadian bil boards

into the branding era. He loved Toronto's Queen Street West —the funky clothing stores, the artists on all

the patios, and, most of all, the graffiti art that figured large on the walls in that part of town. For Chesney, it

was a short step from the public's growing interest in the cultural value of graffiti to the commercial takeover

of that pocket of marginal space — a space used and reused by the disenfranchised for political and cultural

expression in every city in the world.

From the start, Chesney considered himself a distant relative of the graffiti kids —

though less a cousin than

a rich uncle. The way he saw it, as a commercial artist and bil board salesman he was also a creature of the

streets, because even if he was painting for corporate clients, he, like the graffiti artists, left his mark on

walls. It was in this context that Chesney pioneered the advertising practice of the

"building takeover." In the

late eighties, Chesney's company Murad began painting directly onto building walls, letting the size of each

structure dictate the dimensions of the ad. The idea harked back to 1920s Coca-Cola murals on corner

grocery stores and to early-industrial urban factories and department stores that painted their names and


logos in giant block lettering on their buildings' facades. The walls Chesney rented to Coke, Warner Brothers

and Calvin Klein were a little bit bigger, however, reaching their pinnacle at a colossal 20,000-square-foot

bil board overlooking one of Toronto's busiest intersections. Gradually, the ads wrapped around the corners

of the buildings so that they covered not just one wall, but all of them: the ad as edifice.

In the summer of 1996, when Levi Strauss chose Toronto to test-market its new SilverTab jeans line,

Chesney put on his most daring show yet: he called it "The Queen Street Takeover." Between 1996 and

1997, Levi's increased its spending on bil board advertisements by a startling 301

percent — and Toronto

saw much of that windfall. For one year, as the centrepiece of the most expensive outdoor ad campaign in

Canadian history, Chesney painted his beloved strip silver. He bought up the facades of almost every

building on the busiest stretch of Queen and turned them into Levi's bil boards, upping the ante of the ad

extravaganza even further with 3-D extensions, mirrors and neon. It was Murad's greatest triumph, but the

takeover presented some problems for Michael Chesney. When I spent a day with him at the tail end of the

SilverTab bonanza, he could barely walk down Queen Street without running into somebody who was

furious about the invasion. After ducking a few bullets, he told me a story of bumping into an acquaintance:


"she said, 'You took over Queen Street.' She was really almost crying and I just, my heart sank, and she

was really bummed out. But, hey, what can you do? It's the future, it's not Queen anymore."

Nearly every major city has seen some variation of the 3-D ad takeover, if not on entire buildings, then on

buses, streetcars or taxis. It is sometimes difficult, however, to express dissatisfaction with this brand

expansion — after all, most of these venues and vehicles have been carrying some form of advertising for

decades. But somewhere along the line, the order flipped. Now buses, streetcars and taxis, with the help of

digital imaging and large pieces of adhesive vinyl, have become ads on wheels, shepherding passengers

around in giant chocolate bars and gum wrappers, just as Hilfiger and Polo turned clothing into wearable

brand bil boards.

If this creeping ad expansion seems a mere matter of semantics when applied to taxis and T-shirts, its

implications are much more serious when looked at in the context of another marketing trend: the branding

of entire neighbourhoods and cities. In March 1999, Los Angeles mayor Richard Riordan unveiled a plan to

revitalize poor inner-city areas, many of them stil scarred from the 1992 riots after the Rodney King verdict:

corporations would adopt a run-down part of town and brand its redevelopment.

For the time being, the

sponsors of Genesis LA, as the project is called - among them Bank-America and Wells Fargo Co. — only


have the option of seeing these sites named after them, much like a sponsored sports arena. But if the

initiative follows the expansive branding trajectory seen elsewhere, the sponsoring companies could well

wield more politically powerful roles in these communities soon.

The idea of a fully privatized, branded town or neighbourhood is not nearly as far-fetched today as it was

only a few years ago, as the inhabitants of Disney's town Celebration, Florida, can attest —and as the

citizens of Cashmere, Washington, have quickly learned. A sleepy town of 2,500

people, Cashmere has as

its major industry the Liberty Orchard candy factory, which has been making Aplets and Collets chewy

sweets since it was founded in 1918. It was all very quaint until Liberty Orchard announced in September

1997 that it would leave for greener pastures unless the town agreed to transform itself into a 3-D tourist

attraction for the Aplets and Cotlets all-American brand, complete with signs along the highway and a

downtown turned into a corporate gift shop. The Wall Street Journal reported the company's ransom

demands:

They want all road signs and official correspondence by the city to say

"Cashmere, Home of Aplets and

Cotlets." They have asked that one of the two main streets in town be changed to Cotlets Avenue, and the

other one be renamed Aplets Avenue. The candy maker also wants the Mayor and Council to sell City Hall


to them, build new parking lots and possibly go to the bond market to start a tourism campaign on behalf of

the worldwide headquarters of a company that says its story is "America in a nutshell."

Although there is a clear trajectory in all of these stories, there is little point, at this stage in our sponsored

history, in pining for either a mythic brand-free past or some Utopian commercial-free future. Branding

becomes troubling —as it did in the cases just discussed —when the balance tips dramatically in favour of

the sponsoring brand, stripping the hosting culture of its inherent value and treating it as little more than a

promotional tool. It is possible, however, for a more balanced relationship to unfold —one in which both

sponsor and sponsored hold on to their power and in which clear boundaries are drawn and protected. As a

working journalist, I know that critical, independent — even Anticorporate —

coverage does appear in

corporate-owned media, sandwiched, no less, between the car and tobacco ads.

Are these articles tainted

by this impure context? No doubt. But if balance (as opposed to purity) is the goal, then maybe print media,

where the first mass-market advertising campaigns began, can hold some important lessons for how to cope

with the expansionist agenda of branding.

It is common knowledge that many advertisers rail at controversial content, pull their ads when they are

criticized even slightly and perpetually angle for so-called value-addeds —plugs for their wares in shopping


guides and fashion spreads. For example, S.C. Johnson Co. stipulates that its ads in women's magazines

"should not be opposite extremely controversial features or material antithetical to the nature/copy of the

advertised product" while De Beers’s diamonds demands that their ads be far from any "hard news or

anti/love-romance themed editorial." And up until 1997, when Chrysler placed an ad it demanded that it be

"alerted in advance of any and all editorial content that encompasses sexual, political, social issues or any

editorial that might be construed as provocative or offensive." But the advertisers don't always get their way:

controversial stories make it to print and to air, even ones critical of major advertisers. At its most daring

and uncompromised, the news media can provide workable models for the protection of the public interest

even under heavy corporate pressure, though these battles are often won behind closed doors. On the other

hand, at their worst, these same media show how deeply distorting the effects of branding can be on our

public discourse — particularly since journalism, like every other part of our culture, is under constantly

increasing pressure to merge with the brands.

Part of this stepped-up pressure is coming from the explosion of sponsored media projects: magazines,

Web sites and television programs that invite corporate sponsors to become involved at the development

stage of a venture. That's the role Heineken played in the British music and youth culture show Hotel


Babylon, which aired on 1TV. In an embarrassing incident in January 1996, a memo from a Heineken

executive was leaked to the press that berated the producers for insufficiently

"Heineken-izing" the as-yetunaired

program. Specifically, Justus Kos objected to male audience members drinking wine as opposed to

"masculine drinks like beer, whisky," noted that "more evidence of beer is not just requested but needed"

and complained that the show's host "shouldn't stand in the way of the beer columns when introducing

guests." Most inflammatory of all was the executive's complaint that there was

"too high a proportion of

negroes in the audience." After the controversy made its way into the press, Heineken CEO Karel Vuursteen

issued a public apology.

Another sponsor scandal erupted during the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan, when CBS

investigative journalist Roberta Baskin saw her CBS Sports department colleagues reporting on the games

in jackets adorned with bold Nike logos. Nike was the official sponsor of the network's Olympic coverage

and it provided news and sports reporters with the swooshed gear because, according to Nike spokesman

Lee Weinstein, it "helps us build awareness about our products." Baskin was

"dismayed and embarrassed"

that CBS reporters seemed to be endorsing Nike products, not only because it represented a further

dissolution of the line between editorial and advertising, but because two years earlier, Baskin had broken a


news story about physical abuse of workers at a Nike shoe factory in Vietnam.

She accused the station of

refusing to allow her to pursue a follow-up and of yanking the original story from a scheduled rerun because

of its sponsorship deal with Nike. CBS News president Andrew Heyward strenuously denied bowing to

sponsor pressure, calling Baskin's allegations "truly preposterous." He did pull the Nike jackets off the news

reporters midway through the games, though the sports department kept theirs on.

In some ways, these stories are simply pumped-up versions of the same old tug-of-war between editorial

and advertising that journalists have faced for a century and a quarter.

Increasingly, however, corporations

aren't just asking editors and producers to become their de facto ad agencies by dreaming up ways to plug

their wares in articles and photo shoots, they are also asking magazines to become their actual ad agencies,

by helping them to create the ads that run in their magazines. More and more magazines are turning their

offices into market-research firms and their readers into focus groups in an effort to provide the most

cherished "value-added" they can offer their clients: highly detailed demographic information about their

readership, amassed through extensive surveys and questionnaires.

In many cases, the magazines then use the readership information to design closely targeted

advertisements for their clients. Details magazine, for instance, designed a twenty-four-page


comic/advertisement strip in October 1997, with products like Hugo Boss cologne and Lee jeans woven into

a story line about the daily adventures of a professional in-line skater. On the page following each product's

extreme cameo, the company's real ad appeared.

The irony of these branding experiments, of course, is that they only seem to make brands more resentful of

the media that host them. Inevitably, the lifestyle brands begin to ask why they need to attach themselves to

someone else's media project in the first place. Why, even after proving they can integrate into the most

stylish and trendiest of magazines, should they be kept at arm's length or, worse, branded with the word

"Advertisement," like the health warnings on packs of cigarettes? So, with lifestyle magazines looking more

and more like catalogs for designers, designer catalogs have begun to look more and more like magazines:

Abercrombie Fitch, J. Crew, Harry Rosen and Diesel have al shifted to a storybook format, where

characters frolic along sketchily drawn plotlines.

The merger between media and catalogue reached a new high with the launch of the teen TV drama

Dawson's Creek in January of 1998. Not only did the characters all wear J. Crew clothes, not only did the

windswept, nautical set make them look as if they had stepped off the pages of a J. Crew catalogue, and not

only did the characters spout dialogue like "He looks like he stepped out of a J.

Crew catalogue," but the


cast was also featured on the cover of the January J. Crew catalogue. Inside the new "freestyle magalog,"

the young actors are pictured in rowboats and on docks-looking as if they just stepped off the set of a

Dawson's Creek episode.

To see the birthplace of this kind of brand ambition, you have to go online, where there was never really any

pretence of a wall existing between editorial and advertisement. On the Web, marketing language reached

its nirvana: the ad-free ad. For the most part, the on-line versions of media outlets feature straightforward

banner ads similar to their paper or broadcast versions, but many media outlets have also used the Met to

blur the line between editorial and advertising much more aggressively than they could in the non-virtual

world. For instance, on the Teen People site, readers can click and order cosmetics and clothing as they

read about them. On the Entertainment Weekly site, visitors can click and order the books and CDs being

reviewed. In Canada, The Globe and Mail has attracted the ire of independent booksellers for the on-line

version of its book review section, ChaptersGLOBE.com. After reading Globe reviews, readers can click to

order books directly from the Chapters chain — a reviewer/retailer partnership that formed "Canada's

largest online bookstore." The New York Times' on-line partnership with Barnes and Noble has caused

similar controversies in the U.S.


These sites are relatively tame examples of the branding-content integration taking place on the Net,

however. Sites are increasingly created by "content developers," whose role is to produce editorial that wil

make an ad-cozy home for the developers' brand-name clients. One such on-line venture is Parent Soup,

invented by content developer "iVil age" for Fisher-Price, Starbucks, Procter and Gamble and Polaroid. It

calls itself a "parents' community" and attempts to imitate a user-driven newsgroup, but when parents go to

Parent Soup to get peer advice, they receive such branded wisdom as: the way to improve your child's selfesteem

is by taking Polaroid’s of her. No need to bully or buy off editors -just publish do-it-yourself content,

with ads pre-integrated.

Absolut Vodka's 1997 Absolut Kelly Internet site provided an early preview of the direction in which branded

media are headed. The distil er had long since solicited original, brand-centred creations from visual artists,

fashion designers and novelists to use in its advertisements — but this was different. On Absolut Kelly, only

the name of the site advertised the product; the rest was an il ustrated excerpt from Wired magazine editor

Kevin Kelly's book Out of Control. This, it seemed, was what the brand managers had aspired to all along:

for their brands to become quietly integrated into the heart of the culture. Sure, manufacturers wil launch

noisy interruptions if they are locked on the wrong side of the commerce/culture divide, but what they really


want is for their brand to earn the right to be accepted, not just as advertising art but simply as art. Off-line,

Absolut is stil a major advertiser in Wired, but on-line, it is Absolut that is the host, and a Wired editor the

supporting act.

Rather than merely bankrolling someone else's content, all over the Net, corporations are experimenting

with the much-coveted role of being "content providers": Gap's site offers travel tips, Volkswagen provides

free music samples, Pepsi urges visitors to download video games, and Starbucks offers an on-line version

of its magazine, Joe. Every brand with a Web site has its own virtual, branded media outlet —a beachhead

from which to expand into other non-virtual media. What has become clear is that corporations aren't just

selling their products on-line; they're selling a new model for the media's relationship with corporate

sponsors and backers. The Internet, because of its anarchic nature, has created the space for this model to

be realized swiftly, but the results are clearly made for off-line export. For instance, about a year after the

launch of Absolut Kelly, the company reached full editorial integration in Saturday Night magazine when the

final page of a nine-page excerpt from Mordecai Richler's novel Barney's Version was wrapped around the

silhouette of an Absolut bottle. This was not an ad, it was part of the story, yet at the bottom of the page

were the words

"Absolut Mordecai."


Although magazines and individual television shows are beginning to see the branded light, it is a network,

MTV, that is the model for fully branded media integration. MTV started out sponsored, as a joint venture

between Warner Communications and American Express. From the beginning, MTV has not been just a

marketing machine for the products it advertises around the clock (whether those products are skin

cleansers or the albums it moves with its music videos); it has also been a twenty-four-hour advertisement

for MTV itself: the first truly branded network. Though there have been dozens of imitators since, the

original genius of MTV, as every marketer wil tell you, is that viewers didn't watch individual shows, they

simply watched MTV. "As far as we were concerned, MTV was the star," says Tom Freston, network

founder. And so advertisers didn't want to just advertise on MTV, they wanted to co-brand with the station in

ways that are stil unimaginable on most other networks: giveaways, contests, movies, concerts, awards

ceremonies, clothing, countdowns, listings, credit cards and more.

The model of the medium-as-brand that MTV perfected has since been adopted by almost every other

major media outlet, whether magazines, film studios, television networks or individual shows. The hip-hop

magazine Vibe has extended into television, fashion shows and music seminars.

Fox Sports has announced

that it wants its new line of men's clothing to be on par with Nike: "We are hoping to take the attitude and


lifestyle of Fox Sports off the TV and onto men's backs, creating a nation of walking bil boards," said David

Hil , CEO of Fox Broadcasting.

The rush to branding has been most dramatic in the film industry. At the same time that brand-name

product placement in films has become an indispensable marketing vehicle for companies like Nike,

Macintosh and Starbucks, films themselves are increasingly being conceptualized as "branded media

properties." Newly merged entertainment conglomerates are always looking for threads to sew together their

disparate holdings in cross-promotional webs and, for the most part, that thread is the celebrity generated by

Hollywood blockbusters. Films create stars to cross-promote in books, magazines and TV, and they also

provide prime vehicles for sports, television and music stars to "extend" their own brands.

I'l explore the cultural legacy of this type of synergy-driven production in Chapter 9, but there is a more

immediate impact as well, one that has much to do with the phenomenon of disappearing unmarketed

cultural "space" with which this section is concerned. With brand managers envisioning themselves as

sensitive culture makers, and culture makers adopting the hard-nosed business tactics of brand builders, a

dramatic change in mindset has occurred. Whatever desire might exist to protect a television show from too

much sponsor interference, an emerging musical genre from crass commercialism or a magazine from


overt advertiser control has been trampled by the manic branding imperative: to disseminate one's own

brand "meaning" through whatever means necessary, often in partnership with other powerful brands. In this

context, the Dawson's Creek brand actively benefits from its exposure in the J.

Crew catalogue, the Kelly

brand grows stronger from its association with the Absolut brand, the People magazine brand draws cachet

from a close association with Tommy Hilfiger, and the Phantom Menace tie-ins with Pizza Hut, Kentucky

Fried Chicken and Pepsi are invaluable Star Wars brand promotion. When brand awareness is the goal

shared by all, repetition and visibility are the only true measures of success. The journey to this point of full

integration between ad and art, brand and culture, has taken most of this century to achieve, but the point of

no return, when it arrived, was unmistakable: April 1998, the launch of the Gap Khakis campaign.

The Branding of Music

In 1993, the Gap launched its "Who wore khakis?" ads, featuring old photographs of such counterculture

figures as James Dean and Jack Kerouac in beige pants. The campaign was in the cookie-cutter co-optation

formula: take a cool artist, associate that mystique with your brand, hope it wears off and makes you cool

too. It sparked the usual debates about the mass marketing of rebellion, just as Wil iam Burroughs's

presence in a Nike ad did at around the same time.


Fast forward to 1998. The Gap launches its breakthrough Khakis Swing ads: a simple, exuberant miniature

music video set to "Jump, Jive 'n' Wail" — and a great video at that. The question of whether these ads

were "co-opting" the artistic integrity of the music was entirely meaningless. The Gap's commercials didn't

capitalize on the retro swing revival — a solid argument can be made that they caused the swing revival. A

few months later, when singer-songwriter Rufus Wainwright appeared in a Christmas-themed Gap ad, his

sales soared, so much so that his record company began promoting him as "the guy in the Gap ads." Macy

Gray, the new RB "It Girl," also got her big break in a Baby Gap ad. And rather than the Gap Khaki ads

looking like rip-offs of MTV videos, it seemed that overnight, every video on MTV

—from Brandy to Britney

Spears and the Backstreet Boys —looked like a Gap ad; the company has pioneered its own aesthetic,

which spil ed out into music, other advertisements, even films like The Matrix.

After five years of intense

lifestyle branding, the Gap, it has become clear, is as much in the culture-creation business as the artists in

its ads.

For their part, many artists now treat companies like the Gap less as deep-pocketed pariahs trying to feed

off their cachet than as just another medium they can exploit in order to promote their own brands,

alongside radio, video and magazines. "We have to be everywhere. We can't afford to be too precious in


our marketing," explains Ron Shapiro, executive vice president of Atlantic Records. Besides, a major ad

campaign from Nike or the Gap penetrates more nooks and crannies of the culture than a video in heavy

rotation on MTV or a cover article in Rolling Stone. Which is why piggybacking on these campaign blitzes-Fat Boy Slim in Nike ads, Brandy in Cover Girl commercials, Lil' Kim rapping for Candies —has become,



Business Week announced with much glee, "today's top 40 radio."

Of course the branding of music is not a story of innocence lost. Musicians have been singing ad jingles and

signing sponsorship deals since radio's early days, as well as having their songs played on commercial radio

stations and signing deals with multinational record companies. Throughout the eighties — music's decade

of the straight-up shil — rock stars like Eric Clapton sang in beer ads, and the pop stars, appropriately

enough, crooned for pop: George Michael, Robert Plant, Whitney Houston, Run-DMC, Madonna, Robert

Palmer, David Bowie, Tina Turner, Lionel Richie and Ray Charles all did Pepsi or Coke ads, while sixties

anthems like the Beatles' "Revolution" became background music for Nike commercials.

During this same period, the Rolling Stones made music history by ushering in the era of the sponsored rock

tour —and fittingly, sixteen years later; it is stil the Stones who are leading the charge into the latest

innovation in corporate rock: the band as brand extension. In 1981, Jovan —a distinctly un-rock-and-roll


perfume company — sponsored a Rolling Stones stadium tour, the first arrangement of its kind, though

tame by today's standards. Though the company got its logos on a few ads and banners, there was a clear

distinction between the band that had chosen to "sell out" and the corporation that had paid a huge sum to

associate itself with the inherent rebelliousness of rock. This subordinate status might have been fine for a

company out merely to move products, but when designer Tommy Hilfiger decided that the energy of rock

and rap would become his "brand essence," he was looking for an integrated experience, one more in tune

with his own transcendent identity quest. The results were evident in the Stones'

Tommy-sponsored Bridges

to Babylon tour in 1997. Not only did Hilfiger have a contract to clothe Mick Jagger, he also had the same

arrangement with the Stones' opening act, Sheryl Crow — on stage, both modelled items from Tommy's

newly launched "Rock V Roll Collection."

It wasn't until January 1999, however —when Hilfiger launched the ad campaign for the Stones' No Security

Tour - that full brand-culture integration was achieved. In the ads, young, glowing Tommy models were

pictured in full-page frame "watching" a Rolling Stones concert taking place on the opposite page. The

photographs of the band members were a quarter of the size of those of the models. In some of the ads, the

Stones were nowhere to be found and the Tommy models alone were seen posing with their own guitars. In


all cases, the ads featured a hybrid logo of the Stones' famous red tongue over Tommy's trademarked redwhite-and-blue flag. The tagline was "Tommy Hilfiger Presents the Rolling Stones No Security Tour"-though

there were no dates or locations for any tour stops, only the addresses of flagship Tommy stores.

In other words, this wasn't rock sponsorship; it was "live-action advertising," as media consultant Michael J.

Wolf describes the ads. It's clear from the campaign's design that Hilfiger isn't interested in buying a piece

of someone else's act, even if they are the Rolling Stones. The act is a background set, powerfully

showcasing the true rock-and-roll essence of the Tommy brand; just one piece of Hilfiger's larger project of

cawing out a place in the music world, not as a sponsor but as a player — much as Nike has achieved in the

sports world.

The Hilfiger/Stones branding is only the highest-profile example of the new relationship between bands and

sponsors that is sweeping the music industry. For instance, it was a short step for Volkswagen — after using

cutting-edge electronic music in its ads for the new Beetle — to launch DriversFest '99, a VW branded

music festival in Long Island, New York. DriversFest competes for ticket sales with the Mentos Freshmaker

Tour, a two-year-old travelling music festival owned and branded by a breath-mint manufacturer — on the

Mentos Web site, visitors are invited to vote for which bands they want to play the venue. As with the


Absolut Kelly Web site and the Altoids' Curiously Strong art exhibition, these are not sponsored events: the

brand is the event's infrastructure; the artists are its fil er, a reversal in the power dynamic that makes any

discussion of the need to protect unmarketed artistic space appears hopelessly naive.

This emerging dynamic is clearest in the branded festivals being developed by the large beer companies.

Instead of merely playing in beer ads, as they likely would have in the eighties, acts like Hole, Soundgarden,

David Bowie and the Chemical Brothers now play beer-company gigs. Molson Breweries, which owns 50

percent of Canada's only national concert promoter, Universal Concerts, already has its name promoted

almost every time a rock or pop star gets up on stage in Canada — either through its Molson Canadian

Rocks promotional arm or its myriad venues: Molson Stage, Molson Park, Molson Amphitheatre. For the

first decade or so, this was a fine arrangement, but by the mid-nineties, Molson was tired of being upstaged.

Rock stars had an annoying tendency to hog the spotlight and, worse, sometimes they even insulted their

sponsors from the stage.

Clearly fed up, in 1996 Molson held its first Blind Date Concert. The concept, which has since been exported

to the U.S. by sister company Mil er Beer, is simple: hold a contest in which winners get to attend an

exclusive concert staged by Molson and Mil er in a small club — much smaller than the venues where one


would otherwise see these megastars. And here's the clincher: keep the name of the band secret until it

steps on stage. Anticipation mounts about the concert (helped along by national ad campaigns building up

said anticipation), but the name on everyone's lips isn't David Bowie, the Rolling Stones, Soundgarden,

1NXS or any of the other bands that have played the Dates, it's Molson and Mil er.

No one, after all, knows

who is going to play, but they know who is putting on the show. With Blind Date, Molson and Mil er invented

a way to equate their brands with extremely popular musicians, while stil maintaining their competitive edge

over the stars. "In a funny way," says Universal Concerts' Steve Herman, "the beer is bigger than the band."

The rock stars, turned into high-priced hired guns at Molson's bar mitzvah party, continued to find sad little

ways to rebel. Almost every musician who played a Blind Date acted out: Courtney Love told a reporter,

"God bless Molson.... I douche with it." The Sex Pistols' Johnny Lydon screamed

"Thank you for the money"

from the stage, and Soundgarden's Chris Cornell told the crowd, "Yeah, we're here because of some fucking

beer company... Labatt's." But the tantrums were al incidental to the main event, in which Molson and Mil er

were the real rock stars and it didn't really matter how those petulant rent-a-bands behaved.

Jack Rooney, Mil er's vice president of marketing, explains that his $200 mil ion promotion budget goes


toward devising creative new ways to distinguish the Mil er brand from the plethora of other brands in the

marketplace. "We're competing not just against Coors and Corona," he says, "but Coke, Nike and

Microsoft." Only he isn't telling the whole story. In Advertising Age's annual "Top Marketing 100" list of

1997's best brands there was a new arrival: the Spice Girls (fittingly enough, since Posh Spice did once tell

a reporter, "We wanted to be a 'household name'. Like Ajax.") And the Spice Girls ranked number six in

Forbes magazine's inaugural "Celebrity Power 100," in May 1999, a new ranking based not on fame or

fortune but on stars' brand "franchise." The list was a watershed moment in corporate history, marking the

fact that, as Michael J. Wolf says, "Brands and stars have become the same thing."

But when brands and stars are the same thing, they are also, at times, competitors in the high-stakes tussle

for brand awareness, a fact more consumer companies have become ready to admit. Canadian clothing

company Club Monaco, for instance, has never used celebrities in its campaigns.

"We've thought about it,"

says vice president Christine Ralphs, "but whenever we go there, it always becomes more about the

personality than the brand, and for us, we're just not wil ing to share that."

There is good reason to be protective: though more and more clothing and candy companies seem intent on

turning musicians into their opening acts, bands and their record labels are launching their own challenges


to this demoted status. After seeing the enormous profits that the Gap and Tommy Hilfiger have made

through their association with the music world, record labels are barrelling into the branding business

themselves. Mot only are they placing highly sophisticated cross-branding apparatus behind working

musicians, but bands are increasingly being conceived — and test-marketed — as brands first: the Spice

Girls, the Backstreet Boys, 1M' Sync, Al Saints and so on. Prefab bands aren't new to the music industry,

and neither are bands with their own merchandising lines, but the phenomenon has never dominated pop

culture as it has at the end of the nineties, and musicians have never before competed so aggressively with

consumer brands. Sean "Puffy" Combs has leveraged his celebrity as a rapper and record producer into a

magazine, several restaurants, a clothing label and a line of frozen foods. And Raekwon, of the rap group

Wu-Tang Clan, explains that "the music, movies, the clothing, it is all part of the pie we're making. In the

year 2005 we might have Wu-Tang furniture for sale at Nordstrom." Whether it's the Gap or Wu-Tang Clan,

the only remaining relevant question in the sponsorship debate seems to be, where do you have the guts to

draw the borders around your brand?

Nike and the Branding of Sports

Inevitably, any discussion about branded celebrity leads to the same place: Michael Jordan, the man who


occupies the number-one spot on all of those ranking lists, who has incorporated himself into the JORDAN

brand, whose agent coined the term "superbrand" to describe him. But no discussion of Michael Jordan's

brand potential can begin without the brand that branded him: Nike. Nike has successfully upstaged sports

on a scale that makes the breweries' rock-star aspirations look like amateur night.

Now of course pro sports,

like big-label music, is in essence a profit-driven enterprise, which is why the Nike story has less to teach us

about the loss of unmarketed space — space that, arguably, never even existed in this context —than it

does about the mechanics of branding and its powers of eclipse. A company that swallows cultural space in

giant gulps, Nike is the definitive story of the transcendent nineties superbrand, and more than any other

single company, its actions demonstrate how branding seeks to erase all boundaries between the sponsor

and the sponsored. This is a shoe company that is determined to unseat pro sports, the Olympics and even

star athletes, to become the very definition of sports itself.

Nike CEO Phil Knight started selling running shoes in the sixties, but he didn't strike it rich until high-tech

sneakers became the must-have accessory of America's jogging craze. But when jogging subsided in the

mid-eighties and Reebok cornered the market on trendy aerobics shoes, Nike was left with a product

destined for the great dustbin of yuppie fads. Rather than simply switching to a different kind of sneaker,


Knight decided that running shoes should become peripheral in a reincarnated Nike. Leave sneakers to

Reebok and Adidas-Nike would transform itself into what Knight calls "the world's best sports and Fitness

Company."

The corporate mythology has it that Nike is a sports and fitness company because it was built by a bunch of

jocks who loved sports and were fanatically devoted to the worship of superior athletes. In reality, Nike's

project was a little more complicated and can be separated into three guiding principles. First, turn a select

group of athletes into Hollywood-style superstars who are associated not with their teams or even, at times,

with their sport, but instead with certain pure ideas about athleticism as transcendence and perseverance —

embodiments of the Greco-Roman ideal of the perfect male form. Second, pit Nike's "Pure Sports" and its

team of athletic superstars against the rule-obsessed established sporting world.

Third, and most important,

brand like mad.

Step 1: Create Sport Celebrities

I wake up every morning, jump in the shower, look down at the symbol, and that pumps me up for the day.

It's to remind me every day what I have to do, which is, "Just Do It."

-Twenty-four-year-old Internet entrepreneur Carmine Collettion on his decision to get a Nike swoosh

tattooed on his navel, December 1997

It was Michael Jordan's extraordinary basketball skil that catapulted Nike to branded heaven, but it was


Mike's commercials that made Jordan a global superstar. It's true that gifted athletes like Babe Ruth and

Muhammad Ali were celebrities before Mike's time, but they never reached Jordan's otherworldly level of

fame. That stratum was reserved for movie and pop stars, which had been transformed by the special

effects, art direction and careful cinematography of films and music videos. Sport stars pre-Mike, no matter

how talented or worshiped, were stil stuck on the ground. Football, hockey and baseball may have been

ubiquitous on television, but televised sports were just real-time play-by-plays, which were often tedious,

sometimes exciting and high tech only in the slow-mo replay. As for athletes endorsing products, their

advertisements and commercials couldn't quite be described as cutting-edge star creation — whether it was

Wilt Chamberlain goofily grinning from a box of Wheaties or Rocket Richard being sentenced to "two

minutes for looking so good" in Grecian Formula commercials.

Mike's 1985 TV spots for Michael Jordan brought sports into the entertainment world: the freeze frame, the

close-up and the quick cuts that allowed Jordan to appear to be suspended in mid-jump, providing the

stunning il usion that he could actually take flight. The idea of harnessing sport-shoe technology to create a

superior being — of Michael Jordan flying through the air in suspended animation

— was Mike mythmaking

at work. These commercials were the first rock videos about sports and they created something entirely


new. As Michael Jordan says, "What Phil [Knight] and Mike have done is turn me into a dream."

Many of Mike's most famous TV commercials have used Nike superstars to convey the idea of sports, as

opposed to simply representing the best of the athlete's own team sport. Spots often feature famous

athletes playing a game other than the one they play professionally, such as tennis pro Andre Agassi

showing off his version of "rock-and-roll golf." And then there was the breakthrough "Bo Knows" campaign,

which lifted baseball and football player Bo Jackson out of his two professional sports and presented him

instead as the perfect all-around cross-trainer. A series of quick-cut interviews with Mike stars —McEnroe,

Jordan, Gretzky — ironically suggested that Jackson knew their sports better than they did. "Bo knows

tennis," "Bo knows basketball" and so on.

At the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, Mike took this strategy out of the controlled environment of its TV

commercials and applied it to a real sports competition. The experiment started in 1995 when Mike's

marketing department dreamed up the idea of turning a couple of Kenyan runners into Africa's first Olympic

ski team. As Mark Bossardet, Mike's director of global athletics, explained, "We were sitting around the

office one day and we said, 'What if we took Kenyan runners and transferred their skil s to cross-country

skiing?'" Kenyan runners, who have dominated cross-country track-and-field competitions at the Olympics


since 1968, have always represented the "idea of sports" at Mike headquarters.

("Where's the Kenyans

running?" Phil Knight has been heard to demand after viewing a Mike ad deemed insufficiently inspiring and

heroic. In Mike shorthand it means, "Where's the Spirit of Sports?"). So according to Mike marketing logic, if

two Kenyan runners -living specimens of sports incarnate —were plucked out of their own sport and out of

their country and their native climate, and dumped on a frozen mountaintop, and if they were then able to

transfer their agility, strength and endurance to cross-country skiing, their success would represent a

moment of pure sporting transcendence. It would be a spiritual transformation of Man over nature, birthright,

nation and petty sports bureaucrats — brought to the world by Mike, of course.

"Mike always felt sports

shouldn't have boundaries," the swooshed press release announced. Finally there would be proof.

And if nothing else, Mike would get its name in lots of quirky human-interest sidebar stories—just like the

wacky Jamaican bobsled team that hogged the headlines at the 1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary. What

sports reporter could resist the heart-warmer of Africa's first ski team?

Mike found its test-tube subjects in two mid-level runners, Philip Boit and Henry Bitok. Since Kenya has no

snow, no ski federation and no training facilities, Nike financed the entire extravagant affair, dishing out

$250,000 for training in Finland and custom-designed uniforms, and paying the runners a salary to live away


from their families. When Nagano rolled around, Bitok didn't qualify and Boit finished last-a full twenty

minutes after the gold-medal winner, Bjorn Daehlie of Norway. It turns out that cross-country running and

cross-country skiing — despite the similarity of their names — require entirely different sets of skil s and use

different muscles.

But that was beside the point. Before the race began, Nike held a press conference at its Olympic

headquarters, catered the event with Kenyan food and beer and showed reporters a video of the Kenyans

encountering snow for the first time, skiing into bushes and falling on their butts.

The journalists also heard

accounts of how the climate change was so dramatic that the Kenyans' skin cracked and their fingernails

and toenails fell off, but "now," as Boit said, "I love snow. Without snow, 1 could not do my sport." As the

Tampa Tribune of February 12, 1998, put it, "They're just two kooky Kenyans trying to make it in the frozen

tundra."

It was quintessential Nike branding: by equating the company with athletes and athleticism at such a primal

level, Nike ceased merely to clothe the game and started to play it. And once Nike was in the game with its

athletes, it could have fanatical sports fans instead of customers.

Step 2: Destroy the Competition

Like any competitive sports player, Nike has its work cut out for it: winning. But winning for Nike is about


much more than sneaker wars. Of course Nike can't stand Adidas, Fila and Reebok, but more important,

Phil Knight has sparred with sports agents, whose individual greed, he claims, puts them "inherently in

conflict with the interests of athletes at every turn"; the NBA, which he feels has unfairly piggybacked on

Nike's star-creation machinery; and the International Olympic Committee, whose elitism and corruption

Knight derided long before the organization's 1999 bribery scandals. In Nike's world, al of the official sports

clubs, associations and committees are actually trampling the spirit of sports — a spirit Nike alone truly

embodies and appreciates.

So at the same time as Nike's myth machine was fabricating the idea of Team Nike, Nike's corporate team

was dreaming up ways to play a more central role in pro sports. First Nike tried to unseat the sports agents

by starting an agency of its own, not only to represent athletes in contract negotiation but also to develop

integrated marketing strategies for its clients that are sure to complement —not dilute —Nike's own

branding strategy, often by pushing its own ad concepts on other companies.

Then there was a failed attempt to create — and own — a college football version of the Super Bowl (the

Nike Bowl), and in 1992, Nike did buy the Ben Hogan golf tour and rename it the Nike Tour. "We do these

things to be in the sport. We're in sports — that's what we do," Knight told reporters at the time. That is


certainly what they did when Nike and rival Adidas made up their own sporting event to settle a grudge

match over who could claim the title "fastest man alive" in their ads: Nike's Michael Johnson or Adidas's

Donovan Bailey. Because the two compete in different categories (Bailey in the 100-meter, Johnson in the

200), the sneaker brands agreed to split the difference and had the men compete in a made-up 150-meter

race. Adidas won.

When Phil Knight faces the inevitable criticism from sports purists that he is having an undue influence on

the games he sponsors, his stock response is that "the athlete remains our reason for being." But as the

company's encounter with star basketball player Shaquil e O'Neal shows, Nike is only devoted to a certain

kind of athlete. Company biographer Donald Katz describes the tense meeting between O'NeaFs manager,

Leonard Armato, and Nike's marketing team:

Shaq had observed the explosion of the sports-marketing scene ("He took sports-marketing courses,"

Armato says) and the rise of Michael Jordan, and he'd decided that rather than becoming a part of several

varied corporate marketing strategies, an array of companies might be assembled as part of a brand

presence that was he. Consumer products companies would become part of Team Shaq, rather than the

other way around. "We're looking for consistency of image," Armato would say as he began collecting the

team on Shaq's behalf. "Like Mickey Mouse."


The only problem was that at Nike headquarters, there is no Team Shaq, only Team Nike. Nike took a pass

and handed over the player many thought would be the next Michael Jordan to Reebok —not "Nike

material," they said. According to Katz, Knight's mission "from the beginning had been to build a pedestal

for sports such as the world had never seen." But at Nike Town in Manhattan, the pedestal is not holding up

Michael Jordan, or the sport of basketball, but a rotating Nike sneaker. Like a prima Donna, it sits in the

spotlight, the first celebrity shoe.

Step 3: Sell Pieces of the Brand As If It Was the Berlin Wall Nothing embodies the era of the brand like Nike Town, the company's chain of flagship retail outlets. Each

one is a shrine, a place set apart for the faithful, a mausoleum. The Manhattan Nike Town on East Fiftyseventh

Street is more than a fancy store fitted with the requisite brushed chrome and blond wood, it is a

temple, where the swoosh is worshiped as both art and heroic symbol. The swoosh is equated with Sports at

every turn: in reverent glass display cases depicting "The definition of an athlete"; in the inspirational quotes

about "Courage," "Honour," "Victory" and "Teamwork" inlaid in the floorboards; and in the building's

dedication "to all athletes and their dreams."

I asked a salesperson if there was anything amid the thousands of T-shirts, bathing suits, sports bras or

socks that did not have a Nike logo on the outside of the garment. He racked his brain. T-shirts, no. Shoes,


no. Track suits? No.

"Why?" he finally asked, sounding a bit hurt. "Is somebody allergic to the swoosh?"

Nike, king of the superbrands, is like an inflated Pac-Man, so driven to consume it does so not out of malice

but out of jaw-clenching reflex. It is ravenous by nature. It seems fitting that Nike's branding strategy

involves an icon that looks like a check mark. Nike is checking off the spaces as it swallows them:

superstores? Check. Hockey? Baseball? Soccer? Check. Check. Check. T-shirts?

Check. Hats? Check.

Underwear? Check. Schools? Bathrooms? Shaved into brush cuts? Check.

Check. Check. Since Nike has

been the leader in branding clothing, it's not surprising that it has also led the way to the brand's final

frontier: the branding of flesh. Not only do dozens of Nike employees have a swoosh tattooed on their

calves, but tattoo parlours all over North America report that the swoosh has become their most popular

item. Human branding? Check.

The Branded Star

There is another reason behind Nike's stunning success at disseminating its brand. The superstar athletes

who form the building blocks of its image — those creatures invented by Nike and cloned by Adidas and

Fila — have proved uniquely positioned to soar in the era of synergy: they are made to be cross-promoted.

The Spice Girls can make movies, and film stars can walk the runways but neither can quite win an Olympic


medal. It's more practical for Dennis Rodman to write two books, star in two movies and have his own

television show than it is for Martin Amis or Seinfeld to play defence for the Bulls, just as it is easier for

Shaquil e O'Neal to put out a rap album than it is for Sporty Spice to make the NBA draft. Only animated

characters — another synergy favourite — are more versatile than sports stars in the synergy game.

But for Nike, there is a downside to the power of its own celebrity endorsers.

Though Phil Knight wil never

admit it, Nike is no longer just competing with Reebok, Adidas and the NBA; it has also begun to compete

with another brand: its name is Michael Jordan.

In the three years before he retired, Jordan was easing away from his persona as Nike incarnate and turning

himself into what his agent, David Falk, calls a "superbrand." He refused to go along when Nike entered the

sports-agent business, telling the company that it would have to compensate him for mil ions of dollars in

lost revenue. Instead of letting Nike manage his endorsement portfolio, he tried to build synergy deals

between his various sponsors, including a bizarre attempt to persuade Nike to switch phone companies

when he became a celebrity spokesperson for WorldCom. Other highlights of what Falk terms "Michael

Jordan's Corporate Partnership Program" include a WorldCom commercial in which the actors are decked

out in Oakley sunglasses and Wilson sports gear, both Jordan-endorsed products.

And, of course, the movie


Space Jam — in which the basketball player starred and which Falk executive-produced — was Jordan's

coming-out party as his own brand. The movie incorporated plugs for each of Jordan's sponsors (choice

dialogue includes "Michael, it's show time. Get your Hanes on, lace up your Nikes, grab your Wheaties and

Gatorade and we'l pick up a Big Mac on the way!"), and McDonald's promoted the event with Space Jam

toys and Happy Meals.

Mike had been playing up Jordan's business ambitions in its "CEO Jordan"

commercials, which show him

changing into a suit and racing to his office at halftime. But behind the scenes, the company has always

resented Jordan's extra-Mike activities. Donald Katz writes that as early as 1992,

"Knight believed that

Michael Jordan was no longer, in sports-marketing nomenclature, 'clean.'"

Significantly, Mike boycotted the

co-branding bonanza that surrounded Space Jam. Unlike McDonald's, it didn't use the movie in tie-in

commercials, despite the fact that Space Jam is based on a series of Mike commercials featuring Jordan

and Bugs Bunny. When Falk told Advertising Age that "Mike had some reservations about the

implementation of the movie," he was exercising considerable restraint. Jim Riswold, the long-time Mike

adman who first conceived of pairing Jordan with Bugs Bunny in the shoe commercials, complained to The

Wall Street Journal that Space Jam "is a merchandising bonanza first and a movie second. The idea is to


sell lots of product." It was a historic moment in the branding of culture, completely inverting the traditionally

fraught relationship between art and commerce: a shoe company and an ad agency huffing and puffing that

a Hollywood movie would sully the purity of their commercials.

For the time being at least, a peace has descended between the warring superbrands. Mike has given

Jordan more leeway to develop his own apparel brand, stil within the Nike Empire but with greater

independence. In the same week that he retired from basketball, Jordan announced that he would be

extending the JORDAN clothing line from basketball gear into lifestyle wear, competing directly with Polo,

Hilfiger and Nautica. Settling into his role as CEO — as opposed to celebrity endorser — he signed up other

pro athletes to endorse the JORDAN brand: Derek Jeter, a shortstop for the Mew York Yankees and boxer

Roy Jones Jr. And, as of May 1999, the full JORDAN brand is showcased in its own "retail concept shops"

— two in New York and one in Chicago, with plans for up to fifty outlets by the end of the year 2000. Jordan

finally had his wish: to be his own free-standing brand, complete with celebrity endorsers.

The Age of the Brandasaurus

On the surface, the power plays between mil ionaire athletes and bil ion-dollar companies would seem to

have little to do with the loss of unmarketed space that is the subject of this section. Jordan and Nike,


however, are only the most broad strokes, manifestations of the way in which the branding imperative

changes the way we imagine both sponsor and sponsored to the extent that the idea of unbranded space —

music that is distinct from khakis, festivals that are not extensions of beer brands, athletic achievement that

is celebrated in and of itself—becomes almost unthinkable. Jordan and Nike are emblematic of a new

paradigm that eliminates all barriers between branding and culture, leaving no room whatsoever for



unmarketed space.

An understanding is beginning to emerge that fashion designers, running-shoe companies, media outlets,

cartoon characters and celebrities of all kinds are all more or less in the same business: the business of

marketing their brands. That's why in the early nineties, Creative Artists Agency, the most powerful celebrity

agency in Hollywood, began to represent not just celebrity people, but celebrity brands: Coke, Apple and

even an alliance with Nike. That's why Benetton, Microsoft and Starbucks have leapfrogged over the

"magalog" trend and have gone full force into the magazine publishing business: Benetton with Colours,

Microsoft with the on-line zine Slate and Starbucks with Joe, a joint venture with Time Inc. That's why teen

sensation Britney Spears and sitcom character Al y McBeal each have their own line of designer clothing;

why Tommy Hilfiger has helped launch a record label; and rapper Master P has his own sports agency


business. It's also why Ralph Lauren has a line of designer household paints, Brooks Brothers has a line of

wines, Nike is set to launch a swooshed cruise ship, and auto-parts giant Magna is opening up an

amusement park. It is also why market consultant Faith Popcorn has launched her own brand of leather

Cocooning armchairs, named after the trend she coined of the same name, and Fashion Licensing of

America Inc. is marketing a line of Ernest Hemingway furniture, designed to capture the "brand personality"

of the late writer.

As manufacturers and entertainers swap roles and move together toward the creation of branded lifestyle

bubbles, Nike executives predict that their "competition in the future [wil ] be Disney, not Reebok." And it

seems only

fitting that just as Nike enters the entertainment business, the entertainment giants have decided to try their

hand at the sneaker industry. In October 1997, Warner Brothers launched a low-end basketball shoe,

endorsed by Shaquil e O'Neal. "It's an extension of what we do at retail,"

explained Dan Romanelli of

Warner Consumer products.

It seems that wherever individual brands began — in shoes, sports, retail, food, music or cartoons — the

most successful among them have all landed in the same place: the stratosphere of the superbrand. That is

where Mick Jagger struts in Tommy Hilfiger, Steven Spielberg and Coke have the same agent, Shaq wants


to be "like Mickey Mouse," and everyone has his or her own branded restaurant

— from Jordan to Disney to

Demi Moore to Puffy Combs and the supermodels.

It was Michael Ovitz, of course, who came up with the blueprint for the highest temple of branding so far,

one that would do for music, sports and fashion what Walt Disney long ago did for kids' cartoons: turn the

slick world of television into a real-world branded environment. After leaving Creative Artists Agency in

August 1995 and being driven out as president of Disney shortly after, Ovitz took his unprecedented $87

mil ion golden handshake and launched a new venture: entertainment- and sports-themed mega malls, a

synthesis of pro sports, Hollywood celebrity and shopping. His vision is of an unholy mixture of Nike Town,

Planet Hollywood and the NBA's marketing wing — all leading straight to the cash register. The first

venture, a 1.5-mil ion-square-foot theme mall in Columbus, Ohio, is scheduled to open in the year 2000. If

Ovitz gets his way, another mall, planned for the Los Angeles area, wil include an NFL football stadium.

As these edifices of the future suggest, corporate sponsors and the culture they brand have fused together

to create a third culture: a self-enclosed universe of brand-name people, brandname products and brandname

media. Interestingly, a 1995 study conducted by University of Missouri professor Roy F. Fox shows

that many kids grasp the unique ambiguities of this sphere intuitively. The study found that a majority of


Missouri high-school students who watched Channel One's mix of news and ads in their classrooms thought

that sports stars paid shoe companies to be in their commercials.

"I don't know why athletes do that —pay all that money for all them ignorant commercials for themselves.

Guess it makes everyone like 'em more and like their teams more."

So opined Debbie, a ninth-grader and one of the two hundred students who participated in the study. For

Fox, the comment demonstrates a disturbing lack of media literacy, proof positive that kids can't critically

evaluate the advertising they see on television. But perhaps these findings show that kids understand

something most of us stil refuse to grasp. Maybe they know that sponsorship is a far more complicated

process than the buyer/ seller dichotomy that existed in previous decades and that to talk of who sold out or

bought in has become impossibly anachronistic. In an era in which people are brands and brands are

culture, what Nike and Michael Jordan do is more akin to co-branding than straight-up shil ing, and while the

Spice Girls may be doing Pepsi today, they could easily launch their own Spice Cola tomorrow.

It makes a good deal of sense that high-school kids would have a more realistic grasp of the absurdities of

branded life. They, after al , are the ones who grew up sold.

[IMAGE]

Top: Virgin's Richard Branson, the rock-and-roll CEO. Bottom: Revolution Soda Co.'s consumable Che.

CHAPTER THREE

ALT.EVERYTHING

The Youth Market and the Marketing of Cool

It's terrible to say; very often the most exciting outfits are from the poorest people.

— Designer Christian Lacroix in Vogue, April 1994

In our final year of high school, my best friend, Lan Ying, and I passed the time with morbid discussions

about the meaninglessness of life when everything had already been done. The world stretched out before

us not as a slate of possibility, but as a maze of well-worn grooves like the ridges burrowed by insects in

hardwood. Step off the straight and narrow career-and-materialism groove and you just end up on another

one — the groove for people who step off the main groove. And that groove was worn indeed (some of the

grooving done by our own parents). Want to go travelling? Be a modern-day Kerouac? Hop on the Let's Go

Europe groove. How about a rebel? An avant-garde artist? Go buy your alterna-groove at the second-hand

bookstore, dusty and moth-eaten and done to death. Everywhere we imagined ourselves standing turned

into a cliché beneath our feet — the stuff of Jeep ad copy and sketch comedy. To us it seemed as though

the archetypes were all hackneyed by the time our turn came to graduate, including that of the black-clad

deflated intellectual, which we were trying on at that very moment. Crowded by the ideas and styles of the

past, we felt there was no open space anywhere.

Of course it's a classic symptom of teenage narcissism to believe that the end of history coincides exactly


with your arrival on earth. Almost every angst-ridden, Camus-reading seventeen-year-old girl finds her own

groove eventually. Stil , there is a part of my high-school globo-claustrophobia that has never left me, and in

some ways only seems to intensify as time creeps along. What haunts me is not exactly the absence of

literal space so much as a deep craving for metaphorical space: release, escape, some kind of open-ended

freedom.

Al my parents wanted were the open road and a VW camper. That was enough escape for them. The

ocean, the night sky, and some acoustic guitar... what more could you ask? Well, actually, you could ask to

go soaring off the side of a mountain on a snowboard, feeling as if, for one moment, you are riding the

clouds instead of the snow. You could scour Southeast Asia, like the world-weary twenty-something’s in Alex

Garland's novel The Beach, looking for the one corner of the globe uncharted by the Lonely Planet to start

your own private Utopia. You could, for that matter, join a New Age cult and dream of alien abduction. From

the occult to raves to riots to extreme sports, it seems that the eternal urge for escape has never enjoyed

such niche marketing.

In the absence of space travel and confined by the laws of gravity, however, most of us take our open space

where we can get it, sneaking it like cigarettes, outside hulking enclosures. The streets may be lined with


bil boards and franchise signs, but kids stil make do, throwing up a couple of nets and passing the puck or

soccer ball between the cars. There is release, too, at England's free music festivals, and in conversions of

untended private property into collective space: abandoned factories turned into squats by street kids or

ramped entrances to office towers transformed into skateboarding courses on Sunday afternoons.

But as privatization slithers into every crevice of public life, even these intervals of freedom and back alleys

of unsponsored space are slipping away. The indie skateboarders and snowboarders all have Vans sneaker

contracts, road hockey is fodder for beer commercials, inner-city redevelopment projects are sponsored by

Wells Fargo, and the free festivals have all been banned, replaced with the annual Tribal Gathering, an

electronic music festival that bil s itself as a "strike back against the establishment and club-land's evil

empire of mediocrity, commercialism, and the creeping corporate capitalism of our cosmic counter-culture"'

and where the organizers regularly confiscate bottled water that has not been purchased on the premises,

despite the fact that the number-one cause of death at raves is dehydration.

I remember the moment when it hit me that my frustrated craving for space wasn't simply a result of the

inevitable march of history, but of the fact that commercial co-optation was proceeding at a speed that

would have been unimaginable to previous generations. I was watching the television coverage of the


controversy surrounding Woodstock '94, the twenty-fifth-anniversary festival of the original Woodstock

event. The baby-boomer pundits and aging rock stars postured about how the $2

cans of Woodstock

Memorial Pepsi, festival key chains and on-site cash machines betrayed the anticommercial spirit of the

original event and, incredibly, whined that the $3 commemorative condoms marked the end of "free love"

(as if AIDS had been cooked up as a malicious affront to their nostalgia).

What struck me most was that the debate revolved entirely around the sanctity of the past, with no

recognition of present-tense cultural challenges. Despite the fact that the anniversary festival was primarily

marketed to teenagers and college students and showcased then-up-and-coming bands like Green Day, not

a single commentator explored what this youth-culture "commodification" might mean to the young people

who would actually be attending the event. Never mind about the offence to hippies decades after the fact;

how does it feel to have your culture "sold out" now, as you are living it? The only mention that a new

generation of young people even existed came when the organizers, confronted with charges from exhippies

that they had engineered Greedstock or Woodshlock, explained that if the event wasn't shrinkwrapped

and synergized, the kids today would mutiny. Woodstock promoter John Roberts explained that

today's youth are "used to sponsorship. If a kid went to a concert and there wasn't merchandise to buy, he'd


probably go out of his mind."

Roberts isn't the only one who holds this view. Advertising Age reporter Jeff Jensen goes so far as to make

the claim that for today's young people, "Selling out is not only accepted, it's considered hip.” To object

would be, well, unhip. There is no need to further romanticize the original Woodstock. Among (many) other

things, it was also a big-label-backed rock festival, designed to turn a profit. Stil , the myth of Woodstock as

a sovereign youth-culture state was part of a vast project of generational self-definition — a concept that

would have been wholly foreign to those in attendance at Woodstock '94, for whom generational identity had

largely been a pre-packaged good and for whom the search for self had always been shaped by marketing

hype, whether or not they believed it or defined themselves against it. This is a side effect of brand

expansion that is far more difficult to track and quantify than the branding of culture and city spaces. This

loss of space happens inside the individual; it is colonization not of physical space but of mental space.

In a climate of youth-marketing feeding frenzy, all culture begins to be created with the frenzy in mind.

Much of youth culture becomes suspended in what sociologists Robert Goldman and Stephen Papson call

"arrested development," noting that "we have, after all, no idea of what punk or grunge or hip hop as social

and cultural movements might look like if they were not mined for their gold ..."

This "mining" has not gone


unnoticed or unopposed. Both the Anticorporate cultural journal The Baffler and the now-defunct Might

magazine bril iantly lampooned the desperation and striving of the youth-culture industry in the mid-nineties.

Dozens, if not hundreds, of zines and Web sites have been launched and have played no small part in

setting the mood for the kind of brand-based attacks that I chronicle in Part IV of this book. For the most

part, however, branding's insatiable cultural thirst just creates more marketing.

Marketing that thinks it is

culture.

To understand how youth culture became such a sought-after market in the early nineties, it helps to go

back briefly to the recession era "brand crisis" that took root immediately preceding this frenzy —a crisis

that, with so many consumers failing to live up to corporate expectations, created a clear and pressing need

for a new class of shoppers to step in and take over.

During the two decades before the brand crisis, the major cultural industries were stil drinking deeply from

the river of baby-boomer buying power, and the youth demographic found itself on the periphery, upstaged

by the awesome power of classic rock and reunion tours. Of course actual young consumers remained a

concern for the industries that narrowly market to teens, but youth culture itself was regarded as a rather

shallow and tepid well of inspiration by the entertainment and advertising industries. Sure, there were plenty


of young people who considered their culture "alternative" or "underground" in the seventies and eighties.

Every urban centre maintained its bohemian pockets, where the faithful wrapped themselves in black,

listened to the Grateful Dead or punk (or the more digestible New Wave), and shopped at second-hand

clothing stores and in dank record stores. If they lived outside urban centres, tapes and accessories of the

cool lifestyle could be ordered from the backs of magazines like Maximum Rock

'n' Roll, or swapped

through networks of friends or purchased at concerts.

While this is a gross caricature of the youth subcultures that rose and fell during these decades, the relevant

distinction is that these scenes were only half-heartedly sought after as markets.

In part this was because

seventies punk was at its peak at the same time as the infinitely more mass-marketable disco and heavy

metal, and the gold mine of high-end preppy style. And while rap music was topping the charts by the

mid- to late eighties, arriving complete with a fully articulated style and code, white America was not

about to declare the arrival of a new youth culture. That day would have to wait a few years until

the styles and sounds of urban black youth were fully co-opted by white suburbia.

So there was no mass-marketing machine behind these subcultures: there was no Internet, no travelling

alternative-culture shopping malls like Lollapalooza or Lilith Fair, and there certainly weren't slick catalogs


like Delia and Airshop, which now deliver body glitter, plastic pants and big-city attitude like pizzas to kids

stuck in the suburbs. The industries that drove Western consumerism were stil catering to the citizens of

Woodstock Nation, now morphed into consumption-crazed yuppies. Most of their kids, too, could be counted

on as yuppies-in-training, so keeping track of the trends and tastes favoured by style-setting youth wasn't

worth the effort.

The Youth Market Saves the Day

Al that changed in the early nineties when the baby boomers dropped their end of the consumer chain and

the brands underwent their identity crisis. At about the time of Marlboro Friday, Wall Street took a closer

look at the brands that had flourished through the recession, and noticed something interesting. Among the

industries that were holding steady or taking off were beer, soft drinks, fast food and sneakers — not to

mention chewing gum and Barbie dolls. There was something else: 1992 was the first year since 1975 that

the number of teenagers in America increased. Gradually, an idea began to dawn on many in the

manufacturing sector and entertainment industries: maybe their sales were slumping not because

consumers were "brand-blind," but because these companies had their eyes fixed on the wrong

demographic prize. This was not a time for selling Tide and Snuggle to housewives — it was a time for


beaming MTV, Nike, Hilfiger, Microsoft, Netscape and Wired to global teens and their overgrown imitators.

Their parents might have gone bargain basement, but kids, it turned out, were stil wil ing to pay up to fit in.

Through this process, peer pressure emerged as a powerful market force, making the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses consumerism of their suburban parents pale by comparison. As clothing retailer Elise Decoteau

said of her teen shoppers, "They run in packs. If you sell to one, you sell to everyone in their class and

everyone in their school."

There was just one catch. As the success of branding superstars like Nike had shown, it was not going to be

sufficient for companies simply to market their same products to a younger demographic; they needed to

fashion brand identities that would resonate with this new culture. If they were going to turn their lacklustre

products into transcendent meaning machines-as the dictates of branding demanded — they would need to

remake themselves in the image of nineties cool: its music, styles and politics.

Cool Envy: The Brands Go Back to School

Fuelled by the dual promises of branding and the youth market, the corporate sector experienced a burst of

creative energy. Cool, alternative, young, hip —whatever you want to call it-was the perfect identity for

product-driven companies looking to become transcendent image-based brands.

Advertisers, brand

managers, music, film and television producers raced back to high school, sucking up to the in-crowd in a


frantic effort to isolate and reproduce in TV commercials the precise "attitude"

teens and twenty-something’s

were driven to consume with their snack foods and pop tunes. And as in high schools everywhere, "Am I

cool?" became the deeply dull and all-consuming question of every moment, echoing not only through class

and locker rooms, but through the high-powered meetings and conference calls of Corporate High.

The quest for cool is by nature riddled with self-doubt ("Is this cool?" one can hear the legions of teen

shoppers nervously quizzing each other. "Do you think this is lame?") Except now the harrowing doubts of

adolescence are the bil ion-dollar questions of our age. The insecurities go round and round the boardroom

table, turning ad writers, art directors and CEOs into turbo-powered teenagers, circling in front of their

bedroom mirrors trying to look blasé. Do the kids think we're cool? they want to know. Are we trying too hard

to be cool, or are we really cool? Do we have attitude? The right attitude?

The Wall Street Journal regularly runs serious articles about how the trend toward wide-legged jeans or

miniature backpacks is affecting the stock market. IBM, out-cooled in the eighties by Apple, Microsoft and

pretty well everybody, has become fixated on trying to impress the cool kids, or, in the company's lingo, the

"People in Black." "We used to call them the ponytail brigade, the black turtleneck brigade," says IBM's

David Gee, whose job it is to make Big Blue cool. "Now they're the PIBs —People in Black. We have to be


relevant to the PIBs." For Pepe Jeans, the goal, articulated by marketing director Phil Spur, is this: "They

[the cool kids] have to look at your jeans, look at your brand image and say 'that's cool...' At the moment

we're ensuring that Pepe is seen in the right places and on the right people."

The companies that are left out of the crowd of successfully hip brands — their sneakers too small, their

pant-legs too tapered, their edgy ads insufficiently ironic —now skulk on the margins of society: the

corporate nerds. "Coolness is stil elusive for us," says Bil Benford, president of L.A. Gear athletic wear, and

one half expects him to slash his wrists like some anxious fifteen-year-old unable to face schoolyard exile

for another term. No one is safe from this brutal ostracism, as Levi Strauss learned in 1998. The verdict was

merciless: Levi's didn't have superstores like Disney, it didn't have cool ads like the Gap, it didn't have hiphop

credibility like Hilfiger and no one wanted to tattoo its logo on their navel, like Nike.

In short, it wasn't

cool. It had failed to understand, as its new brand developer Sean Dee diagnosed, that "loose jeans is not a

fad, it's a paradigm shift."

Cool, it seems, is the make-or-break quality in 1990s branding. It is the ironic sneer-track of ABC sitcoms

and late-night talk shows; it is what sells psychedelic Internet servers, extreme sports gear, ironic watches,

mind-blowing fruit juices, kitsch-laden jeans, post-modern sneakers and post-gender colognes. Our


"aspirational age," as they say in marketing studies, is about seventeen. This applies equally to the fortyseven-year-old baby boomers scared of losing their cool and the seven-year-olds kick-boxing to the

Backstreet Boys.

As the mission of corporate executives becomes to imbue their companies with deep coolness, one can

even foresee a time when the mandate of our elected leaders wil be "Make the Country Cool." In many

ways, that time is already here. Since his election in 1997, England's young Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has

been committed to changing Britain's somewhat dowdy image to "Cool Britannia."

After attending a summit

with Blair in an art-directed conference room in Canary Wharf, French president Jacques Chirac said, "I'm

impressed. It all gives Britain the image of a young, dynamic and modern country."

At the G-8 summit in

Birmingham, Blair turned the august gathering into a basement rec room get-together, where the leaders

watched Al Saints music videos and then were led in a round of "Al You Need Is Love"; no Nintendo

games were reported. Blair is a world leader as nation stylist — but wil his attempt to "rebrand Britain" really

work, or wil he be stuck with the old, outdated Brit brand? If anyone can do it, it's Blair, who took a page

from the marketers of Revolution Soda and successfully changed the name of his party from an actual

description of its loyalties and policy proclivities (that would be "labour") to the brand-asset descriptor "New


Labour." His is not the Labour Party but a labour-scented party.

The Change Agents: Cooling the Water Cooler

The journey to our current state of world cool almost ended, however, before it really began. Even though

by 1993 there was scarcely a fashion, food, beverage or entertainment company that didn't pine for what the

youth market promised, many were at a loss as to how to get it. At the time that cool-envy hit, many

corporations were in the midst of a hiring freeze, recovering from rounds of layoffs, most of which were

executed according to the last-hired-first-fired policies of the late-eighties recession. With far fewer young

workers on the payroll and no new ones coming up through the ranks, many corporate executives found

themselves in the odd position of barely knowing anyone under thirty years old. In this stunted context,

youth itself looked oddly exotic — and information about Xers, Generation Y and twenty-something’s was

suddenly a most precious commodity.

Fortunately, a backlog of hungry twenty-something’s were already in the job market. Like good capitalists,

many of these young workers saw a market niche: being professionally young. In so many words, they

assured would-be bosses that if they were hired, hip, young countercultures would be hand-delivered at the

rate of one per week; companies would be so cool, they would get respect in the scenes. They promised the

youth demographic, the digital revolution, a beeline into convergence.


And as we now know, when they got the job, these conduits of cool saw no need to transform themselves

into clone-ish Company Men. Many can be seen now, roaming the hallways of Fortune 500 corporations

dressed like club kids, skateboard in tow. They drop references to all-night raves at the office water cooler

("Memo to the boss: why not fil this thing with ginseng-laced herbal iced tea?").

The CEOs of tomorrow

aren't employees, they are, to use a term favoured at IBM, "change agents." But are they impostors —

scheming "suits" hiding underneath hip-hop snowboarding gear? Not at all. Many of these young workers

are the real deal; the true and committed product of the scenes they serve up, and utterly devoted to the

transformation of their brands. Like Tom Cruise in Jerry Maguire, they stay up late into the night penning

manifestos, revolutionary tracts about the need to embrace the new, to flout bureaucracy, to get on the Web

or be left behind, to redo the ad campaign with a groovier, grittier feel, to change quicker, be hipper.

And what do the change agents' bosses have to say about all this? They say bring it on, of course.

Companies looking to fashion brand identities that wil mesh seamlessly with the Zeitgeist understand, as

Marshall McLuhan wrote, "When a thing is current, it creates currency." The change agents stroke their

bosses' middle-aged egos simply by showing up — how out of touch could the boss be with a radical like


this on the same intranet system? Just look at Netscape, which no longer employs a personnel manager

and instead has Margie Mader, Director of Bringing in the Cool People. When asked by Fast Company,

"How do you interview for cool?" she replied, "...there are the people who just exude cool: one guy

skateboarded here for his interview; another held his interview in a roller-hockey rink." At MTV, a couple of

twenty-five-year-old production assistants, both named Melissa, co-wrote a document known as the "Melissa

Manifesto," calling on the already insufferably bubbly channel to become even more so. ("We want a

cleaner, brighter, more fun MTV," was among their fearless demands.) Upon reading the tract, MTV

President Judy McGrath told one of her colleagues, "I feel like blowing everybody out and putting these

people in charge."" Fellow rebel Tom Freston, CEO of MTV, explains that "Judy is inherently an antiestablishment

person. Anybody who comes along and says, 'Let's off the pig,' has got her ear."

Cool Hunters: The Legal Stalkers of Youth Culture

While the change agents were getting set to cool the corporate world from the inside out, a new industry of

"cool hunters" was promising to cool the companies from the outside in. The major corporate cool

consultancies — Sputnik, The L. Report, Bureau de Style-were al founded between 1994 and 1996, just in

time to present themselves as the brands' personal cool shoppers. The idea was simple: they would search


out pockets of cutting-edge lifestyle, capture them on videotape and return to clients like Reebok, Absolut

Vodka and Levi's with such bold pronouncements as "Monks are cool." They would advise their clients to

use irony in their ad campaigns, to get surreal, to use "viral communications."

In their book Street Trends, Sputnik founders Janine Lopiano-Misdom and Joanne De Luca concede that

almost anyone can interview a bunch of young people and make generalizations,

"but how do you know

they are the 'right' ones — have you been in their closets? Trailed their daily routines? Hung out with them

socially?... Are they the core consumers, or the mainstream followers?" Unlike the market researchers who

use focus groups and one-way glass to watch kids as if they were overgrown lab rats, Sputnik is "one of

them" —it is in with the in-crowd.

Of course all this has to be taken with a grain of salt. Cool hunters and their corporate clients are locked in a

slightly S/M, symbiotic dance: the clients are desperate to believe in a just-beyond-their-reach well of

untapped cool, and the hunters, in order to make their advice more valuable, exaggerate the crisis of

credibility the brands face. On the off chance of Brand X becoming the next Nike, however, many

corporations have been more than wil ing to pay up. And so, armed with their change agents and their cool

hunters, the superbrands became the perennial teenage followers, trailing the scent of cool wherever it led.


In 1974, Norman Mailer described the paint sprayed by urban graffiti artists as artil ery fired in a war

between the street and the establishment. "You hit your name and maybe something in the whole scheme

of the system gives a death rattle. For now your name is over their name...your presence is on their

Presence, your alias hangs over their scene." Twenty-five years later, a complete inversion of this

relationship has taken place. Gathering tips from the graffiti artists of old, the superbrands have tagged

everyone — including the graffiti writers themselves. No space has been left unbranded.

Hip-Hop Blows Up the Brands

As we have seen, in the eighties you had to be relatively rich to get noticed by marketers. In the nineties,

you have only to be cool. As designer Christian Lacroix remarked in Vogue, "It's terrible to say, very often

the most exciting outfits are from the poorest people."

Over the past decade, young black men in American inner cities have been the market most aggressively

mined by the brandmasters as a source of borrowed "meaning" and identity. This was the key to the success

of Nike and Tommy Hilfiger, both of which were catapulted to brand superstardom in no small part by poor

kids who incorporated Nike and Hilfiger into hip-hop style at the very moment when rap was being thrust into

the expanding youth-culture limelight by MTV and Vibe (the first mass-market hiphop magazine, founded in


1992). "The hip-hop nation," write Lopiano-Misdom and De Luca in Street Trends, is "the first to embrace a

designer or a major label, they make that label 'big concept' fashion. Or, in their words, they 'blow it up.'"

Designers like Stussy, Hilfiger, Polo, DK1MY and Nike have refused to crack down on the pirating of their

logos for T-shirts and baseball hats in the inner cities and several of them have clearly backed away from

serious attempts to curb rampant shoplifting. By now the big brands know that profits from logowear do not

just flow from the purchase of the garment but also from people seeing your logo on "the right people," as

Pepe Jeans' Phil Spur judiciously puts it. The truth is that the "got to be cool"

rhetoric of the global brands is,

more often than not, an indirect way of saying "got to be black." Just as the history of cool in America is

really (as many have argued) a history of African-American culture —from jazz and blues to rock and roll to

rap —for many of the superbrands, cool hunting simply means black-culture hunting. Which is why the cool

hunters' first stop was the basketball courts of America's poorest neighbourhoods.

The latest chapter in mainstream America's gold rush to poverty began in 1986, when rappers Run-DMC

breathed new life into Adidas products with their hit single "My Adidas," a homage to their favourite brand.

Already, the wildly popular rap trio had hordes of fans copying their signature style of gold medallions,

black-and-white Adidas tracksuits and low-cut Adidas sneakers, worn without laces. "We've been wearing


them all our lives," Darryl McDaniels (a k a DMC) said of his Adidas shoes at the time. That was fine for a

time, but after a while it occurred to Russell Simmons, the president of Run-DMC's label Def Jam Records,

that the boys should be getting paid for the promotion they were giving to Adidas.

He approached the

German shoe company about kicking in some money for the act's 1987 Together Forever tour. Adidas

executives were sceptical about being associated with rap music, which at that time was alternately

dismissed as a passing fad or vilified as an incitement to riot. To help change their minds, Simmons took a

couple of Adidas bigwigs to a Run-DMC show. Christopher Vaughn describes the event in Black Enterprise:

"At a crucial moment, while the rap group was performing the song ["My Adidas"], one of the members

yelled out, 'Okay, everybody in the house, rock your Adidas!' -and three thousand pairs of sneakers shot in

the air. The Adidas executives couldn't reach for their check books fast enough."

By the time of the annual

Atlanta sports-shoe Super Show that year, Adidas had unveiled its new line of Run-DMC shoes: the Super

Star and the Ultra Star —"designed to be worn without laces."

Since "My Adidas," nothing in inner-city branding has been left up to chance.

Major record labels like BMG

now hire "street crews" of urban black youth to talk up hip-hop albums in their communities and to go out on

guerril a-style postering and sticker missions. The L.A.-based Steven Rifkind Company bil s itself as a


marketing firm "specializing in building word-of-mouth in urban areas and inner cities." Rifkind is CEO of the

rap label Loud Records, and companies like Nike pay him hundreds of thousands of dollars to find out how

to make their brands cool with trend-setting black youth.

So focused is Nike on borrowing style, attitude and imagery from black urban youth that the company has

its own word for the practice: bro-ing. That's when Nike marketers and designers bring their prototypes to

inner-city neighbourhoods in Mew York, Philadelphia or Chicago and say, "Hey, bro, check out the shoes,"

to gauge the reaction to new styles and to build up a buzz. In an interview with journalist Josh Feit, Mike

designer Aaron Cooper described his bro-ing conversion in Harlem: "We go to the playground, and we

dump the shoes out. It's unbelievable. The kids go nuts. That's when you realize the importance of Nike.

Having kids tell you Nike is the number one thing in their life —number two is their girlfriend." Nike has even

succeeded in branding the basketball courts where it goes bro-ing through its philanthropic wing, P.L.A.Y

(Participate in the Lives of Youth). P.L.A.Y sponsors inner-city sports programs in exchange for high swoosh

visibility, including giant swooshes at the centre of resurfaced urban basketball courts. In tonier parts of the

city, that kind of thing would be called an ad and the space would come at a price, but on this side of the

tracks, Mike pays nothing, and files the cost under charity.

Tommy Hilfiger: To the Ghetto and Back Again


Tommy Hilfiger, even more than Nike or Adidas, has turned the harnessing of ghetto cool into a massmarketing

science. Hilfiger forged a formula that has since been imitated by Polo, Nautica, Munsingwear

(thanks to Puff Daddy's fondness for the penguin logo) and several other clothing companies looking for a

short cut to making it at the suburban mall with inner-city attitude.

Like a depoliticized, hyper-patriotic Benetton, Hilfiger ads are a tangle of Cape Cod multiculturalism:

scrubbed black faces lounging with their windswept white brothers and sisters in that great country club in

the sky, and always against the backdrop of a bil owing American flag. "By respecting one another we can

reach all cultures and communities," the company says. "We promote...the concept of living the American

dream." But the hard facts of Tommy's interracial financial success have less to do with finding common

ground between cultures than with the power and mythology embedded in America's deep racial

segregation.

Tommy Hilfiger started off squarely as white-preppy wear in the tradition of Ralph Lauren and Lacoste. But

the designer soon realized that his clothes also had a peculiar cachet in the inner cities, where the hip-hop

philosophy of "living large" saw poor and working-class kids acquiring status in the ghetto by adopting the

gear and accoutrements of prohibitively costly leisure activities, such as skiing, golfing, and even boating.


Perhaps to better position his brand within this urban fantasy, Hilfiger began to associate his clothes more

consciously with these sports, shooting ads at yacht clubs, beaches and other nautical locales. At the same

time, the clothes themselves were redesigned to appeal more directly to the hiphop aesthetic. Cultural

theorist Paul Smith describes the shift as "bolder colours, bigger and baggier styles, more hoods and cords,

and more prominence for logos and the Hilfiger name." He also plied rap artists like Snoop Dogg with free

clothes and, walking the tightrope between the yacht and the ghetto, launched a line of Tommy Hilfiger

beepers.

Once Tommy was firmly established as a ghetto thing, the real selling could begin

- not just to the

comparatively small market of poor inner-city youth but to the much larger market of middle-class white and

Asian kids who mimic black style in everything from lingo to sports to music.

Company sales reached $847

mil ion in 1998-up from a paltry $53 mil ion in 1991 when Hilfiger was stil , as Smith puts it, "Young

Republican clothing." Like so much of cool hunting, Hilfiger's marketing journey feeds off the alienation at

the heart of America's race relations: selling white youth on their fetishization of black style, and black youth

on their fetishization of white wealth.

Indie Inc.

Offering Fortune magazine readers advice on how to market to teenage girls, reporter Nina Munk writes that


"you have to pretend that they're running things.... Pretend you stil have to be discovered. Pretend the girls

are in charge." Being a huge corporation might sell on Wall Street, but as the brands soon learned on their

cool hunt, "indie" was the pitch on Cool Street. Many corporations were unfazed by this shift, coming out

with faux indie brands like Politix cigarettes from Moonlight Tobacco (courtesy of Philip Morris), Dave's

Cigarettes from Dave's Tobacco Company (Philip Morris again), Old Navy's mock army surplus (the Gap)

and OK Cola (Coke).

In an attempt to cash in on the indie marketing craze, even Coke itself, the most recognizable brand name

on earth, has tried to go underground. Fearing that it was too establishment for brand-conscious teens, the

company launched an ad campaign in Wisconsin that declared Coke the

"Unofficial State Drink." The

campaign included radio spots that were al egedly broadcast from a pirate radio station called EKOC: Coke

backward. Not to be outdone, Gap-owned Old Navy actually did launch its own pirate radio station to

promote its brand — a micro-band transmitter that could only be picked up in the immediate vicinity of one

of its Chicago bil boards. And in 1999, when Levi's decided it was high time to recoup its lost cool, it also

went indie, launching Red Line jeans (no mention of Levi's anywhere) and K-1

Khakis (no mention of Levi's

or Dockers).

Ironic Consumption: No Deconstruction Required


But Levi's may have, once again, missed a "paradigm shift." It hasn't taken long for these attempts to

seriously pitch the most generic of mass-produced products as punk-rock lifestyle choices to elicit sneers

from those ever-elusive, trend-setting cool kids, many of whom had already moved beyond indie by the time

the brands caught on. Instead, they were now finding ways to express their disdain for mass culture not by

opting out of it but by abandoning themselves to it entirely —but with a sly ironic twist. They were watching

Me/rose Place, eating surf 'n' turf in revolving restaurants, singing Frank Sinatra in karaoke bars and sipping

girly drinks in tikki bars, acts that were rendered hip and daring because, well, they were the ones doing

them. Not only were they making a subversive statement about a culture they could not physically escape,

they were rejecting the doctrinaire Puritanism of seventies feminism, the earnestness of the sixties quest for

authenticity and the "literal" readings of so many cultural critics. Welcome to ironic consumption. The

editors of the zine Hermenaut articulated the recipe:

Following the late ethnologist Michel de Certeau, we prefer to concentrate our attention on the independent

use of mass culture products, a use which, like the ruses of camouflaged fish and insects, may not

"overthrow the system," but which keeps us intact and autonomous within that system, which may be the

best for which we can hope.... Going to Disney World to drop acid and goof on Mickey isn't revolutionary;


going to Disney World in full knowledge of how ridiculous and evil it all is and stil having a great innocent

time, in some almost unconscious, even psychotic way, is something else altogether. This is what de

Certeau describes as "the art of being in-between," and this is the only path of true freedom in today's

culture. Let us, then, be in-between. Let us revel in Baywatch, Joe Camel, Wired magazine, and even

glossy books about the society of spectacle [touché], but let's never succumb to the glamorous allure of

these things.

In this complicated context, for brands to be truly cool, they need to layer this uncool-equals-cool aesthetic

of the ironic viewer onto their pitch: they need to self-mock, talk back to themselves while they are talking,

be used and new simultaneously. And after the brands and their cool hunters had tagged all the available

fringe culture, it seemed only natural to fil up that narrow little strip of unmarketed brain space occupied by

irony with preplanned knowing smirks, someone else's couch commentary and even a running simulation of

the viewer's thought patterns. "The New Trash brands," remarks writer Nick Compton of kitsch lifestyle

companies like Diesel, "offer inverted commas big enough to live, love and laugh within."

Pop Up Videos, the VH1 show that adorns music videos with snarky thought bubbles, may be the endgame

of this kind of commercial irony. It grabs the punch line before anyone else can get to it, making social


commentary - even idle sneering - if not redundant then barely worth the expense of energy.

Irony's cozy, protected, self-referential niche is a much better fit than attempts to earnestly pass off fruit

drinks as underground rock bands or sneakers as gangsta rappers. In fact, for brands in search of cool new

identities, irony and camp have become so all-purpose that they even work after the fact. It turns out that

the so-bad-it's-good marketing spin can be deployed to resuscitate hopelessly uncool brands and failed

cultural products. Six months after the movie Showgirls flopped in the theatres, for instance, MGM got wind

that the sexploitation flick was doing okay on video, and not just as a quasi-respectable porno. It seemed

that groups of trendy twenty-something’s were throwing Showgirls irony parties, laughing sardonically at the

implausibly poor screenplay and shrieking with horror at the aerobic sexual encounters. Not content to

pocket the video returns, MGM decided to relaunch the movie in the theatres as the next Rocky Horror

Picture Show. This time around, the newspaper ads made no pretence that anyone had seriously admired

the film. Instead, they quoted from the abysmal reviews, and declared Showgirls an "instant camp classic"

and "a rich sleazy kitsch-fest." The studio even hired a troupe of drag queens for the New York screenings

to holler at the crowd with bullhorns during particularly egregious cinematic moments.


With the tentacles of branding reaching into every crevice of youth culture, leaching brand-image content

not only out of street styles like hip-hop but psychological attitudes like ironic detachment, the cool hunt has

had to go further afield to find unpilfered space and that left only one frontier: the past.

What is retro, after al , but history re-consumed with a PepsiCo tie-in and breath-mint and phone-card brand

extensions? As the re-release of lost in Space, the Star Wars trilogy, and the launch of The Phantom

Menace made clear, the mantra of retro entertainment seems to be "Once more with synergy!" as

Hollywood travels back in time to cash in on merchandising opportunities beyond the imagination of

yesterday's marketers.

Sell or Be Sold

After almost a decade of the branding frenzy, cool hunting has become an internal contradiction: the hunters

must rarefy youth "microcultures" by claiming that only full-time hunters have the know-how to unearth them

— or else why hire cool hunters at all? Sputnik warns its clients that if the cool trend is "visible in your

neighbourhood or crowding your nearest mall, the learning is over. It's too late....

You need to get down with

the streets, to be in the trenches every day." And yet this is demonstrably false; so-called street fashions -

many of them planted by brandmasters like Nike and Hilfiger from day one —

reach the ballooning industry


of glossy youth-culture magazines and video stations without a heartbeat's delay.

And if there is one thing

virtually every young person now knows, it's that street style and youth culture are infinitely marketable

commodities.

Besides, even if there was a lost indigenous tribe of cool a few years back, rest assured that it no longer

exists. It turns out that the prevailing legalized forms of youth stalking are only the tip of the iceberg: the

Sputnik vision for the future of hip marketing is for companies to hire armies of Sputnik spawns —young

"street promoters," "Net promoters" and "street distributors" who wil hype brands one-on-one on the street,

in the clubs and on-line. "Use the magic of peer-to-peer distribution — it worked in the freestyle sport

cultures, mainly because the promoters were their friends.... Street promoting wil survive as the only true

means of personally 'spreading the word.'" So all arrows point to more jobs for the ballooning industry of

"street snitches," certified representatives of their demographic who wil happily become walking

infomercials for Nike, Reebok and Levi's.

By fall 1998 it had already started to happen with the Korean car manufacturer Daewoo hiring two thousand

college students on two hundred campuses to talk up the cars to their friends.

Similarly, Anheuser-Busch

keeps troops of U.S. college frat boys and "Bud Girls" on its payroll to promote Budweiser beer at campus


parties and bars.' The vision is both horrifying and hilarious: a world of glorified diary trespassers and

professional eavesdroppers, part of a spy-vs.-spy corporate-fuelled youth culture stalking itself, whose

members wil videotape one another's haircuts and chat about their corporate keepers' cool new products in

their grassroots newsgroups.

Rock-and-Roll CEOs

There is an amusing irony in the fact that so many of our captains of industry pay cool hunters good money

to lead them on the path to brand-image nirvana. The true barometers of hip are not the hunters, the postmodern

admen, the change agents or even those trendy teenagers they're all madly chasing. They are the

CEOs themselves, who are, for the most part, so damn rich that they can afford to stay on top of all the

coolest culture trends. Guys like Diesel Jeans founder Renzo Rosso, who, according to Business Week,

"rides to work on a Ducati Monster motorcycle." Or Nike's Phil Knight, who only took off his ever-present

wraparound Oakley sunglasses after Oakley CEO Jim Jannard refused to sell him the company. Or famed

admen Dan Wieden and David Kennedy who built a basketball court — complete with bleachers —in their

corporate headquarters. Or Virgin's Richard Branson, who launched a London bridal store in a wedding

dress, rappelled off the roof of his new Vancouver mega store while uncorking a bottle of champagne and


then later crash-landed in the Algerian desert in his hot-air balloon — all during the month of December

1996. These CEOs are the new rock stars —and why shouldn't they be? Forever trailing the scent of cool,

they are full-time, professional teenagers, but unlike real teenagers, they have nothing to distract them from

the hot pursuit of the edge: no homework, puberty, college-entrance exams or curfews for them.

Getting Over It

As we wil see later on, the sheer voracity of the corporate cool hunt did much to provoke the rise of brandbased

activism: through adbusting, computer hacking and spontaneous il egal street parties, young people

all over the world are aggressively reclaiming space from the corporate world, "unbranding" it, guerril astyle.

But the effectiveness of the cool hunt also set the stage for Anticorporate activism in another way:

inadvertently, it exposed the impotence of almost all other forms of political resistance except anti-corporate

resistance, one cutting-edge marketing trend at a time.

When the youth-culture feeding frenzy began in the early nineties, many of us who were young at the time

saw ourselves as victims of a predatory marketing machine that co-opted our identities, our styles and our

ideas and turned them into brand food. Nothing was immune: not punk, not hiphop, not fetish, not techno

— not even, as I'l get to in Chapter 5, campus feminism or multiculturalism. Few of us asked, at least not


right away, why it was that these scenes and ideas were proving so packageable, so unthreatening - and so

profitable. Many of us had been certain we were doing something subversive and rebellious but...what was it

again?

In retrospect, a central problem was the mostly unquestioned assumption that just because a scene or style

is different (that is, new and not yet mainstream), it necessarily exists in opposition to the mainstream,

rather than simply sitting unthreateningly on its margins. Many of us assumed that

"alternative" — music

that was hard to listen to, styles that were hard to look at —was also anticommercial, even socialist. In

Hype!, a documentary about how the discovery of "the Seattle sound" transformed a do-it-yourself hardcore

scene into an international youth-culture-content factory, Pearl Jam's Eddie Vedder makes a rather moving

speech about the emptiness of the "alternative" breakthrough of which his band was so emblematic:

If all of this influence that this part of the country has and this musical scene has

— if it doesn't do anything

with it, that would be the tragedy. If it doesn't do anything with it like make some kind of change or make

some kind of difference, this group of people who feel this certain way, who think these sorts of things that

the underdogs we've al met and lived with think — if they finally get to the forefront and nothing comes out

of it, that would be the tragedy.


But that tragedy has already happened, and Vedder's inability to spit out what he was actually trying to say

had more than a little to do with it. When the world's cameras were turned on Seattle, all we got were a few

anti-establishment fuck-yous, a handful of overdoses and Kurt Cobain's suicide.

We also got the decade's

most spectacular "sell-out" — Courtney Love's awe-inspiring sail from junkie punk queen to high-fashion

cover girl in a span of two years. It seemed Courtney had been playing dress-up all along. What was

revealing was how little it mattered. Did Love betray some karmic debt she owed to smudged eyeliner? To

not caring about anything and shooting up? To being surly to the press? Don't you need to buy in to

something earnestly before you can sell it out cynically?

Seattle imploded precisely because no one wanted to answer questions like those, and yet in the case of

Cobain, and even Vedder, many in its scene possessed a genuine, if malleable, disdain for the trappings of

commercialism. What was "sold out" in Seattle, and in every other subculture that has had the misfortune of

being spotlighted by the cool hunters, was some pure idea about doing it yourself, about independent labels

versus the big corporations, about not buying in to the capitalist machine. But few in that scene bothered to

articulate these ideas out loud, and Seattle — long dead and forgotten as anything but a rather derivative

fad — now serves as a cautionary tale about why so little opposition to the theft of cultural space took place


in the early to mid-nineties. Trapped in the headlights of irony and carrying too much pop-culture baggage,

not one of its antiheroes could commit to a single, solid political position.

A similar challenge is now being faced by all those ironic consumers out there —

a cultural suit of armour

many of us are loath to critique because it lets us feel smug while watching limitless amounts of bad TV.

Unfortunately, it's tough to hold on to that subtle state of De Certeau's "in-betweenness" when the eighthundred-

pound culture industry goril a wants to sit next to us on the couch and tag along on our ironic trips

to the mall. That art of being in-between, of being ironic, or camp, which Susan Sontag so bril iantly

il uminated in her 1964 essay "Notes on Camp," is based on an essential cliquiness, a club of people who

get the aesthetic puns. "To talk about camp is therefore to betray it," she acknowledges at the beginning of

the essay, selecting the format of enumerated notes rather than a narrative so as to tread more lightly on

her subject, one that could easily have been trampled with too heavy an approach.

Since the publication of Sontag's piece, camp has been quantified, measured, weighed, focus-grouped and

test-marketed. To say it has been betrayed, as Sontag had feared, is an understatement of colossal

dimensions. What's left is little more than a vaguely sarcastic way to eat Pizza Pops. Camp cannot exist in

an ironic commercial culture in which no one is fully participating and everyone is an outsider inside their


clothes, because, as Sontag writes, "In naive, or pure, Camp, the essential element is seriousness, a

seriousness that fails."

Much of the early camp culture that Sontag describes involved using an act of imagination to make the

marginal — even the despised — glamorous and fabulous. Drag queens, for instance, took their forced exile

and turned it into a ball, with all the trappings of the Hollywood balls to which they would never be invited.

The same can even be said of Andy Warhol. The man who took the world on a camping trip was a refugee

from bigoted small-town America; the Factory became his sovereign state. Sontag proposed camp as a

defence mechanism against the banality, ugliness and overearnest-ness of mass culture. "Camp is the

modern dandyism. Camp is the answer to the problem: how to be a dandy in the age of mass culture." Only

now, some thirty-five years later, we are faced with the vastly more difficult question, How to be truly critical

in an age of mass camp?

Or perhaps it is not that difficult. Yes, the cool hunters reduce vibrant cultural ideas to the status of

archaeological artefacts, and drain away whatever meaning they once held for the people who lived with

them — but this has always been the case. It's a cinch to co-opt a style; and it has been done many times

before, on a much grander scale than the minor takeover of drag and grunge.

Bauhaus modernism, for


example, had its roots in the imaginings of a socialist Utopia free of garish adornment, but it was almost

immediately appropriated as the relatively inexpensive architecture of choice for the glass-and-steel

skyscrapers of corporate America.

On the other hand, though style-based movements are stripped of their original meanings time and time

again, the effect of this culture vulturing on more politically grounded movements is often so ludicrous that

the most sensible reaction is just to laugh it off. The spring 1998 Prada collection, for instance, borrowed

heavily from the struggle of the labour movement. As "supershopper" Karen von Hahn reported from Milan,

"The collection, a sort of Maoist/Soviet-worker chic full of witty period references, was shown in a Pradablue

room in the Prada family palazzo to an exclusive few." She adds, "After the show, the small yet ardent

group of devotees tossed back champagne cocktails and canapés while urbane jazz played in the

background."

Mao and Lenin also make an appearance on a Spring 1999 handbag from Red or Dead. Yet despite these

clear co-optations of the class struggle, one hardly expects the labour movements of the world to toss in the

towel in a huff, give up on their demands for decent working conditions and labour standards worldwide

because Mao is suddenly the It Boy in Milan. Neither are union members everywhere accepting wage


rollbacks because Pizza Hut aired a commercial in which the boss delivers pizzas to a picket line and all

anti-management animosity is abandoned in favour of free food.

The Tibetan people in the West seem similarly nonplussed by their continued popularity with the Beastie

Boys, Brad Pitt and designer Anna Sui, who was so moved by their struggle that she made an entire line of

banana-print bikini tops and surfer shorts inspired by the Chinese occupation (Women's Wear Daily dubbed

the Tibet line "techno beach blanket bingo"). More indifference has met Apple computers' appropriation of

Gandhi for their "Think Different" campaign, and Che Guevara's reincarnation as the logo for Revolution

Soda (slogan: "Join the Revolution"; see image on page 62) and as the mascot of the upscale London cigar

lounge, Che. Why? Because not one of the movements being "co-opted"

expressed itself primarily through

style or attitude. And so style co-optation — and indeed any outside-the-box brainstorming on Madison

Avenue - does not have the power to undo them either.

It may seem cold comfort, but now that we know advertising is an extreme sport and CEOs are the new rock

stars, it's worth remembering that extreme sports are not political movements and rock, despite its historic

claims to the contrary, is not revolution. In fact, to determine whether a movement genuinely challenges the

structures of economic and political power, one need only measure how affected it is by the goings-on in the


fashion and advertising industries. If, even after being singled out as the latest fad, it continues as if nothing

had happened, it's a good bet it is a real movement. If it spawns an industry of speculation about whether

movement X has lost its "edge," perhaps its adherents should be looking for a sharper utensil. And as we

wil soon see, that is exactly what many young activists are in the process of doing.

[IMAGE]

Top: Image from 1984 Apple television campaign; Apple has been a major promoter of technology if

classrooms. Bottom: Channel One is broadcast in 12,000 U.S. schools.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE BRANDING OF LEARNING

Ads in Schools and Universities

A democratic system of education... is one of the surest ways of creating and greatly extending markets for

goods of all kinds and especially those goods in which fashion may play a part.

-Ex-adman James Rorly, Our Master's Voice. 1934

Although the brands seem to be everywhere - at kids' concerts, next to them on the couch, on stage with

their heroes, in their on-line chat groups, and on their playing fields and basketball courts - for a long time

one major unbranded youth frontier remained: a place where young people gathered, talked, sneaked

smokes, made out, formed opinions and, most maddeningly of all, stood around looking cool for hours on

end. That place is called school. And clearly, the brands had to get into the schools.


"You'l agree that the youth market is an untapped wellspring of new revenue.

You'l also agree that the

youth market spends the majority of each day inside the schoolhouse. Now the problem is, how do you

reach that market?" asks a typically tantalizing brochure from the Fourth Annual Kid Power Marketing

Conference.

As we have just seen, marketers and cool hunters have spent the better part of the decade hustling the

brands back to high school and pouring them into the template of the teenage outlaw. Several of the most

successful brands had even cast their corporate headquarters as private schools, referring to them as

"campuses" and, at the Nike World Campus, nicknaming one edifice "the student union building." Even the

cool hunters are going highbrow; by the late nineties, the rage in the industry was to recast oneself less as a

trendy club-hopper than as a bookish grad student. In fact, some insist they aren't cool hunters at all but

rather "urban anthropologists."

And yet despite their up-to-the-minute outfits and intellectual pretensions, the brands and their keepers stil

found themselves on the wrong side of the school gate, a truly intolerable state of affairs and. one that

would not last long. American marketing consultant Jack Al yers described the insufferable slight like this:

"The choice we have in this country [the U.S.] is for our educational system to join the electronic age and


communicate to students in ways they can understand and to which they can relate. Or our schools can

continue to use outmoded forms of communications and become the daytime prisons for mil ions of young

people, as they have become in our inner cities."' This reasoning, which baldly equates corporate access to

the schools with access to modern technology, and by extension to the future itself, is at the core of how the

brands have managed, over the course of only one decade, to all but eliminate the barrier between ads and

education. It was technology that lent a new urgency to nineties chronic under funding: at the same time as

schools were facing ever-deeper budget cuts, the costs of delivering a modern education were rising

steeply, forcing many educators to look to alternative funding sources for help.

Swept up by info-tech hype,

schools that couldn't afford up-to-date textbooks were suddenly expected to provide students with

audiovisual equipment, video cameras, classroom computers, desktop publishing capacity, the latest

educational software programs, Intern-et access —even, at some schools, video-conferencing.

As many education experts have pointed out, the pedagogical benefits technology brings to the classroom

are dubious at best, but the fact remains that employers are clamouring for tech-trained graduates and

chances are the private school down the street or across town is equipped with all the latest gadgets and


toys. In this context, corporate partnerships and sponsorship arrangements have seemed to many public

schools, particularly those in poorer areas, to be the only possible way out of the high-tech bind. If the price

of staying modern is opening the schools to ads, the thinking goes, then parents and teachers wil have to

grin and bear it.

The fact that more schools are turning to the private sector to finance technology purchases does not mean

that governments are relinquishing any role in supplying public schools with computers. Quite the opposite.

A growing number of politicians are making a computer on every desk a key plank in their election

platforms, albeit in partnership with local businesses. But in the process school boards are draining money

out of programs like music and physical education to finance this high-tech dream

— and here too they are

opening the door to corporate sponsorships and to direct forms of brand promotion in cash-strapped

cafeterias and sports programs.

As fast-food, athletic gear and computer companies step in to fil the gap, they carry with them an

educational agenda of their own. As with all branding projects, it is never enough to tag the schools with a

few logos. Having gained a foothold, the brand managers are now doing what they have done in music,

sports and journalism outside the schools: trying to overwhelm their host, to grab the spotlight. They are


fighting for their brands to become not the add-on but the subject of education, not an elective but the core

curriculum.

Of course the companies crashing the school gate have nothing against education. Students should by all

means learn, they say, but why don't they read about our company, write about our brand, research their

own brand preferences or come up with a drawing for our next ad campaign?

Teaching students and

building brand awareness, these corporations seem to believe, can be two aspects of the same project.

Which is where Channel One, owned by K-l l Communications, and its Canadian counterpart, the Youth

Mews Network, come in, perhaps the best-known example of in-school branding.

At the beginning of the decade, these self-styled in-school broadcasters approached North American school

boards with a proposition. They asked them to open their classrooms to two minutes of television

advertising a day, sandwiched between twelve minutes of teenybopper current affairs programming. Many

schools consented, and the broadcasts soon aired. Turning off the cheerful ad patter is not an option. Not

only is the programming mandatory viewing for students, but teachers are unable to adjust the volume of

the broadcast, especially during commercials. In exchange, the schools do not receive direct revenue from

the stations but they can use the much-coveted audiovisual equipment for other lessons and, in some

cases, receive "free" computers.


Channel One, meanwhile, charges advertisers top dollar for accessing its pipeline to classrooms — twice as

much as regular TV stations because, with mandatory attendance and no channel-changing or volume

control, it can boast something no other broadcaster can: "No audience erosion."

The station now boasts a

presence in 12,000 schools, reaching an estimated eight mil ion students (see image on page 86).

When those students aren't watching Channel One or surfing with ZapMe!, an in-school Internet browser

first offered free to American schools in 1998, they may turn their attention to their textbooks —and those

too may be sending out more messages to "Just Do It" or "CK Be." The Cover Concepts company sells slick

ads that wrap around books to 30,000 U.S. schools, where teachers use them instead of plastic or tinfoil as

protective jackets. And when lunchtime arrives, more ads are literally on the menu at many schools. In

1997, Twentieth Century-Fox managed to get cafeteria menu items named after characters from its film

Anastasia in forty U.S. elementary schools. Students could dine on "Rasputin RibB-Cue on Bartok Bun"

and "Dimitri's Peanut Butter Fudge." Disney and Kellogg's have engaged in similar lunch-menu promotions

through School Marketing, a company that describes itself as a "school-lunch ad agency."

Competing with the menu sponsors are the fast-food chains themselves, chains that go head-to-head with


cafeterias in 13 percent of U.S. schools. In an arrangement that was unheard of in the eighties, companies

like McDonald's and Burger King now set up kiosks in lunchrooms, which they advertise around the school.

Subway supplies 767 schools with sandwiches; Pizza Hut corners the market in approximately 4,000

schools; and a staggering 20,000 schools participate in Taco Bell's "frozen burrito product line." A Subway

sandwich guide about how to access the in-school market advises franchisees to pitch their brand-name

food to school boards as a way to keep students from sneaking out at lunch hour and getting into trouble.

"Look for situations where the local school board has a closed campus policy for lunch. If they do, a strong

case can be made for branded product to keep the students on campus." The argument works for

administrators such as Bob Honson, the director of nutritional services for the Portland, Oregon, school

district. "Kids come to us with brand preferences," he explains.

Not all students' brand preferences, however, are accommodated with equal enthusiasm. Since the fastfood

outposts don't accept vouchers from kids on the federal lunch program and their food is usually twice

as expensive as cafeteria fare, kids from poor families are stuck with mystery meat while their wealthier

classmates lunch on Pizza Hut pizza and Big Macs. And they can't even look forward to days when the

cafeteria serves pizza or cheeseburgers, since many schools have signed agreements with the chains that


prohibit them from serving "generic versions" of fast-food items: no-name burgers, it seems, constitute

"unfair competition."

Students may also find that brand wars are being waged over the pop machine outside the gym. In Canada

and the U.S., many school boards have given exclusive vending rights to the Pepsi-Cola Company in

exchange for generally undisclosed lump sums. What Pepsi negotiates in return varies from district to

district. In Toronto, it gets to fil the 560 public schools with its vending machines, to block the sales of Coke

and other competitors, and to distribute "Pepsi Achievement Awards" and other goodies emblazoned with its

logo. In communities like Cayuga, a rural Ontario tobacco-farming town, Pepsi buys the right to brand entire

schools. "Pepsi - Official Soft Drink of Cayuga Secondary School" reads the giant sign beside the road. At

South Fork High School in Florida, there is a blunt, hard-sell arrangement: the school has a clause in its

Pepsi contract committing the school to "make its best effort to maximize all sales opportunities for Pepsi-Cola products."

Similarly bizarre and haphazard corporate promotions arrangements are thrown together on college and

university campuses around the world. At almost every university in North America, advertising bil boards

appear on campus bicycle racks, on benches, in hallways linking lecture halls, in libraries and even in


bathroom stalls. Credit-card companies and long-distance phone carriers solicit students from the moment

they receive their orientation-week information kit to the instant after they receive their degree; at some

schools, diplomas come with an envelope stuffed with coupons, credit offers and advertising flyers. In the

U.S. Barnes Noble is rapidly replacing campus-owned bookstores, and Chapters has similar plans in

Canada. Taco Bells, KFCs, Starbucks and Pizza Huts are already fixtures on university campuses, where

they are often clumped together in food courts inside on-campus malls.

Not surprisingly, in the U.S and Canada the fiercest scholastic marketing battles are fought over high-school

gym class and university athletics. The top high-school basketball teams have sponsorship deals with Nike

and Adidas, which deck out teenagers in swoosh- and stripe-festooned shoes, warm-ups and gym bags. At

the university level, Nike has sponsorship deals with more than two hundred campus athletics departments

in the U.S. and twelve in Canada. As anyone familiar with college ball well knows, the standard

arrangement gives the company the right to stamp the swoosh on uniforms, sports gear, official university

merchandise and apparel, on stadium seats and, most important, on ad banners in full view of the cameras

that televise high-profile games. Since student players can't get paid in amateur athletics, it is the coaches

who receive the corporate money to dress their teams in the right logos, and the amounts at stake are huge.


Nike pays individual coaches as much as $1.5 mil ion in sponsorship fees at top sports universities like

Duke and North Carolina, sums that make the coaches' salaries look like tokens of appreciation.

As educational institutions surrender to the manic march of branding, a new language is emerging. Nike

high schools and universities square off against their Adidas rivals: the teams may well have their own

"official drink," either Coke or Pepsi. In its daily broadcasts, Channel One makes frequent references to the

goings-on at "Channel One schools." Wil iam Hoynes, a sociologist at Vassar College who conducted a

study on the broadcaster, says the practice is "part of a broader marketing approach to develop a 'brand

name' consciousness of the network, including the promotion of the 'Channel One school' identity."

As several critics have pointed out, Channel One isn't just hawking its advertisers'

sneakers and candy to

school kids, it is also selling the idea that its own programming is an invaluable educational aid, one that

modernizes such arid, outmoded educational resources as books and teachers. In the model advanced by

these broadcasters, the process of learning is little more than the transferring of

"stuff to a student's brain.

Whether that stuff happens to be about a new blockbuster from Disney or the Pythagorean theorem, the net

effect, according to this theory, is the same: more stuff stuffed. So Fox's attempts to flog Anastasia in


schools didn't stop with lunch-menu ads; it also provided teachers with an

"Anastasia study guide." Jeffrey

Godsick, Fox senior vice president of publicity and promotion, explained that Fox was providing a service to

the schools, not the other way around. "Public school teachers are desperate for materials that wil excite

the kids," he said.

It's impossible to know which teachers use these branded materials in class and which ones toss them

away, but a report published by the U.S. Consumers Union in 1995 "found that thousands of corporations

were targeting school children or their teachers with marketing activities ranging from teaching videos, to

guidebooks, and posters to contests, product giveaways, and coupons."

It wil come as no surprise that it is the folks at the Nike World Campus who have devised the most

advanced hybrid of in-class advertisement, public relations exercise and faux teaching aid: the "Air-to-Earth" lesson kit. During the 1997-98 academic year, elementary school students in more than eight

hundred classrooms across the U.S. sat down at their desks to find that today's lesson was building a Nike

sneaker, complete with a swoosh and an endorsement from an NBA star. Called a

"despicable use of

classroom time" by the National Education Association and "the warping of education" by the Consumers

Union, the make-your-own-Nike exercise purports to raise awareness about the company's environmentally


sensitive production process. Nike's claim to greenness relies heavily on the fact that the company recycles

old sneakers to re-cover community centre basketball courts, which, in a postmodern marketing spiral, it

then brands with the Nike swoosh.

Hey, Kids! Be a Self-Promoter!

In a corporate climate obsessed with finding the secret recipe for cool, there are stil more in-school

resources to tap. After all, if there is one thing the cool hunters have taught us, it's that groups of kids aren't

just lowly consumers: they are also card-carrying representatives of their age demographic. In the eyes of

the brand managers, every lunchroom and classroom is a focus group waiting to be focused. So getting

access to schools means more than just hawking product —it's a bona fide, bargain-basement cool-hunting

opportunity.

For this reason, the in-school computer network ZapMe! doesn't merely sell ad space to its sponsors; it also

monitors students' paths as they surf the Net and provides this valuable market research, broken down by

the students' sex, age and zip code, to its advertisers. Then, when students log on to ZapMe!, they are

treated to ads that have been specially "micro-targeted" for them. This kind of detailed market research is

exploding in North American schools: weekly focus groups, taste tests, brand-preference questionnaires,

opinion polls, panel discussions on the Internet, al are currently being used inside classrooms. And in a feat


of peer-on-peer cool hunting, some market researchers have been experimenting with sending kids home

from school with disposable cameras to take pictures of their friends and family —

returning with

documented evidence, in one assignment conducted for Nike, "of their favourite place to hang out."

Exercises like these are "educational" and "empowering" the market researchers argue, and some

educators agree. In explaining the merits of a cereal taste test, the principal of Our Lady of Assumption

elementary school in Lynnfield, Massachusetts, said: "It's a learning experience.

They had to read, they had

to look, they had to compare.""

Channel One is pushing the market-research model even further, frequently enlisting "partner" teachers to

develop class lessons in which students are asked to create a new ad campaign for Snapple or to redesign

Pepsi's vending machines. In New York and Los Angeles high-school students have created thirty-second

animated spots for Starburst fruit candies, and students in Colorado Springs designed Burger King ads to

hang in their school buses.'2 Finished assignments are passed on to the companies and the best entries win

prizes and may even be adopted by the companies — all subsidized by the taxpayer-funded school system.

At Vancouver's Laurier Annex school, students in Grades 3 and 4 designed two new product lines for the

British Columbia restaurant chain White Spot. For several months in 1997, the children worked on


developing the concept and packaging for "Zippy" pizza burgers, a product that is now on the kids' menu at

White Spot. The following year, they designed an entire concept for birthday parties to be held at the chain.

The students' corporate presentation included "sample commercials, menu items, party games invented by

the students and cake ideas," taking into account such issues as safety, possible food allergies, low costs

"and allowing for flexibility." According to nine-year-old Jeffrey Ye, "It was a lot of work."

Perhaps the most infamous of these experiments occurred in 1998, when Coca-Cola ran a competition

asking several schools to come up with a strategy for distributing Coke coupons to students. The school that

devised the best promotional strategy would win $500. Greenbriar High School in Evans, Georgia, took the

contest extremely seriously, calling an official Coke Day in late March during which all students came to

school in Coca-Cola T-shirts, posed for a photograph in a formation spelling Coke, attended lectures given

by Coca-Cola executives and learned about all things black and bubbly in their classes. It was a little piece

of branding heaven until it came to the principal's attention that in an act of hideous defiance, one Mike

Cameron, a nineteen-year-old senior, had come to school wearing a T-shirt with a Pepsi logo. He was

promptly suspended for the offence. "I know it sounds bad — 'Child suspended for wearing Pepsi shirt on


Coke Day,'" said principal Gloria Hamilton. "It really would have been acceptable...if it had just been inhouse,

but we had the regional president here and people flew in from Atlanta to do us the honour of being

resource speakers. These students knew we had guests."

Though all public institutions are starved for new sources of income, most schools and universities do try to

set limits. When York University's Atkinson College sent out a call to donors in 1997 stating that "for a gift of

$10,000... you or your corporation can become the official sponsor for the development and design of one

of our new multi-media, high-tech courses," the college insisted that only the courses' names were for sale

— not their content. Roger Trull, who brokers deals with corporations at Ontario's McMaster University,

explains where he draws the line: "They have to be things that don't impact on academics," meaning only

extracurricular sponsorship. Besides, many point out that before lunchrooms and letter-man sweaters went

brand-name, schools weren't exactly corporate-free turf. Advertising historian Stuart Ewen writes that as

early as the 1920s, teaching kids to consume was seen as just another way of promoting patriotism and

economic well-being.

Back then, toothbrush companies visited American schools to conduct "toothpaste dril s" and cocoa

producers made cameos in science class to demonstrate "the various stages in the production of cocoa."


And in more recent history, commercialism had already become a major part of campus life before the

brands even arrived. For instance, U.S. college sports is a big business in its own right with sales of

merchandise generating $2.75 bil ion in 1997, a higher figure than the merchandising sales of the National

Basketball Association, Major League Baseball and the National Hockey League.

And well before the fastfood

invasion, many cafeterias had already been contracted out to companies like Marriott and Cara, which

also specialize in providing airlines and hospitals with institutional glop.

For these catering giants, however, faceless and generic was their calling card —

the very antithesis of

branding. When the prima-Donna brands arrived on campus, they brought their preening and posturing

values with them, introducing to schools new concepts like corporate image control, logo visibility, brandextension

opportunities and the fierce protection of trade secrets. And this collision of the dictates of

academia with the dictates of branding often proves uncomfortable. At the University of British Columbia,

for instance, students have been unable to find out what is in the text of an agreement between their school

and the Coca-Cola Company. Despite the fact that UBC is a publicly funded institution, the soft-drink

company demanded that the amount it paid for the vending rights are kept secret for reasons of corporate

competitiveness. (Coca-Cola also refused to cooperate with requests for information for this book, claiming


that all of its campus activities — including the precise number' of campuses with which it has agreements

— are confidential "for competitive purposes.") In May 1996, students and faculty at the University of Wisconsin at Madison did find out what was in the text

of a sponsorship deal their administration was about to sign with Reebok —and they didn't like what they

discovered. The deal contained a "non-disparagement" clause that prohibited members of the university

community from criticizing the athletic gear company. The clause stated: "During and for a reasonable time

after the term, the University wil not issue any official statement that disparages Reebok. Additionally, the

University wil promptly take all reasonable steps necessary to address any remark by any University

employee, agent or representative, including a Coach, that disparages Reebok, Reebok's products or the

advertising agency or others connected with Reebok." Reebok agreed to nix the demand after students and

faculty members launched an educational campaign about the company's patchy record on labour rights in

Southeast Asia. What was exceptional about the Wisconsin clause is that the university community found

out about it before the deal was signed. This has not been the case at other universities where athletic

departments have quietly entered into multimil ion-dollar deals that contained similar gag orders. The

University of Kentucky's deal with Nike, for instance, has a clause that states that the company has the right


to terminate the five-year $25 mil ion contract if the "University disparages the Nike brand... or takes any

other action inconsistent with the endorsement of Nike products." Nike denies that its motivation is to stifle

campus critics.

Regardless of the intentions when the deals are inked, the fact is that campus expression is often stifled

when it conflicts with the interests of a corporate sponsor. For example, at Kent State University —one of

the U.S. campuses at which Coca-Cola has exclusive vending rights — members of the Amnesty

International chapter advocated a boycott of the soft drink because Coca-Cola did business with the sinceousted

Nigerian dictatorship. In April 1998, the activists made a routine application to their student council

for funding to bring in a human-rights speaker from the Free Nigeria Movement.

"Is he going to speak

negatively about Coca-Cola?" a council member asked. "Because Coca-Cola does a lot of positive things

on our campus like helping organizations and sports." The representatives from Amnesty replied that the

speaker would indeed have some negative comments to make about the company's involvement in Nigeria

and funding for the event was denied.

On some university campuses, protests critical of a corporate sponsor have been effectively blocked. In

August 1996, Tennis Canada hosted the DuMaurier Tennis Open Tournament, sponsored by Imperial


Tobacco, at York University. Concerned that neither a university nor a sporting event should be seen to be

endorsing tobacco products, an anti-smoking group, the Grim Reaper Society, asked York for permission to

pass out pamphlets to students and tournament goers near the university stadium.

Susan Mann, the

president of York University, refused the request, saying the school did not

"normally" allow "interest

groups" on campus "unless for University purposes." Activists handed out cards and leaflets to motorists at

a traffic light just outside the entrance to York and, on the last day of the tournament, they staged a clever

culture-jam: the leaflets they handed out were shaped like fans. Clearly amused, many of the tournament

goers brought their fans inside the tennis stadium, cooling themselves off with anti-tobacco slogans. After a

few hours, police officers hired by the tournament approached the peaceful, off-site protest and, citing traffic

problems, ticketed two of the activists and seized all the remaining fans.

These are extreme examples of how corporate sponsorship deals re-engineer some of the fundamental

values of public universities, including financial transparency and the right to open debate and peaceful

protest on campus. But the subtle effects are equally disturbing. Many professors speak of the slow

encroachment of the mall mentality, arguing that the more campuses act and look like malls, the more

students behave like consumers. They tell stories of students fil ing out their course-evaluation forms with


all the smug self-righteousness of a tourist responding to a customer-satisfaction form at a large hotel chain.

"Most of all I dislike the attitude of calm consumer expertise that pervades the responses. I'm disturbed by

the serene belief that my function —and more important, Freud's, or Shakespeare's, or Blake's —is to

divert, entertain, and interest," writes University of Virginia professor Mark Edmundson in Harper's

magazine. A professor at Toronto's York University, where there is a full-fledged mall on campus, tells me

that his students slip into class slurping grande lattes, chat in the back and slip out. They're cruising,

shopping, disengaged.

Branding U

While brands slowly transform the experience of campus life for undergraduates, another kind of takeover is

under way at the institutional research level. Al over the world, university campuses are offering their

research facilities, and priceless academic credibility, for the brands to use as they please. And in North

America today, corporate research partnerships at universities are used for everything: designing new Nike

skates, developing more efficient oil extraction techniques for Shell, assessing the Asian market's stability

for Disney, testing the consumer demand for higher bandwidth for Bell or measuring the relative merits of a

brand-name drug compared with a generic one, to name just a few examples.

Dr. Betty Dong, a medical researcher at the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF), had the


misfortune of taking on that last assignment -testing a brand-name drug with brand-name money. Dong was

the director of a study sponsored by the British pharmaceutical company Boots (now called Knoll) and

UCSF. The fate of that partnership does much to il uminate precisely how the mandate of universities as

sites for public-interest research is often squarely at odds with the interests of branded fact-finding missions.

Dr. Dong's study compared the effectiveness of Boots' thyroid drug, Synthroid, with a generic competitor.

The company hoped that the research would prove that its much higher priced drug was better or at least

substantially different from the generic one — a claim that, if legitimized by a study from a respected

university, would increase Synthroid sales. Instead, Dr. Dong found that the opposite was true. The two

drugs were bio-equivalent, a fact that represented a potential saving of $365

mil ion a year for the eight

mil ion Americans who were taking the name-brand drug, and a potential loss to Boots of $600 mil ion (the

revenue from Synthroid). After the results were reviewed by her peers, Dr. Dong's findings were slated to be

published in the Journal of the American Medical Association on January 25, 1995. At the last minute,

however, Boots successfully halted publication of the article, pointing to a clause in the partnership contract

that gave the company veto rights over the publication of findings. The university, fearing a costly lawsuit,


sided with the drug company and the article was yanked. After the whole ordeal was exposed in The Wall

Street Journal, Boots backed off and the paper was finally published in April 1997, two years behind

schedule. "The victim is obvious: the university," wrote Dorothy S. Zinberg, a faculty member at Harvard's

Centre for Science and International Affairs. "Each infringement on its unwritten contract with society to

avoid secrecy whenever possible and maintain its independence from government or corporate pressure

weakens its integrity."

In 1998, a similar case ripped through the University of Toronto and the affiliated Hospital for Sick Children

— only this time, the researcher found that the drug being tested might actually be harmful to patients. Dr.

Nancy Olivieri, a world-renowned scientist and expert on the blood disorder thalassemia, entered into a

research contract with the drug-company giant Apotex. The company wanted Olivieri to test the

effectiveness of the drug deferi-prone on her young patients suffering from thalassemia major. When

Olivieri found evidence that, in some cases, the drug might have life-threatening side effects, she wanted to

warn the patients participating in the trial and to alert other doctors in her field.

Apotex pulled the plug on the

study and threatened to sue Olivieri if she went public, pointing to an overlooked clause in the research

contract that gave it the right to suppress findings for one year after the trials ended. Olivieri went ahead


and published in The New England Journal of Medicine and, once again, the administration of both her

university and her hospital failed to defend the sanctity of academic research conducted in the public

interest. Adding further insult, in January 1999, they demoted Olivieri from her top-level research position at

the hospital. (After a long and public battle, the doctor eventually got her job back.)

Perhaps the most chil ing of these cases involves an associate professor at Brown University in Rhode

Island, who worked as an occupational health physician at the university-affiliated Memorial Hospital of

Rhode Island in Pawtucket. Dr. David Kern was commissioned by a local textile factory to investigate two

cases of lung disease that he had treated at the hospital. He found six more cases of the disease in the ISOperson

plant, a startling occurrence since its incidence in the general population is one in 40,000. Like Dr.

Dong and Dr. Olivieri, Dr. Kern was set to present a paper on his findings when the textile company

threatened to sue, citing a clause in the agreement that prevented the publication of "trade secrets." Once

again, the university and the hospital administration sided squarely with the company, forbidding Dr. Kern to

publish his findings and shutting down the one-person clinic where he conducted his research.

The only element out of the ordinary in these three cases of stifled research is that they involved academics


with the personal integrity and the dogged tenacity to publicly challenge their corporate "partners" and their

own employers — factors that eventually led to the truth coming out through the press. But relying on

crusading individuals to protect the integrity of academic research does not provide a foolproof safeguard in

every case. According to a 1994 study conducted on industry research partnerships at U.S. universities,

most corporate interference occurs quietly and with no protest. The study found that companies maintained

the right to block the publication of findings in 35 percent of cases, while 53

percent of the academics

surveyed agreed that "publication can be delayed."

There is also a more insidious level of interference that takes place at universities every day, interference

that occurs before research even begins,

being committed to paper. As John V. Lombardi, president of the University of Florida at Gamesvil e, says:

We have taken the great leap forward and said: 'Let's pretend we're a corporation.'" What such a leap

means back on the ground is that studies are designed to fit the mandate of corporate-endowed research

chairs with such grand names as the Taco Bell Distinguished Professor of Hotel and Restaurant

Administration at Washington State University, the Yahoo! Chair of Information-Systems Technology at

Stanford University and the Lego Professorship of Learning Research at Massachusetts Institute of


Technology. J. Patrick Kelly, the professor who holds the Kmart Chair of Marketing at Wayne State,

estimates that his research has saved Kmart "many more times" the amount of the $2 mil ion donation that

created his position. The professor who holds the Kmart-endowed chair at West Virginia University,

meanwhile, has such a hands-on relationship with the retailer that he or she is required by contract to spend

a minimum of thirty days a year training assistant managers.

Where Was the Opposition?

Many people, upon learning of the advanced stage of branded education, want to know where the university

faculty, teachers, school boards and parents were while this transformation was taking place. At the

elementary and high-school level, this is a difficult question to answer —

particularly since one is hardpressed

to find anyone but the advertisers who is actively in favour of allowing ads into schools. Over the

course of the decade, all the large teachers' unions in North America have been quite vocal about the threat

to independent instruction posed by commercialization, and many concerned parents have formed groups

like Ralph Nader's Commercial Alert to make their opposition heard. Despite this, however, there was never

one big issue on which parents and educators could band together to fight — and possibly win — a major

policy battle on classroom commercialization.

Unlike the very public standoffs over prayer in schools or over explicit sex education, the move to allow


advertisements did not take the form of one sweeping decision but, rather, of thousands of little ones.

Usually these were made on an ad hoc, school-by-school basis, frequently with no debate, no notice, no

public scrutiny at all, because advertising agencies were careful to fashion school promotions that could slip

between the cracks of standard school-board regulations.

However, when Channel One and the Youth News Network wanted to bring ads directly into classrooms,

there was some debate: genuine, heated discussions took place at the school-board level, and most boards

across Canada decided to block YNN. Channel One, though far more successful, particularly in poorer

districts, has also had to swallow its share of board refusals.

There is, however, another, more ingrained cultural factor that has helped the brands get inside the schools,

and it has to do with the effectiveness of branding itself. Many parents and educators could not see anything

to be gained by resistance; kids today are so bombarded by brand names that it seemed as if protecting

educational spaces from commercialization was less important than the immediate benefits of finding new

funding sources. And the hawkers of in-school advertising have not been at all shy about playing upon this

sense of futility among parents and educators. As Frank Vigil, president of ZapMe!

computer systems, says:

"America's youth is exposed to advertising in many aspects of their lives. We believe students are savvy


enough to discern between educational content and marketing materials." Thus it became possible for many

parents and teachers to rationalize their failure to protect yet another previously public space by telling

themselves that what ads students don't see in class or on campus, they wil certainly catch on the subway,

on the Net or on TV when they get home. What's one more ad in the life of these marked-up and markeddown

kids? And then again...what's another?

But while this may explain the brands' inroads in high schools, it stil doesn't explain how this process has

been able to take such a firm hold on the university campuses. Why have university professors remained

silent, passively allowing their corporate "partners" to trample the principles of freedom of inquiry and

discourse that have been the avowed centrepieces of academic life? More to the point, aren't our campuses

supposed to be overflowing with troublemaking tenured radicals? Isn't the institution of tenure, with its

lifelong promise of job security, designed to make it safe for academics to take controversial positions

without fear of repercussion? Aren't these people, to borrow a term more readily understood in the halls of

academe, counter-hegemonic?

As Janice Newson, a York University sociology professor who has published widely on this issue, has noted:

"On the surface, it is easier to account for the increasing realization of the corporate-linked university than it


is to account for the lack of resistance to it." Newson, who has been sounding the alarm on the corporate

threat to academic freedom for more than a decade, writes that she had (wrongly) assumed that

members of the academic community would become actively concerned about, if not resistant to, this shift

in direction. After al , a significant if not transformative pattern of institutional change has occurred over a

relatively short period of time. And in many ways, these changes sharply contrast to both the idea and the

practices of the university that preceded them, the university in which most current members of the

academy began their careers. Newson's critique could well be expanded to include student activists, who

until the mid-nineties were also mysteriously absent from the corporatization non-debate. Sadly, part of the

explanation for the lack of campus mobilization is simple self-interest. Until the mid-nineties, the growing

corporate influence in education and research seemed to be taking place almost exclusively in the

engineering departments, management schools and science labs. Campus radicals had always been prone

to dismiss these faculties as hopelessly compromised right-wing bastions: who cared what was happening

on that side of campus, so long as the more traditionally progressive fields (literature, cultural studies,

political science, history and fine arts) were left alone? And as long as professors and students in the arts


and humanities remained indifferent to this radical shift in campus culture and priorities, they were free to

pursue other interests — and there were many on offer. For instance, more than a few of those tenured

radicals who were supposed to be corrupting young minds with socialist ideas were preoccupied with their

own postmodernist realization that truth itself is a construct. This realization made it intellectually untenable

for many academics to even participate in a political argument that would have

"privileged" any one model

of learning (public) over another (corporate). And since truth is relative, who is to say that Plato's dialogues

are any more of an "authority" than Fox's Anastasia? This academic trend only accounts for a few of the

missing-in-actions, however. Many other campus radicals were stil up for a good old political fight, but

during the key years of the corporate campus invasion they were tied up in a different battle: the allconsuming

gender and race debates of the so-called political correctness wars. As we wil see in the next

chapter, if the students allowed themselves to be turned into test markets, it was partly because they had

other things on their minds. They were busy taking on their professors on the merits of the canon and the

need for more stringent campus sexual-harassment policies. And if their professors failed to prevent the

very principles of unfettered academic discourse from being traded in for a quick buck, this may also have


been because they were too preoccupied with defending themselves against their own "McCarthyite"

students. So there they all were, fighting about women's studies and the latest backlash book while their

campuses were being sold out from under their feet. It wasn't until the politics of personal representation

were themselves co-opted by branding that students and professors alike began to turn away from their

quarrels with each other, realizing they had a more powerful foe.

But by then, much had already been lost. A/lore fundamentally than somewhat antiquated notions of "pure"

education and research, what is lost as schools "pretend they are corporations"

(to borrow a phrase from the

University of Florida) is the very idea of unbranded space. In many ways, schools and universities remain

our culture's most tangible embodiment of public space and collective responsibility. University campuses in

particular —with their residences, libraries, green spaces and common standards for open and respectful

discourse - play a crucial, if now largely symbolic, role: they are the one place left where young people can

see a genuine public life being lived. And however imperfectly we may have protected these institutions in

the past, at this point in our history the argument against transforming education into a brand-extension

exercise is much the same as the one for national parks and nature reserves: these quasi-sacred spaces

remind us that unbranded space is stil possible.

[IMAGE]


Top: Scene from a "die-in" at a 1990 Act-Up rally. Bottom: Diesel 1995 print campaign showing two sailors

kissing.

CHAPTER FIVE

PATRIARCHY GETS FUNKY

The Triumph of Identity Marketing

Let's face it, when you're a story line on Friends, it's hard to keep thinking you're radical.

-Jay Blotcher, AIDS activist, New York magazine, September 1996

As an undergraduate in the late eighties and early nineties, I was one of those students who took a while to

wake up to the slow branding of university life. And I can say from personal experience that it's not that we

didn't notice the growing corporate presence on campus-we even complained about it sometimes. It's just

that we couldn't get particularly worked up about it. We knew the fast-food chains were setting up their stalls

in the library and that profs in the applied sciences were getting awfully cozy with pharmaceutical

companies, but finding out exactly what was going on in the boardrooms and labs would have required a lot

of legwork, and, frankly, we were busy. We were fighting about whether Jews would be allowed in the racial

equality caucus at the campus women's centre, and why the meeting to discuss it was scheduled at the

same time as the lesbian and gay caucus-were the organizers implying that there were no Jewish lesbians?

No black bisexuals? In the outside world, the politics of race, gender and sexuality remained tied to more


concrete, pressing issues, like pay equity, same-sex spousal rights and police violence, and these serious

movements were - and continue to be - a genuine threat to the economic and social order. But somehow,

they didn't seem terribly glamorous to students on many university campuses, for whom identity politics had

evolved by the late eighties into something quite different. Many of the battles we fought were over issues

of "representation" — a loosely defined set of grievances mostly lodged against the media, the curriculum

and the English language. From campus feminists arguing over "representation"

of women on the reading

lists to gays wanting better "representation" on television, to rap stars bragging about "representing" the

ghettos, to the question that ends in a riot in Spike Lee's 1989 film Do the Right Thing — "Why are there no

brothers on the wall?" — ours was a politics of mirrors and metaphors.

These issues have always been on the political agendas of both the civil-rights and the women's

movements, and later, of the fight against AIDS. It was accepted from the start that part of what held back

women and ethnic minorities was the absence of visible role models occupying powerful social positions,

and that media-perpetuated stereotypes — embedded in the very fabric of the language — served to not so

subtly reinforce the supremacy of white men. For real progress to take place, imaginations on both sides

had to be decolonized.


But by the time my generation inherited these ideas, often two or three times removed, representation was

no longer one tool among many, it was the key. In the absence of a clear legal or political strategy, we

traced back almost all of society's problems to the media and the curriculum, either through their

perpetuation of negative stereotypes or simply by omission. Asians and lesbians were made to feel

"invisible," gays were stereotyped as deviants, blacks as criminals and women as weak and inferior: a selffulfil ing

prophecy responsible for almost all real-world inequalities. And so our battlefields were sitcoms with

gay neighbours who never got laid, newspapers fil ed with pictures of old white men, magazines that

advanced what author Naomi Wolf termed "the beauty myth," reading lists that we expected to look like

Benetton ads, Benetton ads that trivialized our reading-list demands. So outraged were we media children

by the narrow and oppressive portrayals in magazines, in books and on television that we convinced

ourselves that if the typecast images and loaded language changed, so too would the reality. We thought

we would find salvation in the reformation of MTV, CNN and Calvin Klein. And why not? Since media

seemed to be the source of so many of our problems, surely if we could only

"subvert" them to better

represent us, they could save us instead. With better collective mirrors, selfesteem would rise and


prejudices would magically fall away, as society became suddenly inspired to live up to the beautiful and

worthy reflection we had retouched in its image.

For a generation that grew up mediated, transforming the world through pop culture was second nature. The

problem was that these fixations began to transform! us in the process. Over time, campus identity politics

became so consumed fry personal politics that they all but eclipsed the rest of the world. The slogan ' 'the

personal is political" came to replace the economic as political and, in the end, the Political as political as

well. The more importance we placed o»n representation issues, the more central a role they seemed to

elbow for themselves in our lives — perhaps because, in the absence of more tangible political goals, any

movement that is about fighting for better social mirrors is going to eventually fall victim to its own

narcissism.

Soon "outing" wasn't about AIDS, but became a blanket demand for gay and lesbian "visibility" — all gays

should be out, not just right-wing politicians but celebrities as well. By 1991, the radical group Queer Nation

had broadened its media critique: it didn't just object to portrayals of homicidal madmen with AIDS, but any

non-straight kil er at al . The group's San Francisco and L.A. chapters held protests against The Silence of

the Lambs, objecting to its transvestite serial-kil er vil ain, and they disrupted filming on Basic Instinct


because it featured ice-pick-wielding kil er lesbians. GLAAD (Gay and Lesbian Al iance Against Defamation)

had moved from lobbying the news media about its use of terms like "gay plague"

to describe AIDS, and

had begun actively pushing the networks for more gay and lesbian characters in TV shows. In 1993, Torie

Osborn, a prominent U.S. lesbian rights activist, said that the single biggest political issue facing her

constituency was not same-sex spousal benefits, the right to join the military or even the right of two women

to marry and adopt children. It was, she told a reporter, "Invisibility. Period. End of sentence."

Much like a previous generation of anti-porn feminists who held their rallies outside peep shows, many of

the political demonstrations of the early nineties had shifted from the steps of government buildings and

courthouses to the steps of museums with African art exhibits that were deemed to celebrate the colonial

mindset. They massed at the theatre entrances showing mega musicals like Showboat and Miss Saigon,

and they even crept right up to the edge of the red carpet at the 1992 Academy Awards.

These struggles may seem slight in retrospect, but you can hardly blame us media narcissists for believing

that we were engaged in a crucial battle on behalf of oppressed people everywhere: every step we took

sparked a new wave of apocalyptic panic from our conservative foes. If we were not revolutionaries, why,


then, were our opponents saying that a revolution was under way, that we were in the midst of a "culture

war"? "The transformation of American campuses is so sweeping that it is no exaggeration to call it a

revolution," Dinesh D'Souza, author of Il iberal Education, informed his readers.

"Its distinctive insignia can

be witnessed on any major campus in America today, and in all aspects of university life."

Despite their claims of living under Stalinist regimes where dissent was not tolerated, our professors and

administrators put up an impressively vociferous counteroffensive: they fought tooth and nail for the right to

offend us thin-skinned radicals; they lay down on the tracks in front of every new harassment policy, and

generally acted as if they were fighting for the very future of Western civilization.

An avalanche of look-alike

magazine features bolstered the claim that ID politics constituted an international emergency: "Il iberal

Education" (Atlantic Monthly), "Visigoths in Tweed" (Fortune), "The Silences"

(Maclean's), "The Academy's

New Ayatollahs" (Outlook), "Taking Offence" (Newsweek). In New York magazine, writer John Taylor

compared my generation of campus activists with cult members, Hitler Youth and Christian fundamentalists.

So great was the threat we allegedly posed that George Bush even took time out to warn the world that

political correctness "replaces old prejudices with new ones."

The Marketing of ID


The backlash that identity politics inspired did a pretty good job of masking for us the fact that many of our

demands for better representation were quickly accommodated by marketers, media makers and popculture

producers alike — though perhaps not for the reasons we had hoped. If I had to name a precise

moment for this shift in attitude, I would say August of 1992: the thick of the

"brand crisis" that peaked with

Marlboro Friday. That's when we found out that our sworn enemies in the

"mainstream" — to us a giant

monolithic blob outside of our known university-affiliated enclaves —didn't fear and loathe us but actually

thought we were sort of interesting. Once we'd embarked on a search for new wells of cutting-edge imagery,

our insistence on extreme sexual and racial identities made for great brand-content and niche-marketing

strategies. If diversity is what we wanted, the brands seemed to be saying, then diversity was exactly what

we would get. And with that, the marketers and media makers swooped down, airbrushes in hand, to touch

up the colours and images in our culture.

The five years that followed were an orgy of red ribbons, Malcolm X baseball hats and Silence = Death Tshirts.

By 1993, the stories of academic Armageddon were replaced with new ones about the sexy wave of

"Do-Me Feminism" in Esquire and "Lesbian Chic" in New York and Newsweek.

The shift in attitude was not

the result of a mass political conversion but of some hard economic calculations.

According to Rocking the


Ages, a book produced in 1997 by leading U.S. consumer researchers Yankelovich Partners, "Diversity"

was the "defining idea" for Gen-Xers, as opposed to "Individuality" for boomers and "Duty" for their parents.

Xers are starting out today with pluralistic attitudes that are the strongest we have ever measured. As we

look towards the next twenty five years, it is clear that acceptance of alternative lifestyles wil become even

stronger and more widespread as Xers grow up and take over the reins of power, and become the dominant

buying group in the consumer marketplace.... Diversity is the key fact of life for Xers, the core of the

perspective they bring to the marketplace. Diversity in all of its forms —cultural, political, sexual, racial,

social — is a hallmark of this generation...

The Sputnik cool-hunting agency, meanwhile, explained that "youth today are one big sample of diversity"

and encouraged its clients to dive into the psychedelic "United Streets of Diversity" and not be afraid to

taste the local fare. Dee Dee Gordon, author of The L. Report, urged her clients to get into Girl Power with a

vengeance: "Teenage girls want to see someone who kicks butt back"; and, sounding suspiciously like me

and my university friends, brand man Tom Peters took to berating his corporate audiences for being

"OWMs-Old White Males."

As we have seen, this information was coming hot on the heels of two other related revelations. The first


was that consumer companies would only survive if they built corporate empires around "brand identities."

The second was that the ballooning youth demographic held the key to market success. So, of course, if the

market researchers and cool hunters all reported that diversity was the key character trait of this lucrative

demographic, there was only one thing to be done: every forward-thinking corporation would have to adopt

variations on the theme of diversity as their brand identities.

Which is exactly what most brand-driven corporations have attempted to do. In an effort to understand how

Starbucks became an overnight household name in 1996 without a single national ad campaign, Advertising

Age speculated that it had something to do with its tie-dyed, Third World aura.

"For devotees, Starbucks'

'experience' is about more than a daily espresso infusion; it is about immersion in a politically correct,

cultured refuge...." Starbucks, however, was only a minor player in the P.C.

marketing craze. Abercrombie

£t Fitch ads featured guys in their underwear making goo-goo eyes at each other; Diesel went further,

showing two sailors kissing (see image on page 106); and a U.S. television spot for Virgin Cola depicted

"the first-ever gay wedding featured in a commercial," as the press release proudly announced. There were

also gay-targeted brands like Pride Beer and Wave Water, whose slogan is "We label bottles not people,"

and the gay community got its very own cool hunters — market researchers who scoured gay bars with


hidden cameras.

The Gap, meanwhile, fil ed its ads with racially mixed rainbows of skinny, childlike models. Diesel

harnessed frustration at that unattainable beauty ideal with ironic ads that showed women being served up

for dinner to a table of pigs. The Body Shop harnessed the backlash against both of them by refusing to

advertise and instead fil ed its windows with red ribbons and posters condemning violence against women.

The rush to diversity fitted in neatly with the embrace of African-American style and heroes that companies

like Nike and Tommy Hilfiger had already pinpointed as a powerful marketing source. But Nike also realized

that people who saw themselves as belonging to oppressed groups were ready-made market niches: throw

a few liberal platitudes their way and, presto, you're not just a product but an ally in the struggle. So the

walls of Nike Town were adorned with quotes from Tiger Woods declaring that

"there are stil courses in the

U.S. where I am not allowed to play, because of the colour of my skin." Women in Nike ads told us that "I

believe 'babe' is a four-letter word" and "I believe high heels are a conspiracy against women."

And everyone, it seemed, was toying with the fluidity of gender, from the old-hat story of MAC makeup

using drag queen RuPaul as its spokesmodel to tequila ads that inform viewers that the she in the bikini is

really a he; from Calvin Klein's colognes that tell us that gender itself is a construct to Sure Ultra Dry


deodorant that in turn urges all the gender benders to chil out: "Man? Woman?

Does it matter?"

Oppression Nostalgia

Fierce debates stil rage about these campaigns. Are they entirely cynical or do they indicate that

advertisers want to evolve and play more positive social roles? Benetton's mid-nineties ads careered wildly

between witty and beautiful challenges to racial stereotypes on the one hand, and grotesque commercial

exploitation of human suffering on the other. They were, however, indisputably part of a genuine attempt to

use the company's vast cultural real estate to send a message that went beyond

"Buy more sweaters"; and

they played a central role in the fashion world's embrace of the struggle against AIDS. Similarly, there is no

denying that the Body Shop broke ground by proving to the corporate sector that a multinational chain can

be an outspoken and controversial political player, even while making mil ions on bubble bath and body

lotion. The complicated motivations and stark inconsistencies inside many of these "ethical" businesses wil

be explored in greater depth in a later chapter. But for many of the activists who had, at one point not so

long ago, believed that better media representation would make for a more just world, one thing had

become abundantly clear: identity politics weren't fighting the system, or even subverting it. When it came

to the vast new industry of corporate branding, they were feeding it.


The crowning of sexual and racial diversity as the new superstars of advertising and pop culture has

understandably created a sort of Identity Crisis. Some ex-ID warriors are even getting nostalgic about the

good old days, when they were oppressed, yes, but the symbols of their radicalism weren't for sale at Wal-Mart. As music writer Ann Powers observed of the much-vaunted ascendancy of Girl Power, "at this

intersection between the conventional feminine and the evolving Girl, what's springing up is not a revolution

but a mall... Thus, a genuine movement devolves into a giant shopping spree, where girls are encouraged

to purchase whatever identity fits them best off the rack." Similarly, Daniel Mendelsohn has written that gay

identity has dwindled into "basically, a set of product choices.... At least culturally speaking, oppression may

have been the best thing that could have happened to gay culture. Without it, we're nothing."

The nostalgia, of course, is absurd. Even the most cynical ID warrior wil admit, when pressed, that having

El en Degeneres and other gay characters out on TV has some concrete advantages. Probably it is good for

the kids, particularly those who live outside of larger urban settings —in rural or small-town environments,

where being gay is more likely to confine them to a life of self-loathing. (The attempted suicide rate in 1998

among gay and bisexual male teens in America was 28.1 percent, compared with 4.2 percent among


straight males of the same age group.) Similarly, most feminists would concede that although the Spice

Girls' crooning, "If you wanna be my lover, you have to get with my friends" isn't likely to shatter the beauty

myth, it's stil a step up from Snoop Dogg's 1993 ode to gang rape, "It ain't no fun if my homies can't have

none."

And yet, while raising teenagers' self-esteem and making sure they have positive role models is valuable,

it's a fairly narrow achievement, and from an activist perspective, one can't help asking, Is this it? Did all our

protests and supposedly subversive theory only serve to provide great content for the culture industries,

fresh new lifestyle imagery for Levi's new "What's True" ad campaign and girl-power-charged record sales

for the music business? Why, in other words, were our ideas about political rebellion so deeply nonthreatening

to the smooth flow of business as usual?

The question, of course, is not Why, but Why on earth not? Just as they had embraced the "brands, not

products" equation, the smart businesses quickly realized that short-term discomfort —whether it came from

a requirement to hire more women or to more carefully vet the language in an ad campaign—was a small

price to pay for the tremendous market share that diversity promised. So while it may be true that real gains

have emerged from this process, it is also true that Dennis Rodman wears dresses and Disney World


celebrates Gay Day less because of political progress than financial expediency.

The market has seized

upon multiculturalism and gender-bending in the same ways that it has seized upon youth culture in general

— not just as a market niche but as a source of new carnival-esque imagery. As Robert Goldman and

Stephen Papson note, "White-bread culture wil simply no longer do." The $200

bil ion culture industry

—now America's biggest export —needs an ever-changing, uninterrupted supply of street styles, edgy

music videos and rainbows of colours. And the radical critics of the media clamouring to be "represented" in

the early nineties virtually handed over their colourful identities to the brandmasters to be shrink-wrapped.

The need for greater diversity — the rallying cry of my university years —is now not only accepted by the

culture industries, it is the mantra of global capital. And identity politics, as they were practiced in the

nineties, weren't a threat, they were a gold mine. "This revolution," writes cultural critic Richard Goldstein in

The Vil age Voice, "turned out to be the saviour of late capitalism." And just in time, too.

Market Masala: Diversity and the Global Sales Pitch

About the same time that my friends and I were battling for better cultural representation, the advertising

agencies, broadcasters and global brands were preoccupied with some significant problems of their own.

Thanks to freer trade and other forms of accelerated deregulation, the global marketplace was finally


becoming a reality, but new, urgent questions were being asked: What is the best way to sell identical

products across multiple borders? What voice should advertisers use to address the whole world at once?

How can one company accommodate cultural differences while stil remaining internally coherent?

For certain corporations, until recently, the answer was simple: force the world to speak your language and

absorb your culture. In 1983, when global reach was stil a fantasy for all but a handful of corporations,

Harvard business professor Theodore Levitt published the essay "The Globalization of Markets," in which he

argued that any corporation that was wil ing to bow to some local habit or taste was an unmitigated failure.

"The world's needs and desires have been irrevocably homogenized," he wrote in what instantly became the

manifesto of global marketing. Levitt made a stark distinction between weak multinational corporations,

which change depending on which country they are operating in, and swaggering global corporations, which

are, by their very definition, always the same, wherever they roam. "The multinational corporation operates

in a number of countries, and adjusts its products and practices to each — at high relative costs. The global

corporation operates with resolute constancy — at low relative cost — as if the entire world (or major

regions of it) were a single entity; it sells the same things in the same way everywhere.... Ancient

differences in national tastes or modes of doing business disappear."


Levitt's "global" corporations were, of course, American corporations and the

"homogenized" image they

promoted were the images of America: blond, blue-eyed kids eating Kellogg's cereal on Japanese TV; the

Marlboro Man bringing U.S. cattle country to African vil ages; and Coke and McDonald's selling the entire

world on the taste of the U.S.A. As globalization ceased to be a somewhat kooky dream and became a

reality, these cowboy-marketing antics began to step on a few toes. The twentieth century's familiar

bogeyman — "American cultural imperialism" — has, in more recent years, incited cries of "cultural

Chernobyl" in France, prompted the creation of a "slow-food movement" in Italy and led to the burning of

chickens outside the first KFC outlet in India.

Americans in particular have never been known for their cultural sensitivity and so, not surprisingly, the road

to Levitt's global marketing is paved with cultural faux pas. The most serious of these took place after the

collapse of European communism, when media moguls fell over one another to take the credit for freedom

and democracy the world over —a claim they would pay for later on. "We put MTV

into East Germany, and

the next day the Berlin Wall fell," Viacom International chairman Sumner Redstone said. Ted Turner

claimed the credit for CNN and the Goodwil Games. "I said, 'Let's try and undo this. Let's get our young

people together, and let's get this cycle together and let's try to get some world peace going and let's end


the Cold War.' And, by God, we did it." Rupert Murdoch, meanwhile, told the world that "satellite

broadcasting makes it possible for information-hungry residents of many closed societies to bypass statecontrolled

television."

This post-Cold War bravado didn't go over too well in countries like China, where standing up to so-called

Western values remains a sacrosanct political claim. Consequently, several Western media moguls —now

hell-bent on penetrating all of Asia with their satellites-have gone to great lengths to distance themselves

from their earlier freedom-fighter rhetoric and now actively collaborate with dictatorships to restrict the flow

of information, a situation that I'l get to in more detail in Chapter 8.

It was in this minefield that "diversity" marketing appeared, presenting itself as a cure-all for the pitfalls of

global expansion. Rather than creating different advertising campaigns for different markets, campaigns

could sell diversity itself, to all markets at once. The formula maintained the onesize-fits-all cost benefits of

old-style cowboy cultural imperialism, but ran far fewer risks of offending local sensibilities. Instead of urging

the world to taste America, it calls out, like the Skittles slogan, to "Taste the Rainbow." This candy-coated

multiculturalism has stepped in as a kinder, gentler packaging for the homogenizing effect of what Indian

physicist Vandana Shiva calls "the monoculture" - it is, in effect, mono-multiculturalism.


Today the buzzword in global marketing isn't selling America to the world, but bringing a kind of market

masala to everyone in the world. In the late nineties, the pitch is less Marlboro Man, more Ricky Martin: a

bilingual mix of North and South, some Latin, some RB, all couched in global party lyrics. This ethnic-foodcourt

approach creates a One World placelessness, a global mall in which corporations are able to sell a

single product in numerous countries without triggering the old cries of "Coca-Colonization."

As culture becomes increasingly homogenized globally, the task of marketing is to stave off the nightmare

moment when branded products cease to look like lifestyles or grand ideas and suddenly appear as the

ubiquitous goods they really are. In its liquid ethnicity, marketing masala has been introduced as the

antidote to this horror of cultural homogeneity. By embodying corporate identities that are radically

individualistic and perpetually new, the brands attempt to inoculate themselves against accusations that

they are in fact selling sameness.

The Global Teen

Of course not everyone is equally amenable to the idea of treating culture and nationality as fashion

accessories to be slipped on and off. Those who have fought wars and survived revolutions tend to be more

protective of their national traditions. The desolately poor, who constitute one-quarter of the world's


population,16 also have a little trouble getting into the global groove, especially since cable TV and most

brand-name products are stil just a rumour in those parts of the developing world where a total of 1.3 bil ion

people live on US$1 a day or less. No, it's the young people living in developed and semi-developed

countries who are the great global hope. More than anything or anyone else, logo-decorated middle-class

teenagers, intent on pouring themselves into a media-fabricated mould, have become globalization's most

powerful symbols.

This has happened for several reasons. First of al , just as in the U.S. market, there are a lot of them. The

world is crawling with teenagers, especially in southern countries, where the UN

estimates that 507 mil ion

adults wil die before they turn forty. Two-thirds of Asia's population is under thirty and, thanks to years of

bloody warfare, about 50 percent of the population in Vietnam was born after 1975. Al in all, the so-called

global teen demographic is estimated at one bil ion, and these teenagers consume a disproportionate share

of their families' incomes. In China, for instance, conspicuous consumption for al members of the

household remains largely unrealistic. But, argue the market researchers, the Chinese make enormous

sacrifices for the young — particularly for young boys — a cultural value that spells great news for cellphone

and sneaker companies. Laurie Klein of Just Kid Inc., a U.S. firm that conducted a consumer study


on Chinese teens, found that while Mom, Dad and both grandparents may do without electricity, their only

son (thanks to the country's one-child policy) frequently enjoys what is widely known as "little emperor

syndrome," or what she calls the "4-2-1" phenomenon: four elders and two parents scrimp and save so the

one child can be an 1VITV clone. "When you have the parents and four grandparents spending on one

child, it's a no-brainer to know that this is the right market," says one venture capitalist in

China. Furthermore, since kids are more culturally absorbent than their parents, they often become their

families' dedicated shoppers, even for big household items. Taken together, what this research shows is that

while adults may stil harbour traditional customs and ways, global teens shed those pesky national hangups

like last year's fashions. "They prefer Coke to tea, Nikes to sandals, Chicken McNuggets to rice, credit

cards to cash," Joseph Quinlan, senior economist at Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.

told The Wall Street

Journal. The message is clear: get the kids and you've got the whole family and the future market.

Inflated by rhetoric like this, the image of the global teen floats over the planet like a euphoric corporate

hallucination. These kids, we are repeatedly told, live not in a geographic place but in a global consumer

loop: hot-linked from their cellular telephones to Internet newsgroups; bonded together by Sony


Playstations, MTV videos and NBA games. The most extensive and widely cited study of the global teen

demographic was conducted in 1996 by the New York-based ad agency DMBB's BrainWaves division. The

"New World Teen Study" surveyed 27,600 middle-class fifteen- to eighteen-yearolds in forty-five countries

and came up with some resoundingly good news for the agency's clients, a list that includes Coca-Cola,

Burger King and Philips. "Despite different cultures, middle-class youth all over the world seem to live their

lives as if in a parallel universe. They get up in the morning, put on their Levi's and Nikes, grab their caps,

backpacks, and Sony personal CD players, and head for school." Elissa Moses, senior vice president at the

advertising agency, called the arrival of the global teen demographic "one of the greatest marketing

opportunities of all time."

But before the brands are able to sell the same products in the same way all around the world, the teens

themselves must identify with their new demographic. For this reason, what most global ad campaigns are

stil selling most aggressively is the idea of the global teen market — a kaleidoscope of multi-ethnic faces

blending into one another: Rasta braids, pink hair, henna hand painting, piercing and tattoos, a few national

flags, flashes of foreign street signs, Cantonese and Arabic lettering and a sprinkling of English words, all

over the layered samplings of electronic music. Nationality, language, ethnicity, religion and politics are all


reduced to their most colourful, exotic accessories, converging to assure us, as Diesel president Renzo

Rosso does, there is "never an 'us and them,' but simply one giant 'we.'"

To achieve this state of oneness, global teens must sometimes be pitted against traditional elders who don't

appreciate their radical taste in denim. For instance, a TV ad for Diesel jeans shows two Korean teenagers

turning into birds after they commit double suicide, finding freedom only in the total surrender to the brand.

In these ads, the ultimate product — more than the soft drinks, ice creams, sneakers or jeans —is the global

teen, who must exist as a demographic in the minds of young consumers worldwide or the entire exercise of

global marketing collapses. For this reason, global youth marketing is a mind-numbingly repetitive affair,

drunk on the idea of what it is attempting to engineer: a third notion of nationality

—not American, not local,

but one that would unite the two, through shopping.

Standing triumphant at the centre of the global teen phenomenon is MTV, which, in 1998, was in 273.5

mil ion households worldwide — only 70 mil ion of which were in the U.S. By 1999, MTV's eight global

divisions broadcast in 83 countries and territories, fewer than CNN's 212-country reach, but impressive

nonetheless. Furthermore, the New World Teen Study found that the single most significant factor

contributing to the shared tastes of the middle-class teens it surveyed was TV —in particular, MTV, which


85 percent of them watched every day. Elissa Moses called the station "an all-news bulletin for creating

brand-images” and a "public-address system to a generation." This sort of programming reach has been

unprecedented since the 1950s when families gathered around the TV set to watch the Ed Sullivan show.

Global teens watch so much MTV per day that the only equivalent shared cultural experience among adults

occurs during an outbreak of war when all eyes are focused on the same CNN

images.

And the more viewers there are to absorb MTV's vision of a tribe of culture swapping, global teen nomads,

the more homogeneous a market its advertisers have in which to sell their products. According to Chip

Walker, director of the New World Teen Study, "Teens who watch MTV music videos are much more likely

than other teens to wear the teen 'uniform' of jeans, running shoes, and denim jacket... They are also much

more likely to own electronics and consume 'teen' items such as candy, sodas, cookies and fast food. They

are much more likely to use a wide range of personal-care products too." In other words MTV International

has become the most compelling global catalogue for the modern branded life.

In-Fighting While the Global House Burned Down

The global economy's embrace of Representation Nation suggests that my generation's campus identity

politics boiled down, in the end, to a set of modest political goals that were frequently (and deceptively)


cloaked in immodest rhetoric and tactics. This isn't a P.C. mea culpa — I’m proud of the small victories we

won for better lighting on campus, more women faculty members and a less Eurocentric curriculum (to dig

up a much-maligned phrase from my P.C. days). What I question is the battles we North American culture

warriors never quite got around to. Poverty wasn't an issue that came up much back then; sure, every once

in a while in our crusades against the trio of 'isms, somebody would bring up

"classism," and, being out-

P.C.-ed, we would dutifully add "classism" to the hit list in question. But our criticism was focused on the

representation of women and minorities within the structures of power, not on the economics behind those

power structures. "Discrimination against poverty" (our understanding of injustice was generally construed

as discrimination against something) couldn't be solved by changing perceptions or language or even,

strictly speaking, individual behaviour. The basic demands of identity politics assumed an atmosphere of

plenty. In the seventies and eighties, that plenty had existed and women and non-whites were able to battle

over how the collective pie would be divided: would white men learn to share, or would they keep hogging

it? In the representational politics of the New Economy nineties, however, women as well as men, and

whites as well as people of colour, were now fighting their battles over a single, shrinking piece of pie - and


consistently failing to ask what was happening to the rest of it. For us, as students, to address the problems

at the roots of "classism" we would have had to face up to core issues of wealth distribution - and, unlike

sexism, racism or homophobia, that was not what we used to call "an awareness problem."

So class fell off the agenda, along with all serious economic-let alone corporate —

analysis. Certainly there

were those in the ID ranks with revolutionary goals. Like the sixties counterculture radicals who thought they

were shaking the foundations of Western civilization by dropping acid, there were a handful of professors

and students of identity politics who believed that "great blows are being struck against capitalism in the

realms of theory," as critic Gayatri Spivak put it. And Dinesh D'Souza and his ilk couldn't resist calling the

P.C.ers "nee-Marxists"-but in fact, nothing could have been further from the truth.

The prospect of having to

change a few pronouns and getting a handful of women and minorities on the board and on television posed

no real threat to the guiding profit-making principles of Wall Street. "The real guilt of P.C....," wrote SUMY

professor of literature Tim Brennan in 1991, "is not its supposed intolerance or rigidity, but that it is not

political enough — that it is impersonating political struggle."

That failure has turned out to be immeasurably problematic because the economic trends that have so

accelerated in the past decade have all been about massive redistribution and stratification of world


resources: of jobs, goods and money. Everyone except those in the very highest tier of the corporate elite is

getting less.

And what is striking in retrospect is that in the very years when P.C. politics reached their most selfreferential

peak, the rest of the world was doing something very different: it was looking outward, and

expanding. At the moment when the field of vision among most left-wing progressives was shrinking to

include only its immediate surroundings, the horizons of global business were growing to encompass the

whole globe. While CEOs dreamed of Big Macs in Russia, Benetton in Shanghai and logos projected on the

moon, the political lens for far too many activists and theorists was narrowing so dramatically that with the

exception of a brief period during the Gulf War, foreign and economic policy were off the radar screen. In

North America, even the fight against free trade was all about protecting Canadian or American workers and

resources, not about the possible effects of the trade agreement on Mexico, or the effects other rapid

liberalization measures were having in the developing world. When the free-trade debate was lost, the left

retreated even further into itself, choosing ever more minute disputes over which to go to the wall. This

retreat reflected a broader political paralysis in the face of the daunting abstractions of global capitalism -

ironically, the very issues that should have been most pressing for anyone concerned with the future of


social justice.

In this new globalized context, the victories of identity politics have amounted to a rearranging of the

furniture while the house burned down. Yes, there are more multi-ethnic sitcoms and even more black

executives -but whatever cultural enlightenment has followed has not prevented the population in the

underclass from exploding or homelessness from reaching crisis levels in many North American urban

centres. Sure, women and gays have better role models in the media and pop culture —but the ownership in

the culture industries has consolidated so rapidly that, according to Wil iam Kennard, the chairman of the

U.S. Federal Communications Commission, "There are fewer opportunities of entry by minority groups,

community groups, small businesses in general." And though girls may indeed rule in North America, they

are stil sweating in Asia and Latin America, making T-shirts with the "Girls Rule"

slogan on them and Nike

running shoes that wil finally let girls into the game.

This oversight isn't simply a failure of feminism but a betrayal of the feminist movement's own founding

principles. Although the gender politics that I grew up with in the eighties were concerned almost exclusively

with having women equally represented in the structures of power, the relationship between gender and

class have not always been so casually overlooked. Bread and Roses — the rallying cry of the women's


movement — has its origin in a slogan on a banner in the 1912 walkout of textile workers in Lawrence,

Massachusetts. "What the woman who labours wants," explained historic organizer Rose Schneiderman in a

1912 speech, "is the right to live, not simply exist." And March 8, the date of International Women's Day,

was selected to mark the anniversary of a 1908 demonstration in which "women garment workers marched

through the streets of New York, protesting dreadful working conditions, child labour, 12-hour working days,

minuscule pay." The young women who grew up reading The Beauty Myth, and who saw eating disorders

and low self-esteem as the most harmful by-products of the fashion industry, tended to forget those women

when we marched on March 8, if we ever knew about them to begin with.

As we look back, it seems like wilful blindness. The abandonment of the radical economic foundations of the

women's and civil-rights movements by the conflation of causes that came to be called political correctness

successfully trained a generation of activists in the politics of image, not action.

And if the space invaders

marched into our schools and our communities unchallenged, it was at least partly because the political

models in vogue at the time of the invasion left many of us il -equipped to deal with issues that were more

about ownership than representation. We were too busy analyzing the pictures being projected on the wall

to notice that the wall itself had been sold.


If that remained true until recently, however, it is no longer so. As we wil see in Part IV, a radical new

political culture is emerging in high schools and on college campuses. Rather than calling attention to the

house of mirrors that passes for empirical truth (as the post-modern academics did), and rather than fighting

for better mirrors (as the ID warriors did), today's media activists are concentrating on shattering the

impenetrable shiny surfaces of branded culture, picking up the pieces and using them as sharp weapons in

a war of actions, not images.

[IMAGE]

Top: Wal-Mart greeter with the human touch. Bottom: The citizens of Warrenton, Virginia, aren't buying it.

CHAPTER SIX

BRAND BOMBING

Franchises in the Age of the Super-brand

MTV is associated with the forces of freedom and democracy around the world.

-Viacom CEO Sumner Redstone, owner of MTV, October 1994

There isn't a lot of angst, it's just unbridled consumerism.

-MTV CEO Tom Freston describes the content on MTV India, June 1997

The branded multinationals may talk diversity, but the visible result of their actions is an army of teen clones

marching — in "uniform," as the marketers say —into the global mall. Despite the embrace of polyethnic

imagery, market-driven globalization doesn't want diversity; quite the opposite. Its enemies are national

habits, local brands and distinctive regional tastes. Fewer interests control ever more of the landscape.


Dazzled by the array of consumer choices, we may at first fail to notice the tremendous consolidation taking

place in the boardrooms of the entertainment, media and retail industries.

Advertising floods us with the

kaleidoscopic soothing images of United Streets of Diversity and Microsoft's wide-open "Where do you want

to go today?" enticements. But in the pages of the business section, the world goes monochromatic and

doors slam shut from all sides: every other story— whether the announcements of a new buyout, an

untimely bankruptcy, a colossal merger — points directly to a loss of meaningful choices. The real question

is not "Where do you want to go today?" but "How best can I steer you into the synergized maze of where I

want you to go today?"

This assault on choice is taking place on several different fronts at once. It is happening structurally, with

mergers, buyouts and corporate synergies. It is happening locally, with a handful of superbrands using their

huge cash reserves to force out small and independent businesses. And it is happening on the legal front,

with entertainment and consumer-goods companies using libel and trademark suits to hound anyone who

puts an unwanted spin on a pop-cultural product. And so we live in a double world: carnival on the surface,

consolidation underneath, where it counts.

Everyone has, in one form or another, witnessed the odd double vision of vast consumer choice coupled


with Orwellian new restrictions on cultural production and public space. We see it when a small community

watches its lively downtown hollow out, as big-box discount stores with 70,000

items on their shelves set up

on their periphery, exerting their gravitational pull to what James Howard Kunstler describes as "the

geography of nowhere.” I It is there on the trendy downtown main street as yet another favourite cafe,

hardware store, independent bookstore or art video house is cleared away and replaced by one of the Pac-Man chains: Starbucks, Home Depot, the Gap, Chapters, Borders, Blockbuster. It is there inside the big-box

retail outlets each time a magazine is taken off a shelf by a manager mindful of his bosses' corporate

definition of "family values." You can see it in the messy bedroom of a fourteen-year-old Web master who

has just had her fan page shut down by Viacom or EM1, unimpressed by her attempts to create her own

little pocket of culture with borrowed snippets of trademarked song lyrics and images. It is there again when

protesters are thrown out of shopping malls for handing out political leaflets, told by the security guards that

although the edifice may have replaced the public square in their town, it is, in fact, private property.

A decade ago, any attempt to connect the dots among this mess of trends would have seemed strange

indeed: what does synergy have to do with the chain-store craze? What does copyright and trademark law


have to do with personal fan culture? Or corporate consolidation with freedom of speech? But today, a clear

pattern is emerging: as more and more companies seek to be the one overarching brand under which we

consume, make art, even build our homes, the entire concept of public space is being redefined. And within

these real and virtual branded edifices, options for unbranded alternatives, for open debate, criticism and

uncensored art — for real choice — are facing new and ominous restrictions. If the erosion of noncorporate

space explored in the last section is feeding a kind of globo-claustrophobia that longs for release, then it is

these restrictions on choice — restricted by the same companies that promised a new age of freedom and

diversity — that are slowly focusing that potentially explosive longing on the multinational brands, creating

the conditions for the Anticorporate activism that wil be explored later on in the book.

Constant Cloning

There is a distinctive quality to many of the chains that have proliferated during the eighties and nineties

—Ikea, Blockbuster, the Gap, Kinko's, the Body Shop, Starbucks —which sets them apart from the fast-food

restaurants, strip malls and muffler joints responsible for the sixties and seventies franchise sprawl. They

don't flash with the garish, cartoonlike plastic yellow shells and golden arches; they are more apt to glow

with a healthy New Age sheen. These crisp royal blue and kelly green boxes snap together like pieces of


Lego (the new kind that can make only one thing: the model fire station or spaceship helpfully pictured on

the box). The Kinko's, Starbucks and Blockbuster clerks buy their uniform of khakis and white or blue shirts

at the Gap; the "Hi! Welcome to the Gap!" greeting cheer is fuelled by Starbucks double espressos; the

resumes that got them the jobs were designed at Kinko's on friendly Macs, in 12-point Helvetica on

Microsoft Word. The troops show up for work smelling of CK One (except at Starbucks, where colognes and

perfumes are thought to compete with the "romance of coffee" aroma), their faces freshly scrubbed with

Body Shop Blue Corn Mask, before leaving apartments furnished with Ikea self-assembled bookcases and

coffee tables.

The cultural transformation these institutions have effected is familiar to everyone, but there are few helpful

statistics available on the proliferation of franchises and chains, largely because most research on retailing

lumps franchises in with independent businesses. A franchise is technically owned by the franchisee, even if

every detail of the outlet — from the sign that hangs out front to the precise temperature of the coffee — is

controlled by a head office hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Even without industrywide figures,

it's undeniable that something very dramatic has happened to the face of retail this decade. Take Starbucks,

for instance. As recently as 1986, the coffee company was a strictly local phenomenon, with a handful of


cafes around Seattle. By 1992, Starbucks had 165 stores with outlets in several U.S. and Canadian cities.

By 1993, that number had already gone up to 275, and in 1996, it reached 1,000.

In early 1999, Starbucks

hit 1,900 stores with outlets in twelve countries, from the U.K. to Kuwait.

Blockbuster, another of the distinctly nineties chains, has enjoyed an even more dramatic expansion rate

over precisely the same time period. In 1985, Blockbuster was a lone video store in Dallas, Texas. It was

bought by waste-management czar Wayne Huizenga in 1987 and by 1989 there were 1,079 stores. In 1994,

the year Huizenga sold Blockbuster to Viacom, there were 3,977. By early 1999, the number had reached

6,000, distributed over twenty-six countries, including 700 outlets in the U.K.

alone.

Similar patterns can be tracked for the Gap (and its holdings Banana Republic and Old Navy) and the Body

Shop, which averaged between 120 and 150 store openings a year through the mid-eighties to the present.

Even Wal-Mart didn't truly find its feet as a retail powerhouse until the late eighties. Although the first Wal-Mart outlet opened in 1962, the superstore model didn't take off until 1988 and it wasn't until 1991 that Wal-Mart-by then opening 150 discount stores a year — surpassed Kmart and Sears to become the most

powerful force in American retailing.

This growth spurt was brought about by three industry trends, all of them dramatically favouring big chains


with deep cash reserves. The first is price wars, in which the biggest megachains systematically undersell all

their competitors; the second is the practice of blitzing out the competition by setting up chain-store

"clusters." The third trend, to be explored in the next chapter, is the arrival of the palatial flagship

superstore, which appears on prime real estate and acts as a three-dimensional ad for the brand.

Price Wars: The Wal-Mart Model

In mid-1999, Wal-Mart had 2,435 big-box discount stores in nine countries, selling everything from Barbie

Dream Homes to Kathie Lee Gifford skirts and handbags to Black Decker dril s to Prodigy CDs. Of those

stores, 565 were "Supercenters," a concept that combines Wal-Mart's original discount model with fullservice

grocery stores, hair salons and banks, as well as 443 Sam's Clubs, which offer even deeper

discounts for bulk purchases and big-ticket items like office furniture. The recipe that has made Wal-Mart

the largest retailer in the world, hauling in $137 bil ion in sales in 1998, is straightforward enough. First, build

stores two and three times the size of your closest competitors. Next, pile your shelves with products

purchased in such great volume that the suppliers are forced to give you a substantially lower price than

they would otherwise. Then cut your in-store prices so low that no small retailer can begin to compete with

your "everyday low prices."


Because everything about the Arkansas-based retailer is premised on achieving an economy of scale, an

average Wal-Mart store measures 92,000 square feet, not including the requisite substantial parking lot.

Since discounting is its calling card, Wal-Mart must keep its overhead down, which is why the lots for its

windowless stores are purchased on the edges of towns, where land is cheap and taxes are lower. Every

year of Wal-Mart's expansion, its new stores have grown bigger in size, and many of its original,

comparatively modest discount outlets have been converted and expanded into superstores, some as large

as 200,000 square feet.

Another key element in keeping costs down is that Wal-Mart only opens outlets close to its distribution

centres. For this reason, Wal-Mart has spread like molasses: slow and thick. It won't move into a new region

until it has blanketed the last area with stores — as many as forty in a hundred-mile radius. That way, the

company saves money on transportation and shipping costs, and develops such a concentrated presence in

an area that advertising its brand is barely necessary. "We would go as far as we could from a warehouse

and put in a store. Then we would fil in the map of that territory, state by state, county seat by county seat,

until we had saturated the market area," Wal-Mart founder Sam Walton explained.

Then the company would

open up a new distribution centre in a new region and repeat the process.


After Wal-Mart began in the U.S. South, plodding slowly through Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri and

Louisiana, it took a while before Wall Street and the Eastern-based media grasped the magnitude of Sam

Walton's project. For this reason, it wasn't until the early nineties, three decades after the opening of the first

Wal-Mart, that opposition to the big boxes began to mount. The argument against Wal-Mart's retail style

—by now almost as familiar as Wal-Mart itself—holds that bargain prices lure shoppers to the suburbs,

sucking community life and small businesses out of the town centres. Smaller businesses can't compete

—in fact, many of Wal-Mart's competitors claim they pay more for their goods wholesale than Wal-Mart

charges retail.

By now, there have been several books written about the effect of the big boxes, most notably In Sam We

Trust, by Wall Street Journal reporter Bob Ortega. As Onega notes, Wal-Mart is not alone in its "size

matters" approach to retailing —it is simply the leader in an exploding category of big-box retailers who use

their clout to wrangle special treatment. Home Depot, Office Depot and Bed, Bath

Beyond, which are

often grouped together in pumped-up strip malls called "power centres," are all known in the retail industry

as "category kil ers" because they enter a category with so much buying power that they almost instantly kil

the smaller competitors.


This retail style has always been controversial and was responsible for the first anti-chain movement, which

arose in the 1920s. As discounters like AP and Woolworth’s proliferated, small merchants tried to make it

il egal for chains to use their relative size to extract lower wholesale prices and drive down retail prices. The

rhetoric of the time, as Ortega points out, bears a striking resemblance to the language of the grassroots

opposition groups that have sprung up in dozens of North American towns when the pending arrival of a

new Wal-Mart outlet has been announced.

On the legal front, charges of monopolistic practices have been cropping up with growing regularity, and not

just against Wal-Mart. In September 1997, for instance, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission found that

Toys 'R' Us was guilty of il egally pressuring manufacturers not to supply popular toys to other chains.

Because Toys 'R' Us is the largest toy retailer in the world, the manufacturers agreed; and consumers'

options were reduced dramatically, along with their chances to comparison shop.

"Many toy manufacturers

had no choice but to go along," said Wil iam Baer, director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of

Competition when the case was decided. This was precisely the type of situation the FTC was hoping to

avoid when, in 1997, it blocked a planned merger between two huge office-supply chains — Staples and

Office Depot — stating that the consolidation would hurt competition.


Beyond spawning the category kil er, Sam Walton's legacy has had other, further-reaching effects. In many

ways, it was the inhuman scale of the big boxes and their accompanying sprawl

—the streets without

sidewalks, the shopping centres only accessible by car, the stores the size of small hamlets with all the

design flair of tool sheds — that set the stage for the other significant retail trends of the decade. Discount

stores were great for saving money but not for much else. And so, as the big boxes expanded into seas of

concrete on the edge of town, they generated a renewed hunger for human-scale development; for the oldfashioned

town square, for public gathering places that allowed both large meetings and intimate

conversation; for a kind of retail with more interaction and more sensory stimulation. In other words, they

laid the groundwork for Starbucks, Virgin Megastores and Mike Town.

Where big boxes used their size to move previously unimaginable amounts of product, the new retailers

would use their size to fetishize brand-name goods, placing them on a pedestal as high as Wal-Mart's

discounts were low. Where the big boxes had swapped a sense of community values for a discount, the

branded chains would re-create it and sell it back — at a price.

Clustering: The Starbucks Model

"A Comforting Third Place" is the phrase Starbucks uses to promote itself in its newsletters and evangelical

annual reports. This is not just another non-space like Wal-Mart or McDonald's, it's an intimate nook where


sophisticated people can share "coffee...community...camaraderie...connection."

Everything about New Age

chains like Starbucks is designed to assure us that they are a different breed from the strip-mall franchises

of yesterday. This isn't dreck for the masses, it's intelligent furniture, it's cosmetics as political activism, it's

the bookstore as an "old-world library," it's the coffee shop that wants to stare deep into your eyes and

"connect."

But there's a catch. The need for more intimate spaces designed to tempt people to linger may indeed

provide a powerful counterpoint to the cavernous big boxes, but these two retail trends are not as far apart

as they appear at first. For instance, the mechanics of Starbucks' dizzying expansion during the past

thirteen years has more in common with Wal-Mart's plan for global domination than the brand managers at

the folksy coffee chain like to admit. Rather than dropping an enormous big box on the edge of town,

Starbucks' policy is to drop "clusters" of outlets in urban areas already dotted with cafes and espresso bars.

This strategy relies just as heavily on an economy of scale as Wal-Mart's does and the effect on competitors

is much the same. Since Starbucks is explicit about its desire to enter markets only where it can "become

the leading retailer and brand of coffee," the company has concentrated its store-a-day growth in relatively

few areas. Instead of opening a few stores in every city in the world, or even in North America, Starbucks


waits until it can blitz an entire area and spread, to quote Globe and Mail columnist John Barber, "like head

lice through a kindergarten." It's a highly aggressive strategy, and it involves something the company calls

"cannibalization."

The idea is to saturate an area with stores until the coffee competition is so fierce that sales drop even in

individual Starbucks outlets. In 1993, for instance, when Starbucks had just 275

outlets concentrated in a

few U.S. states, per-store sales increased by 19 percent from the previous year.

By 1994, store sales growth

was only 9 percent, in 1996 it dipped to 7 percent, and in 1997 Starbucks saw only a 5 percent sales growth;

in new stores, it was as low as 3 percent. Understandably, the closer the outlets get to each other, the more

they begin to poach or "cannibalize" each other's clientele — even in hyper-caffeinated cities like Seattle

and Vancouver people can only suck back so many lattes before they float into the Pacific. Starbucks' 1995

annual report explains: "As part of its expansion strategy of clustering stores in existing markets, Starbucks

has experienced a certain level of cannibalization of existing stores by new stores as the store concentration

has increased, but management believes such cannibalization has been justified by the incremental sales

and return on new store investment." What that means is that while sales were slowing at individual stores,

the total sales of all the chain's stores combined continued to rise - doubling, in fact, between 1995 and


1997. Put another way, Starbucks the company was expanding its market while its individual outlets were

losing market share, largely to other Starbucks outlets.

It also helped Starbucks, no doubt, that its cannibalization strategy preys not only on other Starbucks outlets

but equally on its real competitors, independently run coffee shops and restaurants. And, unlike Starbucks,

these lone businesses can only profit from one store at a time. The bottom line is that clustering, like bigboxing,

is a competitive retail strategy that is only an option for a large chain that can afford to take a

beating on individual stores in order to reap a larger, long-term branding goal. It also explains why critics

usually claim that companies like Starbucks are preying on small businesses, while the chains themselves

deny it, admitting only that they are expanding and creating new markets for their products. Both are true,

but the chains' aggressive strategy of market expansion has the added bonus of simultaneously taking out

competitors.

There have been other, more brazen ways in which Starbucks has used its size and deep pockets to its

competitive advantage. Until the practice began creating controversy a few years back, Starbucks' realestate

strategy was to stake out a popular independent cafe in a well-trafficked, funky location and simply

poach the lease from under it. Several independent cafe owners in prime locations are on record claiming


that Starbucks went directly to their landlords and offered to pay them higher rental payments for the same

or adjacent spaces. For instance, Chicago's Scenes Coffee House and Drama received an eviction notice

after Starbucks rented a space in the shopping complex where it was located. The coffee chain attempted a

similar manoeuvre with Dooney's cafe in Toronto, though Starbucks claims it was the landlord who made

the initial approach. Starbucks did gain control of Dooney's lease but the community protest was so strong

that the company ended up having to sublet the space back to Dooney's. These cutthroat real-estate

practices hardly make Starbucks unique as a developer: McDonald's has perfected the scorched-earth

approach to franchising, opening neighbouring franchises and mini-outlets at gas stations until an area is

blanketed. The Gap has also adopted the cluster approach to retailing, brand bombing key neighbourhoods

with multiple outlets of the Gap, Baby Gap, Gap Kids, Old Navy, Banana Republic and in 1999 Gap Body

stores. The idea is to make Gap's family of brands synonymous with clothing in the same way that

McDonald's is synonymous with hamburgers and Coke is synonymous with soft drinks. "If you go to a

supermarket, you would expect to find some fundamental items. You would expect to find milk: non-fat, 1

percent, 2 percent, whole milk. You would expect dates to be fresh.... I don't know why apparel stores


should be any different," says Mickey Drexler, Gap CEO.10 It's fitting that Drexler's model for the Gap's

ubiquity is the supermarket, since it was the first supermarket chains that pioneered the clustering

expansion model. After AP launched its "economy stores" in 1913 (the prototype of the modern

supermarket), it quickly opened 7,500 outlets, then closed half of them after saturation had been achieved

and many competitors were forced out of business.

The Gap welcomes these comparisons with Coke, McDonald's and AP, but Starbucks, because of the

nature of its brand image, strenuously rejects them." After al , the Gap's project is to take a distinctive

product — clothing — and brand it so completely that purchasing it from the Gap is as easy as buying a

quart of milk or a can of Coke. Starbucks, on the other hand, is in the business of taking a much more

generic product — a cup of coffee — and branding it so completely that it becomes a spiritual/designer

object. So Starbucks doesn't want to be known as a blockbuster, it wants, as its marketing director Scott

Bedbury says, to "align ourselves with one of the greatest movements towards finding a connection with

your soul."

Yet no matter how urbane the original concept may have been, the business of chains has a logic and a

momentum of its own, having very little to do with what it sells. It breaks down each of a brand's elements


— no matter how progressive and homespun —into a kit of easy-to-assemble bits and parts. Just as the

chains snap together like Lego, each chain outlet is made up of hundreds of its own snappable parts. Within

the logic of chains, it matters little whether those snappable parts are a McDonald's deep fryer and a

Hamburglar mannequin or the "four elemental icons" that form the building blocks for each Starbucks store

design: "Earth to grow. Eire to roast. Water to brew. Air for aroma." A clone is a clone, whether it is moulded

in the shape of an arch or a peace symbol, and its purpose is stil replication.

This process is even more apparent when the chains expand on the global stage.

When retailers move

outside their countries of origin, Starbucks-style clustering melds with Wal-Mart-style price wars to create a

kind of "bulk clustering strategy." To keep prices low in a new market, chains like Wal-Mart, Home Depot

and McDonald's must carry with them their trump card of being volume buyers; and in order to have the

market clout to get lower prices than their competitors, they can't dribble into countries one store at a time.

Instead, it has become a favoured expansion tactic to buy out an existing chain and simply move into its

stores in one dramatic entrance, as Wal-Mart did when it bought out 120 Woolco stores in Canada in 1994

and when it purchased the Wertkauf GmbH hypermarket chain in Germany in 1997. Similarly, when

Starbucks moved into the U.K. in 1998, it acquired the already existing Seattle Coffee Company and


retrofitted its 82 stores as Starbucks outlets.

For national companies looking to avoid becoming the prey of the global giants, it has become an

increasingly popular strategy to initiate pre-emptive mergers of their own between two or more large

national brands. In the name of nationalism and global competitiveness, they consolidate, lay off staff and

mimic American retail formulas. Mot surprisingly, they generally end up transforming themselves into copies

of the global brands they were attempting to block. That's what happened in Canada when fear of Wal-Mart

prompted the country's oldest department store chain, the Hudson's Bay Company, to buy Kmart Canada,

fold it in with Zellers, lay off six thousand workers and open several lines of bigbox discount outlets: one for

furniture, one for home and bath and one for discount clothing. "Wal-Mart executed better than either Kmart

or Zellers. By merging the two operations, we're going to learn how to execute better," said George Heller,

president of Kmart.

Selection versus Choice

The combination of the big-box and clustering approaches to retailing is having a transformative effect on

the retail landscape. Though they represent very different retail trends, the combined effect of the Wal-Mart

and Star-bucks models has been to gradually erode the market share of small business in what was one of

the few fields remaining where independent operators stood a solid chance of competing head-to-head with


multinationals. With the chains able to outbid smaller competitors for space and supplies with barely a

second thought, retail has become a battle of the big spenders. Whether they are using their clout to drive

prices down to impossibly low levels, to keep them artificially high or simply to seize near monopolistic

market shares, the net effect is the same: a retail arena in which size is a prerequisite and small companies

can barely maintain a toehold. Like sumo wrestlers, the competitors in this game must push the limits of

their weight category; bigness begets bigness.

Of course independent stores and restaurants continue to open and thrive, but more and more, these are

high-end, specialty retailers in gentrified neighbourhoods, while the suburbs, small towns and working-class

neighbourhoods get blanketed in — and blasted by — the self-replicating clones.

This shift affects not only

who can afford to stay in business but also (as I'l get into in Chapter 8) what makes it onto the store's

shelves.

There is another retail trend that is in many ways exerting an even more significant influence than the two

just discussed: the branded superstore, a marketplace marriage of the size power of big boxes with the

branding clout of the store clusters. As I'l show in the next chapter, the superstore is the logical result of the

corporate preoccupation with synergy: part marketing, part brand-extension supermarket, part theme park.


Al of these three retail phenomena, and the impact they are having on consumer choice, are about much

more than changes to the way we shop. They are key pieces of the branding puzzle that is transforming

everything, from the way we congregate to the way we work. In fact, the divide between the bland big boxes

at the edge of town and the branded castles and clusters in the centre of town can be traced back to

Marlboro Friday and its aftermath. These parallel developments are the physical embodiment of the split

that opened up between the lowly price-slashers and the spiritual brand-builders.

For its part, Wal-Mart

stands as the single most powerful symbol of the decline in brand value that sent Wall Street into a tailspin

on that Friday in April 1993. The year before the so-called brand crash was a record one for Wal-Mart,

during which it opened 161 new discount stores-unheard-of growth for the end of a recession. Wal-Mart's

shoppers were the new "value generation" in motion, flocking to the suburbs to avoid paying premium prices

for heavily marketed brands. If Wal-Mart was selling Tide at deep discounts, so much the better, but these

formerly brand-conscious shoppers were just as happy to take home detergent from Wal-Mart's own private

label, Great Value.

At the same time, the proliferation of Nike Towns, Disney Stores and Star-bucks clusters is powerful

evidence of a renewed reverence for a handful of elite lifestyle brands. For many of their loyal consumers,


no price is too high to pay for these branded goods and, in fact, merely buying the products provides an

insufficient relationship. Brand-obsessed shoppers have adopted an almost fetishist approach to

consumption in which the brand name acquires a talismanic power.

Not surprisingly, capitalizing on the urge for this sort of brand cocooning has become the central

preoccupation of the fashion, athletics and entertainment corporations selling these fetish brands. Themepark-inspired superstores are one part of this process, but as the successive waves of mergers and

attendant synergies continue, they are only the beginning.

[IMAGE]

Top: Michael Eisner (Walt Disney Co. CEO) seals merger with Thomas Murphy (Capital Cities/ABC

Chairman). Bottom: Ted Turner (Turner Broadcasting Chairman and President) does the same with Gerald

Levin (Time Warner Chairman and CEO).

CHAPTER SEVEN

MERGERS AND SYNERGY

The Creation of Commercial Utopias

I would prefer ABC not cover Disney.

-Disney CEO Michael Eisner, September 29, 1998, National Public Radio Commenting on the future of poetry and art in a democratic society, Alexis de Tocquevil e wrote that he was

not worried about a lapse into safe realism so much as a flight into unanchored fantasy. "I fear that the

productions of democratic poets may often be surcharged with immense and incoherent imagery, with


exaggerated descriptions and strange creations; and that the fantastic beings of their brain may sometimes

make us regret the world of reality."

We are surrounded now by the realization of Tocquevil e's predictions: gleaming, bulbous golden arches;

impossibly smooth backlit bil boards; squishy cartoon characters roaming fantastically fake theme parks.

When I was growing up, these strange creations awakened something in me that I've since come to think of

as deep longing for the seductions of fake; I wanted to disappear into shiny, perfect, unreal objects.

Maybe this condition was brought on by television, maybe it was a too-early trip to Disneyland, maybe it was

malls, but just as Tocquevil e predicted in 1835, the world of reality looked pretty dingy by comparison. The

humiliating spectacle of my all-too-real family, so sixties authentic, set against the cascade of inviting

plasticity that was the seventies and eighties, was simply too much to bear. "Stop it, guys, you're

embarrassing me!" was the near-hysterical cri de coeur of my youth. Even when there was no one but

family around, I could feel the plastic world's reproachful gaze.

My parents, part of a wave of American hippies who moved to Canada to dodge the Vietnam War draft,

were terribly disturbed by these tendencies of mine. In their newly adopted country, they had imagined

themselves to be breeding a new kind of post revolutionary child, blessed with the benefits of Canada's


humane social services, public health-care system and solid subsidies to the arts.

Hadn't they diligently

mushed their own baby food? Read Parent Effectiveness Training? Banned war toys and other "gendered"

play?

In an effort to save me from corruption, my parents were forever dragging me out of the city to appreciate

the Canadian wilderness and experience the joys of real-time family interaction. I was distinctly

unimpressed. The only thing that saved me on these reality excursions was my dreams of fakeness,

unfolding in the back seat of our station wagon as it sped past verdant farmland and majestic mountains. At

five or six, I would eagerly await the moulded plastic of franchise signs on the side of the road, craning my

neck as we passed McDonald's, Texaco, Burger King. My favourite was the Shell sign, so bright and

cartoon-like I was convinced that if I could climb up and touch it, it would be like touching something from

another dimension -from the world of TV. During these family trips, my brother and I would beg to stop for

fast food packed in shiny laminated boxes, and sometimes my parents would relent, if they were feeling

particularly defeated that day. But more often than not, lunch would be another ponchoed picnic at a

national park, with dry cheddar cheese, autumnal fruit and other distressingly un-packaged foodstuffs.

By the time I was eight or nine, my back-seat daydreams grew more intricate. I spent an entire journey


through the Rockies conducting covert make-overs on everyone in the car. My father would lose the sandals

and get a sharp, dignified suit, my mother a helmet hairdo and a wardrobe of smart pastel blazers, skirts

and matching pumps. As for me, the possibilities were endless: kitchen cupboards fil ed with fake foods,

closets overflowing with designer labels, unlimited access to eyeliner and perms. I wasn't allowed to have a

Barbie ("a racket," my parents ruled, "first it's a doll, then a camper van, then the whole mansion") but I had

Barbie in my brain.

It seemed as if the vanguard feminist-socialist child-rearing experiment was doomed to failure. Not only was

I crazy for Shell signs, but by the age of six, my older brother had developed an uncanny knack for

remembering the jingles from television commercials and would tear around the house in his Incredible Hulk

T-shirt declaring himself "cuckoo for Cocoa Puffs." At the time, I couldn't understand why my parents were

so upset about these stupid rhymes, but now I've come to feel their pain: despite their very best efforts, they

had somehow given birth to an advertisement for General Mil s — in other words, to regular kids.

Cartoons and fast-food franchises speak to children in a voice too seductive for mere mortal parents to

compete with. Every kid wants to hold a piece of the cartoon world between his or her fingers - that's why

the licensing of television and movie characters for toys, cereals and lunchboxes has spawned a $16.1


bil ion annual industry. It is also why so-called family entertainment companies have been going to greater

and greater lengths to extend their television and movie fantasies into real-world experiential

extravaganzas: branded museum exhibits, high-tech superstores, and, the old standard, theme parks. Back

in the 1930s, Walt Disney, the grandfather of modern synergy, understood the desire to crawl inside the

screen when he fantasized about building a self-enclosed Disney city and remarked that every Mickey

Mouse product or toy doubled as an advertisement for his cartoons. Mattel has long grasped this as well, but

if Disney's project has been extending the fantasy of its films into toys, then Mattel's was extending its toys

into ever more elaborate fantasy worlds. This vision is perhaps best understood as the "Zen of Barbie":

Barbie is One. Barbie is all things.

Which is to say that the corporate synergy mania consuming so much of pop culture today is not all new.

Barbie and Mickey Mouse are miniature branding trailblazers —those two have always wanted more

extensions for their brands, more lateral monopolies to control. What has changed in the past decade is that

almost everyone in the corporate world now recognizes that the urge to disappear into the cross-promotional

tie-ins of cherished consumer products (be they toys, TV shows or sneakers) does not magically disappear

when children outgrow sugar cereal. Plenty of Saturday-morning-cartoon kids have grown up into Saturdaynight-club kids, fulfil ing their longing for plastic fantasy with earnestly ironic Hello Kitty backpacks and

Japanimation-inspired helmets of blue hair. You can see some of them at the Sega Playdiums, which are

fil ed with grown-up gamers on weekend nights —no one under eighteen is even allowed to enter these

roaring carnivals of virtual reality, especially on South Park theme nights.

It is this insistent desire to become one with your favourite pop-culture products that every one of the

superbrands — from Nike to Viacom to the Gap to Martha Stewart —is trying to harness and expand upon,

exporting Walt Disney's synergy principles from kid culture and transplanting them into every aspect of both

teen and adult mass culture. Michael J. Wolf, a management consultant to such major players as Viacom,

Time Warner, MTV and Citigroup, can attest to that fact. "I can't begin to count the number of times that

people who run consumer businesses have confided to me that their goal is to create the broad-based

success that Disney seems to bring to every project and every business it touches," he writes.

This goal didn't materialize out of thin air. Rather, it can be traced back once again to the corporate "brands,

not products" epiphany sparked by Marlboro Friday: if brands are about

"meaning," not product attributes,

then the highest feat of branding comes when companies provide their consumers with opportunities not

merely to shop but to fully experience the meaning of their brand. Sponsorship, as seen in Chapter 2, is a


good start, but synergy and lifestyle branding are the logical conclusion. Just as companies like Molson and

Nike have sought to build celebrity brands by upstaging the concerts and sports matches they sponsored, so

are many of these same companies also attempting to overthrow local retailers by creating branded

superstores, then, further down the road, branded hotels and miniature vil ages.

As two sides of the same

project, synergy and branding are both about creating cross-promotional brandbased experiences that

combine buying with elements of media, entertainment and professional sports to create an integrated

branded loop. Disney and Mattel have always known this — now everyone else is learning it too.

A true branded loop cannot be created overnight, which is why the process usually begins with the simplest

form of brand extension, a giant merger: Bell Atlantic and Nynex; Digital Equipment and Compaq;

WordCom Inc. and MCI; Time Warner and Turner; Disney and ABC; Cineplex and Loews; Citicorp and

Travellers; Bertelsmann and Random House; Seagram and PolyGram; America Online and Netscape;

Viacom and CBS...the list grows each day. Usually, the companies cite the Wal-Mart principle: everyone

else in the industry is merging and only the biggest and strongest wil survive. But size for its own sake is

only the beginning of the story. Once the perimeter of the brand has expanded, corporate attention


inevitably shifts to ways of making it more self-sufficient, through various internally coordinated crosspromotions.

In a word, through synergy.

Sometime in the early nineties, writes Michael J. Wolf, the attitude of his media industry clients underwent a

philosophical change. "Companies were no longer interested in merely being the biggest studio or the most

successful TV network. They had to be more. Theme parks, cable networks, radio, consumer products,

books, and music all became prospects for their potential empires. Media land was gripped by merger

mania. If you weren't everywhere... you were nowhere."

This sort of reasoning lies behind virtually al the major mergers of the mid- to late nineties. Disney buys

ABC, which then broadcasts its movies and cartoons. Time Warner purchases Turner Broadcasting, which

then cross-promotes its magazines and films on CNN. George Lucas buys block stocks in Hasbro and

Galoob before he sells the toy companies the licensing rights for the new Star Wars films, at which point

Hasbro promptly buys Galoob to consolidate its hold on the toy market. Time Warner opens a division

devoted to turning its films and cartoons into Broadway musicals. Nelvana, a Canadian-based producer of

kids' cartoons, purchases Kids Can Press, a publisher of children's books upon which such lucrative

Nelvana cartoons as Franklin the Turtle are based. The merger transforms Nelvana into an "integrated


company," in which future books can get their genesis in the company's marketable TV cartoons and

lucrative lines of toys.

In the broader book world, after purchasing Random House (this book's primary publisher), Bertelsmann AG

buys 50 percent of Barnesandnoble.com, giving the largest English-language publishing company in the

world a significant stake in the exploding on-line book retail market. Barnes Noble, meanwhile, bids to buy

Ingram, a major American book distributor, which also services the chain's competitors. If the Ingram deal

had gone through (it was abandoned amid public outcry), the potential synergies among these three

companies would have stretched to include the entire book publishing process, from contracting and editing

to distributing, publicizing and, finally, retailing.

Perhaps the purest expression of synergy's market goals was Viacom's 1994

purchase of Blockbuster Video

and Paramount Pictures. The deal gave Viacom the opportunity not only to profit from Paramount films

when they played in its Paramount theatres but when they came out on video as well. "The combination of

Viacom and Paramount, in my view, is the whole essence of the multimedia revolution," says Sumner

Redstone, the bil ionaire mogul behind Viacom. And this ability to keep cash flows inside a corporate family

carries for these moguls its own kind of reward. Virgin's Richard Branson, for instance, laughs in the face of


the accusation that his far-flung branding forays are stretching the Virgin name in too many directions. "It

may be right that Mars sticks to the chocolate bar and Mike keeps its feet on the ground. But if their

executives cross the Atlantic on a Virgin plane, listen to Virgin records and keep their money with a Virgin

bank, then at least Britain wil have one new global brand for the next century."

What the Virgin case clearly shows is that in the aftermath of the synergy revolution, brand extensions are

no longer adjuncts to the core product or main attraction; rather, these extensions form the foundation upon

which entire corporate structures are being built. Synergy, as Branson suggests, is about much more than

old-style cross-promotion; it is about using ever-expanding networks of brand extensions to spin a selfsustaining

lifestyle web. Branson and others are stretching the fabric of their brands in so many directions

that they are transformed into tent-like enclosures large enough to house any number of core activities, from

shopping to entertainment to holidays. Starbucks, upon announcing that it would begin selling furniture over

the Internet, calls this a "brand canopy." This is the true meaning of a lifestyle brand: you can live your

whole life inside it.

The concept is key to understanding not only synergy but also the related blurring of boundaries between

sectors and industries. Retail is blurring with entertainment, entertainment with retail. Content companies


(like film studios and book publishers) are leaping into distribution; distribution networks (like phone and

Internet companies) are leaping into content production.

And all the while, the people previously pigeonholed as pure content — the stars themselves — are

charging into production, distribution and, of course, retail. So the "if you aren't everywhere, you're nowhere"

sentiment described by Wolf reaches well beyond the media conglomerates.

Everyone, it seems, wants to

be everywhere —whether they started as home decorators, sneaker manufacturers, record companies or

basketball stars, they are all ending up, as Shaquil e O'Neal and his people so aptly put it, "like Mickey

Mouse."

In this fluid context, the branded tent of tents might be Disney or Viacom, but it could just as easily be

Tommy Hilfiger, America Online, Martha Stewart or Microsoft. Quite simply, every company with a powerful

brand is attempting to develop a relationship with consumers that resonates so completely with their sense

of self that they wil aspire, or at least consent, to be serfs under these feudal brandlords. This explains why

marketing talk of pitch and product has been usurped so completely by the more intimate discourse of

"meaning" and "relationship building" —brand-based companies are no longer interested in a consumer

fling. They want to move in together.

And so the fiercest marketplace battles are taking place not between warring products but between warring


branded camps that are constantly redrawing the borders around their enclaves, pushing the boundaries to

include ever more complete lifestyle packages: if music, why not food, asks Puff Daddy. If clothes, why not

retail, asks Tommy Hilfiger. If retail, why not music, asks the Gap. If coffee houses, why not publishing, asks

Starbucks. If theme parks, why not towns, asks Disney.

Superstores: Stepping Inside the Brand

Not surprisingly, it was the Walt Disney Company, the inventor of modern branding, that created the model

for the branded superstore, opening the first Disney Store in 1984. There are now close to 730 outlets

worldwide. Coke followed shortly after with a store sporting all manner of branded paraphernalia, from key

chains to cutting boards. But if Disney and Coke paved the way, it was Barnes Noble that created the

model that would forever change the face of retailing, introducing the first superstore to its chain of

bookstores in 1990. The prototype for the new construct, according to company documents, was "old-world

library ambiance and a wood and green palette" complemented by "comfortable seating, restrooms and

extended hours" —and, of course, by a little co-branding in the form of in-store Starbucks coffee shops. The

formula affected not only the chain's ability to sell books but also the role it occupied in pop culture; it

became a celebrity, a source of endless media controversy, and eventually the thinly veiled inspiration for a


Hollywood movie, You've Got Mail. In less than a decade, Barnes Noble became the first bookstore that

was also a superbrand in its own right.

Little wonder, then, that virtually all the consumer and entertainment companies that have been building up

their brand images through marketing, synergy and sponsorship are now intent on having their own retail

temples. Nike, Diesel, Warner Brothers, Tommy Hilfiger, Sony, Virgin, Microsoft, Hustler and the Discovery

Channel have all leaped into branded retail. For these companies, stores that sell multiple brands have

become antithetical to the very principles of sound brand management. They want nothing to do with

venues in which their products are sold side by side with their competitors'. "The multi-brand store is

disappearing, and companies like us need stores that reflect our personality,"

explains Maurizio Marchiori,

advertising director at Diesel, which has opened twenty branded stores since 1996.

The superstores constructed to reflect these corporate personalities are exploring the boundaries of what

Nike refers to as "inspirational retail." As Nike president Thomas Clarke explains, large-scale "event" outlets

"give retailers the opportunity to romance products better." How this seduction takes place varies from

brand to brand, but the general idea is to create a venue that is part shopping centre, part amusement park,

part multimedia extravaganza — an advertisement more potent and evocative than a hundred bil boards.


Popular superstore attractions include deejays spinning live from their own inhouse broadcast booths, giant

screens and star-studded launch parties. A cut above are the listening booths at the Virgin Megastores, the

indoor waterfalls and rock-climbing walls at Seattle's Recreational Equipment, Inc., the interactive digital

foot-measuring stations at Nike Town, the complimentary foot massages and reflexology at Rockport stores

and the arcade-style computer games at the San Francisco Microsoft Store. And then, of course, there is

that fixture of branded retail: the in-store coffee bar — even the Hustler superstore has one of those.

Describing his vision for the 9,000-square-foot branded sex emporium in West Hollywood, Hustler owner

Larry Flynt explained that he wanted to create a retail space "more comfortable for women, more like

Barnes £t Noble."

"Creating a destination" is the key buzz-phrase for the superstore builder: these are places not only to shop

but also visit, places to which tourists make ritualistic pilgrimages. For this reason, the locations chosen for

the stores are far more upmarket than those to which the hawkers of Disney key chains, Nike sneakers and

Tommy jeans are accustomed. In fact, so many mass-market brand Mecca’s have made their home on New

York's Fifth Avenue and L.A.'s Rodeo Drive that the neighbours — the exclusive Gucci, Cartier and Armani

brands — have begun to complain about the popularizing presence of Daffy Duck and Air Jordan.


Selling mass-market consumer goods and doodads on the most expensive pieces of real estate in the

world, in the most costly, high-tech, art-directed retail environments ever imagined, doesn't always add up

on paper. But to look at the superstore as a break-even business enterprise is to miss the point entirely. No

expense is spared in the building of the stores because, while the Time Square Disney Store or the Fifth

Avenue Warner Brothers outlet may be money losers in and of themselves, they serve a much higher

purpose in the overall branding picture. As Dan Romanelli, president of Warner Brothers consumer products

division, says of the company's flagship, "Fifth and 57th is probably the best retail location in the world. It

has helped immensely in building our international business and in making a statement about our brand."

Discovery Communication takes a similar attitude. Spinning off from its four television channels, the media

company has launched thirty-five Discovery shops since 1996, hybrids of department stores, amusement

parks and museums. The jewel in the crown is a $20 mil ion flagship store in Washington, D.C., that

features a full-scale model of a T. rex dinosaur skeleton and a World War 11

fighter plane. According to

Michela English, president of Discovery Enterprises Worldwide, these outlets are not expected to make

money until at least 2001. That, however, isn't stopping the company from adding dozens more stores.


"There is a bil board impact to having the Discovery name on stores," she explains.

Generally, this "bil board impact" is favoured by companies whose primary source of sales is stil multibrand

venues: department stores, Cineplex Theatres, THMV record stores, Foot Locker and so on. Even without

being able to control their entire distribution networks, branded superstores provide these companies with a

kind of spiritual homeland for their brands, one so recognizable and grand that no matter where the

individual products roam they wil carry that grandness with them like a halo. It is as if a homing device had

been implanted in the brand, so that, for instance, stalls selling Virgin merchandise at Virgin movie theatres

aren't stalls selling merchandise at movie theatres — they are "Virgin mini-megastores," a satellite of

something much deeper and more important than what meets the eye. And when consumers go to the local

Foot Locker and are confronted with pairs of Nikes unceremoniously lined up next to the Reeboks, Filas and

Adidas, they wil , with any luck, remember the sensory overload they experienced on their pilgrimage to

Nike Town. As Michael Wolf writes, branded retail is about "imprinting an experience on you as surely as

the farmer's wife imprints good feelings in a clutch of baby geese when she feeds them a handful of grain

every day."

Branded Vil ages: Moving into the Brand


The stores are only the beginning — the first phase in an evolution from experiential shopping to living the

fully branded experience. In a superstore, writes Wolf, "the lights, the music, the furniture, the cast of clerks

create a feeling not unlike a play in which you, the shopper, are given a leading role." But in the scheme of

things that play is rather short: an hour or two at the most. Which is why the next phase after retail-astourist-destination has been the creation of branded holidays: never mind Disney World, Disney has

launched the Disney Magic cruise ship and among its destinations is Disney's privately owned island in the

Bahamas, Castaway Cay. Nike has its own sports-themed cruise ship in the works and Roots Canada,

shortly after introducing a home wear line and opening a flagship store in Manhattan, launched the Roots

Lodge, a branded hotel in British Columbia.

I visited the Roots development at the construction phase in Ucluelet, a small town on the west coast of

Vancouver Island. The site is called the Reef Point Resort and it is here that branding is being taken to the

next level. In April 1999, the Roots Lodge wasn't yet open, but construction was far enough along to make

the concept perfectly clear: a high-end, fully branded summer camp for adults.

Instead of canoes, an

"adventure station" rents out ocean kayaks and surfboards; instead of outhouses, each cabin has its own hot

tub; instead of the communal campfire, individual gas fireplaces. The lodge restaurant is set up mess-hall


style, but the food is pure Pacific Coast gourmet. Most important, the rough-hewn wooden cabins are

equipped with the entire Roots home furniture line.

"Like living in a bil board," one visitor observes as we receive our official tour, and that is no exaggeration. A

cross between a catalogue showroom and an actual living room, the resort has a Roots logo on display in

the cabins on pil ows, towels, cutlery, plates and glasses. The chairs, sofas, rugs, blinds and shower curtains

are all Roots. On the wooden Roots coffee table is a brown leather Roots blotter, gently cradling a flattering

book about the Roots story - and you can buy it all to take with you at the Roots store across the way. At the

lodge, the "play" Wolf refers to lasts not a few hours but a weekend, maybe even a week or two. And the set

at the company's disposal includes not only the architecture and design of the buildings (as is the case with

superstores), but the entire Canadian wilderness around the lodge: the eagle in the cedar outside the

window, the old-growth forest that guests walk through to reach the cabins, the crashing waves of the

Pacific.

There is a strong symmetry at work in this branding exercise. The Roots clothing line got its genesis in a

place not unlike this one. Company founders Don Green and Michael Budman both went to summer camp

in Algonquin Park, Ontario, and were so moved by their experience of active living in the Canadian


outdoors that they designed a line of clothing to capture the very best of that feeling: comfortable walking

shoes, cozy sweatshirts, Canadian Workman socks, and, of course, the beaver logo. "Algonquin's majestic

hil s, sparkling lakes and forest primeval inspired Roots," states an early print advertisement. "Its golden

summer days, cold starry nights, autumn blaze and stil winter white are now recreated in the colours and

spirit of Roots Algonquin."

The pitch was anything but subtle, as journalist Michael Posner observed in 1993

when he wrote, "Here's

the truth: Roots is less a company than a summer camp." The clothing manufacturer has been expanding

on that carefully crafted image since the beginning. First it built retail outlets that, with the help of wallmounted

canoe paddles and exposed beams, conjure not a chain store but, as journalist Geoff Pevere

writes, "summer-camp mess halls and cottages built by caring and callused hands." Then came the home

wear line, featuring blankets and pil owcases designed to look like oversized workmen's socks. And now, full

circle, comes the Roots Lodge, where the original "inspiration" for a line of clothing becomes a fully realized

extension of the Roots brand: from summer camp to branded camp; from lifestyle marketing to the lifestyle

itself.

Mark Consiglio, the fast-talking, fleece-wearing developer of the resort, has bigger plans stil for Reef Point,


of which the Roots Lodge represents only a fraction of the available property. He shows me a model for a

250-cabin complex and explains his vision: a retail town centre with brand-name stores and services. The

Roots store, of course, but perhaps an Aveda Spa as well, and maybe stores like Club Monaco and the

Body Shop too. Each retail outlet wil be attached by boardwalk to its very own branded lodge, which, like

the Roots Lodge, wil be kitted with al the logo-festooned accessories the company can supply. Consiglio

can't name names yet — "stil in negotiations"—but he does tell me pointedly that

"Roots isn't the only

clothing company getting into home wear, you know. Everyone is doing it."

The problem with branded vacation destinations, however, is that they only provide temporary opportunities

for brand convergence, an oasis from which families, at the end of the trip, are abruptly yanked and dumped

back into their old lives, no doubt a poorly managed mishmash of competing logos and brand identities.

Which is where Celebration, Florida, comes in —that very first Disney town. The meticulously planned

development arrives complete with picket fences, a Disney-appointed homeowners' association and a

phoney water tower. For the families who live there year-round, Disney has achieved the ultimate goal of

lifestyle brandling; for the brand to become life itself.

Except the life on offer is perhaps not the One we might have expected from the Mouse. When Walt Disney


first conceived of a branded city, it was meant to be an artificiality bonanza, a temp]e to the mid-fifties

futuristic gods of technology and automation. The city never was built in Walt's lifetime, though some of the

ideas went into the Epcot Centre sixteen years after his death. When Disney CEO

Michael Eisner decided

to pick up on Walt's old dream and build a branded town he opted against the Jetsons-inspired fantasy world

his predecessor had imagined. Though wired with every modern technology and convenience, Celebration

is less futurism than homage, an idealized re-creation of the liveable America that existed before malls, bigbox

sprawl, freeways, amusement parks and mass commercialization. Oddly enough, Celebration is not

even sales vehicle for Mickey Mouse licensed products; it is, in contemporary terns an almost Disney-free

town - no doubt the only one left in America. In other words, when Disney finally reached its fully enclosed,

synergized, self-sufficient space, it chose to create a pre-Disneyfied world- its calm, understated aesthetics

are the antithesis of the cartoon world for sale down the freeway at Disney World.

Like the gated communities that have Sprung up across the U.S., on Celebration's tranquil, tree-lined,

bil board-free streets inhabitants are not subject to any of the stimulations or ravages of contemporary life.

No Levi Strauss has bought up all the storefronts on Main Street to sell a new style of wide-legged pants,

and no graffiti artists have defaced the ads; no Wal-Mart has left the downtown boarded up and twisted, and


no community group has formed to fight the big boxes; no factory closures have eroded the tax base and

pumped up the welfare rolls and no quarrelsome critics are around to point fingers. What is most striking

about Celebration, however, particularly when compared with most Northern American suburban

communities, is the amount of public space it offers - parks, communal buildings and vil age squares. In a

way, Disney's branding breakthrough is a celebration of brandlessness, of the very public spaces the

company has always been so adept at getting its brands on in the rest of its endeavours.

Of course this is an il usion. The families who have chosen to make Celebration their home are leading the

first branded lives. As social historian Dieter Hassenpflug has remarked, "Even the streets are under

Disney's control—private space that pretend[s] to be public." So Celebration is an intricate inversion of

Tocquevil e's prediction: an "authenticity" bunker, specially retrofitted by the founder of fake.

The whole idea reminds me of a place on Vancouver Island called Cathedral Grove, about an hour and half

s drive from the Roots Lodge and the mouth of Clayoquot Sound, Canada's most cherished old-growth

forest. The drive through this part of the world has converted thousands of unsuspecting tourists into

environmental activists, and it's easy to see why. After driving uphil for miles you reach a vista of


mountains covered with lush cedars, sparkling lakes and drifting eagles —the wilderness that soothes and

reassures the soul. The planet is as strong and rich as it ever was, it tells us —we just have to drive farther

north to see it. But the serenity doesn't last long. The next dip and climb brings a radically different view:

two huge bald grey mountains so burned and scarred they look more like the moon's surface than the earth.

Nothing but death and asphalt for miles.

Nestled in the folds of this psychic roller coaster is the entrance to Cathedral Grove. Every day, hundreds of

cars pull over to the side of the road, and their passengers embark on foot, glossy brochures in hand, to see

the only old-growth trees left in the area. The largest tree has a rope around it and a plaque mounted on a

stick. The irony, not lost on most residents of the area, is that this miniature park is owned and operated by

MacMil an Bloedel, the logging company responsible for clear-cutting Vancouver Island and much of

Clayoquot Sound. Cathedral Grove isn't a forest but a tree museum —just as Celebration is a town

museum.

It's tempting to dismiss Celebration and the idea of the branded town as the particular neurotic obsession of

the Disney corporation: this isn't a harbinger of the future privatization of public space, it's just Walt playing

God again from beyond the grave. But with virtually every superbrand openly modelling itself after Disney,


Celebration should not be too readily dismissed. Of course Disney is ahead of the game — Disney invented

the game — but as is always the case with the Mouse, there are many would-be imitators trailing behind,

taking notes. From his perch as adviser to the top media conglomerates, Michael J. Wolf observes that

theme-park-style shopping locations like Minneapolis's Mall of America may be precursors to the live-in

malls of the future. "Maybe the next step in this evolution is to put housing next to the stores and

megaplexes and call it a small town. People living, working, shopping, and consuming entertainment in one

place. What a concept," he enthuses.

Setting aside, for a moment, the Brave New World/Step ford Wives associations such a vision inevitably

evokes, there is something undeniably seductive about these branded worlds. It has to do, I think, with the

genuine thril of utopianism, or the il usion of it at any rate. It's worth remembering that the branding process

begins with a group of people sitting around a table trying to conjure up an ideal image; they toss around

words like "free," "independent," "rugged," "comfortable," "intelligent," "hip." Then they set out to find realworld

ways to embody those ideas and attributes, first through marketing, then through retail environments

like superstores and coffee chains, then — if they are really cutting edge —

through total lifestyle

experiences like theme parks, lodges, cruise ships and towns.


Why wouldn't these creations be seductive? We live in a time when expectations for building real-world

commons and monuments with pooled public resources —schools, say, or libraries or parks —are

consistently having to be scaled back or excised completely. In this context, these private branded worlds

are aesthetically and creatively thril ing in a way that is totally foreign to anyone who missed the post-war

boom. For the first time in decades, groups of people are constructing their own ideal communities and

building actual monuments, whether it's the marriage of work and play at the Nike World Campus, the

luxurious intellectualism of the Barnes Noble superstores or the wilderness fantasy of the Roots Lodge.

The emotional power of these enclaves rests in their ability to capture a nostalgic longing, then pump up the

intensity: a school gym equipped with NBA-quality equipment; summer camp with hot tubs and gourmet

food; an old-world library with designer furniture and latte; a town with no architectural blunders and no

crime; a museum with the deep pockets of Hollywood. Yes, these creations can be vaguely spooky and scifi,

but they should not be dismissed as just more crass commercialism for the unthinking masses: for better

or for worse, these are privatized public Utopias.

Shrinking Options in the Privatized Town Square

The terrible irony of these surrogates, of course, is how destructive they are proving to be to the real thing:


to actual town centres, to independent business, to the non-Disney version of public spaces, to art as

opposed to synergized cultural products and to a free and messy expression of ideas. Commercial climates

are being dramatically altered by the expanding size and ambitions of these large players, and nowhere

more so than in retail, where, as we have seen, companies like Discovery and Warner Brothers are in it for

the "bil board effect" as much as for the sales. Independent shopkeepers, on the other hand, generally lack

the resources to turn shopping into performance art, let alone into a destination vacation spot.

As superstores adopt the production values and special effects of Hollywood, small business is getting

caught between, on the one hand, the deep discounting of the Wal-Marts and online retailers like

Amazon.com, and on the other the powerful draw of the theme-park-infused retail environments. These

market trends are combining to drastically undermine the traditional concepts of value and individual

service that small business is known for offering. The staff at the indies may be more experienced and

knowledgeable than the assistants at the superstores (the high turnover doesn't allow clerks to gain

experience: more on that in the next section, "No Jobs"), but even that relative advantage can often get

drowned out by the pure entertainment value of the superstores.

As many have commented, this phenomenon has been particularly pronounced in the book industry, where


membership in the American Booksellers Association has fallen startlingly from 5,132 in 1991 to 3,400 in

1999. part Of the problem is the Wal-Mart effect: the superstore chains have negotiated discounts on

wholesale books with many publishers, making it nearly impossible for the independents to compete on

price. The other difficulty is the retail standard set by the superstores. Bookstores are now expected to play

the role of the university library, theme park, playground, pickup joint, community centre, literary salon and

coffee house all in one-a pricey undertaking even for the big players, which often involves taking a loss in

the interest of future brand equity and market share. That has been the experience here in Canada, where

the Canadian equivalent of Barnes Noble, the bookstore chain Chapters, was able to open ten

superstores in prime locations in 1997, while running at a loss of $2.1 mil ion.

It is here, once again, that the economy of scale comes powerfully into play. Of course some independent

bookstores have held their own against the chains by adding cafes, cozy reading chairs and cooking

demonstrations, but there is only so far most independents can travel down the road of experiential

shopping before they experience financial stress. If, on the other hand, they do nothing to compete, single,

independent stores can all too soon begin to look like poor cousins next to the brandstravaganza unfolding

across the street. The end result is a retail playing field where more books are being sold, but it is becoming


as difficult for small retailers to compete as it is for independent film producers to go up against the major

studios on the multiplex circuit. Retail has become a vastly unequal playing field; yet another industry-like

film, television or software - where you have to be huge to stay in the game. Here once again is the strange

combination of a sea of product coupled with losses in real choice: the signature of our branded age.

A great deal of critical attention has been lavished on the effects of superstores on the book industry-partly

because bookstore consolidation has clear implications for freedom of speech, and partly because media

types tend to care more passionately about where they buy their books than where they buy their socks. In

many ways, however, the bookstores are an anomaly in the superstore universe: they are multibrand stores,

carrying books from thousands of book publishers, and they are primary business ventures, as opposed to

being extensions, synergy schemes or 3-D bil boards for brands primarily invested elsewhere. To see the

animosity toward marketplace diversity most directly, one has to look not to the bookstores but to the pure

branded superstores like those built by Virgin, Sony and Nike. It is there that the quest for total brand reach

is revealed most starkly as the antithesis of marketplace diversity: like synergy itself, these stores seek

name-brand cohesion, a safe logo cocoon apart from the warring messages of other brands.


The Virgin megastores provide perhaps the clearest displays of this kind of brand cohesion, employing

various intra-brand synergies to leapfrog over entire stages of consumer choice.

In the past, record labels,

no matter how much money they sank into promoting new artists, were stil at the mercy of record-store

owners and radio- and music-video station programmers (which is why the labels got themselves into so

much legal trouble in the fifties for bribing deejays). No more. Virgin's 122

megastores are wired up to be

synergy machines, equipped with building-sized mural ads, listening stations for customers to sample new

CDs, huge video screens, deejay booths, and satellite dishes to beam live concerts into the stores. This is

par for the course in the age of the superstore, but since Virgin is also a record label, all of this technology

can be harnessed to create a sense of breaking excitement about a new Virgin artist. "We'l be featuring

certain artists every month. That means we play them in the store, we can do live shows via satellite from

another location and we can give them store presence," says Christos Garkinos, vice president of marketing

for Virgin Entertainment Group. "Think of what we can do for a developing artist."

More to the point, why

wait around for something as temperamental as audience demand or radio play when by controlling all the

variables you can create the il usion of a blockbuster success before it even happens?


That is synergy, in a nutshell. Microsoft uses the term "bundling" to describe the expanding package of core

goods and services included in its Windows operating system, but bundling is simply the software industry's

word for what Virgin calls synergy and Nike calls brand extensions. By bundling the Internet Explorer

software within Windows, one company, because of its near monopoly in system software, has attempted to

buy its way in as the exclusive portal to the Internet. What the Microsoft case so clearly demonstrates is that

the moment when all the synergy wheels are turning in unison and all's right in the corporate universe is the

very moment when consumer choice is at its most rigidly controlled and consumer power at its feeblest.

Similarly, in the entertainment and media industries, synergy nirvana has been attained when all of a

conglomerate's arms have been successfully coordinated to churn out related versions of the same product,

like moulded Play-Doh, into different shapes: toys, books, theme parks, magazines, television specials,

movies, candies, CDs, CD-ROMs, superstores, comics and mega musicals.

Because synergy's efficiency is not measured by the success of any one

"product," whether a film or a book,

but rather on how well any one of those products travels through the conglomerate's multimedia channels,

synergy projects tend to grow out of freewheeling meetings in which agents, clients, brand managers and

producers riff on how next to leverage their flagship brands. And so the market is flooded with the mutant


progeny of these brainstorming sessions: Planet Hollywood restaurants, Disney-published books written by

ABC sitcom stars, Starbucks coffee-flavoured beer, Lost in Space breath mints, a chain of airport bars

modelled after the deceased set of the sitcom Cheers, Taco Bell-flavoured Doritos...

It seems fitting, then, that Sumner Bedstone calls his Viacom entertainment products "software" since there

is so little that is firm at the centre of these synergy schemes. By software, Redstone means branded

entertainment products that he pats and moulds to fit his various media holdings.

"We have created a

software-driven media global powerhouse," he says. "Our mission is to drive that software in every

application here in the U.S. and to every region on the earth. We're going to do it."

Redstone prides himself

on the "absolute open communication" between his holdings. "We are coordinating various aspects of the

business so each takes advantage of the opportunities provided by the other."

The New Trusts: The Assault on Choice

In less enthusiastic eras than our own, other words besides "synergy" were commonly used to describe

attempts to radically distort consumer offerings to benefit colluding owners; in the U.S., il egal trusts were

combinations of companies that secretly agreed to fix prices while pretending to be competitive. And what

else is a monopoly, after all, but synergy taken to the extreme? Markets that respond to the tyranny of size


have always had a tendency toward monopoly. Which is why much of what has taken place in the

entertainment industry during the last decade of merger mania would have been outlawed as recently as

1982, before President Ronald Reagan's all-out assault on U.S. anti-trust laws.

Although many media empires have long had the capacity to coordinate their holdings to promote their

various offerings, most were held in check from aggressively doing so by laws designed to put up barriers

between media production and media distribution. For example, U.S. regulations passed between 1948 and

1952 limited the ability of film studios to own first-run movie theatres because lawmakers feared a vertical

monopoly in the industry. Though the regulations were loosened in 1974, the U.S.

government was at that

point in the midst of implementing a similar series of anti-trust actions designed to keep the three major

U.S. television networks (CBS, ABC and NBC) from producing entertainment shows and movies for their

own stations. The Justice Department charged that the three networks had an il egal monopoly that was

blocking the work of outside producers. According to the Justice Department, the networks should act as

programming "conduits," not programmers themselves. During this government anti-trust campaign, CBS

was forced to sell off its programming arm —which, ironically, is now the synergy-obsessed Viacom.

Another irony is that the interest that pushed most aggressively for the Federal Trade Commission


investigation was Westinghouse Broadcasting, the same company that merged with CBS in 1995 and now

enjoys all the attendant synergies between production and distribution. Full circle arrived in September 1999

when Viacom and CBS announced their merger, worth an estimated $80 bil ion.

The companies, reunited

after all these years apart, converged into an entity far more powerful than before the divorce took place.

In the seventies and early eighties, however, the majors were under so much scrutiny that according to Jack

Myers, then a sales executive at CBS-TV, his network was reluctant to coordinate the sales departments of

its television, radio, music and publishing divisions for cross-promotional purposes. "The idea," writes

Myers, "is one that several major media companies are today attempting to follow, but in 1981 concerns

about anti-trust regulations prevented direct divisional interaction."

Those concerns were alleviated when, in 1983, Reagan began the not-so-gradual dismantling of U.S. antitrust

laws, first opening the door to joint research between competitors, then removing the roadblocks to

giant mergers. He yanked the teeth out of the Federal Trade Commission, dramatically limiting its ability to

impose fines for anticompetitive actions, cutting the staff from 345 to 134 and appointing an FTC chairman

who prided himself on reducing the agency's "excessively adversarial role." A former FTC regional director,

Carlton Eastlake, commented in 1983 that "if the policies of the current chairman are permitted to govern


for a sufficient period of time, some of our most basic liberties wil be jeopardized."

Mot only were the

policies continued, but in 1986 even more dismantling legislation was passed with the explanation that

American companies needed greater flexibility to compete with the Japanese.

Reagan's term saw the ten

biggest mergers in American history up until that point —and not one was challenged by the FTC. The

number of FTC anti-trust cases against corporations dropped by half during the eighties, and the cases that

were prosecuted tended to target such ultra-powerful forces as the Oklahoma Optometric Association, at the

same time as Reagan stepped in personally to protect the world's ten largest airlines from a pending antitrust

investigation by his own government. For the culture industries, the final piece of the new-world jigsaw

fell into place in 1993 when Federal Judge Manuel Real lifted the anti-trust restrictions that had been

imposed on the three major television networks in the seventies. The decision opened the door for the

majors to once again produce their own prime-time entertainment shows and movies and neatly paved the

way for the Disney-ABC merger.

However, even in today's climate of weak anti-trust laws, some of the more audacious synergy dreams have

begun to wake up the long-dormant FTC. In addition to the high-profile case against Microsoft, Barnes

Noble's bid to buy the book distributor Ingram created such rage in the book industry that the FTC was


forced to set up a dedicated phone line to deal with the complaints and Barnes Noble abandoned the bid.

That these controversies are fiercest in the book and software industries is no coincidence: what is at stake

is not the availability of cheap staplers, toys or non-branded towels but the free publication of, and access

to, a healthy diversity of ideas. It doesn't help that the concentration of ownership among Internet,

publishing and book retail companies has come hot on the heels of what must now seem an incautious level

of hype about the openness and personal empowerment of the so-called Information Revolution.

In an open E-mail to Bil Gates, Andrew Shapiro, a Fellow at Harvard Law School's Centre for Internet and

Society, voices an opinion that has surely occurred to most thoughtful observers of modern mergers and

synergy schemes. "If the whole idea of this revolution is to empower people, Bil , why are you locking up the

market and restricting choices? Synergizing your way from one biz to another every month?"

This contradiction represents a much larger betrayal than the usual doublespeak of advertising that we are

all accustomed to. What is being betrayed is no less than the central promises of the information age: the

promises of choice, interactivity and increased freedom.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CORPORATE CENSORSHIP

Barricading the Branded Vil age


Every other week I pull something off the shelf that I don't think is of Wal-Mart quality.

— Teresa Stanton, manager of Wal-Mart's store in Cheraw, South Carolina, on the chain's practice of censoring magazines with provocative covers, in The Wall Street Journal, October 22, 1997

In some instances, the assault on choice has moved beyond predatory retail and monopolistic synergy

schemes and become what can only be described as straightforward censorship: the active elimination and

suppression of material. Most of us would define censorship as a restriction of content imposed by

governments or other state institutions, or instigated —particularly in North American societies —by

pressure groups for political or religious reasons. It is rapidly becoming evident, however, that this definition

is drastically outdated. Although there wil always be a Jesse Helms and a Church Lady to ban a Marilyn

Manson concert, these little dramas are fast becoming sideshows in the context of larger threats to free

expression.

Corporate censorship has everything to do with the themes of the last two chapters: media and retail

companies have inflated to such bloated proportions that simple decisions about what items to stock in a

store or what kind of cultural product to commission — decisions quite properly left to the discretion of

business owners and culture makers — now have enormous consequences: those who make these choices


have the power to reengineer the cultural landscape. When magazines are pulled from Wal-Mart's shelves

by store managers, when cover art is changed on CDs to make them Kmart-friendly, or when movies are

refused by Blockbuster Video because they don't conform to the chain's "family entertainment" image, these

private decisions send waves through the culture industries, affecting not just what is readily available at the

local big box but what gets produced in the first place.

Both Wal-Mart and Blockbuster Video have their roots in the southern U.S.

Christian heartland-Blockbuster

in Texas, Wal-Mart in Arkansas. Both retailers believe that being "family" stores is at the core of their

financial success, the very key to their mass appeal. The model (also adopted by Kmart), is to create a onesize-fits-all family-entertainment centre, where Mom and Dad can rent the latest box-office hit and the new

Garth Brooks release a few steps away from where Johnny can get Tomb Raider 2 and Melissa can coangst

with Alanis.

To protect this formula, Blockbuster, Wal-Mart, Kmart and all the large supermarket chains have a policy of

refusing to carry any material that could threaten their image as a retail destination for the whole family. The

one-stop-shopping recipe is simply too lucrative to risk. So magazines are rejected by Wal-Marts and

supermarket chains —which together account for 55 percent of U.S. newsstand sales — for offences


ranging from too much skin on the cover girls, to articles on "His Her Orgasms"

or "Coming Out: Why I

Had to Leave My Husband for Another Woman." Wal-Mart's and Kmart's policy is not to stock CDs with

cover art or lyrics deemed overly sexual or touching too explicitly on topics that reliably scandalize the

heartland: abortion, homosexuality and Satanism. Meanwhile, Blockbuster Video, which controls 25 percent

of the home-video market in the U.S., carries plenty of violent and sexually explicit movies but it draws the

line at films that receive an 1MC-17 rating, a U.S. designation meaning that nobody under seventeen can

see the film, even accompanied by an adult.

To hear the chains tell it, censoring art is simply one of several services they provide to their family-oriented

customers, like smiling faces and low prices. "Our customers understand our music and video

merchandising decisions are a common-sense attempt to provide the type of material they might want to

purchase," says Dale Ingram, Wal-Mart director of corporate relations.

Blockbuster's line is: "We respect the

needs of families as well as individuals."

Wal-Mart can afford to be particularly zealous since entertainment products represent only a fraction of its

business anyway. No one hit record or movie has the power to make a dent in Wal-Mart's bottom line, a fact

that makes the retailer unafraid to stand up to the entertainment industry's bestselling artists and defend its


vision of a shopping environment where power tools and hip-hop albums are sold in adjoining aisles. The

most well known of these cases involved the chain's refusal to carry Nirvana's second hit album, In Utero,

even though the band's previous album had gone quadruple platinum, because it objected to the back-cover

artwork portraying foetuses. "Country artists like Vince Gil and Garth Brooks are going to sell much better

for Wal-Mart than Nirvana," Wal-Mart spokesperson Trey Baker blithely said at the time. Facing a projected

loss of 10 percent (Wal-Mart's then share of U.S. music sales), Warner and Nirvana backed down and

changed the artwork. They also changed the title of the song "Rape Me" to "Waif Me." Kmart Canada took a

similar attitude to the Prodigy's 1997 release Fat of the Land, on the basis that the cover art and the lyrics in

the songs "Smack My Bitch Up" and "Funky Shit" just wouldn't fit in at the Mart.

"Our typical customer is a

married working mother and we felt it was inappropriate for a family store," said manager Alien Letch. Like

Nirvana, the British bad boys complied with their label's subsequent request and issued a cleaned-up

version.

Such censorship, in fact, has become so embedded in the production process that it is often treated as

simply another stage of editing. Because of Blockbuster's policy, some major film studios have altogether

stopped making films that wil be rated NC-17. If a rare exception is made, the studios wil cut two versions


— one for the theatres, one sliced and diced for Blockbuster. What producer, after all, would be wil ing to

forgo 25 percent of video earnings before their project is even out of the gate? As film director David

Cronenberg told The New Yorker, "The assumption now seems to be that every movie should be watchable

by a kid.... So the pressure on anyone who wants to make a grownup movie is enormous."

Many magazines, including Cosmopolitan and Vibe, have taken to showing advance copies of new issues to

big boxes and supermarkets before they ship them out. Why risk having to deal with the returns if the issue

is deemed too risqué? "If you don't let them know in advance, they wil delist the title and never carry it

again," explains Dana Sacher, circulation director of Vibe.

"This way, they don't carry one issue, but they might carry the next one."

Since bands put out a record every couple of years - not one a month -they don't have the luxury of warning

Wal-Mart about a potentially contentious cover and hoping for better luck on the next release. Like film

producers, record labels are instead acting pre-emptively, issuing two versions of the same album — one

for the big boxes, bleeped, airbrushed, even missing entire songs. But while that has been the strategy for

multi-platinum-selling artists like the Prodigy and Nirvana, bands with less clout often lose the opportunity to

record their songs the way they intended, pre-empting the objections of family-values retailers by issuing

only pre-sanitized versions of their work.


In large part, the complacency surrounding the Wal-Mart and Blockbuster strain of censorship occurs

because most people are apt to think of corporate decisions as non-ideological.

Businesses make business

decisions, we tell ourselves — even when the effects of those decisions are clearly political. And when

retailers dominate the market to the extent that these chains do today, their actions can't help raising

questions about the effect on civil liberties and public life. As Bob Merlis, a spokesperson for Warner

Brothers Records explains, these private decisions can indeed have very public effects. "If you can't buy the

record then we can't sell it," he says. "And there are some places where these mass merchandisers are the

only game in town." So in much the same way that Wal-Mart has used its size to get cheaper prices out of

suppliers, the chain is also using its heft to change the kind of art that its

"suppliers" (i.e., record companies,

publishers, magazine editors) provide.

Censorship in Synergy

While the instances of corporate censorship discussed so far have been a direct by-product of retail

concentration, they represent only the most ham-fisted form of corporate censorship. More subtly-and

perhaps more interestingly- the culture industry's wave of mergers is breeding its own blockages to free

expression, a kind of censorship in synergy.

One of the reasons that producers are not standing up to puritanical retailers is that those retailers,


distributors and producers are often owned, in whole or in part, by the same companies. Nowhere is this

conflict of interest more in play than in the relationship between Paramount Films and Blockbuster Video.

Paramount is hardly positioned to lead the charge against Blockbuster's conservative stocking policy,

because if indeed such a policy is the most cost-effective way to draw the whole family into the video store,

then who is Paramount to take money directly out of mutual owner Viacom's pockets? Similar conflicts arise

in the aftermath of Disney's 1993 purchase of Miramax, the formerly independent film company. On the one

hand, Miramax now has deep resources to throw behind commercially risky foreign films like Roberto

Benigni's Life Is Beautiful; on the other, when the company decides whether or not to carry a politically

controversial and sexually explicit work like Larry Clarke's Kids, it cannot avoid weighing how that decision

wil reflect on Disney and ABC's reputations as family programmers, with all the bowing to pressure groups

that that entails.

Such potential conflicts become even more disturbing when the media holdings involved are not only

producing entertainment but also news or current affairs. When newspapers, magazines, books and

television stations are but one arm of a conglomerate bent on "absolute open communication" (as Sumner

Redstone puts it), there is obvious potential for the conglomerate's myriad financial interests to influence the


kind of journalism that is produced. Of course, newspaper publishers meddling in editorial content to further

their own financial interests is as old a story as the small-town paper owner who uses the local Herald or

Gazette to get his buddy elected mayor. But when the publisher is a conglomerate, its fingers are in many

more pots at once. As multinational conglomerates build up their self-enclosed, self-promoting worlds, they

create new and varied possibilities for conflict of interest and censorship. Such pressures range from

pushing the magazine arm of the conglomerate to give a favourable review to a movie or sitcom produced

by another arm of the conglomerate, to pushing an editor not to run a critical story that could hurt a merger

in the works, to newspapers being asked to tiptoe around judicial or regulatory bodies that award television

licenses and review anti-trust complaints. And what is emerging is that even tough-minded editors and

producers who unquestioningly stand up to external calls for censorship —

whether from vocal political

lobbies, Wal-Mart managers or their own advertisers — are finding these intracorporate pressures much

more difficult to resist.

The most publicized of the synergy-censorship cases occurred in September 1998

when ABC News kil ed a

Disney-related story prepared by its award-winning investigative team of correspondent Brian Ross and

producer Rhonda Schwartz. The story began as a broad investigation of allegations of lax security at theme


parks and resorts, leading to the inadvertent hiring of sex offenders, including paedophiles, as park

employees.

Because Disney was to be only one of several park owners under the microscope, Ross and Schwartz got

the go-ahead on the story. After all, it wasn't the first time the team had faced the prospect of reporting on

their parent company. In March 1998, ABC newsmagazine 20/20 had aired their story about widespread

sweatshop labour in the U.S. territory of Saipan. Though it focused its criticism on Ralph Lauren and the

Gap, the story did mention in passing that Disney was among the other American companies contracting to

the offending factories.

But reporting has a life of its own and as Ross and Schwartz progressed on the theme-park investigation,

they found that Disney wasn't on the periphery, but was at the centre of this story.

When they handed in two

drafts of what had turned into a sex-and-scandal expose of Disney World, David Westin, president of ABC

News, rejected the drafts. "They didn't work," said network spokeswoman Eileen Murphy. Even though

Disney denies the allegations of lax security, first made in the book Disney: The Mouse Betrayed, and even

though CEO Michael Eisner is on record saying "I would prefer ABC not cover Disney," ABC denies the

story was kil ed because of pressure from its parent company. Murphy did say, however, that "we would


generally not embark on an investigation that focused solely on Disney, for a whole variety of reasons, one

of which is that whatever you come up with, positive or negative, wil seem suspect."

The most vocal criticism of the affair came from Bril 's Content, the media-watch magazine founded in 1998

by Steven Bril . The publication lambasted ABC executives and journalists for their silence in the face of

censorship, accusing them of caving in to their own internalized "Mouse-Ke-Fear."

In his previous

incarnation as founder of the Court TV cable network and American Lawyer magazine, Steven Bril had

some firsthand experience with censorship in synergy. After selling his miniature media empire to Time

Warner in 1997, Bril claims that he faced pressure on several different stories that brushed up against the

octopus-like tentacles of the Time Warner/ Turner media empire. In a memo excerpted in Vanity Fair, Bril

writes that company lawyers tried to suppress a report in American Lawyer about a Church of Scientology

lawsuit against Time magazine (owned by Time Warner) and asked Court TV to refrain from covering a trial

involving Warner Music. He also claims to have received a request from Time Warner's chief financial

officer, Richard Bressler, to "kil a story" about Wil iam Baer, the director of the Federal Trade Commission's

Bureau of Competition — ironically, the very body charged with reviewing the Time Warner-Turner merger

for any violation of anti-trust law.


Despite the alleged meddling, all the stories in question made it to print or to air, but Bril 's experience stil

casts a shadow over the future of press freedom inside the merged giants.

Individual crusading editors and

producers have always carried the flag for journalists' right to do their job, but in the present climate, for

every crusader there wil be many more walking on eggs for fear of losing their job. And it's not surprising

that some have begun to see trouble everywhere, second-guessing the wishes of top executives in ways

more creative and paranoid than the executives may even dare to imagine themselves. This is the truly

insidious nature of self-censorship: it does the gag work more efficiently than an army of bullying and

meddling media moguls could ever hope to accomplish.

China Chil

As we have seen in recent years, journalists, producers and editors are not only finding reason to walk

carefully when dealing with judicial and regulatory bodies (not to mention theme parks), but —in the case of

China—we have watched an entire country become a tiptoe zone. A wave of China-chil incidents has swept

through the Western media and entertainment industries since Deng Xiaoping tentatively lifted the

Communist Party monopoly on news and began slowly to open his country's borders to some censorapproved

foreign media and entertainment.

Mow the global culture industry faces the possibility that it is the West that may have to play by China's


rules — outside as well as inside its borders. Those rules were neatly summed up in a 1992 article in The

South China Morning Post: "Provided they do not break the law or go against party line, journalists and

cultural personnel are guaranteed freedom from interference by commissars and censors." And with TOO

mil ion cable subscribers expected in China by the year 2000, several cultural empire builders have already

begun exercising their freedom to agree with the Chinese government.

An early incident involved Rupert Murdoch's notorious decision to drop the BBC's World Service news from

the Asian version of Star TV. Chinese authorities had objected to a BBC

broadcast on Mao Tse-tung,

sending a clear warning about the types of reporting that wil be welcome and profitable in China's wired

world. More recently, HarperCollins Publishers (this book's publisher in the United Kingdom), also owned by

Murdoch's Mews Corp, decided to drop East and West: China, Power, and the Future of Asia, written by

Hong Kong's last British governor, Chris Patten. At issue was the possibility that the views expressed by

Patten—who had called for more democracy in Hong Kong and criticized human-rights abuses in China —

would enrage the Chinese government upon which Murdoch's satellite ventures are dependent. In the storm

of controversy that followed, more allegations of censorship for the sake of global synergy came out of the

woodwork, including one by Jonathan Mirsky, former East Asia editor for the Murdoch-owned London


Times. He claimed that the paper "has simply decided, because of Murdoch's interests, not to cover China

in a serious way."

Fears of retaliation from the Chinese are not without basis. Famous for punishing media organizations that

don't toe the government line and rewarding those that do, the Chinese government banned the sale and

ownership of private satellite dishes in October 1993: the dishes were picking up more than ten foreign

stations, including CNN, BBC and MTV. Liu Xilian, vice minister for radio, film and television, would only

say, "Some of the satellite programs are suitable and some are not suitable for the normal public." The

Chinese government fired another salvo in December 1996 after learning of Disney's plans to release

Kundun, a Martin Scorsese film about Tibet's Dalai Lama. "We are resolutely opposed to the making of this

movie. It is intended to glorify the Dalai Lama, so it is an interference in China's internal affairs," stated

Kong Min, an official at the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television. When the studio went ahead with the film

anyway, Beijing instituted a ban on the release of all Disney films in China, a ban that stayed in place for

two years.

Since China only lets in ten foreign films a year and puts controls on their distribution, the Kundun incident

sent a chil through the film industry, which had several other China-related projects in the works, including


MGM's Red Corner and Sony's Seven Years in Tibet. To their credit, none of the studios pulled the plug on

these films in progress, and in fact many in the film community rallied around Scorsese and Kundun.

However, both MGM and Sony made official statements that attempted to depoliticize their China films,

even if it meant contradicting their lead actors and directors. MGM went ahead with Red Corner, a movie

about China's corrupt criminal justice system, starring Richard Gere, but while Gere maintained that the film

is "a different angle of dealing with Tibet," MGM's worldwide marketing president, Gerry Rich, told a

different story: "We're not pursuing a political agenda. We're in the business of selling entertainment."

Seven Years in Tibet got a similar sell from Sony: "You don't want to convey that it's a movie about a

political cause," a studio executive said. Disney, mean- The medium wil change from while, finally

managed to get the a mass-produced and mass-Chinese government to lift the ban consumed

commodity to an endless on its films with the release of feast of niches and specialties.... Mulan, a

feel-good animated tale A new age of individualism is based on a 1,300-year-old legend coming

and it wil bring an from the Sui Dynasty. The South eruption of culture unprecedented China Morning

Post described the in human history. depiction of Chinese heroism and -George Gilder, Life After

Television, 1990 patriotism as an "olive branch" and


"the most China-friendly movie Hollywood has made in years." It also served its purpose: Mulan flopped at

the box office but it opened the door to discussions between Disney and Beijing for a planned $2 bil ion

Disney theme park in Hong Kong.

If anything, the Western lust for access to the Chinese entertainment market has only become more intense

in recent years, despite worsening relationships between the U.S. and Chinese governments over such

issues as access to China's securities and telecommunications industries, more revelations of espionage

and, most disastrous of all, the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo

war. The reason, in part, is that in the past, the desire to enter China was based on projected earnings, but

in 1998, those projections became a reality. James Cameron's Titanic broke all the records for foreign

releases and earned $40 mil ion at the box office in China, even in the midst of an economic downturn.

China chil is significant above all in what it tells us about the priorities and power wielded today by the

multinationals. Financial self-interest in business is nothing new, nor is it in itself destructive. What is new is

the reach and scope of these megacorporations' financial self-interest, and the potential global

consequences, in both international and local terms. These consequences wil be felt not in boisterous

celebrity standoffs between such players as Rupert Murdoch, Michael Eisner, Martin Scorsese and Chris


Patten, all of whom have the resources and clout to advance their positions regardless of minor setbacks.

Disney and News Corp are moving swiftly ahead in China, yet Tibet remains a cause celebre among movie

stars and musicians, while Patten's book, after quickly finding another publisher, certainly sold more copies

as a result of the controversy. Rather, the lasting effects, once again, wil be in the self-censorship that the

media conglomerates are now in a position to seed down through the ranks of their organizations. If news

reporters, editors and producers have to take into account their moguls'

expansionist agendas when

reporting on foreign affairs, why stop at China? Wouldn't coverage of the Indonesian government's

genocide in East Timor raise concerns for any multinational doing, or hoping to do, business in populous

Indonesia? What if a conglomerate has deals in the works in Nigeria, Colombia or Sudan? This is a long

way from the rhetoric following the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the media moguls claimed that their cultural

products would carry the torch of freedom to authoritarian regimes. Not only does that mission appear to

have been swiftly abandoned in favour of economic self-interest, but it seems that it may be the torch of

authoritarianism that is being carried by those most determined to go global.

Copyright Bullies

After NATO's 1999 air strikes provoked Serbian "rock rallies" where teens in Chicago Bulls caps defiantly


burned the American flag, few would be naive enough to reassert the tired old refrain that MTV and

McDonald's are bringing peace and democracy to the world. What was crystallized in those moments when

pop culture bridged the wartime divide, however, was that even if there exists no other cultural, political or

linguistic common ground, Western media have made good on the promise of introducing the first truly

global lexicon of imagery, music and icons. If we agree on nothing else, virtually everyone knows that

Michael Jordan is the best basketball player that ever lived.

That may seem a minor achievement compared with the grand "global vil age"

pronouncements made after

the collapse of Communism, but it is an accomplishment sufficiently vast to have revolutionized both the

making of art and the practicing of politics. Verbal or visual references to sitcoms, movie characters,

advertising slogans and corporate logos have become the most effective tool we have to communicate

across cultures —an easy and instant "click." The depth of this form of social branding came into sharp

focus in March 1999 when a scandal erupted over a popular textbook used in American public schools. The

Grade 6 math text was riddled with mentions and photographs of well-known brand-name products: Nike

shoes, McDonald's, Gatorade. In one instance, a word problem taught students to calculate diameters by

measuring an Oreo cookie. Predictably, parents' groups were furious over this milestone in the


commercialization of education; here was a textbook, it seemed, with paid advertorial. But McGraw-Hil , the

book's publisher, insisted that the critics had it al wrong. "You're trying to get into what people are familiar

with, so they can see, hey, mathematics is in the world out there," Patricia S.

Wilson, one of the book's

authors, explained. The brand-name references weren't paid advertisements, she said, but an attempt to

speak to students with their own references and in their own language-to speak to them, in other words, in

brands.

Nobody is more acutely aware of how enmeshed language and brands have become than the brand

managers themselves. Cutting-edge trends in marketing theory encourage companies not to think of their

brands as a series of attributes but to look at the psychosocial role they play in pop culture and in

consumers' lives. Cultural anthropologist Grant McCracken teaches corporations that to understand their

own brands they have to set them free. Products like Kraft Dinner, McCracken argues, take on a life of their

own when they leave the store —they become pop-culture icons, vehicles for family bonding, and creatively

consumed expressions of individuality. The most recent chapter in this school of brand theory comes from

Harvard professor Susan Fournier, whose paper, "The Consumer and the Brand: An Understanding within

the Framework of Personal Relationships," encourages marketers to use a human-relationship model in


conceptualizing the brand's place in society: is it a wife through an arranged marriage? A best friend or a

mistress? Do customers "cheat" on their brand or are they loyal? Is the relationship a "casual friendship" or

a "master/slave engagement"? As Foumier writes, "this connection is driven not by the image the brand

'contains' in the culture, but by the deep and significant psychological and socio-cultural meanings the

consumer bestows on the brand in the process of meaning creation."

So here we are, for better or for worse, having meaningful committed relationships with our toothpaste and

co-dependencies on our conditioner. We have almost two centuries' worth of brand-name history under our

collective belt, coalescing to create a sort of global pop-cultural Morse code. But there is just one catch:

while we may all have the code implanted in our brains, we're not really allowed to use it. In the name of

protecting the brand from dilution, artists and activists who try to engage with the brand as equal partners in

their "relationships" are routinely dragged into court for violating trademark, copyright, libel or "brand

disparagement" laws —easily abused statutes that form an airtight protective seal around the brand,

allowing it to brand us, but prohibiting us from so much as scuffing it.

Much of this comes back to synergy. The definition of trademark in U.S. law is

"any word, name, symbol, or

device, or combination thereof, used...to identify and distinguish goods from those manufactured or sold by


others." Many alleged violators of copyright are not trying to sell a comparable good or pass themselves off

as the real thing. As branding becomes more expansionist, however, a competitor is anyone doing anything

remotely related, because anything remotely related has the potential to be a spin-off at some point in the

synergistic future.

And so, when we try to communicate with each other by using the language of brands and logos, we run the

very real risk of getting sued. In the U.S., copyright and trademark laws —

strengthened by Ronald Reagan

in the same piece of 1983 legislation that loosened anti-trust law —are being invoked in ways that have far

more to do with brand control than market competition. Of course there are many uses of these laws that

are absolutely crucial if artists are to have a hope of making a living, particularly with the growing ease of

digital and electronic distribution. Artists need to be protected from outright thievery of their work by

competitors and from its use for commercial profit without permission. I do know a few anti-copyright

radicals who walk around in "Al Copyright Is Theft" and "Information Wants to Be Free" T-shirts, though it

seems to me that those positions are more provocative than practical. But what they do serve to highlight, if

only rhetorically, is the climate of cultural and linguistic privatization being advanced through outright

copyright and trademark harassment.


Copyright and trademark harassment is a massive and growing industry, and though its effects are too

sweeping to fully document, here are a few random examples. Dairy Queen bakers won't squirt Bart

Simpson onto frozen birthday cakes for fear of a lawsuit from Fox; in 1991, Disney forced a group of New

Zealand parents in a remote country town to remove their amateur renditions of Pluto and Donald Duck

from a playground mural; and Barney has been breaking up children's birthday parties across the U.S.,

claiming that any parent caught dressed in a purple dinosaur suit is violating its trademark. The Lyons

Group, which owns the Barney character, "has sent 1,000 letters to shop owners"

renting or selling the

offending costumes. "They can have a dinosaur costume. It's when it's a purple dinosaur that it's il egal, and

it doesn't matter what shade of purple, either," says Susan Elsner Furman, Lyons'

spokesperson.

McDonald's, meanwhile, continues busily to harass small shopkeepers and restaurateurs of Scottish descent

for that nationality's uncompetitive predisposition toward the Mc prefix on its surnames. The company sued

the McAl an's sausage stand in Denmark; the Scottish-themed sandwich shop McMunchies in

Buckinghamshire; went after Elizabeth McCaughey's McCoffee shop in the San Francisco Bay Area; and

waged a twenty-six-year battle against a man named Ronald McDonald whose McDonald's Family

Restaurant in a tiny town in Il inois had been around since 1956.


These types of cases may seem trivial, but the same aggressive ownership rules apply to artists and cultural

producers who are attempting to comment on our shared branded world.

Increasingly, musicians are sued

not only for sampling, but for attempting to sing about a patented common dream.

That's what happened to

the San Francisco "audio-collage" band Negativland when it called one of its albums [72, and sampled outtakes

from Casey Kasem's American Top 40 radio show. It happened, also, to Toronto avant-garde

musician John Oswald when he used his "plunderphonics" method to remix Michael Jackson's song "Bad"

on a 1989 album that he distributed free. Negativland was sued successfully by U2's label, Island Records,

and Jackson's label, CBS Records, sued Oswald for copyright violation. As part of the settlement Oswald

had to hand over all the CDs to be destroyed.

Artists wil always make art by reconfiguring our shared cultural languages and references, but as those

shared experiences shift from firsthand to mediated, and the most powerful political forces in our society are

as likely to be multinational corporations as politicians, a new set of issues emerges that once again raises

serious questions about out-of-date definitions of freedom of expression in a branded culture. In this

context, telling video artists that they can't use old car commercials, or musicians that they can't sample or

distort lyrics, is like banning the guitar or telling a painter he can't use red. The underlying message is that


culture is something that happens to you. You buy it at the Virgin Mega store or Toys 'R' Us and rent it at

Blockbuster Video. It is not something in which you participate, or to which you have the right to respond.

The rules of this one-way dialogue went unchallenged for a long time, mostly because until the eighties,

copyright and trademark cases were largely between corporate competitors suing each other for infringing

on their market share. Artists like REM, the Clash, Dire Straits and K.D. Lang were free to sing about such

trademarked products as Orange Crush, Cadil acs, MTV and Chatelaine magazine, respectively. Moreover,

the average consumer didn't have the means to cut and click into mass-produced culture and incorporate it

into something new of their own — a zine, a High-8 video or an electronic recording. It wasn't until scanners,

cheap photocopiers, digital editing machines and computer programs like Photoshop appeared on the

market as fairly inexpensive consumer goods that copyright and trademark law became a concern for

independent culture-makers assembling their own basement publications, Web sites and recordings. "I think

that culture has always cyclically reiterated itself.... Technology makes it possible to have access to and

easily manipulate and store information from distant places and times," says audio pirate Steev Hise.

"People wil do what they can do."

Doing what he could do is what produced John Oswald's plunderphonics method.

As Oswald explains, it


grew out of the fact that he had access to technology that enabled him to listen to records at different

speeds. "I was doing a kind of manipulative listening in fairly complex ways, and as my interactive listening

habits grew more complex, I began to think of ways to preserve them for other people to hear."

What most bothers Oswald and other artists like him is not that their work is il egal

— it's that it is il egal only

for some artists. When Beck, a major-label artist, makes an album parked with hundreds of samples,

Warner Music clears the rights to each and every piece of the audio collage and the work is lauded for

capturing the media-saturated, multi-referenced sounds of our age. But when independent artists do the

same thing, trying to cut and paste together art from their branded lives and make good on some of the infoage

hype about D1Y culture, it's criminalized — defined as theft, not art. This was the point made by the

musicians on the 1998 Deconstructing Beck underground CD, produced entirely by electronically

recontextualizing Beck's already recontextualized sounds. Their point was simple: if Beck could do it, why

shouldn't they? Right on cue, Beck's label sent out threatening lawyers' letters that quieted down abruptly

when the musicians made it clear that they were gunning for a media fight. Their point, however, had been

made: the prevailing formula for copyright and trademark enforcement is a turf war over who is going to get


to make art with the new technologies. And it seems that if you're not on the team of a company large

enough to control a significant part of the playing field, and can't afford your very own team of lawyers, you

don't get to play.

This is the lesson, it would seem, of Mattel's copyright suit against the Danish pop band Aqua and its label

MCA. Mattel charged that the band's hit song "Barbie Girl" —which contains lyrics like "Kiss me here, touch

there, hanky panky" — wrongfully sexualizes its wholesome blonde. Mattel went to court in September 1997

charging Aqua with trademark infringement and unfair competition. The toy manufacturer asked for

damages and for the album to be removed from stores and destroyed. Aqua won the dispute but not

because its case was any stronger than Negativland's or John Oswald's (it might have been weaker) but

rather because, unlike these independent musicians, Aqua had behind it MCA's team of lawyers, wil ing to

fight tooth and nail to make sure the hit single was allowed to stay on the charts and the shelves. It was, like

Jordan versus Nike, a battle of the brands.

Although the music itself is pure cotton candy, the Aqua case is worth considering because it pushed the

envelope on copyright bullying, introducing the idea that musicians must now be wary not only of direct

sampling but of so much as mentioning any trademarked products. It also highlighted the uncomfortable


tension between the expansive logic of branding —the corporate desire for full cultural integration — and

the petty logic of these legal crusades. Who if not Barbie is as much cultural symbol as product? Barbie,

after all, is the archetypal space invader, a cultural imperialist in pink. She is the one who paints entire

towns fuchsia to celebrate "Barbie Month." She is the Zen mistress who for the past four decades has

insisted on being everything to young girls — doctor, bimbo, teenager, career girl, Unicef ambassador....

The people at Mattel weren't interested in talking about Barbie the cultural icon when they launched the

Aqua suit, however. "This is a business issue, not a freedom of speech issue," a Mattel spokesperson told

Bil board. "This is a $2 bil ion company, and we don't want it messed around with, and situations like this

gradually lead to brand erosion." Barbie is a for-profit enterprise, it's true. And brands such as Barbie,

Aspirin, Kleenex, Coca-Cola and Hoover have always walked a fine line between wanting to be ubiquitous

but not wanting to become so closely associated with a product category that the brand name itself

becomes generic —as easily invoked to sell a competing brand as their own.

But while this fight against erosion seems reasonable in the context of brands competing with each other,

it's a different matter when looked at through the lens of aggressive lifestyle branding —and from that

perspective, a re-examination of the public's right to respond to these "private"

images seems urgently


required. Mattel, for instance, has reaped huge profits by encouraging young girls to build elaborate dream

lives around their doll, but it stil wants that relationship to be a monologue. The toy company, which boasts

of having "as many as 100 different [trademark] investigations going on at any time throughout the world," is

almost comically aggressive in protecting this formula. Among other feats, its lawyers have shut down a riot

girl zine called Hey There, Barbie Girl! and successfully blocked the distribution of Todd Haynes's

documentary Superstar: The Karen Carpenter Story, a re-enactment of the life of the anorexic pop star

using Barbies as puppets (legal pressure also came from Carpenter's family).

It seems fitting that Aqua member Sren Rasted says he got the idea for the song

"Barbie Girl" after visiting

"an art-museum exhibition for kids on Barbie." In an effort to have its star doll inaugurated as a cultural

artefact, Mattel has in recent years been mounting travelling exhibits of old Barbies, which claim to tell the

history of America through "America's favourite doll." Some of these shows are put on directly by Mattel,

others by private collectors working closely with the company, a relationship that ensures that unpleasant

chapters in Barbie's history —the feminist backlash against the doll, say, or Barbie the cigarette model —

are mysteriously absent. There is no question that Barbie, like a handful of other classic brands, is an icon

and artefact in addition to being a children's toy. But Mattel — and Coca-Cola, Disney, Levi's and the other


brands that have launched similar self-curatorial projects — wants to be treated as an important pop-culture

artefact at the same time as it seeks to maintain complete proprietary control over its historical and cultural

legacy. It's a process that ultimately gags cultural criticism, using copyright and trademark laws as effective

tools to silence all unwanted attention. The editors of Mil er's, a magazine for Barbie collectors, are

convinced that Mattel targeted them with a copyright suit because, unlike the uncritical collectors mounting

Barbie art shows, the publication criticized Mattel's high prices and ran old photographs of Barbie posing

with packs of Virginia Slims cigarettes. Mattel is by no means unique in its employment of this strategy.

Kmart, for instance, shut down the Kmart Sucks Web site mounted by a disgruntled employee, not by using

libel or defamation law, which would have required that the chain prove the allegations were false, but by

suing for unauthorized use of its trademark K.

When copyright or trademark law can't be invoked to prevent an unwanted brand portrayal, many

corporations do rely on libel and defamation law to keep their practices from being debated in the public

realm. The high-profile "McLibel" case in Britain, in which the fast-food chain sued two environmentalists for

libel, was one such attempt. (The issue wil be discussed in detail in Chapter 16.) Regardless of which legal

tactic they choose, the impossibly contradictory message sent out by the producers of these iconic products


is the same: we want our brands to be the air you breathe in — but don't dare exhale.

The more corporations like Mattel and McDonald's succeed in their goal of building self-enclosed branded

worlds, the more culturally asphyxiating that demand may become. Copyright and trademark laws are

perfectly justifiable if the brand in question is just a brand, but increasingly that's like saying that Wal-Mart is

just a store. The brand in question may well represent a corporation with a budget larger than that of many

countries, and a logo that is among the world's most transcendent symbols, one that has aggressively

sought to replace the role played by art and media. When we lack the ability to talk back to entities that are

culturally and politically powerful, the very foundations of free speech and democratic society are called into

question.

Privatizing the Town Square

There is an unavoidable parallel between the privatization of language and cultural discourse occurring

through copyright and trademark bullying, and the privatization of public space taking place through the

proliferation of superstores, theme-park malls and branded vil ages like Celebration, Florida. Just as

privately owned words and images are being adopted as a de facto international shorthand, so too are

private branded enclaves becoming de facto town squares — once again, with troubling implications for civil

liberties.


The conflation of shopping and entertainment found at the superstores and theme-park malls has created a

vast grey area of pseudo-public private space. Politicians, police, social workers and even religious leaders

all recognize that malls have become the modern town square. But unlike the old town squares, which were

and stil are sites for community discussion, protests and political rallies, the only type of speech that is

welcome here is marketing and other consumer patter. Peaceful protestors are routinely thrown out by mall

security guards for interfering with shopping, and even picket lines are il egal inside these enclosures. The

town-square concept has recently been picked up by the superstores, many of which now claim that they too

are providing public space. "Essentially, we want people to use the store as a meeting place. A place where

people can get their fix of pop culture and hang out for a while. It's not just a place to shop, it's a place to

be," said Christos Garkinos, vice president of marketing for the Virgin Entertainment Group, on the occasion

of the opening of Vancouver's 40,000-square-foot Virgin Mega store.

The building in which Virgin set up shop previously housed the public library, an apt metaphor for the way

brand expansion is altering the way we congregate, not just as shoppers but as citizens. Barnes Noble

describes its superstores as "a centre for cultural events and gatherings," and some of these stores,

particularly in the United States, do play the part well, housing everything from pop concerts to poetry


readings. Book superstores, with their plush chairs, faux fireplaces, book clubs and coffee bars, have slowly

come to replace libraries and university lecture halls as locales of choice for author readings on the booktour

circuit. But, as with the ban on protests in malls, a different set of rules applies in these quasi-public

spaces. For example, when promoting his book, Downsize This!, filmmaker Michael Moore was confronted

with a picket line outside a Philadelphia outlet of Borders bookstore, where he was scheduled to read. He

told the store he wouldn't go in unless the striking employees were allowed inside and given some time at

the microphone. The manager complied, but Moore's future Borders readings were cancelled. "I couldn't

believe I was being censored in a bookstore," Moore wrote of the incident.

As good as the superstores are at dressing up like town halls, no one mimics public space like America

Online, the virtual community of chat rooms, message boards and discussion groups where there are no

customers — only netizens. But AOL subscribers have, in the past two years, learned some harsh lessons

about their virtual community and the limits on the rights of its citizens. AOL, though part of the publicly

owned Internet, is a sort of privatized mini-Net inside the larger Web. The company collects the toll on the

way in and, like mall security guards, it can set the rules while customers are inside its domain. That was the

message that echoed through the virtual commons when AOUs so-called Community Action Team began


deleting messages from discussion groups deemed harassing, profane, embarrassing or just "unwanted." In

addition to screening messages, the team also has the right to forbid virtual sparring partners from ever

trading messages again and to suspend or expel repeat offenders from the service and from access to their

own E-mail accounts. Some lists —like a particularly heated one on Irish politics

— have been shut down for

extended "cooling-off" periods.

The company's rationale is strikingly similar to Wal-Mart's shelving policy (and Blockbuster's video rental

policy). Katherine Boursecnik, AOUs vice president for network programming, told The New York Times,

"We are a service that prides ourselves on having a wide-ranging appeal to a wide range of individuals. But

at the same time we're also a family service." While few contest that on-line discussion is a breeding ground

for al sorts of antisocial behaviour (from chronic overposting to sexual harassment), the sheer power that

the company has to regulate the tone and content of online discourse has raised the spectre of the "AOL

Thought Police." The issue, as with Wal-Mart, is AOUs commanding market share: in mid-1999 it had 15

mil ion subscribers - 43 percent of the U.S. Internet service market. Its closest competitor, Microsoft, had

only 6.4 percent.

Complicating matters further, Internet discussion is a hybrid medium, falling somewhere between making a


personal telephone call and watching cable television. So while its subscribers may view AOL as a phone

company, with no more right to intercept their communications than ATT has to disconnect unsavoury

phone discussions, the company has another view entirely. "Virtual community"

babble aside, AOL is,

above al , a branded media empire over which it exercises as much control as Disney does over the fence

colours in Celebration, Florida.

It seems that no matter how successfully the private sphere emulates or even enhances the look and feel-of

public space, the restrictive tendencies of privatization have a way of peeking through. And the same

applies not only to corporate-owned space, like AOL or Virgin Megastores, but even to publicly owned space

that is sponsored or branded. That point was graphically made in Toronto in 1997

when antitobacco activists

were forcibly removed from the open-air du Maurier Downtown Jazz Festival, just as student protestors had

been removed from the du Maurier Tennis Open on their campus. The irony was that the festival happened

to be taking place in the city's actual town square —Nathan Phil ips Square, just in front of Toronto City Hall.

The protestors learned that while the square may be as public a space as one can find, it becomes, during

jazz festival week, the property of the tobacco sponsor. No critical material was permitted on the premises.

When any space is bought, even if only temporarily, it changes to fit its sponsors.

And the more previously


public spaces are sold to corporations or branded by them, the more we as citizens are forced to play by

corporate rules to access our own culture. Does this mean that free speech is dead? Of course not, but it

does call to mind Noam Chomsky's view that "freedom without opportunity is a devil's gift." In a context of

media and marketing overload, meaningful opportunities to express our freedom

— at levels loud enough to

break through the barrage of commercial sound effects and disturb the corporate landlords — are

disappearing fast around us. Yes, dissenting voices have their Web pages, zines, posters, picket signs and

independent newspapers, as well as plenty of cracks in the corporate armour to exploit — and as we wil see

in Part IV, they are exploiting them as never before. But when corporate speech is increasingly expressed in

multiplatform synergy and in ever more extraordinary displays of branded

"meaning," popular speech

comes to look like the tiny independent retailer next to the superstore. As consumer advocate Ralph Nader

puts it: "There is a decibel-level quality to the exercise of our first amendment rights." Perhaps the most

disturbing manifestation of corporate censorship takes place when the space that is sold is not a place but a

person. As we have seen, the high-stakes sponsorship agreements in the sports world first exerted their

influence by deciding what logo athletes wore and what teams they played on.

Now that control has


expanded to what political views they may hold publicly. Daring political stands like Muhammad Ali's

opposition to the Vietnam War have long since been replaced by the soft-drink radicalism of NBA crossdresser

Dennis Rodman, as sponsors push their athletes to be little more than bil boards with attitude. As

Michael Jordan once commented, "Republicans buy sneakers too."

Canadian sprinter Donovan Bailey learned that lesson the hard way. Days before he won the Olympic race

that would make him the fastest man alive, Bailey came under attack for telling Sports Il ustrated that

Canadian society "is as blatantly racist as the United States." Adidas, horrified that its branded property

would risk alienating so many white sneaker buyers with such an unpopular opinion, rushed in to shut Bailey

up. Adidas vice president Doug Hayes told The Globe and Mail that the comments

"have nothing to do with

Donovan the athlete or the Donovan we know"- seemingly attributing the views to a fictional alter-athlete

who had possessed Bailey temporarily.

A similar case of branding censorship involved British soccer star Robbie Fowler.

After the twenty-one-yearold

scored the second goal against the Norwegian team Brann Bergen in March 1997, Fowler turned to the

crowd, pulled up his official jersey, and revealed a red political T-shirt: "500

Liverpool dockers sacked since

1995," the shirt said. The dockers have been on strike for years, fighting hundreds of layoffs and the shift to


contract work. Fowler, a Liverpool boy himself, decided to publicize the cause when the world was watching.

Ingenuously he commented: "I thought it would be just a simple statement."

He was, of course, mistaken. The Liverpool Football Club, which collects the toll on the branded messages

that appear on the players' official jerseys, raced in to stem any copycat actions.

"We wil be pointing out to

all our players that comments on matters outside football are not acceptable on the field of play," the club

said in a hastily issued statement. And just to make extra sure that the only message on the athletes' shirts

would be from Umbro or Adidas, the European football governing body UEFA followed up by slapping

Fowler with a fine of 2,000 Swiss francs.

There was yet another twist in this branded tale. The shirt Fowler revealed didn't bear just any political

slogan, it was also an ad bust: in a not-so-subtle subversion of a ubiquitous brand, the letters "c" and "k" in

the word "dockers" had been enlarged and designed to look like Calvin Klein's logo: doCKers. When

photographs of the T-shirt were splashed all over British newspapers, the designer threatened to sue for

trademark violation.

When piled on together, such examples give a picture of corporate space as a fascist state where we all

salute the logo and have little opportunity for criticism because our newspapers, television stations, Internet

servers, streets and retail spaces are all controlled by multinational corporate interests. And considering the


speed with which these trends are developing, we clearly have good reason for alarm. But a word of

caution: we may be able to see a not-so-brave new world on the horizon, but that doesn't mean we are

already living in Huxley's nightmare.

In drawing up octopus-like charts of corporate ownership structures and quoting CEOs on their dreams of

world domination, we may easily lose sight of the fact that censorship is not nearly as absolute as many a

newly converted Noam Chomsky acolyte might like to believe. Instead of an airtight formula, it is a steady

trend, clearly intensified by synergy and the mounting stakes of brand-name protection, but riddled with

exceptions. It's true, for example, that Viacom is coating the world in bubble gum through its Blockbuster

and MTV holdings, but Viacom-owned Simon 8t Schuster has published some of the best critiques of

unregulated economic globalization: Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh's Global Dreams and Wil iam

Greider's One World, Ready or Not, among others. NBC and Fox did, however briefly, run Michael Moore's

series TV Nation, which gleefully went after advertisers and even targeted NBC's parent company, General

Electric. And while Disney's purchase of Miramax inspired dark foreboding about the future of independent

film, it was Miramax that distributed Moore's Anticorporate documentary The Big One-a film based on his

similarly critical book, published by Random House, now owned by Bertelsmann.

As, I hope, the book you


are holding helps to prove, there is clearly stil room for corporate critiques within the media giants.

In a sense, the shift that is taking place is at once less totalitarian and more dangerous. We haven't lost the

possibility for non-synergistic art, and serious critical work has a greater potential to reach wide audiences at

this time than ever before in the history of art and culture. But we are losing the spaces in which the

noncorporate-minded can flourish — those spaces are there, but they are shrinking as the captains of the

culture industry become more enraptured by the dream of global crosspromotions. Much of this is a matter

of simple economics: there are limited numbers of movies, books, magazine articles and programming

hours that can be economically produced, published, broadcast, etc., and the window for the ones that don't

fit into the reigning corporate strategy narrows with every merger and consolidation.

There is a chance, however, that the current mania for synergy wil collapse under the weight of its

unfulfil ed promises. Already, Blockbuster has become a dead weight around Viacom's debt-ridden neck.

The stock-market analysts blame "the quality of products coming through its stores"— and it probably

doesn't help that the chain has had to devote entire wings of its stores to showcasing some thirty-four copies

of Kevin Kline's unwatchable In Out (or some other Paramount flop) because the folks at Viacom were


determined to make back some of the mil ions they lost in theatres. And after its

"eatertainment" outlets

haemorrhaged money for two years, Planet Hollywood announced in August 1999

that it would file for

bankruptcy protection. Another synergy scheme that looked foolproof on paper was the 1998 release of

Godzil a. Sony thought it had its blockbuster status sewn up: it had a Madison Square Garden premiere, a

made-for-Toys 'R' Us star, a $60 mil ion marketing budget orchestrating a year-long "teaser" campaign, and

a heavy-handed legal team cracking down on all unwanted publicity on the Internet. Most important, thanks

to Sony's newly consolidated movie theatre holdings, the movie played on more screens than any film ever

before: on launch day, 20 percent of all U.S. movie theatre screens were playing Godzil a. Yet none of this

could compensate for the simple fact that nearly everyone who saw Godzil a warned their friends to stay

away, and they did, in droves.

Even branding evangelist Tom Peters acknowledges that there is such a thing as too much brand, and

impossible though it is to predict when we wil reach that point, when we pass it, it wil be unmistakable.

"How much is enough?" asks Peters. "Nobody knows for sure. It's pure art.

Leverage is good. Too much

leverage is bad." MTV founder Tom Freston, the man who made marketing history by turning a television

station into a brand, admitted in June 1998 that "you can beat a brand to death."


Indeed, by early 1998, Wall Street was declaring the unthinkable: Nike had outswooshed itself; its ubiquity

had ceased to be a branding success story and had become a liability. "Mike's biggest challenge is itself.

They need to come up with another identity that they can stil say, This is Nike,'

but it's something beyond

the swoosh," Josie Esquivel, a stock analyst with Morgan Stanley told The New York Times.

Nike has attempted to respond to this challenge, as we shall see. But if such a backlash is possible against

a single brand, then perhaps it's conceivable that a similar phenomenon can apply equally to the act of

branding as a whole: that after a certain amount of branding mania is stamped on a culture, those of us who

have been branded —by Nike, Wal-Mart, Hilfiger, Microsoft, Disney, Starbucks, et al. -wil begin to turn not

just against these specific logos, but also against the control that corporate power as a whole exerts over

our spaces and choices. Maybe there is a moment when the idea of branding reaches a saturation point and

the backlash is directed not at a product that suddenly finds itself on the wrong side of a fad but at the

multinationals behind the brands.

There is some evidence that this process is already under way. As we wil see in Part IV, "No Logo,"

communities around the world, and at various generational levels, are no longer being blinded by the

brands' shiny promises of newness and of endless selection. Instead of swinging open their doors, they are


organizing at community levels to block the arrival of big-box retailers; they are participating in street-level

campaigns against Nike's Third World labour practices and Shell Oil's human-rights record. They are

launching movements, like Britain's Reclaim the Streets, to regain some fleeting public control over public

space; and they are supporting anti-trust actions against companies such as Microsoft. Given the relative

suddenness of the backlash, this wave of Anticorporate hostility is understandably taking its targets by

surprise. "A few months ago, everyone I met seemed to think that working for Microsoft was a pretty cool

thing to do. Now, strangers treat us like we work for Philip Morris," wrote Slate columnist Jacob Weisberg.

The bewildered sentiment is shared by multinational employees across many sectors. "I don't know how we

are offending people," said Starbucks regional marketing director Donna Peterson in May 1999. "But

sometimes it seems we are." And Royal Dutch/Shell head Mark Moody-Stuart told Fortune magazine,

"Previously, if you went to your golf club or church and said, 'I work for Shell,'

you'd get a warm glow. In

some parts of the world that changed a bit." And (as we wil see in the examination of the Shell boycott in

Chapter 16), that in itself is a bit of an understatement.

Mounting disil usionment in the face of the forces described here in "No Space"

and "No Choice" is not,

however, sufficiently widespread or deep to spark a genuine backlash against the power of the brands. In all


likelihood, resentment at invasive advertising, the corporate takeover of public space, and monopolistic

business practices would have festered as little more than run-of-the-mil cynicism had many of the same

companies gobbling up both space and choice not decided simultaneously to bankroll their innovative

branding forays by slashing jobs. It is this essential economic, human concern that has been a major force

in contributing to the rise in Anticorporate activism: No Good Jobs.

CHAPTER NINE

THE DISCARDED FACTORY

Degraded Production in the Age of the Superbrand

Our strategic plan in North America is to focus intensely on brand management, marketing and product

design as a means to meet the casual clothing wants and needs of consumers.

Shifting a significant portion

of our manufacturing from the U.S. and Canadian markets to contractors throughout the world wil give the

company greater flexibility to allocate resources and capital to its brands. These steps are crucial if we are

to remain competitive.

-John Ermatinger, president of Levi Strauss Americas division, explains the company's decision to shut down twenty-two plants and lay off 13,000 North American workers between

November 1997 and February 1999

Many brand-name multinationals, as we have seen, are in the process of transcending the need to identify

with their earthbound products. They dream instead about their brands' deep inner meanings — the way


they capture the spirit of individuality, athleticism, wilderness or community. In this context of strut over

stuff, marketing departments charged with the managing of brand identities have begun to see their work as

something that occurs not in conjunction with factory production but in direct competition with it. "Products

are made in the factory," says Walter Landor, president of the Landor branding agency, "but brands are

made in the mind."' Peter Schweitzer, president of the advertising giant J. Walter Thompson, reiterates the

same thought: "The difference between products and brands is fundamental. A product is something that is

made in a factory; a brand is something that is bought by a customer." Savvy ad agencies have all moved

away from the idea that they are flogging a product made by someone else, and have come to think of

themselves instead as brand factories, hammering out what is of true value: the idea, the lifestyle, the

attitude. Brand builders are the new primary producers in our so-called knowledge economy.

This novel idea has done more than bring us cutting-edge ad campaigns, ecclesiastic superstores and

Utopian corporate campuses. It is changing the very face of global employment.

After establishing the "soul"

of their corporations, the superbrand companies have gone on to rid themselves of their cumbersome

bodies, and there is nothing that seems more cumbersome, more loathsomely corporeal, than the factories


that produce their products. The reason for this shift is simple: building a superbrand is an extraordinarily

costly project, needing constant managing, tending and replenishing. Most of all, superbrands need lots of

space on which to stamp their logos. For a business to be cost-effective, however, there is a finite amount

of money it can spend on all of its expenses —materials, manufacturing, overhead and branding — before

retail prices on its products shoot up too high. After the multimil ion-dollar sponsorships have been signed,

and the cool hunters and marketing mavens have received their checks, there may not be all that much

money left over. So it becomes, as always, a matter of priorities; but those priorities are changing. As

Hector Liang, former chairman of United Biscuits, has explained: "Machines wear out. Cars rust. People die.

But what lives on are the brands."

According to this logic, corporations should not expend their finite resources on factories that wil demand

physical upkeep, on machines that wil corrode or on employees who wil certainly age and die. Instead, they

should concentrate those resources in the virtual brick and mortar used to build their brands; that is, on

sponsorships, packaging, expansion and advertising. They should also spend them on synergies: on buying

up distribution and retail channels to get their brands to the people.

This slow but decisive shift in corporate priorities has left yesterday's nonvirtual producers — the factory


workers and craftspeople — in a precarious position. The lavish spending in the 1990s on marketing,

mergers and brand extensions has been matched by a never-before-seen resistance to investing in

production facilities and labour. Companies that were traditionally satisfied with a 100 percent mark-up

between the cost of factory production and the retail price have been scouring the globe for factories that

can make their products so inexpensively that the mark-up is closer to 400

percent. And as a 1997 UN

report notes, even in countries where wages were already low, labour costs are getting a shrinking slice of

corporate budgets. "In four developing countries out of five, the share of wages in manufacturing valueadded

today is considerably below what it was in the 1970s and early 1980s." The timing of these trends

reflects not only branding's status as the perceived economic cure-all, but also a corresponding devaluation

of the production process and of producers in general. Branding, in other words, has been hogging all the

"value-added."

When the actual manufacturing process is so devalued, it stands to reason that the people doing the work of

production are likely to be treated like detritus — the stuff left behind. The idea has a certain symmetry:

ever since mass production created the need for branding in the first place, its role has slowly been

expanding in importance until, more than a century and a half after the Industrial Revolution, it occurred to


these companies that maybe branding could replace production entirely. As tennis pro Andre Agassi said in

a 1992 Canon camera commercial, "Image is everything."

Agassi may have been pitching for Canon at the time but he is first and foremost a member of Team Nike,

the company that pioneered the business philosophy of no-limits spending on branding, coupled with a neartotal

divestment of the contract workers that make its shoes in tucked-away factories.

As Phil Knight has

said, "There is no value in making things any more. The value is added by careful research, by innovation

and by marketing." For Phil Knight, production is not the building block of his branded empire, but is instead

a tedious, marginal chore.

Which is why many companies now bypass production completely. Instead of making the products

themselves, in their own factories, they "source" them, much as corporations in the natural-resource

industries source uranium, copper or logs. They close existing factories, shifting to contracted-out, mostly

offshore, manufacturing. And as the old jobs fly offshore, something else is flying away with them: the oldfashioned

idea that a manufacturer is responsible for its own workforce. Disney spokesman Ken Green gave

an indication of the depth of this shift when he became publicly frustrated that his company was being taken

to task for the desperate conditions in a Haitian factory that produces Disney clothes. "We don't employ


anyone in Haiti," he said, referring to the fact that the factory is owned by a contractor. "With the newsprint

you use, do you have any idea of the labour conditions involved to produce it?"

Green demanded of Cathy

Majtenyi of the Catholic Register.

From El Paso to Beijing, San Francisco to Jakarta, Munich to Tijuana, the global brands are sloughing the

responsibility of production onto their contractors; they just tell them to make the damn thing, and make it

cheap, so there's lots of money left over for branding. Make it really cheap.

Exporting the Nike Model

Nike, which began as an import/export scheme of made-in-Japan running shoes and does not own any of its

factories, has become a prototype for the product-tree brand. Inspired by the swoosh's staggering success,

many more traditionally run companies ("vertically integrated," as the phrase goes) are busy imitating Nike's

model, not only copying the company's marketing approach, as we saw in "No Space," but also its on-thecheap

outsourced production structure. In the mid-nineties, for instance, the Vans running-shoe company

pulled up stakes in the old-fashioned realm of manufacturing and converted to the Nike way. In a

prospectus for an initial public stock offering, the company lays out how it "recently repositioned itself from a

domestic manufacturer to a market-driven company" by sponsoring hundreds of athletes as well as highprofile

extreme sporting events such as the Vans Warped Tour. The company's

"expenditure of significant


funds to create consumer demand" was financed by closing an existing factory in California and contracting

production in South Korea to "third party manufacturers."

Adidas followed a similar trajectory, turning over its operation in 1993 to Robert Louis-Dreyfus, formerly a

chief executive at advertising giant Saatchi Saatchi. Announcing that he wanted to capture the heart of

the "global teenager," Louis-Dreyfus promptly shut down the company-owned factories in Germany, and

moved to contracting-out in Asia. Freed from the chains of production, the company had newfound time and

money to create a Nike-style brand image. "We closed down everything," Adidas spokesperson Peter

Csanadi says proudly. "We only kept one small factory which is our global technology centre and makes

about 1 percent of total output."

Though they don't draw the headlines they once did, more factory closures are announced in North America

and Europe each week —45,000 U.S. apparel workers lost their jobs in 1997

alone.) That sector's job-flight

patterns have been equally dramatic around the globe. Though plant closures themselves have barely

slowed down since the darkest days of the late-eighties/early-nineties recession, there has been a marked

shift in the reason given for these "reorganizations." Mass layoffs were previously presented as an

unfortunate necessity, tied to disappointing company performance. Today they are simply savvy shifts in


corporate strategy, a "strategic redirection," to use the Vans term. More and more, these layoffs are

announced in conjunction with pledges to increase revenue through advertising spending, with executives

vowing to refocus on the needs of their brands, as opposed to the needs of their workers.

Consider the case of Sara Lee Corp., an old-style conglomerate that encompasses not only its frozen-food

namesake but also such "unintegrated" brands as Hanes underwear, Wonderbra, Coach leather goods,

Champion sports apparel, Kiwi shoe polish and Ball Park Franks. Despite the fact that Sara Lee enjoyed

solid growth, healthy profits, good stock return and no debt, by the mid-nineties Wall Street had become

disenchanted with the company and was undervaluing its stock. Its profits had risen 10 percent in the 1996-97 fiscal year, hitting $1 bil ion, but Wall Street, as we have seen, is guided by spiritual goals as well as

economic ones. And Sara Lee, driven by the corporeal stuff of real-world products, as opposed to the sleek

ideas of brand identity, was simply out of economic fashion. "Lumpy-object purveyors," as Tom Peters

might say.

To correct the situation, in September 1997 the company announced a $1.6 bil ion restructuring plan to get

out of the "stuff" business by purging its manufacturing base. Thirteen of its factories, beginning with yarn

and textile plants, would be sold to contractors who would become Sara Lee's suppliers. The company


would be able to dip into the money saved to double its ad spending. "It's passé for us to be as vertically

integrated as we were," explained Sara Lee CEO John H. Bryan. Wall Street and the business press loved

the new marketing-driven Sara Lee, rewarding the company with a 15 percent jump in stock price and

flattering profiles of its bold and imaginative CEO. "Bryan's shift away from manufacturing to focus on brand

marketing recognizes that the future belongs to companies — like Coca-Cola Co.

— that own little but sell

much," enthused one article in Business Week. Even more telling was the analogy chosen by Grain's

Chicago Business: "Sara Lee's goal is to become more like Oregon-based Nike Inc., which out-sources its

manufacturing and focuses primarily on product development and brand management."

In November 1997, Levi Strauss announced a similarly motivated shake-up.

Company revenue had

dropped between 1996 and 1997, from $7.1 bil ion to $6.8 bil ion. But a 4 percent dip hardly seems to

explain the company's decision to shut eleven plants. The closures resulted in 6,395 workers being laid off,

one-third of its already downsized North American workforce. In this process, the company shut down three

of its four factories in El Paso, Texas, a city where Levi's was the single largest private employer. Stil

unsatisfied with the results, the following year Levi's announced another round of closures in Europe and


North America. Eleven more of its North American factories would be shut down and the total toll of laid-off

workers rose to 16,310 in only two years.

John Ermatinger, president of Levi's Americas division, had a familiar explanation.

"Our strategic plan in

North America is to focus intensely on brand management, marketing and product design as a means to

meet the casual clothing wants and needs of consumers," he said. Levi's chairman, Robert Haas, who on

the same day received an award from the UN for making life better for his employees, told The Wall Street

Journal that the closures reflected not just "overcapacity" but also "our own desire to refocus marketing, to

inject more quality and distinctiveness into the brand." In 1997, this quality and distinctiveness came in the

form of a particularly funky international ad campaign rumoured to have cost $90

mil ion, Levi's most

expensive campaign ever, and more than the company spent advertising the brand in all of 1996.

THE DISCARDED FACTORY

"This Is Not a Job-Flight Story"

In explaining the plant closures as a decision to turn Levi's into "a marketing company," Robert Haas was

careful to tell the press that the jobs that were eliminated were not "leaving," they were just sort of

evaporating. "This is not a job-flight story," he said after the first round of layoffs.

The statement is

technically true. Seeing Levi's as a job-flight story would miss the more fundamental — and more damaging


— shift that the closures represent. As far as the company is concerned, those 16,310 jobs are off the

payrolls for good, replaced, according to Ermatinger, by "contractors throughout the world." Those

contractors wil perform the same tasks as the old Levi's-owned factories —but the workers inside wil never

be employed by Levi Strauss.

For some companies a plant closure is stil a straightforward decision to move the same facility to a cheaper

locale. But for others — particularly those with strong brand identities like Levi Strauss and Hanes —layoffs

are only the most visible manifestation of a much more fundamental shift: one that is less about where to

produce than how. Unlike factories that hop from one place to another, these factories wil never

rematerialize. Mid-flight, they morph into something else entirely: "orders" to be placed with a contractor,

who may well turn over those orders to as many as ten subcontractors, who —

particularly in the garment

sector — may in turn pass a portion of the subcontracts on to a network of home workers who wil complete

the jobs in basements and living rooms. Sure enough, only five months after the first round of plant closures

was announced, Levi's made another public statement: it would resume manufacturing in China. The

company had pulled out of China in 1993, citing concerns about human-rights violations. Now it has

returned, not to build its own factories, but to place orders with three contractors that the company vows to


closely monitor for violations of labour law.

This shift in attitude toward production is so profound that where a previous era of consumer goods

corporations displayed their logos on the facades of their factories, many of today's brand-based

multinationals now maintain that the location of their production operations is a

"trade secret," to be guarded

at all costs. When asked by human-rights groups in April 1999 to disclose the names and addresses of its

contract factories, Peggy Carter, a vice president at Champion clothing, replied:

"We have no interest in our

competition learning where we are located and taking advantage of what has taken us years to build."

Increasingly, brand-name multinationals -Levi's, Nike, Champion, Wal-Mart, Reebok, the Gap, IBM and

General Motors-insist that they are just like any one of us: bargain hunters in search of the best deal in the

global mall. They are very picky customers, with specific instructions about made-to-order design, materials,

delivery dates and, most important, the need for rock-bottom prices. But what they are not interested in is

the burdensome logistics of how those prices fall so low; building factories, buying machinery and budgeting

for labour have all been lobbed squarely into somebody else's court.

And the real job-flight story is that a growing number of the most high-profile and profitable corporations in

the world are fleeing the jobs business altogether.

The Unbearable Lightness of Cavite: Inside the Free-Trade Zones Despite the conceptual bril iance of the "brands, not products" strategy, production has a pesky way of never

quite being transcended entirely: somebody has to get down and dirty and make the products the global

brands wil hang their meaning on. And that's where the free-trade zones come in.

In Indonesia, China,

Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines and elsewhere, export processing zones (as these areas are also called)

are emerging as leading producers of garments, toys, shoes, electronics, machinery, even cars.

If Nike Town and the other superstores are the glittering new gateways to the branded dreamworlds, then

the Cavite Export Processing Zone, located ninety miles south of Manila in the town of Rosario, is the

branding broom closet. After a month visiting similar industrial areas in Indonesia, I arrived in Rosario in

early September 1997, at the tail end of monsoon season and the beginning of the Asian economic storm.

I'd come to spend a week in Cavite because it is the largest free-trade zone in the Philippines, a 682-acre

walled-in industrial area housing 207 factories that produce goods strictly for the export market. Rosario's

population of 60,000 all seemed to be on the move; the town's busy, sweltering streets were packed with

army jeeps converted into minibuses and with motorcycle taxis with precarious sidecars, its sidewalks lined

with stalls selling fried rice, Coke and soap. Most of this commercial activity serves the 50,000 workers who


rush through Rosario on their way to and from work in the zone, whose gated entrance is located smack in

the middle of town.

Inside the gates, factory workers assemble the finished products of our branded world: Nike running shoes,

Gap pajamas, IBM computer screens, Old Navy jeans. But despite the presence of such il ustrious

multinationals, Cavite

- and the exploding number of export processing zones like it throughout the developing world — could well

be the only places left on earth where the superbrands actually keep a low profile.

Indeed, they are

positively self-effacing. Their names and logos aren't splashed on the facades of the factories in the

industrial zone. And here, competing labels aren't segregated each in its own superstore; they are often

produced side by side in the same factories, glued by the very same workers, stitched and soldered on the

very same machines. It was in Cavite that I finally found a piece of unswooshed space, and I found it, oddly

enough, in a Nike shoe factory. I was only permitted one visit inside the zone's gates to interview officials

-individual factories, I was told, are off limits to anyone but potential importers or exporters. But a few days

later, with the help of an eighteen-year-old worker who had been laid off from his job in an electronics

factory, I managed to sneak back to get the unofficial tour. In the rows of virtually identical giant shed-like


structures, one factory stood out: the name on the white rectangular building said

"Philips," but through its

surrounding fence I could see mountains of Nike shoes piled high. It seems that in Cavite, production has

been banished to our age's most worthless status: its factories are unbrandable, unswooshworthy; producers

are the industrial untouchables. Is this what Phil Knight meant, I wondered, when he said his company

wasn't about the sneakers?

Manufacturing is concentrated and isolated inside the zone as if it were toxic waste: pure, 100 percent

production at low, low prices. Cavite, like the rest of the zones that compete with it, presents itself as the

buy-in-bulk Price Club for multinationals on the lookout for bargains - grab a really big shopping cart. Inside,

it's obvious that the row of factories, each with its own gate and guard, has been carefully planned to

squeeze the maximum amount of production out of this swath of land. Windowless workshops made of

cheap plastic and aluminium siding are crammed in next to each other, only feet apart. Racks of time cards

bake in the sun, making sure the maximum amount of work is extracted from each worker, the maximum

number of working hours extracted from each day. The streets in the zone are eerily empty, and open

doors-the ventilation system for most factories — reveal lines of young women hunched in silence over

clamouring machines.


In other parts of the world, workers live inside the economic zones, but not in Cavite: this is a place of pure

work. Al the bustle and colour of Rosario abruptly stops at the gates, where workers must show their ID

cards to armed guards in order to get inside. Visitors are rarely permitted in the zone and little or no internal

commerce takes place on its orderly streets, not even candy and drink vending.

Buses and taxicabs must

drop their speed and silence their horns when they get into the zone — a marked change from the

boisterous streets of Rosario. If all of this makes Cavite feel as if it's in a different country, that's because, in

a way, it is. The zone is a tax-free economy, sealed off from the local government of both town and

province — a miniature military state inside a democracy.

As a concept, free-trade zones are as old as commerce itself, and were all the more relevant in ancient

times when the transportation of goods required multiple holdovers and rest stops.

Pre-Roman Empire citystates,

including Tyre, Carthage and Utica, encouraged trade by declaring themselves

"free cities," where

goods in transit could be stored without tax, and merchants would be protected from harm. These tax-free

areas developed further economic significance during colonial times, when entire cities — including Hong

Kong, Singapore and Gibraltar — were designated as "free ports" from which the loot of colonialism could

be safely shipped back to England, Europe or America with low import tariffs.

Today, the globe is dotted


with variations on these tax-free pockets, from duty-free shops in airports and the free banking zones of the

Cayman Islands to bonded warehouses and ports where goods in transit are held, sorted and packaged.

Though it has plenty in common with these other tax havens, the export processing zone is really in a class

of its own. Less holding tank than sovereign territory, the EPZ is an area where goods don't just pass

through but are actually manufactured, an area, furthermore, where there are no import and export duties,

and often no income or property taxes either. The idea that EPZs could help Third World economies first

gained currency in 1964 when the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution

endorsing the zones as a means of promoting trade with developing nations. The idea didn't really get off

the ground, however, until the early eighties, when India introduced a five-year tax break for companies

manufacturing in its low-wage zones.

Since then, the free-trade-zone industry has exploded. There are fifty-two economic zones in the Philippines

alone, employing 459,000 people - that's up from only 23,000 zone workers in 1986 and 229,000 as recently

as 1994. The largest zone economy is China, where by conservative estimates there are 18 mil ion people

in 124 export processing zones. In total, the International Labour Organization says that there are at least

850 EPZs in the world, but that number is likely much closer to 1,000, spread through seventy countries and


employing roughly 27 mil ion workers. The World Trade Organization estimates that between $200 and

$250 bil ion worth of trade flows through the zones. The number of individual factories housed inside these

industrial parks is also expanding. In fact, the free-trade factories along the U.S.Mexico border —in

Spanish, maquiladoras (from maquil ar, "to make up, or assemble") - are probably the only structures that

proliferate as quickly as Wal-Mart outlets: there were 789 maquiladoras in 1985.

In 1995, there were 2,747.

By 1997, there were 3,508 employing about 900,000 workers.

Regardless of where the EPZs are located, the workers' stories have a certain mesmerizing sameness: the

workday is long —fourteen hours in Sri Lanka, twelve hours in Indonesia, sixteen in Southern China, twelve

in the Philippines. The vast majority of the workers are women, always young, always working for

contractors or subcontractors from Korea, Taiwan or Hong Kong. The contractors are usually fil ing orders

for companies based in the U.S., Britain, Japan, Germany or Canada. The management is military-style, the

supervisors often abusive, the wages below subsistence and the work low-skil and tedious. As an economic

model, today's export processing zones have more in common with fast-food franchises than sustainable

developments, so removed are they from the countries that host them. These pockets of pure industry hide

behind a cloak of transience: the contracts come and go with little notice; the workers are predominantly


migrants, far from home and with little connection to the city or province where zones are located; the work

itself is short-term, often not renewed.

As I walk along the blank streets of Cavite, I can feel the threatening impermanence, the underlying

instability of the zone. The shed-like factories are connected so tenuously to the surrounding country, to the

adjacent town, to the very earth they are perched upon, that it feels as if the jobs that flew here from the

North could fly away again just as quickly. The factories are cheaply constructed and tossed together on

land that is rented, not owned. When I climb up the water tower on the edge of the zone and look down at

the hundreds of factories, it seems as if the whole cardboard complex could lift up and blow away, like

Dorothy's house in The Wizard of Oz. No wonder the EPZ factories in Guatemala are called "swallows."

Fear pervades the zones. The governments are afraid of losing their foreign factories; the factories are

afraid of losing their brand-name buyers; and the workers are afraid of losing their unstable jobs. These are

factories built not on land but on air.

"It Should Have Been a Different Rosario"

The air the export processing zones are built upon is the promise of industrialization. The theory behind

EPZs is that they wil attract foreign investors, who, if all goes well, wil decide to stay in the country, and the

zones' segregated assembly lines wil turn into lasting development: technology transfers and domestic


industries. To lure the swallows into this clever trap, the governments of poor countries offer tax breaks, lax

regulations and the services of a military wil ing and able to crush labour unrest.

To sweeten the pot further,

they put their own people on the auction block, falling over each other to offer up the lowest minimum wage,

allowing workers to be paid less than the real cost of living.

In Cavite, the economic zone is designed as a fantasyland for foreign investors.

Golf courses, executive

clubs and private schools have been built on the outskirts of Rosario to ease the discomforts of Third World

life. Rent for factories is dirt cheap: 11 pesos per square foot — less than a cent.

For the first five years of

their stay, corporations are treated to an all-expenses-paid "tax holiday" during which they pay no income

tax and no property tax. It's a good deal, no doubt, but it's nothing compared to Sri Lanka, where EPZ

investors stay for ten years before having to pay any tax.

The phrase "tax holiday" is oddly fitting. For the investors, free-trade zones are a sort of corporate Club

Med, where the hotel pays for everything and the guests live free, and where integration with the local

culture and economy is kept to a bare minimum. As one International Labour Organization report puts it, the

EPZ "is to the inexperienced foreign investor what the package holiday is to the cautious tourist." Zero-risk

globalization. Companies just ship in the pieces of cloth or computer parts — free of import tax - and the


cheap, non-union workforce assembles it for them. Then the finished garments or electronics are shipped

back out, with no export tax.

The rationale goes something like this: of course companies must pay taxes and strictly abide by national

laws, but just in this one case, on this one specific piece of land, for just a little while, an exception wil be

made — for the cause of future prosperity. The EPZs, therefore, exist within a kind of legal and economic

set of brackets, apart from the rest of their countries — the Cavite zone, for example, is under the sole

jurisdiction of the Philippines' federal Department of Trade and Industry; the local police and municipal

government have no right even to cross the threshold. The layers of blockades serve a dual purpose: to

keep the hordes away from the costly goods being manufactured inside the zone, but also, and perhaps

more important, to shield the country from what is going on inside the zone.

Because such sweet deals have been laid out to entice the swallows, the barriers around the zone serve to

reinforce the idea that what is happening inside is only temporary, or is not really happening at all. This

collective denial is particularly important in Communist countries where zones house the most Wild West

forms of capitalism this side of Moscow: this is definitely not really happening, certainly not here where the

government in power maintains that capital is the devil and workers reign supreme. In her book Losing


Control?, Saskia Sassen writes that the zones are a part of a process of carving up nations so that "an

actual piece of land becomes denationalized...." Never mind that the boundaries of these only-temporary,

not-really-happening, denationalized spaces keep expanding to engulf more and more of their actual

nations. Twenty-seven mil ion people worldwide are now living and working in brackets, and the brackets,

instead of being slowly removed, just keep getting wider.

It is one of the zones' many cruel ironies that every incentive the governments throw in to attract the

multinationals only reinforces the sense that the companies are economic tourists rather than long-term

investors. It's a classic vicious cycle: in an attempt to alleviate poverty, the governments offer more and

more incentives; but then the EPZs must be cordoned off like leper colonies, and the more they are

cordoned off, the more the factories appear to exist in a world entirely separate from the host country, and

outside the zone the poverty only grows more desperate. In Cavite, the zone is a kind of futuristic industrial

suburbia where everything is ordered; the workers are uniformed, the grass manicured, the factories

regimented. There are cute signs all around the grounds instructing workers to

"Keep Our Zone Clean" and

"Promote Peace and Progress of the Philippines." But walk out of the gate and the bubble bursts. Aside

from the swarms of workers at the start and end of shifts, you'd never know that the town of Rosario is home


to more than two hundred factories. The roads are a mess, running water is scarce and garbage is

overflowing.

Many of the workers live in shantytowns on the outskirts of town and in neighbouring vil ages. Others,

particularly the youngest workers, live in the dormitories, a hodgepodge of concrete bunkers separated from

the zone enclave by only a thick wall. The structure is actually a converted farm, and some rooms, the

workers tell me, are really pigpens with roofs slapped on them.

The Philippines' experience of "industrialization in brackets" is by no means unique. The current mania for

the EPZ model is based on the successes of the so-called Asian Tiger economies, in particular the

economies of South Korea and Taiwan. When only a few countries had the zones, including South Korea

and Taiwan, wages rose steadily, technology transfers occurred and taxes were gradually introduced. But as

critics of EPZs are quick to point out, the global economy has become much more competitive since those

countries made the transition from low-wage industries to higher-skil ones. Today, with seventy countries

competing for the export-processing-zone dollar, the incentives to lure investors are increasing and the

wages and standards are being held hostage to the threat of departure. The upshot is that entire countries

are being turned into industrial slums and low-wage labour ghettos, with no end in sight. As Cuban president


Fidel Castro thundered to the assembled world leaders at the World Trade Organization's fiftieth-birthday

celebration in May 1998, "What are we going to live on?... What industrial production wil be left for us?

Only low-tech, labour-intensive and highly contaminating ones? Do they perhaps want to turn a large part of

the Third World into a huge free trade zone full of assembly plants which don't even pay taxes?"

As bad as the situation is in Cavite, it doesn't begin to compare with Sri Lanka, where extended tax holidays

mean that towns can't even provide public transportation for EPZ workers. The roads they walk to and from

the factories are dark and dangerous, since there is no money for streetlights.

Dormitory rooms are so

overcrowded that they have white lines painted on the floor to mark where each worker sleeps — they "look

like car parks," as one journalist observed.

Jose Ricafrente has the dubious honour of being mayor of Rosario. I met with him in his small office, while a

line-up of needy people waited outside. A once-modest fishing vil age, his town today has the highest per

capita investment in all of the Philippines — thanks to the Cavite zone — but it lacks even the basic

resources to clean up the mess that the factories create in the community.

Rosario has all the problems of

industrialization —pollution, an exploding population of migrant workers, increased crime, rivers of sewage

— without any of the benefits. The federal government estimates that only 30 of the zone's 207 factories


pay any taxes at all, but everybody else questions even that low figure. The mayor says that many

companies are granted extensions of their tax holiday, or they close and reopen under another name, then

take the free ride all over again. "They fold up before the tax holiday expires, then they incorporate to

another company, just to avoid payment of taxes. They don't pay anything to the government, so we're in a

dilemma right now," Ricafrente told me. A small man with a deep and powerful voice, Ricafrente is loved by

his constituents for the outspoken positions he took on human rights and democracy during Ferdinand

Marcos's brutal rule. But the day I met him, the mayor seemed exhausted, worn down by his powerless-ness

to affect the situation in his own backyard. "We cannot even provide the basic services that our people

expect from us," he said, with a sort of matter-of-fact rage. "We need water, we need roads, we need

medical services, education. They expect us to deliver all of them at the same time, expecting that we've

got money from taxes from the places inside the zone." The mayor is convinced that there wil always be a

country — whether Vietnam, China, Sri Lanka or Mexico — that is wil ing to bid lower. And in the process,

towns like Rosario wil have sold out their people, compromised their education system and polluted their

natural resources. "It should be a symbiotic relationship," Ricafrente says of foreign investment. "They


derive income from us, so the government should also derive income from them....

It should have been a

different Rosario."

Working in Brackets

So, if it's clear by now that the factories don't bring in taxes or create local infrastructures, and that the

goods produced are all exported, why do countries like the Philippines stil bend over backward to lure them

inside their borders? The official reason is a trickle-down theory: these zones are job-creation programs and

the income the workers earn wil eventually fuel sustainable growth in the local economy.

The problem with this theory is that the zone wages are so low that workers spend most of their pay on

shared dorm rooms and transportation; the rest goes to noodles and fried rice from vendors lined up outside

the gate. Zone workers certainly cannot dream of affording the consumer goods they produce. These low

wages are partly a result of the fierce competition for factories coming from other developing countries. But,

above al , the government is extremely reluctant to enforce its own labour laws for fear of scaring away the

swallows. So labour rights are under such severe assault inside the zones that there is little chance of

workers earning enough to adequately feed themselves, let alone stimulate the local economy.

The Philippine government denies this, of course. It says that the zones are subject to the same labour


standards as the rest of Philippine society: workers must be paid the minimum wage, receive social security

benefits, have some measure of job security, be dismissed only with just cause and be paid extra for

overtime, and they have the right to form independent trade unions. But in reality, the government views

working conditions in the export factories as a matter of foreign trade policy, not a labour-rights issue. And

since the government attracted the foreign investors with promises of a cheap and docile workforce, it

intends to deliver. For this reason, labour department officials turn a blind eye to violations in the zone or

even facilitate them.

Many of the zone factories are run according to iron-fist rules that systematically break Philippine labour

law. Some employers, for instance, keep bathrooms padlocked except during two fifteen-minute breaks,

during which time all the workers have to sign in and out so management can keep track of their nonproductive

time. Seamstresses at a factory sewing garments for the Gap, Guess and Old Navy told me that

they sometimes have to resort to urinating in plastic bags under their machines.

There are rules against

talking, and at the Ju Young electronics factory, a rule against smiling. One factory shames those who

disobey by posting a list of "The Most Talkative Workers."

Factories regularly cheat on their workers' social security payments and gather il egal "donations" from


workers for everything from cleaning materials to factory Christmas parties. At a factory that makes IBM

computer screens, the "bonus" for working hours of overtime isn't a higher hourly wage but doughnuts and a

pen. Some owners expect workers to pull weeds from the ground on their way into the factory; others must

clean the floors and the washrooms after their shifts end. Ventilation is poor and protective gear scarce.

Then there is the matter of wages. In the Cavite zone, the minimum wage is regarded more as a loose

guideline than as a rigid law. If $6 a day is too onerous, investors can apply to the government for a waiver

on that too. So while some zone workers earn the minimum wage, most — thanks to the waivers - earn less.

Not Low Enough: Squeezing Wages in China

Part of the reason the threat of factory flight is so tangible in Cavite is that compared with China, Filipino

wages are very high. In fact, everyone's wages are high compared with China. But what is truly remarkable

about that is that the most egregious wage cheating goes on inside China itself.

Labour groups agree that a living wage for an assembly-line worker in China would be approximately US87

cents an hour. In the United States and Germany, where multinationals have closed down hundreds of

domestic textile factories to move to zone production, garment workers are paid an average of US$10 and

$18.50 an hour, respectively. Yet even with these massive savings in labour costs, those who manufacture


for the most prominent and richest brands in the world are stil refusing to pay workers in China the 87 cents

that would cover their cost of living, stave off il ness and even allow them to send a little money home to

their families. A 1998 study of brand-name manufacturing in the Chinese special economic zones found that

Wal-Mart, Ralph Lauren, Ann Taylor, Esprit, Liz Claiborne, Kmart, Nike, Adidas, J.C. Penney and the

Limited were only paying a fraction of that miserable 87 cents-some were paying as little as 13 cents an

hour.

The only way to understand how rich and supposedly law-abiding multinational corporations could regress to

nineteenth-century levels of exploitation (and get caught repeatedly) is through the mechanics of

subcontracting itself: at every layer of contracting, subcontracting and homework, the manufacturers bid

against each other to drive down the price, and at every level the contractor and subcontractor exact their

small profit. At the end of this bid-down, contract-out chain is the worker-often three or four times removed

from the company that placed the original order-with a pay check that has been trimmed at every turn.

"When the multinationals squeeze the subcontractors, the subcontractors squeeze the workers," explains a

1997 report on Nike's and Reebok's Chinese shoe factories.

"No Union, No Strike"

A large sign is posted at a central intersection in the Cavite Export Processing Zone: "DO NOT LISTEN TO


AGITATORS AND TROUBLE MAKERS." The words are in English, painted in bright red capital letters and

everyone knows what they mean. Although trade unions are technically legal in the Philippines, there is a

widely understood - if unwritten - "no union, no strike" policy inside the zones. As the sign suggests, workers

who do attempt to organize unions in their factories are viewed as troublemakers, and often face threats and

intimidation.

One of the reasons I went to Cavite is that I had heard this zone was a hotbed of

"troublemaking," thanks to

a newly formed organization called the Workers' Assistance Centre. Attached to Rosario's Catholic church

only a few blocks from the zone's entrance, the centre is trying to break through the wall of fear that

surrounds free-trade zones in the Philippines. Slowly, they have been collecting information about working

conditions inside the zone. Nida Barcenas, one of the organizers at the centre, told me, "At first, I used to

have to follow workers home and beg them to talk to me. They were so scared -

their families said I was a

troublemaker." But after the centre had been up and running for a year, the zone workers flocked there after

their shifts — to hang out, eat dinner and attend seminars. I had heard about the centre back in Toronto,

told by several international labour experts that the research and organizing on free-trade zones coming out

of this little bare-bones operation is among the most advanced being done anywhere in Asia.


The Workers' Assistance Centre, known as WAC, was founded to support the factory workers' constitutional

right to fight for better conditions-zone or no zone. Zernan Toledo is the centre’s most intense and radical

organizer, and though he is only twenty-five and looks like a college student, he runs the centre’s affairs with

all the discipline of a revolutionary cell. "Outside the zone, workers are free to organize a union, but inside

they cannot stage pickets nor have demonstrations," Toledo told me in my two-hour "orientation session" at

the centre. "Group discussions in the factories are prohibited and we cannot enter the zone," he said,

pointing to a diagram of the zone layout hanging on the wall. This catch-22 exists throughout the quasiprivate

zones. As the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions report puts it:

"The workers are

effectively living in 'lawless' territory where to defend their rights and interests they are constantly forced to

take 'il egal' action themselves."

In the Philippines, the zone's culture of incentives and exceptions, which was intended to be phased out as

the foreign companies joined the national economy, has had the opposite effect.

Not only have new

swallows landed, but unionized factories already in the country have shut themselves down and reopened

inside the Cavite Export Processing Zone in order to take advantage of all the incentives. For instance,

Marks £t Spencer goods used to be manufactured in a unionized factory north of Manila. "It only took ten


trucks to bring Marks Spencer to Cavite," a labour organizer in the area told me.

"The union was

eliminated."

Cavite is by no means exceptional in this regard. Union organizing is a source of great fear throughout the

zones, where a successful drive can have dire consequences for both organizers and workers. That was the

lesson learned in December 1998, when the American shirt maker Phil ips-Van Heusen closed down the

only unionized export apparel factory in al of Guatemala, laying off five hundred workers. The Camisas

Modernas plant was unionized in 1997, after a long and bitter organizing drive and significant pressure

placed on the company by U.S. human-rights groups. With the union, wages went up from US$56 a week to

$71 and the previously squalid factory was cleaned up. Jay Mazur, president of the Union of Needletrades,

Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) — America's largest apparel union —

called the contract "a

beacon of hope for more than 80,000 maquiladora workers in Guatemala." When the factory closed,

however, the beacon of hope turned into a flashing red danger signal, reinforcing the familiar warning: no

union, no strike.

Patriotism and national duty are bound up in the exploitation of the export zones, with young people —

mostly women — sent off to sweatshop factories the way a previous generation of young men were sent off


to war. No questioning of authority is expected or permitted. In some Central American and Asian EPZs,

strikes are officially il egal; in Sri Lanka, it is il egal to do anything at all that might jeopardize the country's

export earnings, including publishing and distributing critical material. In 1993, a Sri Lankan zone worker by

the name of Ranjith Mudiyanselage was kil ed for appearing to challenge this policy. After complaining

about a faulty machine that had sliced off a co-worker's finger, Mudiyanselage was abducted on his way out

of an inquiry into the incident. His body was found beaten and burning on a pile of old tires outside a local

church. The man's legal adviser, who had accompanied him to the inquiry, was murdered in the same way.

Despite the constant threat of retaliation, the Workers' Assistance Centre has made some modest attempts

to organize unions inside the Cavite zone factories, with varying degrees of success. For instance, when a

drive was undertaken at the Al Asia garment factory, the organizers came up against a very challenging

obstacle: worker exhaustion. The biggest complaint among the Al Asia seamstresses who stitch clothes for

El en Tracy and Sassoon is forced overtime. Regular shifts last from 7 a.m. to 10

p.m., but on a few nights a

week employees must work "late" — until 2 a.m. During peak periods, it is not uncommon to work two 2

a.m. shifts in a row, leaving many women only a couple of hours of sleep before they have to start their


commute back to the factory. But that also means most Al Asia workers spend their precious thirty-minute

breaks at the factory napping, not talking about unions. "I have a hard time talking with the workers because

the workers are always very sleepy," a mother of four tells me, explaining why she has had no luck in her

attempts to bring a union to the Al Asia factory. She has been with the company for four years and stil

lacks basic job security and health insurance.

Work in the zone is characterized by this brutal combination of tremendous intensity and nonexistent job

security. Everyone works six or seven days a week, and when a big order is due to be shipped out,

employees work until it is done. Most workers want some overtime hours because they need the money, but

the overnight shifts are widely considered a burden. Refusing to stay, however, is not an option. For

instance, according to the official rule book of the Philips factory (a contractor that has fil ed orders for both

Nike and Reebok), "Refusal to render overtime work when so required" is an offence "punishable with

dismissal." The same is true at all the factories I encountered, and there are many reports of workers asking

to leave early-before 2 a.m., for instance-and being told not to return to work the next day.

Overtime horror stories pour out of the export processing zones, regardless of location: in China, there are

documented cases of three-day shifts, when workers are forced to sleep under their machines. Contractors


often face heavy financial penalties if they fail to deliver on time, no matter how unreasonable the deadline.

In Honduras, when fil ing out a particularly large order on a tight deadline, factory managers have been

reported injecting workers with amphetamines to keep them going on forty-eight-hour marathons.

What Happened to Carmelita...

In Cavite, you can't talk about overtime without the conversation turning to Carmelita Alonzo, who died,

according to her co-workers, "of overwork." Alonzo, I was told again and again —

by groups of workers

gathered at the Workers' Assistance Centre and by individual workers in one-on-one interviews—was a

seamstress at the V.T. Fashions factory, stitching clothes for the Gap and Liz Claiborne, among many other

labels. Al of the workers I spoke with urgently wanted me to know how this tragedy happened so that I could

explain it to "the people in Canada who buy these products." Carmelita Alonzo's death occurred following a

long stretch of overnight shifts during a particularly heavy peak season. "There were a lot of products for

ship-out and no one was allowed to go home," recalls Josie, whose denim factory is owned by the same firm

as Carmelita's, and who also faced large orders at that time. "In February, the line leader had overnights

almost every night for one week." Mot only had Alonzo been working those shifts, but she had a two-hour

commute to get back to her family. Suffering from pneumonia — a common il ness in factories that are


suffocatingly hot during the day but fil with condensation at night — she asked her manager for time off to

recover. She was denied. Alonzo was eventually admitted to hospital, where she died on March 8, 1997 —

International Women's Day.

I asked a group of workers gathered late one evening around the long table at the centre how they felt about

what happened to Carmelita. The answers were confused at first. "Feel? But Carmelita is us." But then

Salvador, a sweet-faced twenty-two-year-old from a toy factory, said something that made all of his coworkers

nod in vigorous agreement. "Carmelita died because of working overtime. It is possible to happen

to any one of us," he explained, the words oddly incongruous with his pale blue Beverly Hil s 90210 T-shirt.

Much of the overtime stress could be al eviated if the factories would just hire more workers and create two

shorter shifts. But why should they? The government official appointed to oversee the zone isn't interested

in taking on the factory owners and managers atout the overtime violations.

Raymondo Nagrampa, the

zone administrator, acknowledged that it would certainly be better if the factories hired more people for

fewer hours, but, he told me, "I think I wil leave that. I think this is more of a management decision."

For their part, the factory owners are in no rush to expand the size of their workforce, because after a big

order is fil ed there could be a dry spell and they don't want to be stuck with more employees than work.


Since following Philippine labour law is "a management decision," most decide that it is more convenient for

management to have one pool of workers who are simply forced to work more hours when there is more

work and fewer when there is less of it. And this is the flip side of the overtime equation: when a factory is

experiencing a lull in orders or a shipment of supplies has been delayed, workers are sent home without

pay, sometimes for a week at a time. The group of workers gathered around the table at the Workers'

Assistance Centre burst out laughing when I asked them about job security or a guaranteed number of

working hours. "No work, no pay!" the young men and women exclaim in unison.

The "no work, no pay" rule applies to all workers, contract or "regular." Contracts, when they exist, last only

five months or less, after which time workers have to "recontract." Many of the factory workers in Cavite are

actually hired through an employment agency, inside the zone walls, that collects their checks and takes a

cut-a temp agency for factory workers, in other words, and one more level in the multiple-level system that

lives off their labour. Management uses a variety of tricks in the different zones to keep employees from

achieving permanent status and collecting the accompanying rights and benefits.

In the Central American

maquiladoras, it is a common practice for factories to fire workers at the end of the year and rehire them a

few weeks later so that they don't have to grant them permanent status; in the Thai zones, the same


practice is known as "hire and fire." In China, many workers in the zones have no contracts at all, which

leaves them without any rights or recourse whatsoever.

It is in this casual new relationship to factory employment that the EPZ system breaks down completely. In

principle, the zones are an ingenious mechanism for global wealth redistribution.

Yes, they lure jobs from

the North, but few fair-minded observers would deny the proposition that as industrialized nations shift to

higher-tech economies, it is only a matter of global justice that the jobs upon which our middle classes were

built should be shared with countries stil enslaved by poverty. The problem is that the workers in Cavite,

and in zones throughout Asia and Latin America, are not inheriting "our" jobs at all. Gerard Greenfield,

former research director of the Asian Monitoring and Resource Centre in Hong Kong, says, "One of the

myths of relocation is that those jobs that seemed to be transferred from the socalled North to the South

are perceived as similar jobs to what was already being done before." They are not. Just as company-owned

manufacturing turned — somewhere over the Pacific Ocean — into "orders" to be placed with third-party

contractors, so did full-time employment undergo a mid-flight transformation into

"contracts." "The biggest

challenge to those in Asia," says Greenfield, "is that the new employment created by Western and Asian

multinationals investing in Asia is temporary and short-term employment."


In fact, zone workers in many parts of Asia, the Caribbean and Central America have more in common with

office-temp workers in North America and Europe than they do with factory workers in those Northern

countries. What is happening in the EPZs is a radical alteration in the very nature of factory work. That was

the conclusion of a 1996 study conducted by the International Labour Organization, which stated that the

dramatic relocation of production in the garment and shoe industries "has been accompanied by a parallel

shift of production from the formal to the informal sector in many countries, with generally negative

consequences on wage levels and conditions of work." Employment in these sectors, the study went on, has

shifted from "full-time in-plant jobs to part-time and temporary jobs and, especially in clothing and footwear,

increasing resort to homework and small shops."

Indeed, this is not simply a job-flight story.

A Floating Workforce

On my last night in Cavite, I met a group of six teenage girls in the workers'

dormitories who shared a sixby-

eight-foot concrete room: four slept on the makeshift bunk bed (two to a bed), the other two on mats

spread on the floor. The girls who made Aztek, Apple and IBM CD-ROM drives shared the top bunk; the

ones who sewed Gap clothing, the bottom. Al were the children of farmers, away from their families for the

first time.


Their jam-packed shoebox of a home had the air of an apocalyptic slumber party-part prison cell, part

Sixteen Candles. It may have been a converted pigsty, but these were sixteen-year-old girls, and like

teenage girls the world over they had covered the grey, stained walls with pictures: of fluffy animals, Filipino

action-movie stars, and glossy magazine ads of women modelling lacy bras and underwear. After a little

while, serious talk of working conditions erupted into fits of giggles and hiding under bedcovers. It seems

that my questions reminded two of the girls of a crush they had on a labour organizer who had recently

given a seminar at the Workers' Assistance Centre on the risks of infertility from working with hazardous

chemicals.

Were they worried about infertility?

"Oh, yes. Very worried now."

Al through the Asian zones, the roads are lined with teenage girls in blue shirts, holding hands with their

friends and carrying umbrellas to shield them from the sun. They look like students coming home from

school. In Cavite, as elsewhere, the vast majority of workers are unmarried women between the ages of

seventeen and twenty-five. Like the girls in the dorms, roughly 80 percent of the workers have migrated

from other provinces of the Philippines to work in the factories — a mere 5 percent are native to the town of

Rosario. Like the swallow factories, they too are only tenuously connected to this place. Raymondo


Nagrampa, the zone administrator, says migrants are recruited for the zone to compensate for something

innate in "the Cavite character," something that makes local people unfit to work in the factories situated

near their homes. "I don't mean any offence to the Cavite personality," he explained, in his spacious airconditioned

office. "But from what I gather, this particular character is not suited for the factory life — they'd

rather go into something quickly. They do not have the patience to be right there in the factory line."

Nagrampa attributes this to the fact that Rosario is so close to Manila "and so we can say that the

Cavitenians are not running scared with regard to getting some income for their daily subsistence....

"But in the case of those from the provinces, from the lower areas, they are not exposed to the big-city

lifestyle. They feel more comfortable just working in the factory line, for, after al , this is a marked

improvement from the farm work that they've been accustomed to, where they were exposed to the sun. To

them, for the lowly province rural worker, working inside an enclosed factory is better off than being

outside."

I asked dozens of zone workers — all of them migrants from rural areas — about what Raymondo

Nagrampa had said. Every one of them responded with outrage.

"It's not human!" exclaimed Rosalie, a teenager whose job is installing the

"backlights" in IBM computer


screens. "Our rights are being trampled and Mr. Nagrampa says that because he has not experienced

working in a factory and the conditions inside."

Salvador, in his 90210 T-shirt, was beside himself: "Mr. Nagrampa earns a lot of money and he has an airconditioned

room and his own car, so of course he would say that we prefer this work —it is beneficial to

him, but not to us.... Working on the farm is difficult, yes, but there we have our family and friends and

instead of always eating dried fish, we have fresh food to eat."

His words clearly struck a chord with a homesick Rosalie: "I want to be together with my family in the

province," she said quietly, looking even younger than her nineteen years. "It's better there because when I

get sick, my parents are there, but here there is no one to take care of me."

Many other rural workers told me that they would have stayed home if they could, but the choice was made

for them: most of their families had lost their farms, displaced by golf courses, botched land-reform laws

and more export processing zones. Others said that the only reason they came to Cavite was that when the

zone recruiters came to their vil ages, they promised that workers would earn enough in the factories to

send money home to their impoverished families. The same inducement had been offered to other girls

their age, they told me, to go to Manila to work in the sex trade.

Several more young women wanted to tell me about those promises, too. The problem, they said, is that no


matter how long they work in the zone; there is never more than a few pesos left over to send home. "If we

had land we would just stay there to cultivate the land for our needs," Raquel, a teenage girl from one of the

garment factories, told me. "But we are landless, so we have no choice but to work in the economic zone

even though it is very hard and the situation here is very unfair. The recruiters said we would get a high

income, but in my experience, instead of sending my parents money, I cannot maintain even my own

expenses."

So the workers in Cavite have lost on all counts: they are penniless and homeless. It's a potent combination.

In the dormitories, sleep deprivation, malnutrition and homesickness mingle to create an atmosphere of

deep dis-orientation. "We are alien in the factories. We are also alien in the boarding-house because we all

come from faraway provinces," Liza, an electronics worker, told me. "We are strangers here."

Cecil e Tuico, one of the organizers at the Workers' Assistance Centre, was listening in on the conversation.

After the workers left to make their way through Rosario's dark streets and back to the dormitories, she

pointed out that the alienation the workers so poignantly describe is precisely what the employers look for

when they seek out migrants instead of locals to work in the zone. With the same muted, matter-of-fact

anger I have come to recognize in so many Filipino human-rights activists, Tuico said that the factory


managers prefer young women who are far from home and have not finished high school, because "they are

scared and uneducated about their rights."

The Zones' Other Product: A New Kind of Factory Worker Their naiveté and insecurity undoubtedly make discipline easier for factory managers, but younger workers

are preferred for other reasons, too. Women are often fired from their zone jobs in their mid-twenties, told

by supervisors that they are "too old," and that their fingers are no longer sufficiently nimble. This practice is

a highly effective way of minimizing the number of mothers on the company payroll. In Cavite, the workers

tell me stories about pregnant women forced to work until 2 a.m., even after pleading with the supervisor; of

women who work in the ironing section giving birth to babies with burns on their skin; of women who mould

the plastic for cordless phones giving birth to stil born infants. The evidence I hear in Cavite is anecdotal,

told to me quietly and urgently by women with the same terrified expression I saw when conversation turned

to Carmelita Alonzo. Some of the stories are certainly apocryphal — fear-fuelled zone legends — but the

abuse of pregnant women in export processing zones is also well documented and the problem reaches far

beyond Cavite.

Because most zone employers want to avoid paying benefits, assigning workers to a predictable schedule or

offering any job security, motherhood has become the scourge of these pink-collar zones. A study by


Human Rights Watch that has become the basis for a grievance under the NAFTA side agreement on

labour found that women applying for jobs in the Mexican maquiladoras routinely had to undergo pregnancy

tests. The study, which implicates such investors in the zones as Zenith, Panasonic, General Electric,

General Motors and Fruit of the Loom, found that "pregnant women are denied hiring. Moreover,

maquiladora employers sometimes mistreat and discharge pregnant employees."

The researchers

uncovered mistreatment designed to encourage workers to resign: pregnant women were required to work

the night shift, or to take on exceptionally long hours of unpaid overtime and physically strenuous tasks.

They were also refused time off work to go to the doctor, a practice that has led to on-the-job miscarriages.

"In this way," the study reports, "a pregnant worker is forced to choose between having a healthy, full-term

pregnancy and keeping her job."

Other methods of sidestepping the costs and responsibilities of employing workers with children are reported

on a more haphazard basis throughout the zones. In Honduras and El Salvador the garbage dumps in the

zones are littered with empty packets of contraceptive pil s that are reportedly passed out on the factory

floor. In the Honduran zones there have been reports of management forcing workers to have abortions. At

some Mexican maquiladoras, women are required to prove they are menstruating through such humiliating


practices as monthly sanitary-pad checks. Employees are kept on twenty-eight-day contracts — the length

of the average menstrual cycle —making it easy, as soon as a pregnancy comes to light, for the worker to

be dismissed. In a Sri Lankan zone, one worker was reported to be so terrified of losing her job after giving

birth that she drowned her newborn baby in a toilet.

The widespread assault on women's reproductive freedoms in the zones is the most brutal expression of the

failure on the part of many consumer-goods corporations to live up to their traditional role as mass

employers. Today's "new deal" with workers is a non-deal; one-time manufacturers, turned marketing

mavens, are so resolutely intent on evading any and all commitments that they are creating a workforce of

childless women, a system of footloose factories employing footloose workers. In a letter to Human Rights

Watch explaining why it discriminated against pregnant women in the maquiladoras, General Motors stated

plainly that it "wil not hire female job applicants found to be pregnant" in an effort to avoid "substantial

financial liabilities imposed by the Mexican social security system." Since the critical report was published,

GM has changed the policy. It remains, however, a stark contrast to the days when the company made it a

banner policy that the adult men working in its auto plants should earn enough not only to support a family

of four but to drive them around in a GM car or truck. General Motors has cut about 82,000 jobs in the U.S.


since 1991 and expects to cut another 40,000 by the year 2003, moving production to the maquiladoras and

their clones around the globe. A far cry from those days when it proudly proclaimed, "What's good for

General Motors is good for the country."

Migrant Factories

Within this reengineered system, the workers aren't the only ones on a day pass.

The swallow factories that

employ them have been built to maximize flexibility: to follow the tax breaks and incentives, to bend with

the currency devaluations and benefit by the strict rule of dictators. In North America and Europe, job flight

is a threat with which workers have become al too familiar. A study commissioned by the NAFTA labour

commission found that in the United States, between 1993 and 1995, "employers threatened to close the

plant in 50 percent of al union certification elections.... Specific, unambiguous threats ranged from

attaching shipping labels to equipment throughout the plant with a Mexican address, to posting maps of

North America with an arrow pointing from the current plant site to Mexico." The study found that the

employers followed through on the threats, shutting down all or part of newly unionized plants, in 15 percent

of these cases — triple the closing rate of the pre-NAFTA 1980s. In China, Indonesia, India and the

Philippines the threat of plant closure and job flight is even more powerful. Since the industries are quick to


flee escalating wages, environmental regulation and taxes, factories are made to be mobile. Some of these

swallow factories may well be on their third or even fourth flight, and as the history of subcontracting makes

clear, they touch down more lightly at each new stop.

When the flying multinationals first landed in Taiwan, Korea and Japan, many of their factories were owned

and operated by local contractors. In Pusan, South Korea, for instance — known during the eighties as "the

sneaker capital of the world" —Korean entrepreneurs ran factories for Reebok, L.A. Gear and Nike. But

when, in the late eighties, Korean workers began to rebel against their dollar-a-day wages and formed trade

unions to fight for better conditions, the swallows once again took flight. Between 1987 and 1992, 30,000

factory jobs were lost in Korea's export processing zones, and in less than three years one-third of the shoe

jobs had disappeared. The story is much the same in Taiwan. The migration patterns have been clearly

documented with Reebok's manufacturers. In 1985, Reebok produced almost all its sneakers in South Korea

and Taiwan and none in Indonesia and China. By 1995, nearly all those factories had flown out of Korea and

Taiwan and 60 percent of Reebok's contracts had landed in Indonesia and China.

But on this new leg of the journey, the factories were not owned by local Indonesian and Chinese

contractors. Instead they were owned and run by the same Korean and Taiwanese companies that ran them


before the move. When the multinationals pulled their orders from Korea and Taiwan, their contractors

followed, closing up shop in their home countries and building the new factories in countries where labour

was stil cheap: China, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. One of these contractors — the largest

single supplier for Reebok, Adidas and Nike —is a Taiwanese-owned company called Yue Yuen. Yue Yuen

has closed most of its factories in its homeland of Taiwan and chased the low wages to China, where it

employs 54,000 people in a single factory complex. For Chi Neng Tsai, one of the company's owners, it

simply makes good business sense to go where the workers are hungry: "Thirty years ago, when Taiwan

was hungry, we also were more productive," he says.

Taiwanese and Korean bosses are uniquely positioned to exploit this hunger: they can tell workers from

personal experience what happens when unions come in and wages go up. And maintaining contractors who

have had the rug pulled out from under them once before is a stroke of management genius on the part of

the Western multinationals. What better way to keep costs down than to make yesterday's casualties today's

wardens?

It is a system that doesn't do much for the sense of stability in Cavite, or for the Philippine economy in

general, which is already unusually vulnerable to global forces, since the majority of its companies are


owned by foreign investors. As Filipino economist Antonio Tujan told me, "The contractors have displaced

the Filipino middleman." In fact, Tujan, the director of a Manila-based think tank highly critical of Philippine

economic policy, corrects me when I refer to the buildings I saw inside the Cavite Export Processing Zone

as "factories." They aren't factories, he says, "they are labour warehouses."

He explains that since all the materials are imported, nothing is actually manufactured in the factories, only

assembled. (The components are manufactured in yet another country, where the workers are more highly

skil ed, though stil cheaper than U.S. or European workers.) It's true, now that Tujan mentions it, that when I

climbed up the water tower and looked down on the zone, part of what contributed to the unbearable

lightness of Cavite was that apart from one incinerator, there were no smokestacks. That's a bonus for the

air quality in Rosario but odd for an industrial park of Cavite's size. Neither was there any local rhyme or

reason to what was being produced. When I walked the zone's freshly paved streets, I was surprised by the

variety of manufacturing going on. Like most people, I had thought that Asian export zones were mostly

fil ed with garment and electronics producers, but not Cavite: a factory making car seats sat next to one

making sneakers, across the way from a factory with dozens of aluminium speedboats piled up by its gate.

On another street, the open doors of a factory revealed racks of dresses and jackets, right next to the plant


where Salvador made novelty key chains and other small toys. "You see?" says Antonio Tujan. "We have a

country whose industry is so deformed, so unbelievably mishmash, that it cannot exist by itself. It's all a

myth, you know. They talk about industrialization in the context of globalization, but it's all a myth."

Mo wonder the promise of industrialization in Cavite feels more like a threat. The place is a development

mirage.

The Shoppers Take Flight

The fear that the flighty multinationals wil once again pull their orders and migrate to more favourable

conditions underlies everything that takes place in the zones. It makes for an odd dissonance: despite the

fact that they have no local physical holdings — they don't own the buildings, land or equipment — brands

like Nike, the Gap and IBM are omnipresent, invisibly pulling all the strings. They are so powerful as buyers

that the hands-on involvement owning the factories would entail has come to look, from their perspective,

like needless micromanagement. And because the actual owners and factory managers are completely

dependent on their large contracts to make the machines run, workers are left in a uniquely weak bargaining

position: you can't sit down and bargain with an order form. So even the classic Marxist division between

workers and owners doesn't quite work in the zone, since the brand-name multinationals have divested the


"means of production," to use Marx's phrase, unwil ing to encumber themselves with the responsibilities of

actually owning and managing the factories, and employing a labour force.

If anything, the multinationals have more power over production by not owning the factories. Like most

committed shoppers, they see no need to concern themselves with how their bargains were produced —

they simply pounce on them, keeping the suppliers on their toes by taking bids from slews of other

contractors. One contractor, Young 11 Kim of Guatemala, whose Sam Lucas factory produces clothing for

Wal-Mart and J.C. Penney, says of his big-brand clients, "They're interested in a high-quality garment, fast

delivery, and cheap sewing charges — and that's all." In this cutthroat context, each contractor swears he

could deliver the goods cheaper if the brands would only start producing in Africa, Vietnam or Bangladesh,

or if they would shift to home workers.

More blatantly, the power of the brands may occasionally be invoked to affect public policy in the countries

where export zones are located. Companies or their emissaries may make public statements about how a

raise in the legal minimum wage could price a certain Asian country "out of the market," as Mike's and

Reebok's contractors have been quick to tell the Indonesian government whenever strikes get out of hand.

Calling a strike at a Mike factory "intolerable," Anton Supit, chairman of the Indonesian Footwear


Association, which represents contractors for Mike, Reebok and Adidas, called on the Indonesian military to

intervene. "If the authorities don't handle strikes, especially ones leading to violence and brutality, we wil

lose our foreign buyers. The government's income from exports wil decrease and unemployment wil

worsen." The corporate shoppers may also help draft international trade agreements to reduce quotas and

tariffs, or even lobby a government directly to loosen regulations. In describing the conditions under which

Mike decided to begin "sourcing" its shoes in China, for instance, company vice president David Chang

explained that "one of the first things we told the Chinese was that their prices had to be more competitive

with our other Far East sources because the cost of doing business in China was so enormous.... The hope

is for a 20 percent price advantage over Korea." After all, what price-conscious consumer doesn't

comparison shop? And if a shift to a more "competitive" country causes mass layoffs somewhere else in the

world, that is somebody else's blood on somebody else's hands. As Levi's CEO

Robert Haas said, "This is

not a job-flight story."

Multinational corporations have vehemently defended themselves against the accusation that they are

orchestrating a "race to the bottom" by claiming that their presence has helped to raise the standard of living

in underdeveloped countries. As Mike CEO Phil Knight said in 1996, "For the past 25 years, Nike has


provided good jobs, improved labour practices and raised standards of living wherever we operate."

Confronted with the starvation wages in Haiti, a Disney spokesperson told The Globe and Mail, "It's a

process all developing countries go through, like Japan and Korea, who were at this stage decades ago."

And there is no shortage of economists to spin the mounting revelations of corporate abuse, claiming that

sweatshops are not a sign of eroded rights but a signal that prosperity is just around the corner. "My

concern," said famed Harvard economist Jeffrey D. Sachs, "is not that there are too many sweatshops but

that there are too few...those are precisely the jobs that were the stepping stones for Singapore and Hong

Kong and those are the jobs that have to come to Africa to get them out of back-breaking rural poverty."

Sachs's colleague Paul Krugman concurred, arguing that in the developing world the choice is not between

bad jobs and good jobs but between bad jobs and no jobs. "The overwhelming mainstream view among

economists is that the growth of this kind of employment is tremendous good news for the world's poor."

The no-pain-no-gain defence of sweatshops, however, took a severe beating when the currencies of those

very countries supposedly benefiting most from this development model began crashing like cheap plates.

First in Mexico, then Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia, workers were, and in many


cases stil are, bringing home minimum-wage pay checks worth less than when the "economic miracle" first

came to bless their nations years ago. Nike's public-relations director, Vada Manager, used to claim that

"the job opportunities that we have provided to women and men in developing economies like Vietnam and

Indonesia have provided a bridge of opportunity for these individuals to have a much better quality of life,"

but by the winter of 1998, nobody knew better than Nike that that bridge had collapsed. With currency

devaluation and soaring inflation, real wages in Nike's Indonesian factories fell by 45 percent in 1998. In

July of that year, Indonesian president B.J. Habibie urged his 200 mil ion citizens to do their part to

conserve the country's dwindling rice supply by fasting for two days out of each week, from dawn until dusk.

Development built on starvation wages, far from kick-starting a steady improvement in conditions, has

proved to be a case of one step forward, three steps back. And by early 1998

there were no more shining

Asian Tigers to point to, and those corporations and economists that had mounted such a singular defence

of sweatshops had had their arguments entirely discredited. The fear of flying has been looming large in

Cavite of late. The currency began its downward spiral a few weeks before I arrived, and since then

conditions have only worsened. By early 1999, the price of basic commodities like cooking oil, sugar,


chicken and soap had increased by as much as 36 percent from the year before.

Pay checks that barely

made ends meet now no longer accomplish even that. Workers who had begun to find the courage to stand

up to management are now living not only under the threat of mass layoffs and factory flight but with the

reality. In 1998, 3,072 businesses in the Philippines either closed down or scaled back operation —a 166

percent increase over the year before. For its part, Nike has laid off 268 workers at the Philips factory,

where I had seen, through the surrounding fence, the shoes lying in great piles. A few months later, in

February 1999, Nike pulled out of two other Philippine factories as well, these ones located in the nearby

Bataan export zone; 1,505 workers were affected by the closures. But Phil Knight didn't have to do the dirty

work himself—he just cut the orders and left the rest to the contractors. Like the factories themselves, these

job losses went unswooshed.

The transience woven into the fabric of free-trade zones is an extreme manifestation of the corporate

divestment of the world of work, which is taking place at all levels of industry.

Cavite may be capitalism's

dream vacation, but casualization is a game that can be played at home, and contracting out, as Business

Week reporter Aaron Bernstein has written, is trickling up. "While outsourcing started in manufacturing in

the early 1980s, it has expanded through virtually every industry as companies rush to shed staff in


everything from human resources to computer systems." The same impetus that lies behind the brandsversus-products and contracts-versus-jobs conflict is fuelling the move to temp, part-time, freelance and

homework in North America and Europe, as we wil see in the next chapter.

This is not a job-flight story. It is a flight-from-jobs story.

[IMAGE]

Top: The quintessential free agent. Bottom: Based on a "culture jam" from Adbusters.

CHAPTER TEN

THREATS AND TEMPS

From Working for Nothing to "Free Agent Nation"

A sense of impermanence is blowing through the labour force, destabilizing everyone from office temps to

high-tech independent contractors to restaurant and retail clerks. Factory jobs are being outsourced,

garment jobs are morphing into homework, and in every industry, temporary contracts are replacing full,

secure employment. In a growing number of instances, even CEOs are opting for shorter stints at one

corporation after another, breezing in and out of different corner offices and purging half the employees as

they come and go.

Almost every major labour battle of the decade has focused not on wage issues but on enforced

casualization, from the United Parcel Service workers' stand against "part-time America" to the unionized

Australian dockworkers fighting their replacement by contract workers, to the Canadian autoworkers at Ford


and Chrysler striking against the outsourcing of their jobs to non-union factories.

Al these stories are about

different industries doing variations on the same thing: finding ways to cut ties to their workforce and travel

light. The underbelly of the shiny "brands, not products" revelation can be seen increasingly in every

workplace around the globe. Every corporation wants a fluid reserve of parttimers, temps and freelancers

to help it keep overheads down and ride the twists and turns in the market. As British management

consultant Charles Handy says, savvy companies prefer to see themselves as

"organizers" of collections of

contractors, as opposed to "employment organizations."' One thing is certain: offering employment-the

steady kind, with benefits, holiday pay, a measure of security and maybe even union representation — has

fallen out of economic fashion.

Branded Work: Hobbies, Not Jobs

Though an entire class of consumer-goods companies has transcended the need to produce what it sells, so

far not even the most weightless multinational has been able to free itself entirely from the burden of

employees. Production may be relegated to contractors, but clerks are stil needed to sell the brand-name

goods at the point of purchase, especially given the growth of branded retail. In the service industry,

however, big-brand employers have become artful at dodging most commitments to their employees,


expertly fostering the notion that their clerks are somehow not quite legitimate workers, and thus do not

really need or deserve job security, liveable wages and benefits.

Most of the large employers in the service sector manage their workforce as if their clerks didn't depend on

their pay checks for anything essential, such as rent or child support. Instead, retail and service employers

tend to view their employees as children: students looking for summer jobs, spending money or a quick

stopover on the road to a more fulfil ing and better-paying career. These are great jobs, in other words, for

people who don't really need them. And so the mall and the superstore have given birth to a ballooning

subcategory of joke jobs —the frozen-yogurt jerk, the Orange Julius juicer, the Gap greeter, the Prozachappy

Wal-Mart "sales associate" — that are notoriously unstable, low-paying and overwhelmingly parttime.

What is distressing about this trend is that over the past two decades, the relative importance of the

service sector as a source of jobs has soared. The decline in manufacturing, as well as the waves of

downsizing and cutbacks in the public sector, have been met by dramatic growth in the numbers of servicesector

jobs to the extent that services and retail now account for 75 percent of total U.S.

employment.

Today, there are four and a half times as many Americans selling clothes in specialty and department stores

as there are workers stitching and weaving them, and Wal-Mart isn't just the biggest retailer in the world, it


is also the largest private employer in the United States.

And yet despite these shifts in employment patterns, most brand-name retail, service and restaurant chains

have opted to put on economic blinders, insisting that they are stil offering hobby jobs for kids. Never mind

that the service sector is now fil ed with workers who have multiple university degrees, immigrants unable to

find manufacturing jobs, laid-off nurses and teachers, and downsized middle managers. Never mind, too,

that the students who do work in retail and fast food — as many of them do - are facing higher tuition costs,

less financial assistance from parents and government and more years in school.

Never mind that the food

service workforce has been steadily aging over the last decade so that more than half are now over twentyfive

years old. Or that a 1997 study found that 25 percent of non-management Canadian retail workers had

been with the same company for eleven years or more and that 39 percent had been there for between four

and ten years. That's a lot longer than "Chainsaw" Al Dunlap lasted as CEO of Sunbeam Corp. But never

mind al that. Everyone knows that a job in the service sector is a hobby, and retail is a place where people

go for "experience," not a livelihood.

Nowhere has this message been more successfully absorbed than at the cash register and the takeout

counter, where many workers say they feel as if they are just passing through even after logging a decade in


the McWork sector. Brenda Hilbrich, who works at Borders Books and Music in Manhattan, explains how

difficult it is to reconcile the quality of her employment with a sense of personal success: "You're stuck with

this dichotomy of Tm supposed to do better but yet I can't because I can't find another job.' So you tell

yourself, 'I'm only here temporarily because I'm going to find something better.'"

This internalized state of

perpetual transience has been convenient for service-sector employers who have been free to let wages

stagnate and to provide little room for upward mobility, since there is no urgent need to improve the

conditions of jobs that everyone agrees are only temporary. Borders clerk Jason Chappell says that the

retail chains work hard to reinforce feelings of transience in their workers in order to protect this highly

profitable formula. "So much of the company propaganda is convincing you that you're not workers, that it's

something else, that you're not working class.... Everyone thinks they are middle class even when they're

making $13,000 a year."

I met with Chappell and Hilbrich late one night in October 1997, at a deli in Manhattan's financial district.

We chose this place because it was close to the Borders outlet at the base of the World Trade Centre where

they both work. I had heard about the pair because of their successful efforts to bring a union to Borders,

part of a flurry of labour organizing inside the large chains since the mid-nineties: at Starbucks, Barnes


Noble, Wal-Mart, Kentucky Fried Chicken, McDonald's. It seems as if more and more of the twentysomething-going-on-thirty-something clerks working for the super-brands are looking around

— at the

counters in front of them where they serve Sumatran coffee, and at the bestselling books, and made-in-

China sweaters — and are acknowledging that, for better or worse, some of them aren't going anywhere

fast. Laurie Bonang, who works at Starbucks in Vancouver, British Columbia, told me that "people our age

are finally realizing that we get out of university, we're a zil ion dollars in debt, and we're working in

Starbucks. This isn't how we want to spend the rest of our lives, but for right now the dream job isn't waiting

for us anymore.... I was hoping that Starbucks would be a stepping stone to bigger and better things, but

unfortunately it's a stepping stone to a big sinkhole."

As Bonang told her story, she was painfully aware that she is living out one of the most hackneyed popculture

clichés of our branded age: this is the stuff of Saturday Night life's "Gap Girls" skit, circa 1993, in

which bored, underemployed mall chicks ask each other: "Didja cinch it?" Or of the Starbucks "baristas" who

rattle off long trains of coffee adjectives - grande-decaf-low-fat-moccacino - in movies like You've Got Mail.

But there is a reason why the most vocally unhappy service-sector workers are the ones working for the

highest-profile global retailers and restaurants. Large chains such as Wal-Mart, Starbucks and the Gap, as


they have proliferated since the mid-eighties, have been lowering workplace standards in the service sector,

fuelling their marketing budgets, imperialistic expansion and high-concept "retail experiences" by lowballing

their clerks on wages and hours. Most of the big-name brands in the service sector pay the legal minimum

wage or slightly more, even though the average wage for retail workers is several dollars higher. Wal-Mart

clerks in the U.S., for instance, earn an average of $7.50 an hour and since Wal-Mart classifies "full time"

as twenty-eight hours a week, the average annual income is $10,920-significantly less than the industry

average. Kmart wages are also low and the benefits are considered so substandard that when a 172,000-square-foot Super Kmart opened in San Jose, California, in October 1997, the local city council voted to

endorse a boycott of the retailer. Council member Margie Fernandes said that the low wages, minimal

health benefits and part-time hours are far below those provided by other area retailers, and that these are

not the kind of jobs the community needs. "San Jose is a very, very expensive place to live and we need to

make sure the people who work here can afford to live here," Fernandes explained.

McDonald's and Starbucks staff, meanwhile, frequently earn less than the employees of single-outlet

restaurants and cafes, which explains why McDonald's is widely credited for pioneering the throwaway


"McJob" that the entire fast-food industry has since moved to emulate. At Britain's McLibel Trial, in which

the company contested claims made by two Greenpeace activists about its employment practices,

international trade unionist Dan Gallin defined a McJob as "a low skil , low pay, high stress, exhausting and

unstable job." Though the activists on trial for libel were found guilty on several counts, in his verdict Chief

Justice Rodger Bell ruled that in the matter of McJobs the defendants had a point.

The chain has had a

negative impact on food-service wages as a whole, he wrote, and the allegation that McDonald's "pays its

workers low wages, helping to depress wages for workers in the catering trade in Britain has been proved to

be true. It is justified."

As we have seen in Cavite, the brand-name multinationals have freed themselves of the burden of

providing employees with a living wage. In the malls of North America and England, on the high street, in

the food court and at the superstore, they have managed a similar trick. In some cases, particularly in the

garment sector, these retailers are the very same companies that are doing business in the export

processing zones, meaning that their responsibilities as employers have been sharply reduced at both the

production and service ends of the economic cycle. Wal-Mart and the Gap, for instance, contract out their

production to EPZs dotting the Southern Hemisphere, where goods are produced mostly by women in their


teens and twenties who earn minimum wage or less and live in cramped dorm rooms. Those goods —

sweatshirts, baby clothes, toys and Walkmans —are then sold by another workforce, concentrated in the

North, which is also largely fil ed with young people earning approximately minimum wage, most in their

teens and early twenties.

Though in many ways it is indecent to compare the relative privilege of retail workers at the mall with the

abuse and exploitation suffered by zone workers, there is an undeniable pattern at work. In general, the

corporations in question have ensured that they do not have to confront the possibility that adults with

families are depending on the wages that they pay, whether at the mall or in the zone. Just as factory jobs

that once supported families have been reconfigured in the Third World as jobs for teenagers, so have the

brand-name clothing companies and restaurant chains given legitimacy to the idea that fast-food and retailsector

jobs are disposable, and unfit for adults.

As in the zones, the youthfulness of the sector is far from accidental. It reflects a distinct preference on the

part of service-sector employers, achieved through a series of overt and covert management actions.

Young workers are consistently hired over older ones, and workers who have been on staff for a few years

—building up higher wages and seniority — often report losing precious shifts to new batches of younger


and cheaper clerks. Other anti-adult tactics have included the targeting of older workers for harassment —

the issue that sewed as the catalyst for the first strike at a McDonald's outlet. In April 1998, after witnessing

a verbally abusive supervisor reduce an elderly co-worker to tears, the teenage workers at the Golden

Arches in Macedonia, Ohio, walked off the job in protest. They didn't return until management agreed to

undergo "people skil s" training. "We get verbally harassed, and physically too.

Not me, but basically just the

elderly woman," teen striker Bryan Drapp said on Good Morning America. Drapp was fired two months later.

Brenda Hilbrich of Borders contends that justifying low wages on the grounds that young workers are just

passing through is a handy self-fulfil ing prophecy —particularly in her field, bookselling. "It doesn't have to

have a high turnover," she says. "If the conditions are good and you're making a nice salary, people actually

like working in the service industry.

They like working with books. A lot of people who have left have said, 'This was my favourite job, but I had

to go because I can't make enough money to live.'"

The fact is that the economy needs steady jobs that adults can live on. And it's clear that many people

would stay in retail if it paid adult rates, the proof being that when the sector does pay decently, it attracts

older workers, and the rate of staff turnover falls in line with the rest of the economy. But at the large chains,


which seem at least for now to have bottomless resources to build superstores and to sink mil ions into

expanding and synergizing their brands, the idea of paying a living wage is rarely considered. At Borders,

where most clerks earn wages in line with other bookstore chains but below the retail average, company

president Richard L. Flanagan wrote a letter to all his clerks, addressing the question of whether Borders

could pay a "living wage" as opposed to what it reportedly pays now-between US$6.63 and $9.27 an hour.

"While the concept is romantically appealing," he wrote, "it ignores the practicalities and realities of our

business environment."

Much of what makes paying a living wage seem so "romantic" has to do with the rapid expansion described

in Part 11, "No Choice." For companies whose business plans depend upon becoming dominant in their

market before their nearest competitor beats them to it, new outlets come before workers —even when

those workers are a key part of the chain's image. "They expect us to look like a Gap ad, professional, clean

and neat all the time, and I can't even pay to do laundry," says Laurie Bonang of Starbucks. "You can buy

two grande mocha cappuccinos with my hourly salary." Like mil ions of her demographic coevals on the

payrolls of all-star brands like the Gap, Nike and Barnes Noble, Bonang is living inside a stunning

corporate success story —though you'd never know it from the resignation and anger in her voice. Al the


brand-name retail workers I spoke with expressed their frustration at helping their stores rake in, to them,

unimaginable profits, and then having to watch that profit get funnelled into compulsive expansion.

Employee wages, meanwhile, stagnate or even decline. At Starbucks in British Columbia new workers faced

an actual wage decrease — from Can$7.50 to $7 an hour — during a period when the chain was doubling

its profits and opening 350 new stores a year. "I do the banking. I know how much the store pulls in a week,"

Laurie Bonang says. "They just take all that revenue and open up new stores."

Borders clerks also maintain that wages have suffered as a result of rapid growth.

They say that their chain

used to be a more equitable place to work before the neck-and-neck race with Barnes Noble took over

corporate priorities; there was a profit-sharing program and a biannual 5 percent raise for all workers. "Then

came expansion and corresponding cuts," reads a statement from disgruntled employees at a downtown

Philadelphia outlet of Borders. "Profit sharing was dropped, raises were cut..."

In sharp contrast to the days when corporate employees took pride in their company's growth, seeing it as

the result of a successful group effort, many clerks have come to see themselves as being in direct

competition with their employers' expansion dreams. "If Borders opened thirty-eight new stores a year

instead of forty," reasoned Jason Chappell, sitting next to Brenda Hilbrich on the vinyl seats of our deli


booth, "they could afford to give us a nice wage increase. On average it costs $7

mil ion to open a

superstore. That's Borders' own figures...."

"But," Brenda interrupted, "if you say that directly to them, they say, 'Well, that's two markets we don't get

into.'"

"We have to saturate markets," Chappell said, nodding.

"Yeah," Brenda added. "We have to compete with Barnes Noble."

The retail clerks employed by the superchains are only too familiar with the manic logic of expansion.

Busting the McUnion

The need to prevent workers from weighing too heavily on the bottom line is the main reason that the

branded chains have fought off the recent wave of unionization with such ferocity.

McDonald's, for instance,

has been embroiled in bribery scandals during German union drives, and over the course of a 1994 union

drive in France, ten McDonald's managers were arrested for violating labour laws and trade-union rights. In

June 1998, the company fired the two young workers who organized the strike in Macedonia, Ohio. In 1997,

when the employees at a Windsor, Ontario, Wal-Mart were about to hold an election on joining a union, a

series of not-so-subtle management hints led many workers to believe that if they voted yes their store

would be shut down. The Ontario Labour Relations Board reviewed the process and found that the

behaviour of Wal-Mart managers and supervisors before the vote amounted to "a subtle but extremely


effective threat," which caused "the average reasonable employee to conclude that the store would close if

the union got in."

Other chains have not hesitated to make good on the threat to close. In 1997, Starbucks decided to shut

down its Vancouver distribution plant after workers unionized. In February 1998, just as a union certification

for a Montreal-area outlet of McDonald's was being reviewed by the Quebec Labour Commission, the

franchise owner closed down the outlet. Shortly after the closure, the labour commission accredited the

union — cold comfort, since no one works there anymore. Six months later, another McDonald's restaurant

was successfully unionized, this one a busy outlet in Squamish, British Columbia, near the Whistler ski

resort. The organizers were two teenage girls, one sixteen, the other seventeen. It wasn't about wages, they

said — they were just tired of being scolded like children in front of the customers.

The outlet remains open,

making it the only unionized McDonald's in North America, but at the time of writing, the company was on

the verge of having the union decertified. Fighting the battle on the public-relations front, in mid-1999 the

fast-food chain launched an international television campaign featuring McDonald's workers serving up

shakes and fries under the captions "future lawyer," "future engineer" and so on.

Here was the true

McDonald's workforce, the company seemed to be saying: happy, contented and just passing through.


During the late 1990s, the process of turning the service sector into a low-wage ghetto advanced rapidly in

Germany. The German unemployment rate reached 12.6 percent in 1998, primarily because the economy

could not absorb the massive layoffs in the manufacturing sector that occurred after reunification - four out

of five East German factory jobs were lost. To make up for the shortfall, the service sector was touted by

the business press and the political right wing as the economic panacea. There was just one catch: before

the mall could step in to save the German economy, the minimum wage would have to be substantially

lowered and benefits such as long holidays for all workers would have to be dismantled. In other words,

good jobs with security and a living wage would have to be turned into bad jobs.

Then Germany too would

enjoy the benefits of a service-based economic recovery.

It is one of the paradoxes of service-sector employment that the more prominent a role it plays in the labour

landscape, the more casual service-sector companies became in their attitude toward providing job security.

Nowhere is this more in evidence than in the industry's increasing reliance on part-timers. Starbucks, for

instance, staffs its outlets almost exclusively with part-timers while only one-third of Kmart's workforce is

full-time. Workers at the il -fated Montreal-area McDonald's cited as their principal reason for unionization

the fact that they often couldn't get shifts longer than three hours.


In the U.S. the number of part-timers has tripled since 1968, while in Canada, between 1975 and 1997, the

growth rate of part-time jobs was nearly three times the rate of full-time jobs. But the problem is not the parttime

nature of work per se. In Canada, only one-third of part-timers want but cannot find full-time jobs

(which is an increase from one-fifth in the late eighties). In the U.S., only one-quarter want full-time jobs but

can't find them. The vast majority of part-timers are students and women, many of whom are juggling

childcare and paid work. But while many workers are indeed drawn to flexible work arrangements, their

definition of what constitutes "flexibility" is dramatically different from the one favoured by service-sector

bosses. For instance, while studies have shown that working mothers define flexibility as "having the ability

to work less than full-time hours at decent wages and benefits, while stil working a regular schedule," the

service sector has a different view of part-time work, and a different agenda. A handful of brand-name

chains, including Starbucks and Borders, bolster low wages by offering health and dental benefits to their

part-timers. For other employers, however, part-time positions are used as a loophole to keep wages down

and to avoid benefits and overtime; "flexibility" becomes a code for "no promises,"

making the juggling of

other commitments —both financial and parental — more challenging, not less. At some retail outlets I've


researched, the allotment of hours is so random that the ritual of posting next week's schedule prompts the

staff to gather around anxiously, craning their necks and hopping up and down as if they are checking to see

who got the lead in the high-school musical.

Furthermore, the "part-time" classification is often more a technicality than a reality, with retail employers

keeping their part-timers just below the forty-hour legal cutoff for full-time —Laurie Bonang, for instance,

clocks between thirty-five and thirty-nine hours a week at Starbucks. For all intents and purposes, she has

the duties of a full-time employee, but under forty hours the company does not have to pay overtime or

guarantee full-time hours. Other chains are equally creative. Borders instituted a company-wide thirtyseven-and-a-half-hour work week for all employees, and Wal-Mart caps its work week at thirty-three hours,

defining base "full time" as twenty-eight hours. What all of this means in the lives of workers is a scheduling

roller coaster that in many ways is more demanding than the traditional forty-hour week. For instance, the

Gap —which defines full-time as thirty hours a week —has a system of keeping clerks "on call" for certain

shifts during which time they aren't scheduled or paid to work but must be available to come in if the

manager calls. (One worker joked to me that she had to buy a beeper in case a folding crisis flared up in

Gap Kids.)


Starbucks has been the most innovative in the modern art of supple scheduling.

The company has created

a software program called Star Labour that allows head office maximum control over the schedules of its

clerks down to the minute. With Star Labour, gone is anything as blunt and imprecise as a day or evening

shift. The software measures exactly when each latte is sold and by whom, then tailor-makes shifts —often

only a few hours long —to maximize coffee-selling efficiency. As Laurie Bonang explains, "They give you

an arbitrary skil number from one to nine and they plug in when you're available, how long you've been

there, when customers come in and when we need more staff, and the computer spits out your schedule

based on that." While Starbucks' breakthrough in "just-in-time" frothing looks great on a spreadsheet, for

Steve Emery it meant hauling himself out of bed to start work at 5 a.m., only to leave at 9:30 a.m. after the

morning rush had peaked and, according to Star Labour, he was no longer working at maximum efficiency.

Wal-Mart has introduced a similar centralized scheduling system, effectively reducing employee hours by

pinning them precisely to in-store traffic. "It's done just like we order merchandise," says Wal-Mart CEO

David Glass.

The vast gulf between employee and employer definitions of "flexibility" was the central issue of the United

Parcel Service strike in the summer of 1997, the largest U.S. job action in fourteen years. Despite profits of


$1 bil ion in 1996, UPS had kept 58 percent of its workers classified as part-time and was rapidly moving

toward an even more "flexible" workforce. Of the 43,000 jobs UPS had created since 1992, only 8,000 were

full time. The system worked well for the courier company, since it was able to ride the peaks and valleys of

the delivery cycle that sees heavy pickups and deliveries in the morning and evening but lulls during the

day. "There's too much downtime in between to hire full-time workers," explained UPS spokesperson Susan

Rosenberg.

Building up a part-time workforce had other cost-saving benefits. Before the strike, the company paid its

part-timers roughly half the hourly wage of its full-timers for performing the same tasks. Furthermore, the

union claimed that 10,000 of the company's so-called part-timers were, like Laurie Bonang at Starbucks,

actually working between thirty-five and thirty-nine hours a week —just under the cutoff that would require

overtime pay, full benefits and the higher wage scale.

Some service-sector companies have made much of the fact that they offer stock options or "profit-sharing"

to low-level employees, among them Wal-Mart, which calls its clerks "sales associates"; Borders, which

refers to them as "co-owners"; and Starbucks, which prefers the term "partners."

Many employees do

appreciate these gestures, but others claim that while the workplace democracy schemes sparkle on a


corporate Web site, they rarely translate into much of substance. Most part-time workers at Starbucks, for

instance, can't afford to buy into the employee stock-option program since their salaries barely cover their

expenses. And where profit-sharing schemes are automatic, as at Wal-Mart, workers say their "share" of the

$118 bil ion of annual sales their company hauls in is laughable. Clerks in the Windsor, Ontario, outlet of

Wal-Mart, for example, say they only saw an extra $70 during the first three years that their store was open.

"Never mind that from the viewpoint of the boardroom, the pension plan's best feature was that it kept 28

mil ion more shares in firm control of company executives," writes The Wall Street Journal's Bob Ortega of

the Wal-Mart plan. "Most workers perceived that they could cash in, so the cost of the plan paid off in

spades by helping keep the unions out and the wages low".

Free Work: More Fake Jobs, Courtesy of the Superbrands One thing you can say about the retail and service industries: at least they pay their workers a little

something for their trouble. Not so for some other industries that have liberated themselves from the chains

of social-security forms with such free-market gusto that many young workers receive no pay from them at

all. Perhaps predictably, the culture industry has led the way in the blossoming of unpaid work, blithely

turning a blind eye to the unglamorous fact that many people under thirty are saddled with the mundane

responsibility of actually having to support themselves.


Writing about his former job, which involved hiring unpaid interns to send faxes and run errands for Men's

Journal magazine, Jim Frederick notes that many of his applicants had already worked for nothing at

Interview, CBS Mews, MTV, The Vil age Voice and so on. "'Very impressive,' I would say. By my quick

calculations they had contributed, conservatively, five or six thousand dollars'

worth of uncompensated work

to various media conglomerates." Of course, the media conglomerates — the broadcasters, magazines and

book publishers — insist that they are generously offering young people precious experience in a hard

employment market — a foot in the door on the old-fashioned "apprenticeship"

model. Besides, they say,

sounding suspiciously like McDonald's managers the world over, the interns are just kids — they don't really

need the money.

And getting two "unreal" jobs for the price of one, most interns subsidize their unpaid day job by working in

the service industry at night and on weekends, as well as by living at home to a later age. But in the U.S. —

where it has become commonplace to hop from one unpaid culture job to the next for a year or two — a

disproportionate number of interns, as Frederick observes, appear to be living off trust funds, seemingly

without any immediate concerns about earning a living. But just as the servicesector employers wil not

admit that the youthfulness of their workforce might have something to do with the wages they pay and the


security they fail to offer, you wil never catch a television network or a publisher confessing that the

absence of remuneration for internships might also have something to do with the relative privilege of those

applying for these positions at their companies. This racket is not only exploitative in the classic sense, it

also has some very real implications for the future of cultural production: today's interns are tomorrow's

managers, producers and editors and, as Frederick writes, "If you can't get a job unless you've had an

internship, and you can't take an internship unless you can get supported by daddy for a couple of months,

then the system guarantees an applicant pool that is decidedly privileged."

Music video stations such as MTV have been among the more liberal users of the unpaid internship system.

When it was first introduced, the music video channel represented a managerial coup in low-cost, high-profit

broadcasting since the stations primarily play videos that are produced out of house and supplied by record

labels. While some stations, including Canada's MuchMusic, now play licensing and royalty fees to

broadcast videos, these pale in comparison to the production costs of the videos in a single top 30

countdown. Inside the stations, on air-hosts, producers and technicians work alongside unpaid, mostly

student, interns who sometimes are rewarded with jobs and sometimes stay at the station for many months,

hoping for their big break. Which is where the legendary success stories come in -

the famous VJ. who


started off answering phones, or the greatest success story of them all: the tale of Rick the Temp. In 1996,

Rick won the annual "Be a Temp at MuchMusic Contest" and was welcomed to the station with cross

promotional fanfare and branded giveaways. One year later, Rick was on the air in his new job as VJ., but

the kicker was that even after he became a big star, he kept the moniker Rick the Temp. There was Rick on

TV, interviewing the Backstreet Boys, and although he was always paid for his work, for would-be interns,

his success served a daily advertisement for the glory and glamour that waits if you donate your labour as a

gift to a major media company.

Temps: The Rented Worker

Rick the Temp isn't just the Great White Hope for unpaid interns. He also represents the pinnacle of another

subcategory of New Age workers: the temps. And temps, it must be said, need all the hope they can get.

The use of temp labour in the U.S. has increased by 400 percent since 1982 and that growth has been

steady. Annual industry revenue among American temp firms has increased by about 20 percent every year

since 1992, with the firms pulling in revenues of $58.7 bil ion in 1998. The mammoth international temp

agency Manpower Temporary Services rivals Wal-Mart as the largest private employer in the U.S.

According to a 1997 study, 83 percent of the fastest-growing American companies are now outsourcing jobs


they once hired people to perform — compared with 64 percent just three years before. In Canada, the

Association of Canadian Search, Employment Staffing Services estimates that more than 75 percent of

businesses use the services of the $2 bil ion Canadian temp industry.

The most dramatic growth, however, is taking place not in North America but in Western Europe, where

temp agencies are among Europe's fastest-growing companies. In France, Spain, the Netherlands and

Germany, hiring workers on long-term temporary contracts has become a well-trampled back entranceway

to the labour market, allowing employers to sidestep tough laws that provide generous employee benefits

and make firing without just cause far more difficult than in the United States.

France, for instance, has

become the second-largest temp-services market after the U.S., making up 30

percent of worldwide temp

revenue. And though temping accounts for only 2 percent of all the country's jobs, according to France's

labour minister, Martine Aubry, "86 percent of new hires are on short-term contracts." Manpower Europe, an

outpost of the U.S.-based temp

firm, saw its revenue in Spain jump a staggering 719 percent in just one year, from $6.1 mil ion in 1996 to

$50 mil ion in 1997. Italy didn't legalize temp agencies until 1997, but when it did, Manpower Europe rushed

in to open thirty-five offices in 1998.

Every day, 4.5 mil ion workers are assigned to jobs through temp agencies in Europe and the U.S., but


since only 12.5 percent of temps are placed on any given day, the real number of total temporary

employees in Europe and the U.S. is closer to 36 mil ion people. More significant than soaring numbers,

however, is a major shift under way in the nature of the temporary work industry.

Temp agencies are no

longer strictly in the business of farming out rent-a-receptionists when the secretary calls in sick. For

starters, temps are no longer al that temporary: in the U.S., 29 percent stay at the same posting for a year

or more. Their agencies, meanwhile, have become full-service human resource departments for all your nocommitment

staffing needs, including accounting, filing, manufacturing and computer services.

And

according to Bruce Steinberg, director of research at the U.S.-based National Association of Temporary and

Staffing Services, "a quiet evolution is taking place throughout the staffing services industry" — rather than

renting out workers, the agencies are "providing a complete service solution."

What that means is that more

companies are contracting out entire functions and divisions —work previously performed in-house —to

outside agencies charged not only with staffing but, like the contract factories in the export processing

zones, administration and maintenance of the task as well. For instance, in 1993

American Airlines

outsourced the ticket counters at twenty-eight U.S. airports to outside agencies.

Around 550 ticketing-agent


jobs went temp and, in some cases, workers who had earned $40,000 were offered their same jobs back for

$16,000. A similar reshuffling took place when UPS decided to turn over its customer-service centres to

outside contractors — 5,000 employees earning $10 to $12 an hour were replaced with temps earning

between $6.50 and $8.40

As Tom Peters says, "You're a damn fool if you own it!" Bruce Steinberg concurs: by amputating whole

divisions and sloughing them off on "managed services arrangements, the business can concentrate its

time, energy and resources on core business while staffing service practices its core competency of

managing workers." Hiring and managing workers, in other words, is not the base of a healthy company but

a specialized task — somebody else's "core competency" that is better left to the experts, while the real

business is tended to by an ever-shrinking number of workers, as the next chapter wil show.

Yes, but...Won't Bil Gates Save Us?

Any discussion of the plight of corporate temps, UPS couriers, outsourced GM

workers, Gap greeters, MTV

interns and Starbucks "baristas" leads inevitably to the same place: Yes, but...

what about all the great new

jobs in the growing high-tech world? For my generation of workers, the legendary riches awaiting technology

workers in Seattle and Silicon Valley are the "yes, but" answer to any and all grievances about employment


exclusions. Standing in contrast to all the downer stories about layoffs and McJobs is this shimmering digital

Mecca where fifteen-year-olds design video games for Sega, where ATT hires hackers just to keep an eye

on them and where scores of young workers become mil ionaires from their lavish stock options. Yes,

but...Bil Gates wil make it all okay, won't he?

It was Microsoft, with its famous employee stock-option plan, that developed and fostered the mythology of

Silicon Gold, but it is also Microsoft that has done the most to dismantle it. The golden era of the geeks has

come and gone, and today's high-tech jobs are as unstable as any other. Parttimers, temps and contractors

are rampant in Silicon Valley — a recent labour study of the region estimates that between 27 and 40

percent of the Valley's employees are "contingency workers," and the use of temps there is increasing at

twice the rate of the rest of the country. The percentage of Silicon Valley workers employed by temp

agencies is nearly three times the national average.

And Microsoft, the largest of the software firms, didn't just lead the way to this part-time promised land, it

wrote the operating manual. For more than a decade, the company has been busily closing ranks around

the programmers who got there first, and banishing as many other employees as it can from that sacred

inner circle. Through extensive use of independent contractors, temps and "fullservice employment


solutions" Microsoft is well on its way to engineering the perfect employee-less corporation, a jigsaw puzzle

of outsourced divisions, contract factories and freelance employees. Gates has already converted one-third

of his general workforce into temps, and in the Interactive Media Division, where CD-ROMs and Internet

products are developed, about half the workers are officially employed by outside

"payroll agencies," who

deliver tax-free workers like printer cartridges.

Microsoft's two-tier workforce is a microcosm of the job market's New Age new deal. At the centre is the

high-tech dream: permanent, full-time employees, with benefits and generous stock options, working and

playing on the youthful corporate "campus." These Microserfs are cultishly loyal to their corporation, its

soaring stock price and its staggering 51 percent operating profit margin ("Show me the money!" they roared

at the annual staff meeting in Seattle's Kingdome Stadium in fall 1997). And why shouldn't they be loyal?

They earn an average of $220,000 a year, and that's not even factoring in the top five superrich executives.

Orbiting around this starry-eyed core are between 4,000 and 5,750 temporary workers. The temps work side

by side with members of the core group —as technicians, designers and programmers — and perform many

of the same jobs. About 1,500 have been with the company for so long they have taken to calling

themselves "permatemps." The only way to tell the temps from the "real"

Microserfs is by the colour of their


badges: blue for perms, orange for permatemps.

Like the fleet of part-timers who give UPS the "flexibility" to employ workers only during peak hours, and the

contract workers in Cavite who provide their factory owners with the "flexibility" to send them home during

dry spells, what thousands of temps means for Microsoft is the freedom to expand and contract its

workforce at wil . "We use them," says Microsoft personnel officer Doug McKenna,

"to provide us with

flexibility and to deal with uncertainty."

Trouble began in 1990 when the Internal Revenue Service challenged Microsoft's classification of orange

badges as independent contractors, ruling that these people were actually employees of Microsoft and the

company should be paying their payroll tax. Based in part on this finding, in 1993

a group of employees

classified by Microsoft as contractors launched a lawsuit against the company, claiming they were regular

workers and deserved the same benefits and stock options as their permanent colleagues. In July 1997,

Microsoft lost the landmark case when an eleven-judge Court of Appeals panel ruled that the freelancers

were "common law" employees and had the right to the company's benefits program, to its pension and to

its stock-purchasing plan.

Microsoft's response to this setback, however, has not been to add freelancers to its payroll but simply to

work more assiduously to marginalize the temps. To this end, the company has moved away from hiring


"independent contractors" directly. Instead, after employees have been scouted, interviewed and selected

by Microsoft, they are instructed to register with one of five payroll agencies that have special arrangements

with the company. MicroTemps are then hired through an agency that acts as the official employer: cutting

pay checks, withholding income taxes and sometimes providing bare-bones benefits. Laird Post, a principal

with management consultant Towers Pen-in in Seattle, Washington, explains the legalities of this new

arrangement. "It's hard to rationalize legally that the person is not an employee unless they are an employee

of someone else" — in Microsoft's case, that someone else is the payroll agency.

To make sure that the

temps wil never again be confused with actual Microsoft workers, they are barred from all extracurricular

company functions, including taking part in late-night pizza meals and after-hours parties. And in June 1998

the company introduced a new policy requiring temps who have been on an assignment with the company

for a year or more to take a thirty-one-day break before they can take another

"temporary" post. As Sharon

Decker, Microsoft's director of contingency staffing, explains, "We are refocusing a lot of policies we had in

place so everyone understands how a temp should be treated and what is appropriate."

In addition to staffing its campus with permatemps, in 1997 Microsoft initiated a series of moves to


disentangle itself from other earthly and cumbersome aspects of running a multibil ion-dollar company.

"Don't get caught with useless fixed assets," Bob Herbold, Microsoft's chief operating officer, says,

explaining his staffing philosophy to a group of shareholders. According to Herbold, pretty much everything

but the core functions of programming and product development fall into the

"useless fixed assets" category

— including the company's sixty-three receptionists, who were laid off, losing benefits and stock options,

and told to reapply through the Tascor temp agency. "We were overpaying them,"

Herbold said.

In the same stroke, Microsoft sliced and diced its Redmond campus and parcelled out the pieces (along with

employees who wanted to hold on to their jobs) to outside "vendors": Pitney Bowes took over the mail room;

the print and copy centre is now operated by Xerox personnel; the CD-ROM

factory was sold to KAO

Information Systems; even the company store was outsourced to Benussen Deutsch ft Associates. In this

latest round of restructuring, 680 jobs were cut from the payroll and $500 mil ion slashed from the operating

budget. With all these contractors on the campus, Herbold noted, "just managing the outsourcers is quite a

task" —and there was no reason for Microsoft to get saddled with that useless fixed asset. In a stroke of

divestment genius, Microsoft contracted out the task of managing the contractors to Johnson Controls,


which also takes care of the campus facilities. "Our revenue has gone up 91

percent and our head count

has actually decreased 19 percent," Bob Herbold says proudly. And what did Microsoft do with the savings?

"We're plowing them into RD and we're plowing them into profit, obviously."

"Free Agent Nation"

It must be said that many of Microsoft's high-tech freelancers are hardly defenceless victims of Bil Gates's

payroll concoctions, but are freelancers by choice. Like many contractors, the

"software gypsies," as hightech

freelancers are sometimes called, have made a conscious decision to put independence and mobility

before institutional loyalty and security. Some of them are even what Tom Peters likes to call a "Brand

Called You."

Tom Peters's latest management-guru idea is that just as companies must reach branding nirvana by

learning to let go of manufacturing and employment, so must individual workers empower themselves by

abandoning the idea of being employees. According to this logic, if we are to be successful in the new

economy, all of us must self-incorporate into our very own brand — a Brand Called You. Success in the job

market wil only come when we retrofit ourselves as consultants and service providers, identify our own

Brand You equities and lease ourselves out to targeted projects that wil in turn increase our individual

portfolio of "braggables." "I call the approach Me Inc.," Peters writes. "You're Chairperson/CEO/Entrepreneur-in-Chief of your own professional service firm."

Faith Popcorn, the

management guru who came to prominence with her 1991 best-seller, The Popcorn Report, goes so far as

to recommend that we change our names to better "click" with our carefully designed and marketed brand

image. She did — her name used to be Faith Plotkin.

Even more than Popcorn or Peters, however, it is a man named Daniel H. Pink who is the dean at Brand

You U. Pink has seen the growth in temporary and contract work, as well as the rise in self-employment,

and has declared the arrival of "Free Agent Nation." Not only is he writing a book by that title, but Pink

himself is a proud patriot of the nation. After quitting a prestigious White House job as Al Gore's chief

speechwriter, Pink went on a journey in search of fellow "free agents": people who had chosen a life of

contracts and freelance gigs over bosses and benefits. What he found, as he relayed in a cover article in

Fast Company, was the sixties. The citizens of Pink's nation are marketing consultants, head-hunters,

copywriters and software designers who are all striving to achieve a Zen-like balance of work and personal

life. They practice their yoga positions and play with their dogs in their wired home offices, while earning

more money —by jumping from one contract to the next — than they did when they were tied to one

company and paid a fixed salary. "This is the summer of love revisited, man!" we hear from Bo Rinald, an


agent representing a thousand freelance software developers in Silicon Valley.

For Pink's free agents, the

end of jobs is the baby-boomer dream come true: free-market capitalism without neckties; dropped out of

the corporate world in body but plugged-in in spirit. Everyone knows that you can't be a cog in the machine

if you work from your living room....

A younger —and, of course, hipper —version of Free Agent Nation was articulated in a special work issue of

Details magazine. For Gen-Xers with MBAs, the future of work is apparently fil ed with stunningly profitable

snowboarding businesses, video-game companies and cool-hunting firms.

"Opportunity Rocks!" crowed the

headline of an article that laid out the future of work as a non-stop party of extreme self-employment: "Life

without jobs, work without bosses, money without salaries, lives without limits."

According to the writer, Rob

Lieber, "The time of considering yourself an 'employee' has passed. Now it's time to start thinking of yourself

as a service provider, hiring out your skil s and services to the highest, or most interesting, bidder."

I admit to being lured by the sirens of free agency myself. About four years ago, I quit my job as a magazine

editor to go freelance, and like Pink I've never looked back. Of course I love the fact that no one boss

controls my every working hour (that privilege is now spread around to dozens of people), that I'm not

subject to the arbitrary edicts of petty managers and, most important, that I can work in my pajamas if I feel


like it. I know from firsthand experience that freelance life can indeed mean freedom, just as part time, for

others, can live up to its promise of genuine flexibility. Pink has a point when he says of free agency, "This

is a legitimate way to work - it isn't some poor laid-off slob struggling to find his way back to the corporate

bosom." However, there's a problem when it's people like Pink — or other freelance writers overly euphoric

about working in their pajamas —who hold themselves up as living proof that divestment from corporate

employment is a win-win formula. And it does seem as if most of the major articles about the joys of

freelancing have been written by successful freelance writers under the impression that they themselves

represent the mil ions of contractors, temps, freelancers, part-timers and the self-employed. But writing,

because of its solitary nature and low overhead, is one of the very few professions that are genuinely

compatible with homework, and study after study shows that it is absurd to equate the experience of being a

freelance journalist, or having your own advertising company, with that of being a temp secretary at

Microsoft or a contract factory worker in Cavite. On the whole, casualization pans out as the worst of both

worlds: monotonous work at lower wages, with no benefits or security, and even less control over

scheduling.

The bottom line is that the advantages and drawbacks of contract and contingency work have a simple


correlation to the class of the individuals doing the work: the higher up they are on the income scale, the

more chance they have to leverage their comings and goings. The further down they are, the more

vulnerable they are to being yanked around and bargained even lower. The top 20

percent of wage earners

tend to more or less maintain their high wages whether they are in full-time jobs or on freelance contracts.

But according to a 1997 U.S. study, 52 percent of women in non-standard work arrangements are being

paid "poverty-level wages" - compared with only 27.6 percent in the full-time female worker population

being paid those low wages. In other words, most non-standard workers aren't members of Free Agent

Nation. According to the study, "58.2 per cent are in the lowest quality work arrangements-jobs with

substantial pay penalties and few benefits relative to full-time standard workers."

Furthermore, the real

wages of temp workers in the U.S. actually went down, on average, by 14.7

percent between 1989 and

1994.w In Canada, nonpermanent jobs pay one-third less than permanent jobs, and 30 percent of

nonpermanent employees work irregular hours.' Clearly, temping puts the most vulnerable workforce further

at risk, and no matter what Details says, it doesn't rock.

Moreover, there is a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the free agents skipping and hopping on

the top rungs of the corporate ladder, and the agents hanging off the bottom who have been "freed" of such


pesky burdens as security and benefits. Nobody is more liberated, after all, than the CFOs themselves, who,

like Mike's cabal of uber-athletes, have formed their own Dream Team to be traded back and forth between

companies whenever some star power is needed to boost Wall Street morale.

Temp CFOs. as writer Clive

Thompson calls them, now shuttle from multinational to multinational, staying for an average term of only

five years, collecting multimil ion-dollar incentive packages on the way in, and multimil ion-dollar golden

handshakes on the way out." "Companies are changing executives like baseball managers," says John

Challenger, executive vice president of the outplacement firm Challenger, Gray Christmas. "The

replacement wil typically arrive like a SWAT team and sweep out the old and restaff with his or her own

people."()S When "Chainsaw" Al Dunlap was appointed CEO of Sunbeam in July 1996, Scott Graham, an

analyst at Oppenheimer Co., commented, "This is like the Lakers signing Shaquil e O'Neal."

The two extreme poles of workplace transience- represented by the contractor in Cavite afraid of flying

factories, and the temp CFO unveiling restructuring plans in New York —work together like a global seesaw.

Since the CFO superstars earn their reputation on Wall Street through such kamikaze missions as

auctioning off their company's entire manufacturing base or initiating a grandiose merger that wil save


mil ions of dollars in job duplication, the more mobile the CFOs become, the more unstable the position of

the broader workforce wil be. As Daniel Pink points out, the word "freelance" is derived from the age when

mercenary soldiers rented themselves — and their lances —out for battle. "The free lancers roamed from

assignment to assignment— kil ing people for money." Granted it's a little dramatic, but it's not a half-bad

job description for today's free-agent executives. In fact, it is the precise reason CEO salaries skyrocketed

during the years that layoffs were at their most ruthless. Ira T. Kay, author of CEO

Pay and Shareholder

Value, knows why. Writing in The Wall Street Journal, Kay points out that the exorbitant salaries American

companies have taken to paying their CEOs is a "crucial factor making the U.S.

economy the most

competitive in the world" because without juicy bonuses company heads would have "no economic

incentive to face up to difficult management decisions, such as layoffs." In other words, as satirist Wayne

Grytting retorted, we are "supporting those executive bonuses so we can get...fired."

It's a fair enough equation, particularly in the U.S. According to the AFl-C10, "the CEOs of the 30

companies with the largest announced layoffs saw their salaries, bonuses, and long-term compensation

increase by 67.3 per cent." The man responsible for the most layoffs in 1997-Eastman Kodak CEO George


Fisher, who cut 20,100 jobs —received an options grant that same year estimated to be worth $60 mil ion.

And the highest-paid man in the world in 1997 was Sanford Wiell, who earned $230 mil ion as head of the

Travellers Group. The first thing Wiell did in 1998 was announce that Travellers would merge with Citicorp,

a move that, while sending stock prices soaring, is expected to throw thousands out of work. In the same

spirit, John Smith, the General Motors chairman implementing those 82,000 job cuts discussed in the last

chapter, received a $2.54 mil ion bonus in 1997 that was tied to the company's record earnings.

There are many others in the business community who, unlike Ira T. Kay, are appalled by the amounts

executives have been paying themselves in recent years. In Business Week, Jennifer Reingold writes with

some disgust, "Good, bad, or indifferent, virtually anyone who spent time in the corner office of a large

public company in 1997 saw his or her net worth rise by at least several mil ion."

For Reingold, the injustice

lies in the fact that CEOs are able to collect raises and bonuses even when their company's stock price

drops and shareholders take a hit. For instance, Ray Irani, CEO of Occidental Petroleum, collected $101

mil ion in compensation in 1997, the same year that the company lost $390

mil ion.

This camp of market watchers has been pushing for CEO remuneration to be directly linked to stock


performance; in other words, "You make us rich, you get a healthy cut. But if we take a hit, then you take

one too." Though this system protects stockholders from the greed of ineffective executives, it actually puts

ordinary workers at even greater risk, by creating direct incentives for the quick and dirty layoffs that are

always sure to rally stock prices and bring on the bonuses. For instance, at Caterpil ar — the model of the

incentive-driven corporation — executives get paid in stocks that have consistently been inflated by

massive plant closures and worker wage rollbacks. What is emerging out of this growing trend of tying

executive pay to stock performance is a corporate culture so damaged that workers must often be fired or

short-changed for the boss to get paid.

This last point raises the most interesting question of all, I think, about the long-term effect of the brandname

multinationals' divestment of the jobs business. From Starbucks to Microsoft, from Caterpil ar to

Citibank, the correlation between profit and job growth is in the process of being severed. As Buzz

Hargrove, president of the Canadian Auto Workers, says, "Workers can work harder, their employers can be

more successful, but-and downsizing and outsourcing are only one example —the link between overall

economic success and the guaranteed sharing in that success is weaker than ever before." We know what

this means in the short term: record profits, giddy shareholders and no seats left in business class. But what


does it mean in the slightly longer term? What of the workers who fell off the payroll, whose bosses are

voices on the phone at employment agencies, who lost their reason to take pride in their company's good

fortune? Is it possible that the corporate sector, by fleeing from jobs, is unwittingly pouring fuel on the fire of

its own opposition movement?

[IMAGE]

Bil Gates Microsoft President and CEO, gets pied.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

BREEDING DISLOYALTY

What Goes Around, Comes Around

In our manufacturing, administrative, and distribution facilities, we have a specific philosophy- cameras

keep honest people honest.

-Leo Myers, safety and security systems engineer for Mattel, explains the company's enthusiastic use of

video surveil ance on its global workforce, 1990

When I dropped out of university in 1993, I could count on the fingers of one hand the number of my friends

who had jobs. "The Recession" we repeated to one another over and over again, through years of jobless

summers, through listless decisions to slog it out in grad school, through periods of cutbacks to our

universities, through miserable stretches when parents were out of work. Just as we would later blame El

Nino for everything from droughts to floods, the Recession was an economic bad weather system that had

sucked up all the jobs as if they were Missouri trailer parks.


When the jobs disappeared, we understood that it was a result of the tough economic times that seemed to

be affecting everyone (though perhaps not everyone equally) from company presidents facing bankruptcy to

axe-wielding politicians-everybody, men and women, old and young in all walks of life and work, right on

down to me and my middle-class friends and our half-hearted job searches. The shift from the Recession to

the cutthroat global economy happened so suddenly I feel as if I was sick that day and missed the whole

thing-as with Grade 10 algebra, I wil forever be playing catch-up. Al I know is that one minute we were all

in the Recession together. The next, a new strain of business leader was rising like a phoenix from the

ashes-suit freshly pressed, enthusiasm pumped - announcing the arrival of a new golden age. But as we

have seen in the last two chapters when the jobs came back (if the jobs came back), they came back

changed. For the workers in the contract factories of the export processing zones, and for the legions of

temps, part-timers, contract and service-sector workers in industrialized countries, the modern employer has

begun to look like a one-night stand who has the audacity to expect monogamy after a meaningless

encounter. And many of them even got it for a while. Running scared from years of layoffs and gloomy

economic projections, most of us did swallow the rhetoric that we should be happy picking up whatever pay


stubs were scattered our way. There is mounting evidence, however, that workplace transience is finally

eroding our collective faith, not only in individual corporations but in the very principle of trickle-down

economics.

Soaring profits and growth rates, as well as the mind-boggling salaries and bonuses that CEOs of large

corporations pay themselves, have radically changed the conditions under which workers originally came to

accept lower wages and diminished security, leaving many feeling that they've been had. Nowhere was this

shift in attitude more apparent than in the public's sympathy for the striking United Parcel Service workers in

1997. Though Americans are notorious for their lack of sympathy for labour strikes, the plight of UPS parttimers

struck a chord. Polls found that 55 percent of Americans supported the UPS

workers, and only 27

percent sided with the company. Keffo, the editor of a bitter zine for temporary workers, summed up the

public sentiment: "Day after day, [people] read and heard how great the economy is and it doesn't take a

rocket scientist to realize well, duh, if UPS is doing so well, why can't they pay their workers more, or hire

part timers as full timers, or keep their grubby fingers out of their workers' pension fund. So in a hilarious

twist of fate, all the 'good' economic news works against UPS in favour of the Teamsters."

Realizing that it had become a lightning rod for a broader malaise, UPS agreed to convert 10,000 part-time


jobs to full-time jobs at twice the hourly pay, and increased pay for part-timers by 35 percent over five

years. In explaining the concessions, UPS vice chairman John W. Alden said the company never foresaw

its workers becoming symbols of the rage against the New Economy. "If I had known that it was going to go

from negotiating for UPS to negotiating for part-time America, we would've approached it differently."

BREEDING DISLOYALTY

From Job Creators to Wealth Creators

As we have seen, it has only been in the past three or four years that corporations have stopped hiding

layoffs and restructuring behind the rhetoric of necessity and begun to speak openly and unapologetically

about their aversion to hiring people and, in extreme cases, their total exodus from the employment

business. Multinationals that once boasted of their role as "engines of job growth"

— and used it as leverage

to extract all kinds of government support — now prefer to identify themselves as engines of "economic

growth." It's a subtle difference, but not if you happen to be looking for work.

Corporations are indeed

"growing" the economy, but they are doing it, as we have seen, through layoffs, mergers, consolidation and

outsourcing—in other words, through job debasement and job loss. And as the economy grows, the

percentage of people directly employed by the world's largest corporations is actually decreasing.


Transnational corporations, which control more than 33 percent of the world's productive assets, account for

only 5 percent of the world's direct employment. And although the total assets of the world's one hundred

largest corporations increased by 288 percent between 1990 and 1997, the number of people those

corporations employed grew by less than 9 percent during that same period of tremendous growth.

The most striking figure is the most recent: in 1998, despite the stellar performance of the U.S. economy

and despite the record low unemployment rate, U.S. corporations eliminated 677,000 permanent jobs —

more job cuts than in any other year this decade. One in nine of those cuts came in the aftermath of

mergers; many others came from the manufacturing sector. As the low U.S

unemployment rate suggests,

two-thirds of the companies that eliminated jobs created new ones and laid-off workers found alternative

employment relatively quickly. But what those dramatic job cuts demonstrate is that a stable, reliable

relationship between workers and their corporate employers has little or nothing to do with either the

unemployment rate or the relative health of the economy. People are experiencing less stability even in the

very best of economic times — in fact, these good economic times may be flowing, at least in part, from

that loss of stability.

Job creation as part of the corporate mission, particularly the creation of full-time, decently paid, stable jobs,


appears to have taken a back seat in many major corporations, regardless of company profits. Rather than

being one component of a healthy operation, labour is increasingly treated by the corporate sector as an

unavoidable burden, like paying income tax; or an expensive nuisance, like not being allowed to dump toxic

waste into lakes. Politicians may say that jobs are their priority, but the stock market responds cheerfully

every time mass layoffs are announced, and sinks gloomily whenever it looks as if workers might get a

raise. Whatever bizarre route we took to get here, an unmistakable message now emanates from our free

markets: good jobs are bad for business, bad for "the economy" and should be avoided at all cost. Although

this equation has undeniably reaped record profits in the short term, it may well prove to be a strategic

miscalculation on the part of our captains of industry. By discarding their self-identification as job creators,

companies leave themselves open to a kind of backlash that can come only from a population that knows

that the smooth sailing of the economy is of little demonstrable benefit to them.

According to the 1997

report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (U1MCTAD),

"Rising inequalities pose

a serious threat of a political backlash against globalization, one that is as likely to come from the North as

well as from the South.... The 1920s and 1930s provide a stark, and disturbing, reminder of just how quickly


faith in markets and economic openness can be overwhelmed by political events."

With the effects of the

Asian and Russian economic crises in full swing, a UN report on "human development" issued the following

year was even more severe: noting the growing disparities between rich and poor, James Gustave Speth,

administrator of the United Nations Development Program, said, "The numbers are shockingly high, amid

the affluence. Progress must be more evenly distributed."

You hear this kind of talk more and more these days. Ominous warnings about a simmering

antiglobalization backlash cast a shadow over the usual euphoria of the annual gathering of corporate and

political leaders in Davos, Switzerland. The business press is littered with more uneasy forecasts, such as

the one in Business Week that noted, "The sight of bulging corporate coffers co-existing with a continuous

stagnation in Americans' living standards could become politically untenable." And that's America, which

has a record low unemployment rate. The situation becomes even less comfortable in Canada, where

unemployment is at 8.3 percent, and in European Union countries that are stuck with an average

unemployment rate of 11.5 percent. At a speech delivered to the Business Council on National Issues, Ted

Newall, chief executive officer of Nova Corp. in Calgary, Alberta, called the fact that more than 20 percent

of Canadians live below the poverty line a "time bomb that is just waiting to go off." Indeed, a little side


industry has developed of CEOs falling over each other to proclaim themselves ethical clairvoyants: they

write books about the new "stockholder society," publicly berate their peers at luncheon addresses for their

lack of scruples and announce that the time has come for corporate leaders to address the growing

economic disparities. Trouble is, they can't agree on who is going to go first.

The fear that the poor wil storm the barricades is as old as the castle moat, particularly during periods of

great economic prosperity accompanied by inequitable distribution of wealth.

Bertrand Russell writes that

the Victorian elite in England were so consumed by paranoia that the working class would revolt against

their "appalling poverty" that "at the time of Peterloo many large country houses kept artil ery in readiness,

lest they should be attacked by the mob. My maternal grandfather, who died in 1869, while wandering in his

mind during his last il ness, heard a loud noise in the street and thought it was the revolution breaking out,

showing that at least unconsciously, the thought of revolution had remained with him throughout long

prosperous years."

A friend of mine whose family lives in India says her Punjabi aunt is so afraid of an insurrection of her own

household staff that she keeps the kitchen knives locked up, leaving the servants to chop vegetables with

sharpened sticks. It's not so different from the growing numbers of Americans moving into gated


communities because the suburbs no longer provide adequate protection from the perceived urban threat.

Despite the widening gulf between rich and poor consistently reported by the UN

and despite the muchdiscussed

disappearance of the middle class in the West, the attack on jobs and income levels is probably

not the most serious corporate offence we face as global citizens: it is, in theory, not irreversible. Far worse,

in the long term, are the crimes committed by corporations against the natural environment, the food supply

and indigenous peoples and cultures. Nevertheless, the erosion of a commitment to steady employment is

the single most significant factor contributing to a climate of anti-corporate militancy and it is this that has

made the markets most vulnerable to widespread "social unrest," to quote The Wall Street Journal.™

When corporations are perceived as functioning vehicles of wealth distribution —

effectively trickling down

jobs and tax revenue — they at least provide the bedrock for the often Faustian bargains by which citizens

offer loyalty to corporate priorities in exchange for a reliable pay check. In the past, job creation served as a

kind of corporate suit of armour, shielding companies from the wrath that might otherwise have been

directed their way as a result of environmental or human-rights abuses.

Nowhere was this armour more protective than in the "jobs vs. the environment"

debates of the late eighties

and early nineties, when progressive movements were sharply divided, for example, between those who


supported the rights of loggers and those who wanted to protect old-growth forests. In British Columbia,

activists were people who came in by bus from the city while loggers loyally stood by the multinational

corporations that had anchored their communities for generations. This kind of division is becoming less

clear for many participants, as corporations begin to lose their natural allies among blue-collar workers who

have been disenfranchised by callously executed layoffs, sudden mil closures and constant company

threats to move offshore.

Today, it's hard to find a contented company town, where citizens do not feel they have in some way been

betrayed by the local corporate sector. And rather than dividing communities into factions, corporations are

increasingly serving as the common thread by which labour, environmental and human-rights violations can

be stitched together into a single political ideology. After a while it becomes apparent that the unsustainable

search for profits that, for example, leads to the clear-cutting of old-growth forests is the same philosophy

that devastates logging towns by moving the mil s to Indonesia. John Jordan, a British anarchist

environmentalist, puts it this way: "Transnationals are affecting democracy, work, communities, culture and

the biosphere. Inadvertently, they have helped us see the whole problem as one system, to connect every

issue to every other issue, to not look at one problem in isolation."


This simmering backlash is about more than personal grievances. Even if you happen to be one of the lucky

ones who has landed a good job and has never been laid off, everyone has heard the warnings —if not for

themselves, then for their children or their parents or their friends. We live in a culture of job insecurity, and

the messages of self-sufficiency have reached every one of us. In North America, the back end of an

eighteen-wheeler heading for Mexico, workers weeping at the factory gate, the boarded-up windows of a

hollowed-out factory town and people sleeping in doorways and on sidewalks have been among the most

powerful economic images of our time: metaphors, seared into the collective consciousness, for an

economy that consistently and unapologetically puts profits before people.

That message has perhaps been received most vividly by the generation that came of age since the

recession hit in the early nineties. Almost without exception, they mapped out their life plan while listening to

a chorus of voices telling them to lower their expectations, to rely on no one for their success. If they wanted

a job with General Motors, Nike or General Electric, or indeed anywhere in the corporate sector, the

message was the same: count on no one. Just in case they weren't paying attention, it was reinforced by

high-school guidance counsellors holding seminars on how to become "Me Inc.,"

by nightly newscasts fil ed

with stories about how pension funds wil soon be empty and by companies like Prudential Insurance urging


us all to "Be your own rock." At university campuses across North America, orientation-week events —the

time when students are first introduced to campus life - are now sponsored by mutual-fund companies,

which use the opportunity to prod incoming students to start saving for their retirement before they've even

picked a major.

Al this has had its effects. According to the bible of demographic marketing, The Yankelovich Report, the

belief in the need to be self-reliant has increased by one-third with every generation — from the "Matures"

(born 1909-1945), to "Boomers" (born 1946-1964) to "Xers" (defined loosely and somewhat inaccurately as

everyone born between 1965 and the present). "Over two-thirds of Xers agree that, 'I have to take whatever

I can get in this world because no one is going to give me anything.' Far fewer Boomers and Matures agree

—only half and one-third, respectively," the report states." The New York advertising firm DMBB found

similar attitudes in its study of global teens. "From a lengthy battery of attitudinal items, the one that teens

most agree with worldwide is: 'It's up to me to get what I want out of life.'" Mine out of ten young Americans

polled agreed with this sentiment of total self-reliance.

This shift in attitude has translated into a serious boom for the mutual-fund industry. Young people, it

seems, are buying more RSPs than ever before. "Why is Generation X more focused on the need to save?"


wonders a reporter in Business Week. "Much of it has to do with self-reliance.

They believe they'l succeed

only on their own initiative and have little confidence that either Social Security or traditional employer

pensions wil be around to support them in retirement."

In fact, if you believe the business press, the only impact this spirit of self-reliance wil have is the

spearheading of a new wave of cutthroat entrepreneurial initiatives as the kids who can't count on anyone

look out for Number One.

There is no question that many young people have compensated for the fact that they don't trust politicians

or corporations by adopting the social-Darwinist values of the system that engendered their insecurity: they

wil be greedier, tougher, more focused. They wil Just Do It. But what of those who didn't go the MBA route,

who don't want to be the next Bil Gates or Richard Branson? Why should they stay invested in the

economic goals of corporations that have so actively divested them? What is the incentive to be loyal to a

sector that has bombarded them, for their entire adult life, with a single message: Don't count on us?

This issue is not only about unemployment per se. It would be a grave mistake to assume that any old pay

check wil buy the level of loyalty and protection to which many corporations —

sometimes rightly —were

once accustomed. Casual, part-time and low-wage work does not bring about the same identification with


one's employer as the lifelong contracts of yesterday. Go to any mall fifteen minutes after the stores close

and you'l see the new employment relationship in action: all the minimum-wage clerks are lined up, their

purses and backpacks open for "bag check." It's standard practice, retail workers wil tell you, for managers

to search them daily for stolen goods. And according to an annual industry survey conducted by the

University of Florida's Security Research Project, there is reason for suspicion: the study shows that

employee theft accounted for 42.7 percent of the total amount of goods stolen from U.S. retailers in 1998,

the highest rate ever recorded by the survey. Starbucks clerk Steve Emery likes to quote a line he got from

a sympathetic customer: "You pay peanuts, so you get monkeys." When he told me that, it reminded me of

something I had heard only two months earlier from a group of Nike workers in Indonesia. Sitting crosslegged

in a circle at one of the dorms, they told me that, deep down, they hoped their factory would burn to

the ground. Understandably, the factory workers' sentiments were much more extreme than the resentments

expressed by McWorkers in the West —then again, the guards doing "bag check"

at the gated entrance to

the Nike factory in Indonesia were armed with revolvers.

But it is in the ranks of the mil ions of temp workers that the true breeding grounds of the Anticorporate

backlash wil most likely be found. Since most temps don't stay at one post long enough for anyone to keep


track of the value of their labour, the merit principle — once a sacred capitalist tenet — is becoming moot.

And the situation can be intensely demoralizing. "Pretty soon, I'l run out of places to work in this city," writes

Debbie Goad, a temp with twenty years of secretarial experience. "I'm registered at fifteen temporary

agencies. It's like playing the slots in Vegas. They constantly call me, sounding like used-car salesmen. 'I

know I'l get you the perfect job soon.'"

She wrote those words in Temp Slave, a little publication out of Madison, Wisconsin, devoted to tapping a

seemingly bottomless well of worker resentment. In it, workers who have been branded as disposable vent

their anger at the corporations that rent them like pieces of equipment, then return them, used, to the

agency. Temps traditionally have had no one to talk to about these issues — the nature of the work keeps

them isolated from each other and also, inside their temporary workplaces, from their salaried co-workers.

So it's no surprise that Temp Slave, and Web sites like Temp 24-7, boil with repressed hostility, offering

helpful tips on how to sabotage your employer's computer system, as well as essays with titles such as

"Everybody hates temps. The feeling is mutual!" and "The boredom, the sheer boredom of office life for

temps."

Just as temp workforces mess with the merit principle, so does the growing practice of swapping CEOs like


pro ballplayers. Temp CEOs are a major assault on the capitalist folklore of the mail-room boy who works

his way up to becoming president of the company. Today's executives, since they just seem to trade the top

spot with one another, appear to be born into their self-enclosed stratospheres like kings. In such a context,

there is less room for the dream of making it up from the mail room — especially since the mail room has

probably been outsourced to Pitney Bowes and staffed with permatemps.

That is the situation at Microsoft, and it is part of the reason why temp rage seethes there like nowhere else.

Another is that Microsoft openly admits that its reserve of temps exists to protect the core of permanent

workers from the ravages of the free market. When a product line is discontinued, or costs are cut in

ingenious new ways, it's the temps that absorb the blows. If you ask the agencies, they say that their clients

don't mind being treated like outdated software — after all, Bil Gates never promised them a thing. "When

people know it's a temporary arrangement, some day, when the assignment ends, there's not a sense of a

broken trust," explains Peg Cheirett, president of Wasser Group, one of the agencies that supplies Microsoft

with temps.

There's no doubt Gates has devised a means of downsizing that avoids those high-pitched wails of betrayal

that IBM bosses faced in the late eighties when they eliminated 37,000 jobs, shocking employees who were


under the impression they had secured jobs for life. Microsoft's temps have no basis to expect anything of

Bil Gates —that much is true —but while that fact may keep pickets from blocking the entrance to the

Microsoft Campus, it does little to protect the company from getting hacked from inside its own computer

system. (As it did throughout 1998, when the hacker cabal Cult of the Dead Cow released a made-for-Microsoft hacking program called Back Orifice. It was downloaded from the Internet 300,000 times.)

Microsoft's permatemps brush up against the hyperactive capitalist dream of Silicon Gold every day, and

yet they —more than anyone else —know that it's an invitation-only affair. So while Microsoft's permanent

employees are renowned for their corporate cultishness, Microsoft permatemps are almost unparalleled in

their rancour. Asked by journalists what they think of their employer, they offer up such choice comments

as: "They treat you like pond scum" or "It's a system of having two classes of people, and instil ing fear and

inferiority and loathing."

Divestment: A Two-Way Transaction

Commenting on this shift, Charles Handy, author of The Hungry Spirit, writes that

"it is clear that the

psychological contract between employers and employed has changed. The smart jargon now talks of

guaranteeing 'employ-ability' not 'employment,' which, being interpreted, means don't count on us, count on

yourself, but we'l try to help if we can."


But for some — particularly younger workers — there is a silver lining. Because young people tend not to

see the place where they work as an extension of their souls, they have, in some cases, found freedom in

knowing they wil never suffer the kind of heart-wrenching betrayals their parents did. For almost everyone

who has entered the job market in the past decade, unemployment is a known quantity, as is self-generated

and erratic work. In addition, losing one's job is much less frightening when getting it seemed an accident in

the first place. Such familiarity with unemployment creates its own kind of worker divestment — divestment

of the very notion of total dependency on stable work. We may begin to wonder whether we should even

want the same job for our whole lives, and, more important, why we should depend on the twists and turns

of large institutions for our sense of self.

This slow divestment by corporate culture has implications that reach far beyond the psychology of the

individual: a population of skil ed workers who don't see themselves as corporate lifers could lead to a

renaissance in creativity and a revitalization of civic life, two very hopeful prospects. One thing is certain: it

is already leading to a new kind of Anticorporate politics.

[Taking the U.S. statistics as an example: the unemployed, part-time, temporary and replacement workers

make up close to 40 percent of people actively working or looking for work.

However, if you factor in the 67


mil ion working-age Americans who are not included in the unemployment figures because they are not

actively looking for work, the percentage of adults holding down full-time permanent jobs slips into the

minority.]

You can see it in the political computer hackers who go after Microsoft and, as the next chapter wil show, in

the guerril a "adbusters" who target urban bil boards. It is there as well in anarchic pranks like "Phone in Sick

to Work Day," the "Steal from Work! Because Work Is Stealing from You!"

manifesto and on Web sites with

names like Corporate America Sucks, just as it underlies international Anticorporate campaigns like the one

against McDonald's spurred by the McLibel Trial, and the one against Nike, focusing on Asian factory

conditions.

In his essay "Stupid Jobs Are Good to Relax With," Toronto writer Hal Niedzviecki contrasts the detachment

he feels from the steady stream of "joke jobs" that junk up his resume with his father's profound dislocation

at being forced into early retirement after a career of steady upward mobility. Hal helped his father pack up

his desk on his last day at the office, watching as he nicked Post-it Notes and other office supplies from the

company that had employed him for twelve years. "Despite his decades of labour and my years of being

barely employed (and the five degrees we have between us), we have both ended up in the same place. He

feels cheated. I don't."


Members of the sixties youth culture vowed to be the first generation not to "sell out": they just wouldn't buy

a ticket for the express train with the sign reading "lifelong employment." But in the ranks of young parttimers,

temps and contract workers, we are witnessing something potentially far more powerful. We are

seeing the first wave of workers who never bought in — some of them by choice, but most because that

lifelong-employment train has spent most of the past decade standing in the station.

The extent of this shift cannot be overstated. Among the total number of working-age adults in the U.S.,

Canada and the U.K., those with full-time, permanent jobs working for someone other than themselves are

in the minority. Temps, part-timers, the unemployed and those who have opted out of the labour force

entirely — some because they don't want to work but many more because they have given up looking for

jobs — now make up more than half of the working-age population.

In other words, the people who don't have access to a corporation to which they can offer lifelong loyalty are

the majority. And for young workers, consistently overrepresented among the unemployed, part-time and

temporary sectors, the relationship to the work world is even more tenuous.

From No Jobs to No Logo...

It should come as no surprise that the companies that increasingly find themselves at the wrong end of a

bottle of spray paint, a computer hack or an international Anticorporate campaign are the ones with the most


cutting-edge ads, the most intuitive market researchers and the most aggressive in-school outreach

programs. With the dictates of branding forcing companies to sever their traditional ties to steady job

creation, it is no exaggeration to say that the "strongest" brands are the ones generating the worst jobs,

whether in the export processing zones, in Silicon Valley or at the mall.

Furthermore, the companies that

advertise aggressively on MTV, Channel One and in Details, selling sneakers, jeans, fast food and

Walkmans, are the very ones that pioneered the McJob sector and led the production exodus to cheap

labour enclaves like Cavite. After pumping young people up with go-get-'em messages — the "Just Do It"

sneakers, "No Fear" T-shirts and "No Excuses" jeans — these companies have responded to job requests

with a resounding "Who, me?" The workers in Cavite may be unswooshworthy, but Nike's and Levi's core

consumers have received another message from the brands' global shuffle: they are unjobworthy.

To add insult to injury, as we saw in Part 1, "No Space," this abandonment by brand-name corporations is

occurring at the very moment when youth culture is being sought out for more aggressive branding than

ever before. Youth style and attitude are among the most effective wealth generators in our entertainment

economy, but real live youth are being used around the world to pioneer a new kind of disposable workforce.


It is in this volatile context, as the final section wil show, that the branding economy is becoming the

political equivalent of a sign hanging on the back of the body corporate that says

"Kick Me."

[IMAGE]

Top: A call to Depression-era ad jammers from The Ballyhoo. Bottom: Two tobacco ad parodies by Ron

English.

CHAPTER TWELVE

CULTURE JAMMING

Ads Under Attack

Advertising men are indeed very unhappy these days, very nervous, with a kind of apocalyptic expectancy.

Often when I have lunched with an agency friend, a half dozen worried copy writers and art directors have

accompanied us. Invariably they want to know when the revolution is coming, and where wil they get off if it

does come.

— Ex-adman James Rorty, Our Master's Voice, 1934

It's Sunday morning on the edge of New York's Alphabet City and Jorge Rodriguez de Gerada is perched at

the top of a high ladder, ripping the paper off a cigarette bil board. Moments before, the bil board at the

corner of Houston and Attorney sported a fun-loving Newport couple jostling over a pretzel. Now it

showcases the haunting face of a child, which Rodriguez de Gerada has painted in rust. To finish it off, he

pastes up a few hand-torn strips of the old Newport ad, which form a fluorescent green frame around the


child's face.

When it's done, the installation looks as the thirty-one-year-old artist had intended: as if years of cigarette,

beer and car ads had been scraped away to reveal the rusted backing of the bil board. Burned into the metal

is the real commodity of the advertising transaction. "After the ads are taken down," he says, "what is left is

the impact on the children in the area, staring at these images."

Unlike some of the growing legion of New York guerril a artists, Rodriguez de Gerada refuses to slink

around at night like a vandal, choosing instead to make his statements in broad daylight. For that matter, he

doesn't much like the phrase "guerril a art," preferring "citizen art" instead. He wants the dialogue he has

been having with the city's bil boards for more than ten years to be seen as a normal mode of discourse in a

democratic society-not as some edgy vanguard act. While he paints and pastes, he wants kids to stop and

watch - as they do on this sunny day, just as an old man offers to help support the ladder.

Rodriguez de Gerada even claims to have talked cops out of arresting him on three different occasions. "I

say, 'Look, look what's around here, look what's happening. Let me explain to you why I do it.'" He tells the

police officer about how poor neighbourhoods have a disproportionately high number of bil boards selling

tobacco and hard liquor products. He talks about how these ads always feature models sailing, skiing or


playing golf, making the addictive products they promote particularly glamorous to kids stuck in the ghetto,

longing for escape. Unlike the advertisers who pitch and run, he wants his work to be part of a community

discussion about the politics of public space.

Rodriguez de Gerada is widely recognized as one of the most skil ed and creative founders of culture

jamming, the practice of parodying advertisements and hijacking bil boards in order to drastically alter their

messages. Streets are public spaces, adbusters argue, and since most residents can't afford to counter

corporate messages by purchasing their own ads, they should have the right to talk back to images they

never asked to see. In recent years, this argument has been bolstered by advertising's mounting

aggressiveness in the public domain — the ads discussed in "No Space," painted and projected onto

sidewalks; reaching around entire buildings and buses; into schools; onto basketball courts and on the

Internet. At the same time, as discussed in "No Choice," the proliferation of the quasi-public "town squares"

of malls and superstores has created more and more spaces where commercial messages are the only

ones permitted. Adding even greater urgency to their cause is the belief among many jammers that

concentration of media ownership has successfully devalued the right to free speech by severing it from the

right to be heard.


Al at once, these forces are coalescing to create a climate of semiotic Robin Hoodism. A growing number

of activists believe the time has come for the public to stop asking that some space be left unsponsored,

and to begin seizing it back. Culture jamming baldly rejects the idea that marketing — because it buys its

way into our public spaces — must be passively accepted as a one-way information flow.

The most sophisticated culture jams are not stand-alone ad parodies but interceptions — counter-messages

that hack into a corporation's own method of communication to send a message starkly at odds with the one

that was intended. The process forces the company to foot the bil for its own subversion, either literally,

because the company is the one that paid for the bil board, or figuratively, because anytime people mess

with a logo, they are tapping into the vast resources spent to make that logo meaningful. Kalle Lasn, editor

of Vancouver-based Adbusters magazine, uses the martial art of jujitsu as a precise metaphor to explain the

mechanics of the jam. "In one simple deft move you slap the giant on its back. We use the momentum of

the enemy." It's an image borrowed from Saul Alinsky who, in his activist bible, Rules for Radicals, defines

"mass political jujitsu" as "utilizing the power of one part of the power structure against another part...the

superior strength of the Haves become their own undoing." So, by rappelling off the side of a thirty-byninety-foot Levi's bil board (the largest in San Francisco) and pasting the face of serial kil er Charles

Manson over the image, a group of jammers attempts to leave a disruptive message about the labour

practices employed to make Levi's jeans. In the statement it left on the scene, the Bil board Liberation Front

said they chose Manson's face because the jeans were "Assembled by prisoners in China, sold to penal

institutions in the Americas."

The term "culture jamming" was coined in 1984 by the San Francisco audio-collage band Negativland. "The

skilfully reworked bil board ...directs the public viewer to a consideration of the original corporate strategy," a

band member states on the album Jamcon '84. The jujitsu metaphor isn't as apt for jammers who insist that

they aren't inverting ad messages but are rather improving, editing, augmenting or unmasking them. "This is

extreme truth in advertising," one bil board artist tells me. A good jam, in other words, is an X-ray of the

subconscious of a campaign, uncovering not an opposite meaning but the deeper truth hiding beneath the

layers of advertising euphemisms. So, according to these principles, with a slight turn of the imagery knob,

the now-retired Joe Camel turns into Joe Chemo, hooked up to an IV machine.

That's what's in his future,

isn't it? Or Joe is shown about fifteen years younger than his usual swinger self (see image, page 278). Like

Baby Smurf, the "Cancer Kid" is cute and cuddly and playing with building blocks instead of sports cars and


pool cues. And why not? Before RJ. Reynolds reached a $206 bil ion settlement with forty-six states, the

American government accused the tobacco company of using the cartoon camel to entice children to start

smoking — why not go further, the culture jammers ask, and reach out to even younger would-be smokers?

Apple computers' "Think Different" campaign of famous figures both living and dead has been the subject of

numerous simple hacks: a photograph of Stalin appears with the altered slogan

"Think Really Different"; the

caption for the ad featuring the Dalai Lama is changed to "Think Disil usioned" and the rainbow Apple logo

is morphed into a skull (see image on page 344). My favourite truth-in-advertising campaign is a simple jam

on Exxon that appeared just after the 1989 Valdez spil : "Shit Happens. New Exxon," two towering bil boards

announced to mil ions of San Francisco commuters.

Attempting to pinpoint the roots of culture jamming is next to impossible, largely because the practice is

itself a cutting and pasting of graffiti, modern art, do-it-yourself punk philosophy and age-old pranksterism.

And using bil boards as an activist canvas isn't a new revolutionary tactic either.

San Francisco's Bil board

Liberation Front (responsible for the Exxon and Levi's jams) has been altering ads for twenty years, while

Australia's Bil board Utilizing Graffitists Against Unhealthy Promotions (BUG-UP) reached its peak in 1983,

causing an unprecedented $1 mil ion worth of damage to tobacco bil boards in and around Sydney.


It was Guy Debord and the Situationists, the muses and theorists of the theatrical student uprising of Paris,

May 1968, who first articulated the power of a simple detournement, defined as an image, message or

artefact lifted out of its context to create a new meaning. But though culture jammers borrow liberally from

the avant-garde art movements of the past — from Dada and Surrealism to Conceptualism and

Situationism — the canvas these art revolutionaries were attacking tended to be the art world and its

passive culture of spectatorship, as well as the anti-pleasure ethos of mainstream capitalist society. For

many French students in the late sixties, the enemy was the rigidity and conformity of the Company Man;

the company itself proved markedly less engaging. So where Situationist Asger Jorn hurled paint at pastoral

paintings bought at flea markets, today's culture jammers prefer to hack into corporate advertising and other

avenues of corporate speech. And if the culture jammers' messages are more pointedly political than their

predecessors', that may be because what were indeed subversive messages in the sixties — "Never Work,"

"It Is Forbidden to Forbid," "Take Your Desires for Reality" —now sound more like Sprite or Nike slogans:

Just Feel It. And the "situations" or "happenings" staged by the political pranksters in 1968, though

genuinely shocking and disruptive at the time, are the Absolut Vodka ad of 1998

—the one featuring purpleclad

art school students storming bars and restaurants banging on bottles.


In 1993, Mark Dery wrote "Culture Jamming: Hacking, Slashing and Sniping in the Empire of Signs," a

booklet published by the Open Magazine Pamphlet Series. For Dery, jamming incorporates such eclectic

combinations of theatre and activism as the Guerril a Girls, who highlighted the art world's exclusion of

female artists by holding demonstrations outside the Whitney Museum in goril a masks; Joey Skagg, who

has pulled off countless successful media hoaxes; and Artfux's execution-in-effigy of arch-Republican Jesse

Helms on Capitol Hil . For Dery, culture jamming is anything, essentially, that mixes art, media, parody and

the outsider stance. But within these subcultures, there has always been a tension between the forces of the

merry prankster and the hard-core revolutionary. Nagging questions re-emerge: are play and pleasure

themselves revolutionary acts, as the Situationists might argue? Is screwing up the culture's information

flows inherently subversive, as Skagg would hold? Or is the mix of art and politics just a matter of making

sure, to paraphrase Emma Goldman, that somebody has hooked up a good sound system at the revolution?

Though culture jamming is an undercurrent that never dries up entirely, there is no doubt that for the last

five years it has been in the midst of a revival, and one focused more on politics than on pranksterism. For

a growing number of young activists, adbusting has presented itself as the perfect tool with which to register


disapproval of the multinational corporations that have so aggressively stalked them as shoppers, and so

unceremoniously dumped them as workers. Influenced by media theorists such as Noam Chomsky, Edward

Herman, Mark Crispin Mil er, Robert McChesney and Ben Bagdikian, all of whom have explored ideas about

corporate control over information flows, the adbusters are writing theory on the streets, literally

deconstructing corporate culture with a waterproof magic marker and a bucket of wheat paste.

Jammers span a significant range of backgrounds, from purer-than-thou Marxist-anarchists who refuse

interviews with "the corporate press" to those like Rodriguez de Gerada who work in the advertising industry

by day (his paying job, ironically, is putting up commercial signs and superstore window displays) and long

to use their skil s to send messages they consider constructive. Besides a fair bit of animosity between

these camps, the only ideology bridging the spectrum of culture jamming is the belief that free speech is

meaningless if the commercial cacophony has risen to the point that no one can hear you. "I think everyone

should have their own bil board, but they don't," says Jack Napier (a pseudonym) of the Bil board Liberation

Front.

On the more radical end of the spectrum, a network of "media collectives" has emerged, decentralized and

anarchic, that combine adbusting with zine publishing, pirate radio, activist video, Internet development and


community activism. Chapters of the collective have popped up in Tallahassee, Boston, Seattle, Montreal

and Winnipeg — often splintering off into other organizations. In London, where adbusting is called

"subvertising," a new group has been formed, called the UK Subs after the seventies punk group of the

same name. And in the past two years, the real-world jammers have been joined by a global network of online

"hacktivists" who carry out their raids on the Internet, mostly by breaking into corporate Web sites and

leaving their own messages behind.

More mainstream groups have also been getting in on the action. The U.S.

Teamsters have taken quite a

shine to the ad jam, using it to build up support for striking workers in several recent labour disputes. For

instance, Mil er Brewing found itself on the receiving end of a similar jam when it laid off workers at a St.

Louis plant. The Teamsters purchased a bil board that parodied a then current Mil er campaign; as Business

Week reported, "Instead of two bottles of beer in a snow bank with the tagline

'Two Cold,' the ad showed two

frozen workers in a snow bank labelled 'Too Cold: Mil er canned 88 St. Louis workers.'" As organizer Ron

Carver says, "When you're doing this, you're threatening multimil ion-dollar ad campaigns."

One high-profile culture jam arrived in the fall of 1997 when the New York antitobacco lobby purchased

hundreds of rooftop taxi ads to hawk "Virginia Slime" and "Cancer Country" brand cigarettes. Al over


Manhattan, as yellow cabs got stuck in gridlock, the jammed ads jostled with the real ones.

"Mutiny on the Corporate Sponsor Ship"-Paper Tiger, 1997 slogan The rebirth of culture jamming has much

to do with newly accessible technologies that have made both the creation and the circulation of ad parodies

immeasurably easier. The Internet may be bogged down with brave new forms of branding, as we have

seen, but it is also crawling with sites that offer links to culture jammers in cities across North America and

Europe, ad parodies for instant downloading and digital versions of original ads, which can be imported

directly onto personal desktops or jammed on site. For Rodriguez de Gerada, the true revolution has been

in the impact desktop publishing has had on the techniques available to ad hackers. Over the course of the

last decade, he says, culture jamming has shifted "from low-tech to medium-tech to high-tech," with

scanners and software programs like Photoshop now enabling activists to match colours, fonts and

materials precisely. "I know so many different techniques that make it look like the whole ad was reprinted

with its new message, as opposed to somebody coming at it with a spray-paint can."

This is a crucial distinction. Where graffiti traditionally seek to leave dissonant tags on the slick face of

advertising (or the "pimple on the face of the retouched cover photo of America,"

to use a Negativland


image), Rodriguez de Gerada's messages are designed to mesh with their targets, borrowing visual

legitimacy from advertising itself. Many of his "edits" have been so successfully integrated that the altered

bil boards look like originals, though with a message that takes viewers by surprise. Even the child's face he

put up in Alphabet City —not a traditional parody jam — was digitally output on the same kind of adhesive

vinyl that advertisers use to seamlessly cover buses and buildings with corporate logos. "The technology

allows us to use Madison Avenue's aesthetics against itself," he says. "That is the most important aspect of

this new wave of people using this guerril a tactic, because that's what the MTV

generation has become

accustomed to - everything's flashy, everything's bright and clean. If you spend time to make it cleaner it wil

not be dismissed."

But others hold that jamming need not be so high tech. The Toronto performance artist Jubal Brown spread

the visual virus for Canada's largest bil board-busting blitz with nothing more than a magic marker. He

taught his friends how to distort the already hollowed out faces of fashion models by using a marker to black

out their eyes and draw a zipper over their mouths — presto! Instant skull. For the women jammers in

particular, "skulling" fitted in neatly with the "truth in advertising" theory: if emaciation is the beauty ideal,

why not go all the way with zombie chic — give the advertisers a few supermodels from beyond the grave?


For Brown, more nihilist than feminist, skulling was simply a detournement to highlight the cultural poverty

of the sponsored life. ("Buy Buy Buy! Die Die Die!" reads Brown's statement displayed in a local Toronto art

gallery.) On April Fool's Day, 1997, dozens of people went out on skulling missions, hitting hundreds of

bil boards on busy Toronto streets (see image, page 344). Their handiwork was reprinted in Adbusters,

helping to spread skulling to cities across North America.

And nobody is riding the culture-jamming wave as high as Adbusters, the self-described "house-organ" of

the culture-jamming scene. Editor Kalle Lasn, who speaks exclusively in the magazine's enviro-pop lingo,

likes to say that we are a culture "addicted to toxins" that are poisoning our bodies, our "mental

environment" and our planet. He believes that adbusting wil eventually spark a

"paradigm shift" in public

consciousness. Published by the Vancouver-based Media Foundation, the magazine started in 1989 with

5,000 copies. It now has a circulation of 35,000-at least 20,000 copies of which go to the United States. The

foundation also produces "uncommercials" for television that accuse the beauty industry of causing eating

disorders, attack North American over consumption, and urge everyone to trade their cars in for bikes. Most

television stations in Canada and the U.S. have refused to air the spots, which gives the Media Foundation

the perfect excuse to take them to court and use the trials to attract press attention to their vision of more


democratic, publicly accessible media.

Culture jamming is enjoying a resurgence, in part because of technological advancements, but also more

pertinently, because of the good old rules of supply and demand. Something not far from the surface of the

public psyche is delighted to see the icons of corporate power subverted and mocked. There is, in short, a

market for it. With commercialism able to overpower the traditional authority of religion, politics and

schools, corporations have emerged as the natural targets for all sorts of free-floating rage and rebellion.

The new ethos that culture jamming taps into is go-for-the-corporate-jugular.

"States have fallen back and

corporations have become the new institutions," says Jaggi Singh, a Montreal-based Anticorporate activist.

"People are just reacting to the iconography of our time." American labour rights activist Trim Bissell goes

further, explaining that the thirsty expansion of chains like Starbucks and the aggressive branding of

companies like Nike have created a climate ripe for Anticorporate attacks. "There are certain corporations

which market themselves so aggressively, which are so intent on stamping their image on everybody and

every street, that they build up a reservoir of resentment among thinking people,"

he says. "People resent

the destruction of culture and its replacement with these mass-produced corporate logos and slogans. It

represents a kind of cultural fascism."


Most of the superbrands are of course well aware that the very imagery that has generated bil ions for them

in sales is likely to create other, unintended, waves within the culture. Well before the anti-Nike campaign

began in earnest, CEO Phil Knight presciently observed that "there's a flip side to the emotions we generate

and the tremendous well of emotions we live off of. Somehow, emotions imply their opposites and at the

level we operate, the reaction is much more than a passing thought." The reaction is also more than the

fickle flight of fashion that makes a particular style of hip sneaker suddenly look absurd, or a played-todeath

pop song become, overnight, intolerable. At its best, culture jamming homes in on the flip side of

those branded emotions, and refocuses them, so that they aren't replaced with a craving for the next fashion

or pop sensation but turn, slowly, on the process of branding itself.

It's hard to say how spooked the advertisers are about getting busted. Although the U.S. Association of

National Advertisers has no qualms about lobbying police on behalf of its members to crack down on

adbusters, they are generally loath to let the charges go to trial. This is probably wise. Even though ad

companies try to paint jammers as "vigilante censors" in the media,10 they know it wouldn't take much for

the public to decide that the advertisers are the ones censoring the jammers'

creative expressions.

So while most big brand names rush to sue for alleged trademark violations and readily take each other to


court for parodying slogans or products (as Nike did when Candies shoes adopted the slogan "Just Screw

It"), multinationals are proving markedly less eager to enter into legal battles that wil clearly be fought less

on legal than on political grounds. "No one wants to be in the limelight because they are the target of

community protests or boycotts," one advertising executive told Advertising Age."

Furthermore, corporations

rightly see jammers as rabid attention seekers and have learned to avoid anything that could garner media

coverage for their stunts. A case in point came in 1992 when Absolut Vodka threatened to sue Adbusters

over its "Absolut Nonsense" parody. The company immediately backed down when the magazine went to

the press and challenged the distil er to a public debate on the harmful effects of alcohol.

And much to Negativland's surprise, Pepsi's lawyers even refrained from responding to the band's 1997

release, Dispepsi — art anti-pop album consisting of hacked, jammed, distorted and disfigured Pepsi

jingles. One song mimics the ads by juxtaposing the product's name with a laundry list of random

unpleasant images: "I got fired by my boss. Pepsi/I nailed Jesus to the cross.

Pepsi/... The ghastly stench of

puppy mil s. Pepsi" and so on. When asked by Entertainment Weekly magazine for its response to the

album, the soft-drink giant claimed to think it was "a pretty good listen."

Identity Politics Goes Interactive


There is a connection between the ad fatigue expressed by the jammers and the fierce salvos against

media sexism, racism and homophobia that were so much in vogue when I was an undergraduate in the late

eighties and early nineties. This connection is perhaps best traced through the evolving relationships that

feminists have had with the ad world, particularly since the movement deserves credit for laying the

groundwork for many of the current ad critiques. As Susan Douglas notes in Where the Girls Are, "Of all the

social movements of the 1960s and '70s, none was more explicitly anti-consumerist than the women's

movement. Feminists had attacked the ad campaigns for products like Pristeen and Silva Thins, and by

rejecting makeup, fashion and the need for spotless floors, repudiated the very need to buy certain products

at all." Furthermore, when Ms. magazine was relaunched in 1990, the editors took advertiser interference so

seriously that they made the unprecedented move of banishing lucrative advertisements from their pages

entirely. And the "No Comment" section — a back-page gallery of sexist ads reprinted from other

publications - remains one of the highest-profile forums for adbusting.

Many female culture jammers say they first became interested in the machinations of marketing via a

"Feminism 101" critique of the beauty industry. Maybe they started by scrawling

"feed me" on Calvin Klein

ads in bus shelters, as the skateboarding members of the all-high-school Bitch Brigade did. Or maybe they


got their hands on a copy of Nomy Lamm's zine, I'm So Fucking Beautiful, or they stumbled onto the "Feed

the Super Model" interactive game on the official RiotGrrrl Web site. Or maybe, like Toronto's Carly Stasko,

they got started through grrrly self-publishing. Twenty-one-year-old Stasko is a one-woman alternativeimage

factory: her pocket and backpack overflow with ad-jammed stickers, copies of her latest zine and

handwritten flyers on the virtues of "guerril a gardening." And when Stasko is not studying semiotics at the

University of Toronto, planting sunflower seeds in abandoned urban lots or making her own media, she's

teaching courses at local alternative schools where she shows classes of fourteen-year-olds how they too

can cut and paste their own culture jams.

Stasko's interest in marketing began when she realized the degree to which contemporary definitions of

female beauty —articulated largely through the media and advertisements —were making her and her

peers feel insecure and inadequate. But unlike my generation of young feminists who had dealt with similar

revelations largely by calling for censorship and re-education programs, she caught the mid-nineties selfpublishing

craze. Stil in her teens, Stasko began publishing Uncool, a photocopied zine crammed with

collages of sliced-and-diced quizzes from women's magazines, jammed ads for tampons, manifestos on

culture jamming and, in one issue, a full-page ad for Philosophy Barbie. "What came first?" Stasko's Barbie


wonders. "The beauty or the myth?" and "If I break a nail, but I'm asleep, is it stil a crisis?" She says that

the process of making her own media, adopting the voice of the promoter and hacking into the surface of

the ad culture began to weaken advertising's effect on her. "I realized that I can use the same tools the

media does to promote my ideas. It took the sting out of the media for me because I saw how easy it was."

Although he is more than ten years older than Stasko, the road that led Rodriguez de Gerada to culture

jamming shares some of the same twists. A founding member of the political art troop Artfux, he began

adbusting coincident with a wave of black and Latino community organizing against cigarette and alcohol

advertising. In 1990, thirty years after the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People first

lobbied cigarette companies to use more black models in their ads, a church-based movement began in

several American cities that accused these same companies of exploiting black poverty by target-marketing

inner cities for their lethal product. In a clear sign of the times, attention had shifted from who was in the ads

to the products they sold. Reverend Calvin 0. Butts of the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem took his

parishioners on bil board-busting blitzes during which they would paint over the cigarette and alcohol

advertisements around their church. Other preachers took up the fight in Chicago, Detroit and Dallas.


Reverend Butts's adbusting consisted of reaching up to offending bil boards with long-handled paint rollers

and whitewashing the ads. It was functional, but Rodriguez de Gerada decided to be more creative: to

replace the companies' consumption messages with more persuasive political messages of his own. As a

skil ed artist, he carefully morphed the faces of cigarette models so they looked rancid and diseased. He

replaced the standard Surgeon General's Warning with his own messages:

"Struggle General's Warning:

Blacks and Latinos are the prime scapegoats for il egal drugs, and the prime targets for legal ones."

Like many other early culture jammers, Rodriguez de Gerada soon extended his critiques beyond tobacco

and alcohol ads to include rampant ad bombardment and commercialism in general, and, in many ways, he

has the ambitiousness of branding itself to thank for this political evolution. As inner-city kids began

stabbing each other for their Nike, Polo, Hilfiger and Nautica gear, it became clear that tobacco and alcohol

companies are not the only marketers that prey on poor children's longing for escape. As we have seen,

these fashion labels sold disadvantaged kids so successfully on their exaggerated representations of the

good life-the country club, the yacht, the superstar celebrity — that logowear has become, in some parts of

the Global City, both talisman and weapon. Meanwhile, the young feminists of Carly Stasko's generation


whose sense of injustice had been awakened by Naomi Wolfs Beauty Myth, and Jean Kilbourne's

documentary Kil ing Us Softly, also lived through the feeding frenzies around

"alternative," Gen-X, hip-hop

and rave culture. In the process, many became vividly aware that marketing affects communities not only

by stereotyping them, but also — and equally powerfully - by hyping and chasing after them. This was a

tangible shift from one generation of feminists to the next. When Ms. went ad-free in 1990, for instance,

there was a belief that the corrosive advertising interference from which Gloria Steinem and Robin Morgan

were determined to free their publication was a specifically female problem. But as the politics of identity

mesh with the burgeoning critique of corporate power, the demand has shifted from reforming problematic

ad campaigns to questioning whether advertisers have any legitimate right to invade every nook and cranny

of our mental and physical environment: it has become about the disappearance of space and the lack of

meaningful choice. Ad culture has demonstrated its remarkable ability to absorb, accommodate and even

profit from content critiques. In this context, it has become abundantly clear that the only attack that wil

actually shake this resilient industry is one levelled not at the pretty people in the pictures, but against the

corporations that paid for them.

So for Carly Stasko, marketing has become more an environmental than a gender or self-esteem issue, and


her environment is the streets, the university campus and the mass-media culture in which she, as an

urbanite, lives her life. "I mean, this is my environment," she says, "and these ads are really directed at me.

If these images can affect me, then I can affect them back."

The Washroom Ad as Political Catalyst

For many students coming of age in the late nineties, the turning point from focusing on the content of

advertising to a preoccupation with the form itself occurred in the most private of places: in their university

washrooms, staring at a car ad. The washroom ads first began appearing on North American campuses in

1997 and have been proliferating ever since. As we have already seen in Chapter 5, the administrators who

allowed ads to creep onto their campuses told themselves that young people were already so bombarded

with commercial messages that a few more wouldn't kil them, and the revenues would help fund valuable

programs. But it seems there is such a thing as an ad that breaks the camel's back — and for many

students, that was it.

The irony, of course, is that from the advertiser's perspective, niche nirvana had been attained. Short of

eyelid implants, ads in college washrooms represent as captive a youth market as there is on earth. But

from the students' perspective, there could have been no more literal metaphor for space closing in than an

ad for Pizza Pizza or Chrysler Neon staring at them from over a urinal or from the door of a W.C. cubicle.


Which is precisely why this misguided branding scheme created the opportunity for hundreds of North

American students to take their first tentative steps toward direct Anticorporate activism.

Looking back, school officials must see that there is something hilariously misguided about putting ads in

private cubicles where students have been known to pull out their pens or eyeliners and scrawl desperate

declarations of love, circulate unsubstantiated rumours, carry on the abortion debate and share deep

philosophical insights. When the mini-bil boards arrived, the bathroom became the first truly safe space in

which to talk back to ads. In an instant, the direction of the scrutiny through the one-way glass of the focus

group was reversed, and the target market took aim at the people behind the glass. The most creative

response came from students at the University of Toronto. A handful of undergraduates landed part-time

jobs with the washroom bil board company and kept conveniently losing the custom-made screwdrivers that

opened the four hundred plastic frames. Pretty soon, a group calling themselves the Escher Appreciation

Society were breaking into the "student-proof frames and systematically replacing the bathroom ads with

prints by Maurits Cornelis Escher. Rather than brushing up on the latest from Chrysler or Molson, students

could learn to appreciate the Dutch graphic artist — chosen, the Escherites conceded, because his

geometric work photocopies well.


The bathroom ads made it unmistakably clear to a generation of student activists that they don't need

cooler, more progressive or more diverse ads — first and foremost, they need ads to shut up once in a

while. Debate on campuses began to shift away from an evaluation of the content of ads to the fact that it

was becoming impossible to escape from advertising's intrusive gaze.

Of course there are those among the culture jammers whose interest in advertising is less tapped into the

new ethos of anti-branding rage and instead has much in common with the morality squads of the political

correctness years. At times, Adbusters magazine feels like an only slightly hipper version of a Public

Service Announcement about saying no to peer pressure or remembering to Reduce, Reuse and Recycle.

The magazine is capable of lacerating wit, but its attacks on nicotine, alcohol and fast-food joints can be

repetitive and obvious. Jams that change Absolut Vodka to "Absolut Hangover" or Ultra Kool cigarettes to

"Utter Fool" cigarettes are enough to turn off would-be supporters who see the magazine crossing a fine line

between information-age civil disobedience and puritanical finger-waving. Mark Dery, author of the original

culture-jammers' manifesto and a former contributor to the magazine, says the anti-booze, -smoking and

-fast-food emphasis reads as just plain patronizing —as if "the masses" cannot be trusted to "police their

own desires."

Listening to the Marketer Within


In a New Yorker article entitled "The Big Sell-out," author John Seabrook discusses the phenomenon of "the

marketer within." He argues persuasively that an emerging generation of artists wil not concern themselves

with old ethical dilemmas like "selling out" since they are a walking sales pitch for themselves already,

intuitively understanding how to produce pre-packaged art, to be their own brand.

"The artists of the next

generation wil make their art with an internal marketing barometer already in place. The auteur as

marketer, the artist in a suit of his own: the ultimate in vertical integration."

Seabrook is right in his observation that the rhythm of the pitch is hardwired into the synapses of many

young artists, but he is mistaken in assuming that the built-in marketing barometer wil only be used to seek

fame and fortune in the culture industries. As Carly Stasko points out, many people who grew up sold are so

attuned to the tempo of marketing that as soon as they read or hear a new slogan, they begin to flip it and

play with it in their minds, as she herself does. For Stasko, it is the adbuster that is within, and every ad

campaign is a riddle just waiting for the right jam. So the skil Seabrook identifies, which allows artists to

write the press bumpf for their own gallery openings and musicians to churn out metaphor-fil ed bios for their

liner notes, is the same quality that makes for a deadly clever culture jammer. The culture jammer is the

activist artist as antimarketer, using a childhood fil ed with Trix commercials, and an adolescence spent


spotting the product placement on Seinfeld, to mess with a system that once saw itself as a specialized

science. Jamie Batsy, a Toronto-area "hacktivist," puts it like this: "Advertisers and other opinion makers are

now in a position where they are up against a generation of activists that were watching television before

they could walk. This generation wants their brains back and mass media is their home turf."

Culture jammers are drawn to the world of marketing like moths to a flame, and the high-gloss sheen on

their work is achieved precisely because they stil feel an affection — however deeply ambivalent — for

media spectacle and the mechanics of persuasion. "I think a lot of people who are really interested in

subverting advertising or studying advertising probably, at one time, wanted to be ad people themselves,"

says Carrie McLaren, editor of the New York zine Stay Free/21 You can see it in her own ad busts, which

are painstakingly seamless in their design and savage in their content. In one issue, a full-page anti-ad

shows a beat-up kid face down on the concrete with no shoes on. In the corner of the frame is a hand

making away with his Nike sneakers. "Just do it," the slogan says.

Nowhere is the adbuster's ear for the pitch used to fuller effect than in the promotion of adbusting itself, a

fact that might explain why culture jamming's truest believers often sound like an odd cross between usedcar

salesmen and tenured semiotics professors. Second only to Internet hucksters and rappers, adbusters


are susceptible to a spiralling bravado and to a level of self-promotion that can be just plain sil y. There is

much fondness for claiming to be Marshall McLuhan's son, daughter, grandchild or bastard progeny. There

is a strong tendency to exaggerate the power of wheat paste and a damn good joke. And to overstate their

own power: one culture-jamming manifesto, for instance, explains that "the bil board artist's goal is to throw

a well aimed spanner into the media's gears, bringing the image factory to a shuddering halt."

Adbusters has taken this hard-sell approach to such an extreme that it has raised hackles among rival

culture jammers. Particularly galling to its critics is the magazine's line of anticonsumer products that they

say has made the magazine less a culture-jamming clearinghouse than a home-shopping network for

adbusting accessories. Culture-jammer "tool boxes" are listed for sale: posters, videos, stickers and

postcards; most ironically, it used to sell calendars and T-shirts to coincide with Buy Nothing Day, though

better sense eventually prevailed. "What comes out is no real alternative to our culture of consumption,"

Carrie McLaren writes. "Just a different brand." Fellow Vancouver jammers Guerril a Media (GM) take a

more vicious shot at Adbusters in the GM inaugural newsletter. "We promise there are no GM calendars,

key chains or coffee mugs in the offing. We are, however, stil working on those Tshirts that some of you

ordered — we're just looking for that perfect sweatshop to produce them."


Marketing the Antimarketers

The attacks are much the same as those lobbed at every punk band that signs a record deal and every zine

that goes glossy: Adjusters has simply become too popular to have much cachet for the radicals who once

dusted it off in their local second-hand bookstore like a precious stone. But beyond the standard-issue

purism, the question of how best to "market" an antimarketing movement is a uniquely thorny dilemma.

There is a sense among some adbusters that culture jamming, like punk itself, must remain something of a

porcupine; that to defy its own inevitable commodification, it must keep its protective quil s sharp. After the

great Alternative and Girl Power™ cash-ins, the very process of naming a trend, or coining a catchphrase,

is regarded by some with deep suspicion. "Adbusters jumped on it and were ready to claim this movement

before it ever really existed," says McLaren, who complains bitterly in her own writing about the "USA

Today/MTV-ization" of Adbusters. "It's become an advertisement for anti-advertising."

There is another fear underlying this debate, one more confusing for its proponents than the prospect of

culture jamming "selling out" to the dictates of marketing. What if, despite all the rhetorical flair its adherents

can muster, culture jamming doesn't actually matter? What if there is no jujitsu, only semiotic

shadowboxing? Kalle Lasn insists that his magazine has the power to "jolt postmodern society out of its


media trance" and that his uncommercials threaten to shake network television to its core. "The television

mindscape has been homogenized over the last 30 to 40 years. It's a space that is very safe for commercial

messages. So, if you suddenly introduce a note of cognitive dissonance with a spot that says 'Don't buy a

car,' or in the middle of a fashion show somebody suddenly says 'What about anorexia?' there's a powerful

moment of truth." But the real truth is that, as a culture, we seem to be capable of absorbing limitless

amounts of cognitive dissonance on our TV sets. We culture jam manually every time we channel surf—

catapulting from the desperate fundraising pleas of the Foster Parent Plan to infomercials for Buns of Steel;

from Jerry Springer to Jerry Falwell; from Mew Country to Marilyn Manson. In these information-numb

times, we are beyond being abruptly awakened by a startling image, a sharp juxtaposition or even a

fabulously clever detournement.

Jaggi Singh is one activist who has become disil usioned with the jujitsu theory.

"When you're jamming,

you're sort of playing their game, and I think ultimately that playing field is stacked against us because they

can saturate... we don't have the resources to do all those bil boards, we don't have the resources to buy up

all that time, and in a sense, it almost becomes pretty scientific —who can afford these feeds?"

Logo Overload


To add further evidence that culture jamming is more drop in the bucket than spanner in the works,

marketers are increasingly deciding to join in the fun. When Kalle Lasn says culture jamming has the feeling

of "a bit of a fad," he's not exaggerating. It turns out that culture jamming-with its combination of hip-hop

attitude, punk anti-authoritarianism and a well of visual gimmicks-has great sales potential.

Yahoo! already has an official culture-jamming site on the Internet, filed under

"alternative." At Soho Down

Under on West Broadway in New York, Camden Market in London or any other high street where alterno

gear is for sale, you can load up on logo-jammed T-shirts, stickers and badges.

Recurring detournements —

to use a word that seems suddenly misplaced — include Kraft changed to "Krap,"

Tide changed to "Jive,"

Ford changed to "Fucked" and Goodyear changed to "Goodbeer." It's not exactly trenchant social

commentary, particularly since the jammed logos appear to be interchangeable with the corporate kitsch of

unaltered Dubble Bubble and Tide T-shirts. In the rave scene, logo play is all the rage-in clothing, temporary

tattoos, body paint and even ecstasy pil s. Ecstasy dealers have taken to branding their tablets with famous

logos: there is Big Mac E, Purple Nike Swirl E, X-Files E, and a mixture of uppers and downers called a

"Happy Meal." Musician Jeff Renton explains the drug culture's appropriation of corporate logos as a revolt


against invasive marketing. "I think it's a matter of: 'You come into our lives with your mil ion-dollar

advertising campaigns putting logos in places that make us feel uncomfortable, so we're going to take your

logo back and use it in places that make you feel uncomfortable,'" he says.

But after a while, what began as a way to talk back to the ads starts to feel more like evidence of our total

colonization by them, and especially because the ad industry is proving that it is capable of cutting off the

culture jammers at the pass. Examples of pre-jammed ads include a 1997 Nike campaign that used the

slogan "I am not/A target market/I am an athlete" and Sprite's "Image Is Nothing"

campaign, featuring a

young black man saying that all his life he has been bombarded with media lies telling him that soft drinks

wil make him a better athlete or more attractive, until he realized that "image is nothing." Diesel jeans,

however, has gone furthest in incorporating the political content of adbusting's Anticorporate attacks. One of

the most popular ways for artists and activists to highlight the inequalities of free-market globalization is by

juxtaposing First World icons with Third World scenes: Marlboro Country in the war-torn rubble of Beirut

(see image, page 10); an obviously malnourished Haitian girl wearing Mickey Mouse glasses; Dynasty

playing on a TV set in an African hut; Indonesian students rioting in front of McDonald's arches. The power

of these visual critiques of happy one-worldism is precisely what the Diesel clothing company's "Brand 0" ad


campaign attempts to co-opt. The campaign features ads within ads: a series of bil boards flogging a

fictional Brand 0 line of products in a nameless North Korean city. In one, a glamorous skinny blonde is

pictured on the side of a bus that is overflowing with frail-looking workers. The ad is selling "Brand 0 Diet

—There's no limit to how thin you can get." Another shows an Asian man huddled under a piece of

cardboard. Above him towers a Ken and Barbie Brand 0 bil board.

Perhaps the point of no return came in 1997 when Mark Hosier of Negativ-land received a call from the

ultra-hip ad agency Wieden Kennedy asking if the band that coined the term

"culture jamming" would do

the soundtrack for a new Mil er Genuine Draft commercial. The decision to turn down the request and the

money was simple enough, but it stil sent him spinning. "They utterly failed to grasp that our entire work is

essentially in opposition to everything that they are connected to, and it made me really depressed because

I had thought that our aesthetic couldn't be absorbed into marketing," Hosier says.

Another rude awakening

came when Hosier first saw Sprite's "Obey Your Thirst" campaign. "That commercial was a hair's breadth

away from a song on our [Dispepsi] record. It was surreal. It's not just the fringe that's getting absorbed nowthat's

always happened. What's getting absorbed now is the idea that there's no opposition left, that any

resistance is futile.""


I'm not so sure. Yes, some marketers have found a way to distil! culture jamming into a particularly edgy

kind of nonlinear advertising, and there is no doubt that Madison Avenue's embrace of the techniques of

adbusting has succeeded in moving product off the superstore shelves. Since Diesel began its aggressively

ironic "Reasons for Living" and "Brand 0" campaigns in the U.S., sales have gone from $2 mil ion to $23

mil ion in four years,30 and the Sprite "Image Is Nothing" campaign is credited with a 35 percent rise in

sales in just three years." That said, the success of these individual campaigns has done nothing to disarm

the antimarketing rage that fuelled adbusting in the first place. In fact, it may be having the opposite effect.

Ground Zero of the Cool Hunt

The prospect of young people turning against the hype of advertising and defining themselves against the

big brands is a continuous threat coming from cool-hunting agencies like Sputnik, that infamous team of

professional diary readers and generational snoops. "Intellectual crews," as Sputnik calls thinking young

people, are aware and resentful of how useful they are to the marketers: They understand that mammoth corporations now seek their approval to continually deliver goods that wil

translate to megasales in the mainstream. Their stance of being intellectual says to each other, and to

themselves, and most importantly to marketers — who spend innumerable dollars for in-your-face this-iswhat-you-need advertisements — that they cannot be bought or fooled anymore by the hype. Being a head

means that you won't sell out and be told what to wear, what to buy, what to cat or how to speak by anyone

(or anything) other than yourself.'2

But while the Sputnik writers inform their corporate readers about the radical ideas on the street, they

appear to think that though these ideas wil dramatically influence how young people wil party, dress and

talk, they wil magically have no effect whatsoever on how young people wil behave as political beings.

After they sound the alarm, the hunters always reassure their readers that all this Anticorporate stuff is

actually a meaningless pose that can be worked around with a hipper, edgier campaign. In other words,

Anticorporate rage is no more meaningful a street trend than a mild preference for the colour orange. The

happy underlying premise of the cool hunters' reports is that despite all the punk-rock talk, there is no belief

that is a true belief and there are no rebels who cannot be tamed with an ad campaign or by a street

promoter who really speaks to them. The unquestioned assumption is that there is no end point in this style

cycle. There wil always be new spaces to colonize— whether physical or mental

—and there wil always be

an ad that wil be able to penetrate the latest strain of consumer cynicism. Nothing new is taking place, the

hunters tell each other: marketers have always extracted symbols and signs from the resistance movements


of their day.

What they don't say is that previous waves of youth resistance were focused primarily on such foes as "the

establishment," the government, the patriarchy and the military-industrial complex.

Culture jamming is

different—its rage encompasses the very type of marketing that the cool hunters and their clients are

engaging in as they try to figure out how to use anti-marketing rage to sell products. The big brands' new

ads must incorporate a youth cynicism not about products as status symbols, or about mass

homogenization, but about multinational brands themselves as tireless culture vultures.

The admen and adwomen have met this new challenge without changing their course. They are busily

hunting down and reselling the edge, just as they have always done, which is why Wieden Kennedy

thought there was nothing strange about asking Negativland to shil for Mil er.

After all, it was Wieden

Kennedy, a boutique ad agency based in Portland, Oregon, that made Nike a feminist sneaker. It was WK

who dreamed up the post-industrial alienation marketing plan for Coke's OK Cola; WK who gave the world

the immortal plaid-clad assertion that the Subaru Impreza was "like punk rock"; and it was WK who

brought Mil er Beer into the age of irony. Masters at pitting the individual against various incarnations of

mass-market bogeymen, Wieden Kennedy sold cars to people who hated car ads, shoes to people who


loathed image, soft drinks to the Prozac Nation and, most of all, ads to people who were "not a target

market."

The agency was founded by two self-styled "beatnik artists," Dan Wieden and David Kennedy, whose

technique, it seems, for quieting their own nagging fears that they were selling out has consistently been to

drag the ideas and icons of the counterculture with them into the ad world. A quick tour through the agency's

body of work is nothing short of a counterculture reunion-Woodstock meets the Beats meets Warhol's

Factory. After putting Lou Reed in a Honda spot in the mid-eighties, WK used the Beatles anthem

"Revolution" in one Nike commercial, then carted out John Lennon's "Instant Karma" for another. They also

paid proto-rock-and-roller Bo Diddley to do the "Bo Knows" Nike spots, and filmmaker Spike Lee to do an

entire series of Air Jordan ads. WK even got Jean-Luc Godard to direct a European Nike commercial.

There were stil more countercultural artefacts lying around: they stuck Wil iam Burroughs's face in a mini-TV-set in another Nike commercial and designed a campaign, nixed by Subaru before it made it to air, that

used Jack Kerouac's On the Road as the voice-over text for an SVX commercial.

After making its name on the wil ingness of the avant-garde to set its price for the right mix of irony and

dollars, WK can hardly be blamed for thinking that culture jammers would also be thril ed to take part in


the post-modern fun of a self-aware ad campaign. But the backlash against the brands, of which culture

jamming is only one part, isn't about vague notions of alternativeness battling the mainstream. It has to do

with the specific issues that have been the subject of this book so far: the loss of public space, corporate

censorship and unethical labour practices, to name but three-issues less easily digested than tasty morsels

like Girl Power and grunge.

Which is why Wieden Kennedy hit a wall when they asked Negativland to mix for Mil er, and why that was

only the first in a string of defeats for the agency. The British political pop-band Chumbawamba turned down

a S 1.5 mil ion contract that would have allowed Nike to use its hit song "Tub-thumping" in a World Cup

spot. Abstract notions about staying indie were not at issue (the band did allow the song to be used in the

soundtrack for Home Alone 3; at the centre of their rejection was Nike's use of sweatshop labour. "It took

everybody in the room under 30 seconds to say no," said band member Alice Nutter. The political poet

Martin Espada also got a call from one of Nike's smaller agencies, inviting him to take part in the "Nike

Poetry Slam." If he accepted, he would be paid $2,500 and his poem would be read in a thirty-second

commercial during the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano. Espada turned the agency down flat, offering up a

host of reasons and ending with this one: "Ultimately, however, I am rejecting your offer as a protest against


the brutal labour practices of the company. I wil not associate myself with a company that engages in the

well-documented exploitation of workers in sweatshops." The rudest awakening came with Wieden

Kennedy's cleverest of schemes: in May 1999, with labour scandals stil hanging over the swoosh, the

agency approached Ralph Nader —the consumer-rights movement's most powerful leader and a folk hero

for his attacks on multinational corporations — and asked him to do a Nike ad.

The idea was simple: Nader

would get $25,000 for holding up an Air 120 sneaker and saying, "Another shameless attempt by Nike to sell

shoes." A letter sent to Nader's office from Nike headquarters explained that "what we are asking is for

Ralph, as the country's most prominent consumer advocate, to take a light-hearted jab at us. This is a very

Nike-like thing to do in our ads." Nader, never known for being light of heart, would only say, "Look at the

gall of these guys."

It was indeed a very Nike-like thing to do. Ads co-opt out of reflex — they do so because consuming is what

consumer culture does. Madison Avenue is generally not too picky about what it wil swallow, it doesn't

avoid poison directed against itself but rather, as Wieden Kennedy have shown, chomps down on

whatever it finds along the path as it looks for the new "edge." The scenario that it appears unwil ing to

consider is that its admen and adwomen, the perennial teenage followers, may finally be following their


target market off a cliff.

Adbusting in the Thirties: "Become a Toucher Upper!"

Of course the ad industry has disarmed backlashes before — from women complaining of sexism, gays

claiming invisibility, ethnic minorities tired of gross caricatures. And that's not all.

In the 1950s and again in

the 1970s, Western consumers became obsessed with the idea that they were being fooled by advertisers

through the covert use of subliminal techniques. In 1957, Vance Packard published the runaway best-seller

The Hidden Persuaders, which shocked Americans with allegations that social scientists were packing

advertisements with messages invisible to the human eye. The issue re-emerged in 1973, when Wilson

Bryan Key published Subliminal Seduction, a study of the lascivious messages tucked away in ice cubes.

Key was so transported by his discovery that he made such bold claims as "the subliminal promise to

anyone buying Gilbey's gin is simply a good old-fashioned sexual orgy."

But all these antimarketing spasms had one thing in common: they focused exclusively on the content and

techniques of advertising. These critics didn't want to be subliminally manipulated

— and they did want

African Americans in their cigarette ads and gays and lesbians selling jeans.

Because the concerns were so

specific, they were relatively easy for the ad world to address or absorb. For instance, the charge of hidden

messages harboured in ice cubes, and other carefully cast shadows, spawned an irony-laden advertising


subgenre that design historians El en Luton and J. Abbot Mil er term "meta-subliminal" —ads that parody the

charge that ads send secret messages. In 1990, Absolut Vodka launched the

"Absolut Subliminal" campaign

which showed a glass of vodka on the rocks with the word "absolut" clearly screened into the ice cubes.

Seagram's and Tanqueray gin followed with their own subliminal in-jokes, as did the cast of Saturday Night

Live with the recurring character Subliminal Man.

The critiques of advertising that have traditionally come out of academe have been equally unthreatening,

though for different reasons. Most such criticism focuses not on the effects of marketing on public space,

cultural freedom and democracy, but rather on ads' persuasive powers over seemingly clueless people. For

the most part, marketing theory concentrates on the way ads implant false desires in the consuming public

—making us buy things that are bad for us, pollute the planet or impoverish our souls. "Advertising," as

George Orwell once said, "is the rattling of a stick inside a swil bucket." When such is the theorist's opinion

of the public, it is no wonder that there is little potential for redemption in most media criticism: this sorry

populace wil never be in possession of the critical tools it needs to formulate a political response to

marketing mania and media synergy.

The future is even bleaker for those academics who use advertising criticism for a thinly veiled attack on


"consumer culture." As James Twitchell writes in Adcult USA, most advertising criticism reeks of contempt

for the people who "want —ugh! —things." Such a theory can never hope to form the intellectual foundation

of an actual resistance movement against the branded life, since genuine political empowerment cannot be

reconciled with a belief system that regards the public as a bunch of ad-fed cattle, held captive under

commercial culture's hypnotic spell. What's the point of going through the trouble of trying to knock down

the fence? Everyone knows the branded cows wil just stand there looking dumb and chewing cud.

Interestingly, the last time that there was a successful attack on the practice of advertising — rather than a

disagreement on its content or techniques — was during the Great Depression. In the 1930s the very idea of

the happy, stable consumer society portrayed in advertising provoked a wave of resentment from the

mil ions of Americans who found themselves on the outside of the dream of prosperity. An anti-advertising

movement emerged that attacked ads not for faulty imagery but as the most public face of a deeply faulty

economic system. People weren't incensed by the pictures in the ads, but rather by the cruelty of the

obviously false promise that they represented — the lie of the American Dream that the happy consumer

lifestyle was accessible to all. In the late twenties, and through the thirties, the frivolous promises of the ad


world made for stomach-wrenching juxtapositions with the casualties of economic collapse, setting the stage

for an unparalleled wave of consumer activism.

There was a short-lived magazine published in New York called The Ballyhoo, a sort of Depression-era

Adbusters. In the wake of the 1929 stock-market crash, The Ballyhoo arrived as a cynical new voice,

viciously mocking the "creative psychiatry" of cigarette and mouthwash ads, as well as the outright quackery

used to sell all kinds of potions and lotions. The Ballyhoo was an instant success, reaching a circulation of

more than 1.5 mil ion in 1931. James Rorty, a 1920s Mad Ave adman turned revolutionary socialist,

explained the new magazine's appeal: "Whereas the stock in trade of the ordinary mass or class consumer

magazine is reader-confidence in advertising, the stock in trade of Ballyhoo was reader-disgust with

advertising, and with high-pressure salesmanship in general.... Ballyhoo, in turn, parasites on the grotesque,

bloated body of advertising."

Ballyhoo's culture jams include "Scramel" cigarettes ("they're so fresh they're insulting"), or the line of "

different Zilch creams: What the well greased girls wil wear. Absolutely indispensable (Ask any

dispensary)." The editors encouraged readers to move beyond their snickers and go out and bust

bothersome bil boards themselves. A fake ad for the "Twitch Toucher Upper School" shows a drawing of a


woman who has just painted a moustache on a glamorous cigarette model. The caption reads, "Become a

Toucher Upper!" and goes on to say: "If you long to mess up advertisement: if your heart cries out to paint

pipes in the mouths of beautiful ladies, try this 10-second test NOW! Our graduates make their marks all

over the world! Good Toucher Uppers are always in demand" (see image on page 278). The magazine also

created fake products to skewer the hypocrisy of the Hoover administration, like the "Lady Pipperal

Bedsheet De Luxe" — made extra long to snugly fit on park benches when you become homeless. Or the

"smilette" - two hooks that clamp on to either side of the mouth and force a happy expression. "Smile away

the Depression! Smile us into Prosperity!"

The hard-core culture jammers of the era were not the Ballyhoo humorists, however, but photographers like

Walker Evans, Dorothea Lange and Margaret Bourke-White. These political documentarians latched on to

the hypocrisies of ad campaigns such as the National Association of Manufacturers' "There's No Way Like

the American Way" by highlighting the harsh visual contrasts between the ads and the surrounding

landscape. A popular technique was photographing bil boards with slogans like

"World's Highest Standard of

Living" in their actual habitat: hanging surreally over breadlines and tenements.

The manic grinning models

piled into the family sedan were clearly blind to the tattered masses and squalid conditions below. The


photographers of the era also scrupulously documented the fragility of the capitalist system by picturing

fallen businessmen holding up "Wil Work for Food" signs in the shadow of looming Coke bil boards and

peeling hoardings. In 1934, advertisers began to use self-parody to deal with the mounting criticism they

faced, a tactic that some saw as proof of the industry's state of disrepair. "It is contended by the

broadcasters, and doubtless also by the movie producers, that this burlesque sales promotion takes the

curse out of sales talk, and this is probably true to a degree," writes Rorty of the self-mockery. "But the

prevalence of the trend gives rise to certain ominous suspicions... When the burlesque comedian mounts

the pulpit of the Church of Advertising, it may be legitimately suspected that the edifice is doomed; that it

wil shortly be torn down or converted to secular uses."

Of course the edifice survived, though not unscathed. New Deal politicians, under pressure from a wide

range of populist movements, imposed lasting reforms on the industry. The adbusters and social

documentary photographers were part of a massive grassroots public revolt against big business that

included the farmers' uprising against the proliferation of supermarket chains, the establishing of consumer

purchasing cooperatives, the rapid expansion of a network of trade unions and a crackdown on garment

industry sweatshops (which had seen the ranks of the two U.S. garment workers'

unions swell from 40,000


in 1931 to more than 300,000 in 1933). Most of all, the early ad critics were intimately linked to the

burgeoning consumer movement that had been catalyzed by One Hundred Mil ion Guinea Pigs: Dangers in

Everyday Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics (1933), by F.J. Schlink and Arthur Kallet, and Your Money's Worth:

A Study in the Waste of the Consumer Dollar (1927), written by Stuart Chase and F.J. Schlink. These books

presented exhaustive catalogs of the way regular folks were getting lied to, cheated, poisoned and ripped off

by America's captains of industry. The authors founded Consumer Research (later splintered off into the

Consumers Union), which served both as an independent product-testing laboratory and a political group

that lobbied the government for better grading and labelling of products. The CR

believed objective testing

and truthful labelling could make marketing so irrelevant it would become obsolete. According to Chase and

Schlink's logic, if consumers had access to careful scientific research that compared the relative merits of

the products on the market, everyone would simply make measured, rational decisions about what to buy.

The advertisers, of course, were beside themselves, and terrified of the following F.J. Schlink had built up

on the college campuses and among the New York intelligentsia. As adman C.B.

Larrabee noted in 1934,

"Some forty or fifty thousand persons won't so much as buy a box of dog biscuits unless F.J. gives his


'O.K.'... obviously they think most advertisers are dishonest, double-dealing shysters."

Schlink and Chase's rationalist Utopia of Spock-like consumerism never came to fruition, but their lobbying

did force governments around the world to move to outlaw blatantly false claims in advertising, to establish

quality standards for consumer goods, and to become actively involved in the grading and labelling of them.

And the Consumers Union Reports is stil the buyer's bible in America, though it long ago severed its ties to

other social movements.

It is worth noting that the modern-day ad world's most extreme attempts to co-opt Anticorporate rage have

fed directly off images pioneered by the Depression-era documentary photographers. Diesel's Brand 0 is

almost a direct replica of Margaret Bourke-White's "American Way" bil board series, both in style and

composition. And when the Bank of Montreal ran an ad campaign in Canada in the late nineties, at the

height of a popular backlash against soaring bank profits, it used images that recalled Walker Evans's

photographs of 1930s businessmen holding up those "Wil Work for Food" signs.

The bank's campaign

consisted of a series of grainy black-and-white photographs of ragged-looking people holding signs that

asked, "Wil I ever own my own home?" and "Are we going to be okay?" One sign simply read, "The little

guy is on his own." The television spots blasted Depression-era gospel and ragtime over eerie industrial


images of abandoned freight trains and dusty towns.

In other words, when the time came to fight fire with fire, the advertisers raced back to an era when they

were never more loathed and only a world war could save them. It seems that this kind of psychic shock —a

clothing company using the very images that have scarred the clothing industry; a bank trading on anti-bank

rage - is the only technique left that wil get the attention of us ad-resistant roaches. And this may well be

true, from a marketing point of view, but there is also a larger context that reaches beyond imagery: Diesel

produces many of its garments in Indonesia and other parts of the Far East, profiting from the very

disparities il ustrated in its clever Brand 0 ads. In fact, part of the edginess of the campaign is the clear

sense that the company is flirting with a Nike-style public-relations meltdown. So far, the Diesel brand does

not have a wide enough market reach to feel the full force of having its images slingshot back at its body

corporate, but the bigger the company gets — and it is getting bigger every year

— the more vulnerable it

becomes.

That was the lesson in the responses to the Bank of Montreal's "Sign of the Times" campaign. The bank's

use of powerful images of economic collapse at exactly the same time that it announced record profits of

$986 mil ion (up in 1998 to $1.3 bil ion) inspired a spontaneous wave of adbusting.

The simple imagery of


the campaign — people holding up angry signs — was easy for the bank's critics to replicate with parodies

that skewered the bank's exorbitant service fees, its inaccessible loans officers and the closing of branches

in low-income neighbourhoods (after all, the bank's technique had been stolen from the activists in the first

place). Everyone got in on the action: lone jammers, CBC television's satirical show This Hour Has 22

Minutes, The Globe and Mail's Report on Business Magazine, and independent video collectives.

Clearly, these ad campaigns are tapping into powerful emotions. But by playing on sentiments that are

already directed against them — for example, public resentment at profiteering banks or widening economic

disparities — the process of co-optation runs the very real risk of amplifying the backlash, not disarming it.

Above all, imagery appropriation appears to radicalize culture jammers and other Anticorporate activists —a

"co-opt this!" stance develops that becomes even harder to diffuse. For instance, when Chrysler ran a

campaign of pre-jammed Neon ads (the one that added a faux aerosol "p,"

changing "Hi" to "Hip"), it

inspired the Bil board Liberation Front to go on its biggest tear in years. The BLF

defaced dozens of Bay

Area Neon bil boards by further altering "Hip" to "Hype," and adding, for good measure, a skull and

crossbones. "We can't sit by while these companies co-opt our means of communication," Jack Napier said.

"Besides...they're tacky."


Perhaps the gravest miscalculation on the part of both markets and media is the insistence on seeing

culture jamming solely as harmless satire, a game that exists in isolation from a genuine political movement

or ideology. Certainly for some jammers, parody is perceived, in rather grandiose fashion, as a powerful end

in itself. But for many more, as we wil see in the next chapters, it is simply a new tool for packaging

Anticorporate salvos, one that is more effective than most at breaking through the media barrage. And as

we wil also see, adbusters are currently at work on many different fronts: the people scaling bil boards are

frequently the same ones who are organizing against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, staging

protests on the streets of Geneva against the World Trade Organization and occupying banks to protest

against the profits they are making from student debts. Adbusting is not an end in itself. It is simply a tool -

one among many- that is being used, loaned and borrowed in a much broader political movement against

the branded life.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

RECLAIM THE STREETS

I picture the reality in which we live in terms of military occupation. We are occupied the way the French

and Norwegians were occupied by the Nazis during World War II, but this time by an army of marketeers.

We have to reclaim our country from those who occupy it on behalf of their global masters.


-Ursula Franklin, Professor Emeritus, University of Toronto, 1998

This is not a protest. Repeat. This is not a protest. This is some kind of artistic expression. Over.

-A call that went out on Metro Toronto police radios on May 16, 1998, the date of the first Global Street

Party

It is one of the ironies of our age that now, when the street has become the hottest commodity in advertising

culture, street culture itself is under siege. From New York to Vancouver to London, police crackdowns on

graffiti, postering, panhandling, sidewalk art, squeegee kids, community gardening and food vendors are

rapidly criminalizing everything that is truly street-level in the life of a city.

This tension between the commodification and criminalization of street culture has unfolded in a particularly

dramatic manner in England. In the early to mid-nineties, as the ad world leaped to harness the sounds and

imagery of the rave scene to sell cars, airlines, soft drinks and newspapers, the lawmakers in Britain made

raves all but il egal, through the 1994 Criminal Justice Act. The act gave police far-reaching powers to seize

sound equipment and deal harshly with ravers in any public confrontations.

To fight the Criminal Justice Act, the club scene (previously preoccupied with searching out the next al night

dance site) forged new alliances with more politicized subcultures that were also alarmed by these new

police powers. Ravers got together with squatters facing eviction, with the socalled New Age travellers


facing crackdowns on their nomadic lifestyle, and with radical "eco-warriors"

fighting the paving-over of

Britain's woodland areas by building tree houses and digging tunnels in the bulldozers' paths. A common

theme began to emerge among these struggling countercultures: the right to uncolonized space —for

homes, for trees, for gathering, for dancing. What sprang out of these cultural collisions among deejays,

anti-corporate activists, political and New Age artists and radical ecologists may well be the most vibrant

and fastest-growing political movement since Paris '68: Reclaim the Streets (RTS).

Since 1995, RTS has been hijacking busy streets, major intersections and even stretches of highway for

spontaneous gatherings. In an instant, a crowd of seemingly impromptu partyers transforms a traffic artery

into a surrealist playpen. Here's how it works. Like the location of the original raves, the RTS party's venue

is kept secret until the day. Thousands gather at the designated meeting place, from which they depart en

masse to a destination known only to a handful of organizers. Before the crowds arrive, a van rigged up with

a powerful sound system is surreptitiously parked on the soon-to-be-reclaimed street. Next, some theatrical

means of blocking traffic is devised — for example, two old cars deliberately crash into each other and a

mock fight is staged between the drivers. Another technique is to plant twenty-foot scaffolding tripods in the


middle of the roadway with a brave lone activist suspended high up top — the tripod poles prevent cars

from passing but people can weave between them freely; and since to knock the tripod over would send the

person on top crashing to the ground, the police have no recourse but to stand by and watch the events

unfold. With traffic safely blocked, the roadway is declared a "street now open."

Signs go up that say

"Breathe," "Car Free," and "Reclaim Space." The RTS flag - a bolt of lightning on different colored

backdrops — goes up and the sound system begins to blast everything from the latest electronic offerings to

Louis Armstrong's "What a Wonderful World." Then seemingly out of nowhere comes the travelling carnival

of RTSers: bikers, stilt walkers, ravers, drummers. At previous parties, jungle gyms have been set up in the

middle of intersections, as well as giant sandboxes, swing sets, wading pools, couches, throw rugs and

volleyball nets. Hundreds of Frisbees sail through the air, free food is circulated and the dancing begins-on

cars, at bus stops, on roofs and near signposts. Organizers describe their road-nappings as anything from

the realization of "a collective daydream" to "a large-scale coincidence." Like adbusters, RTSers have

transposed the language and tactics of radical ecology into the urban jungle, demanding

uncommercialized space in the city as well as natural wilderness in the country or on the seas. In this spirit,


the most theatrical RTS stunt occurred 10,000 partyers took over London's M41, a six-lane highway. Two

people dressed in elaborate carnival costumes sat thirty feet above the roadway, perched on scaffolding

contraptions that were covered by huge hoop skirts (see image on page 310). The police standing by had no

idea that underneath the skirts were guerril a gardeners with jackhammers, dril ing holes in the highway and

planting saplings in the asphalt. The RTSers — die-hard Situationist fans —had made their point: "Beneath

the tarmac... a forest," a reference to the Paris '68 slogan, "Beneath the cobblestones...a beach."

The events take culture jamming's philosophy of reclaiming public space to another level. Rather than fil ing

the space left by commerce with advertising parodies, the RTSers attempt to fil it with an alternative vision

of what society might look like in the absence of commercial control.

The seeds of RTS's urban environmentalism were planted in 1993 on Claremont Road, a quiet London

street slated to disappear under a new expressway. "The M11 Link Road,"

explains RTSer John Jordan, "wil

stretch from Wanstead to Hackney in East London. To build it, the Department of Transport had to knock

down 350 houses, displace several thousand people, cut through one of London's last ancient woodlands

and devastate a community with a six-lane-wide stretch of tarmac at the cost of 240 mil ion pounds,

apparently to save six minutes on a car journey." When the city ignored fierce local opposition to the road, a


group of activist artists took it upon themselves to try to block the bulldozers by turning Claremont Road into

a living sculptural fortress. They pulled sofas into the streets, hung TVs from tree branches, painted a giant

chessboard in the middle of the road and put up spoof suburban development bil boards in front of the

houses slated for demolition: "Welcome to Claremont Road —Ideal Homes." The activists moved into

chestnut trees, occupied construction cranes, blasted music and blew kisses at the cops and demolition

workers below. The now empty houses were transformed — connected to each other through underground

tunnels and fil ed with art installations. Outside, old cars were painted with slogans and zebra stripes and

turned into flower boxes. The cars were not only made beautiful, they also made effective barricades, as did

a hundred-foot scaffolding tower built through the roof of one of the homes. The tactic, Jordan explains, was

not the use of art to achieve political ends but the transformation of art into a pragmatic political tool "both

beautiful and functional."

When Claremont Road was levelled in November 1994, it had become the most creative, celebratory,

vibrantly living street in London. It was "a kind of temporary microcosm of a truly liberated, ecological

culture," according to Jordan. By the time all the activists had been cherry-picked out of their tree houses

and fortresses, the point of the action -that high-speed roads suck the life out of a city-could have had no


more graphic or eloquent expression.

Though another group had used the same name some years earlier, the current incarnation of Reclaim the

Streets was formed in May 1995, with the express purpose of turning what happened on Claremont Road

into an airborne virus that could spread at any time, to any place in the city-a roving "temporary autonomous

zone," to use a term coined by the American anarchist guru Hakim Bey. According to Jordan, the thinking

was simple: "If we could no longer reclaim Claremont Road, we would reclaim the streets of London." Five

hundred people showed up to the RTS party on Camden Street in May 1995 to dance to a bicycle-powered

sound system, drums and whistles. With the Criminal Justice Act in full effect, the gathering caught the

attention of the newly politicized rave scene and a key alliance was formed. At RTS's next event, three

thousand people showed up to the party on Upper Street, Islington; this time they danced to electronic

music blasting from two trucks equipped with club-quality sound systems.

The combination of rave and rage has proved contagious, spreading across Britain to Manchester, York,

Oxford and Brighton, and in the largest single RTS event to date, drawing 20,000

people to Trafalgar

Square in April 1997. By then, Reclaim the Street parties had gone international, popping up in cities as far

away as Sydney, Helsinki and Tel Aviv. Each party is locally organized, but with the help of E-mail lists and


linked Web sites, activists in different cities are able to read reports from events around the world, swap

cop-dodging strategies, trade information on building effective roadblocks, and read each other's posters,

press releases and flyers. Since video and digital cameras appear to be the accessories of choice at

the street parties, RTSers also draw inspiration from watching footage of faraway parties, which is circulated

through activist video networks, such as the Oxford-based Undercurrents, and uploaded onto several RTS

Web sites.

In many cities, the street parties have dovetailed with another explosive new international movement —the

Critical Mass bicycle rides. The idea started in San Francisco in 1992 and began spreading to cities across

North America, Europe and Australia at roughly the same time as RTS. Critical Mass bicycle riders also

favour the rhetoric of large-scale coincidence: in dozens of cities, on the last Friday of every month,

anywhere from seventeen to seven thousand cyclists gather at a designated intersection and go for a ride

together. By force of their numbers, the bikers form a critical mass and the cars must yield to them. "We're

not blocking traffic," the Critical Mass riders say, "we are the traffic." Since there's a fair amount of overlap

between RTS partyers and Critical Mass riders, it has become a popular tactic for the sites of street parties

to be cleared of traffic by "spontaneous" Critical Mass rides that sweep through the area just moments


before the blockades are set up and the partyers arrive.

Perhaps in light of these connections, the mainstream media almost invariably describe RTS events as

"anti-car protests." Most RTSers, however, insist that this is a profound oversimplification of their goals. The

car is a symbol, they say —the most tangible manifestation of the loss of communal space, walkable streets

and sites of free expression. Rather than simply opposing the use of automobiles, as Jordan says, "RTS has

always tried to take the single issue of transportation and the car into a wider critique of society...to dream of

reclaiming space for collective use, as commons." To underline these wider connections, RTS organized

one London street party in solidarity with striking London Underground workers.

Another was a joint event

with those darlings of British rock stars, soccer players and anarchists — the sacked Liverpool dock workers.

Other actions have taken on the ecological and human rights records of Shell, BP

and Mobil.

These coalitions make RTS extremely difficult to categorize. "Is a street party a political rally?" asks Jordan

rhetorically. "A festival? A rave? Direct action? Or just a bloody good party?" In many ways, the parties

have defied easy labelling: they camouflage identifiable leaders, and have no centre or even a focal point.

RTS parties "swirl," as Jordan says.

Playing Politics

Not only is the confusion deliberate, but it is precisely this absence of rigidity that has helped RTS to capture


the imagination of thousands of young people around the world. Since the days when Abbie Hoffman and

the Yippies infused self-conscious absurdity into their "happenings," political protest had lapsed into a

ritualized affair, following a fairly unimaginative grid of repetitive chants and scripted police confrontation.

Pop, in the meantime, had become equally formulaic in its refusal to let the perceived earnestness of

political conviction enter its ironic play space. Which is where RTS comes in. The deliberate culture clashes

of the street parties mix the earnest predictability of politics with the amused irony of pop. For many people

in their teens and twenties, this presents the first opportunity to reconcile being creatures of their Saturdaymorning-cartoon childhoods with a genuine political concern for their communities and environment. RTS is

just playful and ironic enough to finally make earnestness possible.

In many ways, Reclaim the Streets is the urban centrepiece of England's thriving do-it-yourself subculture.

Exiled to the economic margins by decades of Tory rule, and given little reason to return by the right-ofcentre

policies of Tony Blair's New Labour Party, a largely self-reliant infrastructure of food co-ops, il egal

squats, independent media and free music festivals has emerged across the country. Spontaneous street

parties are an extension of the DIY lifestyle, asserting as they do that people can make their own fun without

asking any state's permission or relying on any corporation's largesse. At a street party, just showing up


makes you both a participant and part of the entertainment.

The street party is also at odds with the way our culture tends to imagine freedom.

Whether it's hippies

dropping out to live in rural communes, or yuppies escaping the urban jungle in sport utility vehicles,

freedom is usually about abandoning the claustrophobia of the city. Freedom is Route 66, it's "On the

Road." It's eco-travel. It's anywhere but here. RTS, on the other hand, doesn't write off the city or the

present. It harnesses the urge for entertainment and raves (and its darker side —

the desire to freak out and

riot) and channels them into an act of civil disobedience that is also a festival. For a day, the longing for free

space is not about escape but transformation of the here and now.

Of course, if you want to be really cynical, RTS is also flowery eco-poetry about vandalism. It's high-minded

talk about blocking traffic. It's wildly dressed and painted kids screeching at extremely confused and

possibly well-meaning cops about the tyranny of "car culture." And when RTS

events go wrong — because

only a handful of people show up, or the antihierarchy anarchist organizers are unable or unwil ing to

communicate with the crowd — that's exactly what the party becomes: some jerk demanding the right to sit

in the middle of the street for a loony reason known only to him. But at their best, RTS actions have been

too joyful and humane to dismiss, cracking the cynicism of many onlookers, from the hip British music


press, which declared the party at Trafalgar Square "the best il egal rave or dance music party in history," to

one striking Liverpool docker who noted that "the others talk about doing something - this lot actually do it."

And, as with all successful radical movements, some voice concern that the mass appeal of RTS has made

it too fashionable, that the subtle theory of "applying radical poetry to radical politics" is getting drowned out

by the pounding beat and the mob mentality. In October 1997, Jordan told me that RTS was going through a

process of rigorous re-examination. He claimed that the 20,000-strong Trafalgar Square party was not the

sort of climax RTS had been moving toward. When the police tried to impound the van containing the sound

system, protestors didn't cheekily blow kisses as hoped, they hurled bottles and rocks and four people were

charged with attempted murder (the charges were later dropped). Despite the organizers' best efforts, RTS

was spiralling into soccer hooliganism and, as one RTS spokesperson told The Daily Telegraph, when the

organizers tried to regain control, some rioters turned against them. "I saw some of our people actually

trying to stop yobbos who had got tanked up on beer and were mindlessly throwing bottles and rocks. A few

of our contingent actually put themselves into the firing line and one was beaten up...." Such shades of grey,

however, were lost on most in the British media who covered Trafalgar Square with headlines like "Riot

Frenzy —Anarchist Thugs Bring Terror to London."


"The Resistance Wil Be as Transnational as Capital"

After Trafalgar Square, Jordan says, it became clear that "it was too easy for the street party to be seen as

just fun, just a party with a hint of political action.... If people think that turning up to a street party once a

year, getting out of your head and dancing your heart out on a recaptured piece of public land is enough,

then we are failing to reach our potential." The next task, he said, is to imagine a takeover bigger than just

one street. "The street party is only a beginning, a taster of future possibilities. To date there have been 30

street parties all over the country. Imagine that growing to 100, imagine each one of those happening on the

same day, imagine each one lasting for days on end and growing.... Imagine the street party growing roots...

la fete permanente....""

I admit that at the time I spoke to Jordan I was sceptical that this movement could pull off that level of

coordination. At the best of times, Reclaim the Streets walks a delicate line, flirting openly with the urge to

riot but attempting to flip it into a more constructive protest. The London RTSers say that one of the goals of

the parties is to "visualize industrial collapse" - the challenge, then, is for participants to inspire one another

enough to dance and plant trees in the rubble, rather than to douse it with gasoline and drop a Zippo. But

shortly after our interview, a notice went out on a couple of activist E-mail lists, floating the idea of a


coordinated day of simultaneous street parties around the world. Seven months later, the first-ever Global

Street Party was under way. To make absolutely sure that the political underpinning of the event didn't get

lost, the date chosen for the Global Street Party was May 16, 1998 —the same day the G-8 leaders

gathered for a summit in

Birmingham, England, and two days before they would proceed to Geneva to celebrate the fiftieth

anniversary of the World Trade Organization. With Indian farmers, landless Brazilian peasants, unemployed

French, Italian and German workers and international human-rights groups planning simultaneous actions

around the two summits, RTS took its place in a fledgling international grassroots movement against

transnational corporations and their agenda of economic globalization. This was definitely not just about

cars.

Though rarely reported as more than isolated traffic snares, thirty RTS events were successfully mounted

around the world, in twenty different countries. On May 16, more than eight hundred people blocked a sixlane

highway in Utrecht, the Netherlands, dancing for five hours. In Turku, Finland, two thousand partyers

peacefully occupied one of the main bridges in the city. Almost a thousand Berliners held a rave at a

downtown intersection and in Berkeley, California, seven hundred people played Twister on Telegraph


Avenue. By far the most successful of the Global Street Parties was in Sydney, Australia, where an il egal

political rally cum music festival went off without a hitch; between three and four thousand people

"kidnapped" a road, setting up three stages for live concerts with bands and half a dozen deejays. There

were no Levi's, Borders, Pepsi or Revlon sponsorships (the sort of backing that supposedly makes highpriced

festivals like Lilith Fair "possible") but, somehow, Sydney's RTS managed to offer

"three chai stalls, a

food fund-raiser, a skateboard skate rail, a five terminal sidewalk Internet station, two sandstone sculptors,

poets, fire twirlers, street gardeners...and loads of mayhem and frivolity."

Police reaction to the Global Street Parry varied wildly from city to city. In Sydney, the officers stood back in

awe, asking only for the sound to be turned down as the party stretched into the evening. In Utrecht, the

police were so friendly that "at one point," reports a local organizer, "they mingled with the crowd, sat on the

pavement waiting for the sound system to arrive. When it finally arrived, they really assisted in getting the

generator going." Not

surprisingly, these were the exceptions. In Toronto, at the party I attended, the police officers let the event

go on for an hour, then went into the crowd of four hundred partyers with open knives and (absurdly) began

stabbing brightly colored balloons and energetically slashing streamers. As a result, the party degenerated


into a series of incoherent cops-are-pigs skirmishes that led the six o'clock news.

But Toronto's crackdown

was nothing compared with what happened in other cities. Five thousand people danced on the streets of

Geneva, but by midnight the party "had turned into a full scale riot. One car was set alight and thousands of

police charged the main encampment, firing tear-gas into the crowd. The demonstrators smashed hundreds

of windows, mainly banks and corporate offices, until 5 a.m., causing over half a mil ion pounds in damage."

With protestors anticipating the arrival of world leaders and trade officials for the WTO anniversary, the

rioting continued for several days.

In Prague, three thousand people showed up for the Global Street Party in Wenceslaus Square, where four

sound systems were rigged up and twenty deejays were ready to play. Before long, however, a police car

drove into the crowd at full speed; the vehicle was surrounded and overturned and once again, the rave

became a riot. After organizers officially dissolved the town event, three hundred people, mostly teens,

marched through the streets of Prague, some of them stopping to hurl rocks and bottles through the plateglass

windows of McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets. More bottle throwing took place at the

Berkeley, California, RTS, as well as several other inane activities including throwing a foam mattress into a

bonfire on Telegraph Avenue (creating toxic fumes at an environmental protest —

bril iant!) and smashing


the window of a local independent bookstore (way to get those corporate bad guys). The event had been

bil ed as a celebration of "art, love and rebellion" but police called it "a riot" —"the biggest in eight years."

There were at least twenty-seven arrests in Cambridge, four in Toronto, four in Berkeley, three in Berlin,

sixty-four in Prague, dozens in Brisbane and more than two hundred over the days of rioting in Geneva.

In several key cities, the Global Street Party was most certainly not the "fete permanente" that John Jordan

had envisioned. However, the immediate international response provoked by nothing more than a few Email

notices proved that there is both the potential and the desire for a truly global protest against, the loss

of public space. If anything, the urge to reclaim that space from branded life speaks so directly to so many

young people of different nationalities that its greatest liability is the very force of the emotions it inspires.

That emotion was in full sway on May 16 in Birmingham, headquarters of the Global Street Party. The eight

most powerful politicians in the world were busy trading hockey jerseys, signing trade agreements and

—one cringes — having their own global sing-along to "Al You Need Is Love."

Against that backdrop, eight

thousand activists who had gathered from all over Britain gained control of a roundabout, hooked up a

sound system, played street volleyball and recaptured the RTS spirit of celebration. As in other cities, there


were confrontations with the police who surrounded the party with a line three officers deep. This time,

however, creative absurdity won out, and instead of rocks and bottles, the weapon of choice was that

increasingly popular piece of slapstick ammo: the custard pie. And a new banner

—a huge red kite —was

hoisted amid the tripods, signs and flags, bearing the names of all the cities where street parties were taking

place simultaneously in twenty countries around the world. "The resistance," one sign said, "wil be as

transnational as capital."

RTS AGITPROP

The privatization of public space in the form of the car continues the erosion of neighbourhood and

community that defines the metropolis. Road schemes, business "parks,"

shopping developments — al add

up to the disintegration of community and the flattening of a locality. Everywhere becomes the same as

everywhere else. Community becomes commodity — a shopping vil age, sedated and under constant

surveil ance. The desire for community is then fulfil ed elsewhere, through spectacle, sold to us in simulated

form. A TV soap "street" or "square" mimicking the area that concrete and capitalism are destroying. The

real street, in this scenario, is sterile. A place to move through not to be in. It exists only as an aid to

somewhere else — through a shop window, bil board or petrol tank.

-London RTS


What I've noticed is that all of these events and actions had one thing in common: RECLAIMING. Whether

we were reclaiming the road from cars, reclaiming buildings for squatters, reclaiming surplus food for the

homeless, reclaiming campuses as a place for protest and theatre, reclaiming our voice from the deep dark

depths of corporate media, or reclaiming our visual environment from bil boards, we were always

reclaiming. Taking back what should have been ours all along. Not "ours" as in

"our club" or "our group," but

ours as in the people. Al the people. "Ours" as in "not the governments" and "not the corporations."... We

want power given back to the people as a collective. We want to Reclaim the Streets.

- Toronto RTS

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

BAD MOOD RISING

The New Anticorporate Activism

The earth is not dying, it is being kil ed. And those that are kil ing it have names and addresses.

-Utah Phil ips

How do we tell Steve that his dad owns a sweatshop?!?

— Tori Spelling, as the character Donna on Beverly Hil s 90210, after discovering that her own line of designer clothing was being manufactured by immigrant women in an L.A. sweatshop,

October 15, 1997

While the latter half of the 1990s has seen enormous growth in the brands'

ubiquity, a parallel phenomenon


has emerged on the margins: a network of environmental, labour and human-rights activists determined to

expose the damage being done behind the slick veneer. Dozens of new organizations and publications have

been founded for the sole purpose of "outing" corporations that are benefiting from repressive government

policies around the globe. Older groups, previously focused on monitoring governments, have reconfigured

their mandates so that their primary role is tracking violations committed by multinational corporations. As

John Vidal, environmental editor of The Guardian, puts it, "A lot of activists are attaching themselves leechlike

onto the sides of the bodies corporate."

This leech-like attachment takes many forms, from the socially respectable to the near-terrorist. Since 1994,

the Massachusetts-based Program on Corporations, Law Democracy, for instance, has been developing

policy alternatives designed to "contest the authority of corporations to govern."

The Oxford-based

Corporate Watch, meanwhile, focuses on researching-and helping others to research — corporate crime.

(Mot to be confused with the San Francisco-based Corporate Watch, which sprang up at about the same

time with a nearly identical mission for the U.S.) JUSTICE. DO IT NIKE! is a group of scrappy Oregon

activists devoted to haranguing Nike about its labour practices in its own backyard. The Yellow Pages, on

the other hand, is an underground international cabal of hackers who have declared war on the computer


networks of those corporations that have successfully lobbied to delink human rights from trade with China.

"In effect, businessmen started dictating foreign policy," says Blondie Wong, director of Hong Kong

Blondes, a group of Chinese pro-democracy hackers now living in exile. "By taking the side of profit over

conscience, business has set our struggle back so far that they have become our oppressors too."

Taking a distinctly lower-tech (some might say primitive) approach is Belgian Noel Godin and his global

band of political pie slingers. Although politicians and movie stars have faced flying pies, the corporate

sector has been the primary target: Microsoft CEO Bil Gates, Monsanto CEO

Robert Shapiro, Chevron

CEO Ken Derr, World Trade Organization director Renato Ruggiero have all been hit, as well as that

architect of global free trade, Milton Friedman. "To their lies, we respond with pies," says Agent Blueberry,

of the Biotic Baking Brigade (see image, page 258).

The fad got so out of hand that in May 1999, Tesco, one of the largest supermarket chains in England,

conducted a series of tests on its pies to see which ones made for the best slinging. "We like to keep

abreast of what the customers are doing, and that's why we have to do the testing," said company

spokesperson Melodic Schuster. Her recommendation: "The custard tart gives total face coverage." Oh, and

rest assured that none of the Tesco tarts contain any ingredients that have been genetically modified. The


chain banned those from its products a month earlier —a response to a groundswell of Anticorporate

sentiment directed at Monsanto and the other agribusiness giants.

As we wil see in a later chapter, Tesco made its decision to disassociate itself from genetically modified

foods after a series of protests against "Frankenfoods" were held on its doorstep

— part of an increasingly

popular strategy among activist groups. Political rallies, which once wound their predictable course in front

of government buildings and consulates, are now just as likely to take place in front of the stores of the

corporate giants: outside Nike Town (see image, page 324), Foot Locker, the Disney Store and Shell gas

pumps; on the roof of the corporate headquarters of Monsanto or BP; through malls and around Gap outlets;

and even at supermarkets.

In short, the triumph of economic globalization has inspired a wave of techno-savvy investigative activists

who are as globally minded as the corporations they track. This powerful form of activism reaches well

beyond traditional trade unions. Its members are young and old; they come from elementary schools and

college campuses suffering from branding fatigue and from church groups with large investment portfolios

worried that corporations are behaving "sinfully." They are parents worried about their children's slavish

devotion to "logo tribes," and they are also the political intelligentsia and social marketers who are more


concerned with the quality of community life than with increased sales. In fact, by October 1997 there were

so many disparate Anticorporate protests going on around the world — against Nike, Shell, Disney,

McDonald's and Monsanto - that Earth First! printed up an impromptu calendar with all the key dates and

declared it the first annual End Corporate Dominance Month. About a month later, The Wall Street Journal

ran a story headlined "Hurry! There Are Only 27 More Protesting Days Until Christmas."

"The Year of the Sweatshop"

In North America, much of this activity can be traced back to 1995-96, the period that Andrew Ross, director

of American Studies at New York University, has called "The Year of the Sweatshop." For a time that year,

North Americans couldn't turn on their televisions without hearing shameful stories about the exploitative

labour practices behind the most popular, mass-marketed labels on the brandscape. In August 1995, the

Gap's freshly scrubbed facade was further exfoliated to reveal a lawless factory in El Salvador where the

manager responded to a union drive by firing 150 people and vowing that "blood wil flow" if organizing

continued. In May 1996, U.S. labour activists discovered that chat-show host Kathie Lee Gifford's

eponymous line of sportswear (sold exclusively at Wal-Mart) was being stitched by a ghastly combination of

child labourers in Honduras and il egal sweatshop workers in Mew York. At about the same time, Guess


jeans, which had built its image with sultry black-and-white photographs of supermodel Claudia Schiffer,

was in open warfare with the U.S. Department of Labour over a failure on the part of its California-based

contractors to pay the minimum wage. Even Mickey Mouse was letting his sweatshops show after a Disney

contractor in Haiti was caught making Pocahontas pajamas under such impoverished conditions that

workers had to nourish their babies with sugar water.

More outrage flowed after NBC aired an investigation of Mattel and Disney just days before Christmas 1996.

With the help of hidden cameras, the reporter showed that children in Indonesia and China were working in

virtual slavery "so that children in America can put fril y dresses on America's favourite doll." In June 1996,

Life magazine created more waves with photographs of Pakistani kids —looking shockingly young and paid

as little as six cents an hour —hunched over soccer balls that bore the unmistakable Nike swoosh. But it

wasn't just Nike. Adidas, Reebok, Umbro, Mitre and Brine were all manufacturing balls in Pakistan where an

estimated 10,000 children worked in the industry, many of them sold as indentured slave labourers to their

employers and branded like livestock. The Life images were so chil ing that they galvanized parents,

students and educators alike, many of whom made the photographs into placards and held them up in

protest outside sporting-goods stores across the United States and Canada.


Running alongside all this was the story of Nike's sneakers. The Nike saga started before the Year of the

Sweatshop began and has only grown stronger as other corporate controversies have slipped in and out of

the public eye. Scandal has dogged Nike, with new revelations about factory conditions trailing the

company's own global flight patterns. First came the reports of union crackdowns in South Korea; when the

contractors fled and set up shop in Indonesia, the watchdogs followed, filing stories on starvation wages and

military intimidation of workers. In March 1996, The New York Times reported that after a wildcat strike at

one Javanese factory, twenty-two workers were fired and one man who had been singled out as an

organizer was locked in a room inside the factory and interrogated by soldiers for seven days. When Nike

began moving production to Vietnam, the accusations moved too, with videotaped testimony of wage

cheating and workers being beaten over the head with shoe uppers. When production moved decisively to

China, the controversies over wages and the factories' "boot camp" style of management were right behind.

It wasn't only the superbrands and their celebrity endorsers who felt the sting of the Year of the Sweatshop

— clothing-store chains, big-box retailers and department stores also found themselves being held

responsible for the conditions under which the toys and fashions on their racks were produced. The issue


came home for America in August 1995, when an apartment complex in El Monte, California, was raided by

the U.S. Department of Labour. Seventy-two Thai garment workers were being held in bonded slavery —

some had been in the compound for as long as seven years. The factory owner was a minor player in the

industry, but the clothes the women were sewing were sold by such retail giants as Target, Sears and

Nordstrom.

It is Wal-Mart, however, that has taken it on the chin most frequently since sweatshops made their big

nineties comeback. As the world's largest retailer Wal-Mart is the primary distributor of many of the branded

goods attracting controversy: Kathie Lee Gifford's clothing line, Disney's Haitian-made pajamas, childproduced

clothing from Bangladesh, sweatshop-produced toys and sports gear from Asia.

Why, consumers

demanded, if Wal-Mart had the power to lower prices, alter CD covers and influence magazine content, did

it not also have the power to demand and enforce ethical labour standards from its suppliers?

Though the revelations came out in the press one at a time, the incidents coalesced to give us a rare look

under the hood of branded America. Few liked what they saw. The unsettling combination of celebrated

brand names and impoverished production conditions have turned Nike, Disney and Wal-Mart, among

others, into powerful metaphors for a brutal new way of doing business. In a single image, the brand-name


sweatshop tells the story of the obscene disparities of the global economy: corporate executives and

celebrities raking in salaries so high they defy comprehension, bil ions of dollars spent on branding and

advertising — all propped up by a system of shanty-towns, squalid factories and the misery and trampled

expectations of young women like the ones I met in Cavite, struggling to survive.

The Year of the Brand Attack

Gradually, the Year of the Sweatshop turned into the Year of the Brand Attack.

Having been introduced to

the labourers behind their toys and clothing, shoppers met the people who grew their coffee at the local

Starbucks; according to the U.S. Guatemalan Labour Education Project, some of the coffee frothed at the

chain was cultivated with the use of child labour, unsafe pesticides and sub-subsistence wages. But it was in

a courtroom in London, England, that the branded world was most thoroughly turned inside out. The highly

publicized McLibel Trial began with McDonald's 1990 attempt to suppress a leaflet that accused the

company of a host of abuses — from busting unions to depleting rain forests and littering the city streets.

McDonald's denied the allegations and sued two London-based environmental activists for libel. The

activists defended themselves by subjecting McDonald's to the corporate equivalent of a colonoscopy: the

case lasted for seven years, and no infraction committed by the company was considered too minor to bring

up in court or to post on the Internet.


The McLibel defendants' allegations about food safety dovetailed with another Anticorporate movement

taking off across Europe at the same time: the campaign against Monsanto and its bio-engineered

agricultural crops. At the centre of this dispute was Monsanto's refusal to inform consumers which of the

foods they bought at the supermarket were the product of genetic engineering, setting off a wave of direct

action that included the uprooting of Monsanto test crops.

As if that weren't enough, multinationals also found themselves under the microscope for their involvement

with some of the world's most violent and repressive regimes: Burma, Indonesia, Colombia, Nigeria and

Chinese-occupied Tibet. The issue was by no means new, but like the McDonald's and Monsanto

campaigns, it came to a new prominence in the mid- to late nineties, with much of the activity focusing on

the host of familiar brand names operating in Burma (now officially known as Myanmar). The bloody coup

that brought the current military regime to power in Burma took place in 1988, but international awareness

about brutal conditions inside the Asian country skyrocketed in 1995 when opposition leader and Nobel

laureate Aung San Suu Kyi was released from six years of house arrest. In a videotaped appeal smuggled

out of the country, Suu Kyi condemned foreign investors for propping up the junta that had disregarded her

party's overwhelming election victory in 1990. Companies operating in Burma, she stated, are directly or


indirectly profiting from state-run slave-labour camps. "Foreign investors should realize there could be no

economic growth and opportunities in Burma until there is agreement on the country's political future."

The first response from human-rights activists was to lobby governments in North America, Europe and

Scandinavia to impose trade sanctions on the Burmese government. When this failed to halt the flow of

trade, they began targeting individual companies based in the activists' own home countries. In Denmark,

the protests centred on the national brewer, Carlsberg, which had entered into a large contract to build a

brewery in Burma. In Holland, the target was Heineken; in the U.S. and Canada, Liz Claiborne, Unocal,

Disney, Pepsi and Ralph Lauren were in the crosshairs.

But the most significant landmark in the growth of Anticorporate activism also came in 1995, when the world

lost Ken Saro-Wiwa. The revered Nigerian writer and environmental leader was imprisoned by his country's

oppressive regime for spearheading the Ogoni people's campaign against the devastating human and

ecological effects of Royal Dutch/Shell's oil dril ing in the Niger Delta. Human-rights groups rallied their

governments to interfere, and some economic sanctions were imposed, but they had little effect. In

November 1995, Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists were executed by a military government who

had enriched themselves with Shell's oil money and through their own people's repression.


The Year of the Brand Attack stretched into two years, then three and now shows no sign of receding. In

February 1999, a new report revealed that workers sewing Disney clothes in several Chinese factories were

earning as little as 13.5 cents an hour and were forced to put in hours of overtime.

In May 1999, ABC's

20/20 returned to the island of Saipan and brought back footage of young women locked inside sweatshop

factories sewing for the Gap, Tommy Hilfiger and Polo Ralph Lauren. New revelations have also come out

about violent clashes surrounding Chevron's dril ing activities in the Niger Delta, and about Talisman

Energy's plans to dril on contested territory in war-torn Sudan.

The volume and the tenacity of public outrage directed against them has blindsided the corporations, in

large part because the activities for which they were being condemned were not particularly new.

McDonald's has never been a friend of the working poor; oil companies have a long and uninterrupted

history of collaborating with repressive governments to extract valuable resources with little concern for the

people who live near them; Nike has produced its sneakers in Asian sweatshops since the early seventies,

and many of the clothing chains have been doing so for even longer. As The Wall Street Journal's Bob

Ortega writes, labour unions had been collecting evidence of child labourers in Bangladesh making clothing

sold at Wal-Mart since 1991, "But even though the unions had photos of children on the assembly lines...the


accusations didn't get much play, in print or on television."

Obviously much of the current focus on corporate abuses has to do with the tenacity of activists organizing

around these issues. But since so many of the abuses being highlighted have been going on for decades,

the current groundswell of resistance raises the question, Why now? Why did 1995-96 become the Year of

the Sweatshop, turning quickly into the Years of the Brand Attack? Why not 1976, 1984, 1988, or, perhaps

most relevant of all, why not 1993? It was in May of that year that the Kader toy factory in Bangkok burned

to the ground. The building was a textbook firetrap, and when the piles of plush fabric ignited, the flames

raced through the locked factory, kil ing 188 workers and injuring 469 more. Kader was the worst fire in

industrial history, taking more lives than the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire that kil ed 146 young workers

in New York City in 1911. The parallels between Triangle and Kader —separated from each other by half a

world, and eighty-two years of so-called development — are chil ing: it was as if time hadn't moved forward,

but had simply shifted locations.

At Triangle, as at Kader, the workers were almost all young women — some as young as fourteen, but most

about nineteen. A report issued after the Triangle fire found that most of the dead were Italian and Russian

immigrants, and almost half had come to America ahead of their families, seeking employment to subsidize


the journeys of parents and siblings - so similar to the situation of the migrant peasant girls who perished at

Kader. Like the Kader factory, the Triangle building was an accident waiting to happen, complete with fake

fire exits, mounds of flammable material and doors that stayed locked all day to keep out the union

organizers. Like the young women at Kader, many of the girls at Triangle wrapped themselves in cloth and

jumped out the factory windows to their deaths — that way, they reasoned, their families would at least be

able to identify their bodies. A New York World reporter described the gruesome Triangle scene. "Suddenly

something that looked like a bale of dark dress goods was hurled from an eighth-story window....Then

another seeming bundle of cloth came hurtling through the same window, but this time a breeze tossed

open the cloth and from the crowd of five hundred persons came a cry of horror.

The breeze disclosed the

form of a girl shooting down to instant death."

The Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire was the defining incident of the first anti-sweatshop movement in the

United States. It catalyzed hundreds of thousands of workers into militancy and promoted a government

response that eventually led to a fifty-four-hour weekly cap on overtime, no work past 9 p.m. and

breakthroughs in health and fire regulations. Perhaps the most significant advance as a result of the fire was

the introduction of what today would be called independent monitoring — the founding of the New York


Factory Investigation Commission, which was authorized to stage surprise raids on suspected sweatshop

operators.

So what did the 188 deaths in the Kader fire accomplish? Sadly, despite the fact that several international

labour and development groups stepped in to denounce the unlawful factory operator, Kader didn't become

a symbol of the desperate need for reform the way Triangle Shirtwaist had done.

In One World, Ready or

Not, Wil iam Greider describes visiting Thailand and meeting victims and activists who had been fighting

hard for retribution. "Some of them were under the impression that a worldwide boycott of Kader products

was underway, organized by conscience-stricken Americans and Europeans. I had to inform them that the

civilized world had barely noticed their tragedy.... A fire in Bangkok was like a typhoon in Bangladesh, an

earthquake in Turkey." Little wonder, then, that only six months after Kader, another devastating sweatshop

fire —this one at the Zhili toy factory in Shenzhen, China — took the lives of another 87 young workers.

At the time, it didn't seem to register with the international community that the toys the Kader women had

been sewing were destined for the joyful aisles of Toys 'R' Us, to be wrapped and placed under Christmas

trees in Europe, the United States and Canada. Many news reports failed even to mention the names of the

brands being stitched in the factory. As Greider writes, "The Kader fire might have been more meaningful


for Americans if they could have seen the thousands of soot-stained dolls that spil ed from the wreckage,

macabre litter scattered among the dead. Bugs Bunny, Bart Simpson and the Muppets. Big Bird and other

Sesame Street dolls. Playskool 'Water Pets.'"

But in 1993 few people in the West —and certainly not in the Western media —

were ready to make the

connection between the burned-out building in Bangkok, buried on page six or ten of their newspapers, and

the brand-name toys fil ing North American and European homes. That is no longer the case today. What

happened in 1995 was a kind of collective "click" on the part of both the media and the public. The

cumulative response to the horror stories of Chinese prison labour, the scenes of teenage girls being paid

pennies in the Mexican maquiladoras, and burning in fires in Bangkok, has been a slow but noticeable shift

in how people in the West see workers in the developing world. "They're getting our jobs" is giving way to a

more humane reaction: "Our corporations are stealing their lives."

Much of this has to do with timing. Concerns expressed about child labour in India and Pakistan had

remained at the level of a steady drone for more than a decade. But by 1995, the question of linking trade

policies to human rights had been pushed so far off most governments' agendas that when thirteen-year-old

Craig Kielburger deliberately disrupted Canadian prime minister Jean Chretien's trade mission to India to


talk about the children who were working there in bonded slavery, the issue seemed urgent and exotic.

Moreover, in North America, the total usurpation of foreign policy by the free-trade agenda invited disruption

— the world was ready to listen.

The same is true of corporate crime in general. It may be nothing new for consumer goods to be produced

under oppressive conditions, but what clearly is new is the tremendously expanded role consumer-goods

companies are playing in our culture. Anticorporate activism is on the rise because many of us feel the

international brand-name connections that crisscross the globe more keenly than we ever have before —

and we feel them precisely because we have never been as "branded" as we are today.

Branding, as we have seen, has taken a fairly straightforward relationship between buyer and seller and -

through the quest to turn brands into media providers, arts producers, town squares and social philosophers

— transformed it into something much more invasive and profound. For the past decade, multinationals like

Nike, Microsoft and Starbucks have sought to become the chief communicators of all that is good and

cherished in our culture: art, sports, community, connection, equality. But the more successful this project

is, the more vulnerable these companies become: if brands are indeed intimately entangled with our culture

and our identities, when they do wrong, their crimes are not dismissed as merely the misdemeanours of


another corporation trying to make a buck. Instead, many of the people who inhabit their branded worlds

feel complicit in their wrongs, both guilty and connected. But this connection is a volatile one: it is not the

old-style loyalty between lifelong employee and corporate boss; rather, this is a connection more akin to the

relationship of fan and celebrity: emotionally intense but shallow enough to turn on a dime.

This volatility is the unintended consequence of brand managers striving for unprecedented intimacy with

the consumer while forging a more casual role with the workforce. In reaching brand-not-products nirvana,

these companies have lost two things that may prove more precious in the long run: consumer detachment

from their global activities and citizen investment in their economic success.

It has taken us a while, but if another Kader happened tomorrow, the first question journalists would ask

would be, "What toys were being produced?" "Where were they being shipped?"

and "Which companies

hired the contractors?" Labour activists in Thailand would be in instant communication with solidarity groups

in Hong Kong, Washington, Berlin, Amsterdam, Sydney, London and Toronto. Emails would be fired off

from Washington-based Campaign for Labour Rights, from the Clean Clothes Campaign out of Amsterdam,

and forwarded through a network of Web sites, listserves and fax trees. The National Labour Committee,

UNITE!, the Labour Behind the Label Coalition and the World Development Movement would be organizing


protests outside Toys 'R' Us, shouting, "Our children don't need bloodstained toys!" University students

would dress up as the cartoon characters of their childhood and hand out pamphlets comparing Bugs

Bunny's payout for Space Jam to the cost of putting in a fire exit at Kader.

Meetings would be scheduled

with national associations of toy manufacturers; new and tougher codes of conduct would be highlighted for

consideration. The public mind is not only able but eager to make the global connections that Wil iam

Greider searched for but did not find after the Kader fire.

Though Anticorporate activism is seeing a renewal unparalleled since the thirties, there have, of course,

been some significant Anticorporate campaigns scattered between the thirties and their present-day revival.

The granddaddy of modern brand-based actions is the boycott against Nestle, which peaked in the late

seventies. The campaign targeted the Swiss company for its aggressive marketing of costly baby formula

as a "safer" alternative to breast-feeding in the developing world. The Nestle case has a strong parallel with

the McLibel Trial (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 16), largely because the issue didn't really capture the

world's attention until the food company made the mistake of suing a Swiss activist group for libel in 1976.'2

As with McLibel, the ensuing court case put Nestle under intense scrutiny and led to an international boycott

campaign, launched in 1977.


The eighties saw the largest industrial accident in human history: a massive toxic leak in 1984 at a Union

Carbide pesticide factory in Bhopal, India, kil ed two thousand people immediately and has taken five

thousand more lives in the years since. Today, graffiti on the wall of the dilapidated and abandoned factory

reads "Bhopal = Hiroshima." Despite this tragedy, widely recognized to be the result of weak safety

precautions including a switched-off alarm system, the eighties were a dry spell for most political

movements that questioned the beneficial power of capital. Although there was a broad recognition during

the Central American wars that U.S. multinationals were propping up various dictatorships, solidarity work in

North America focused primarily on the actions of governments, as opposed to multinational corporations.

As one report on the subject notes, "attacking [corporations] tended to be seen as a hangover from the 'sil y

seventies.'"

There was, however, one major exception to this rule: the anti-apartheid movement. Frustrated by the

international community's refusal to impose meaningful trade sanctions on South Africa, anti-apartheid

activists developed a series of alternative roadblocks designed, if not to prevent multinationals from

profiting from the racist regime, at least to inconvenience them if they persisted in doing so. Students and

faculty members at several universities set up tent cities demanding that schools divest themselves of their


endowments from any company doing business with the African nation. Church groups disrupted corporate

shareholder meetings with demands for immediate withdrawal, while more moderate investors pushed

corporate boards to adopt the Sullivan principles — a set of rules for companies in South Africa that

purported to minimize their complicity with the apartheid regime. Meanwhile, trade unions pulled their

pensions and bank accounts from institutions issuing loans to the South African government, and dozens of

municipal governments passed selective purchasing agreements cancelling large contracts with companies

invested in South Africa. The most creative blockades were erected by the international trade-union

movement. Several times a year, the unions would call a day of action, during which dock workers refused

to unload cargo that had come from South Africa, and airline ticket agents refused to book flights to and

from Johannesburg. In the words of campaign organizer Ken Luckhardt, workers became "activists at the

point of production."

Though there are definite similarities, there is one key difference between the apartheid actions and the kind

of Anticorporate campaigning gaining momentum today. The South Africa boycott was an antiracist

campaign that happened to use trade (whether the importing of wine or the exporting of General Motors

dollars) as a tool to bring down the South African political system. Many of the current Anticorporate


campaigns are also rooted in a political attack-but what they are attacking is as much a global economic

system as a national political one. During the years of apartheid, companies such as the Royal Bank of

Canada, Barclays Bank in England and General Motors were generally regarded as morally neutral forces

that happened to be entangled with an aberrantly racist government. Today, more and more campaigners

are treating multinationals, and the policies that give them free rein, as the root cause of political injustices

around the globe. Sometimes the companies commit these violations in collusion with governments,

sometimes they commit them despite a government's best efforts.

This systemic critique has been embraced, in recent years, by several established human-rights groups like

Amnesty International, PEN and Human Rights Watch, as well as environmental rights organizations like

the Sierra Club. For many of these organizations, this represents a significant shift in policy. Until the mideighties

foreign corporate investment in the Third World was seen in the mainstream development

community as a key to alleviating poverty and misery. By 1996, however, that concept was being openly

questioned, and it was recognized that many governments in the developing world were protecting lucrative

investments — mines, dams, oil fields, power plants and export processing zones

—by deliberately turning

a blind eye to egregious rights violations by foreign corporations against their people. And in the enthusiasm


for increased trade, the Western nations where most of these offending corporations were based also chose

to look the other way, unwil ing to risk their own global competitiveness for some other country's problems.

The bottom line was that in parts of Asia, Central and South America and Africa, the promise that

investment would bring greater freedom and democracy was starting to look like a cruel hoax. And worse: in

case after case, foreign corporations were found to be soliciting, even directly contracting, the local police

and military to perform such unsavoury tasks as evicting peasants and tribes people from their land;

cracking down on striking factory workers; and arresting and kil ing peaceful protestors — all in the name of

safeguarding the smooth flow of trade. Corporations, in other words, were stunting human development,

rather than contributing to it.

Arvind Ganesan, a researcher with Human Rights Watch, is blunt about what his organization refers to as "a

shift in the terms of the debate over corporate responsibility for human rights."

Rather than improved human

rights flowing from increased trade, "governments ignore human rights in favour of perceived trade

advantages." Ganesan points out that the severing of the connection between investment and human-rights

improvements is today clearest in Nigeria, where the long-awaited transition to democracy has been

coupled with a renewed wave of military brutality against Niger Delta communities protesting against the oil


companies.

Amnesty International, in a departure from its focus on prisoners persecuted for either their religious or

political beliefs, is also beginning to treat multinational corporations as major players in the denial of human

rights worldwide. More and more, recent Amnesty reports have found that people such as the late Ken Saro-Wiwa have been persecuted for what a government sees as a destabilizing Anticorporate stance. In a 1997

report, the group documents the fact that Indian vil agers and tribal peoples were violently arrested, and

some kil ed, for peacefully resisting the development of private power plants and luxury hotels on their

lands. A democratic country, in other words, was becoming less democratic as a result of corporate

intervention. "Development," Amnesty warned, is "being pursued at the expense of human rights...."

This pattern highlights the degree to which the central and state authorities in India are prepared to deploy

state force and utilize provisions of the law in the interests of development projects, curtailing the right of

freedom of association, expression and assembly. India's moves to liberalize its economy and develop new

industries and infrastructure have in many areas marginalized and displaced communities and contributed

to further violations of their human rights.

India's situation, the report states, is not "the only or the worst" one, but is part of a trend toward the

disregarding of human rights in favour of "development" in the global economy.


Where the Power Is

At the heart of this convergence of Anticorporate activism and research is the recognition that corporations

are much more than purveyors of the products we all want; they are also the most powerful political forces

of our time. By now, we've all heard the statistics: how corporations like Shell and Wal-Mart bask in budgets

bigger than the gross domestic product of most nations; how, of the top hundred economies, fifty-one are

multinationals and only forty-nine are countries. We have read (or heard about) how a handful of powerful

CEOs are writing the new rules for the global economy, engineering what Canadian writer John Ralston

Saul has called "a coup d'etat in slow motion." In his book about corporate power, Silent Coup, Tony Clark

takes this theory one step further when he argues that citizens must go after corporations not because we

don't like their products, but because corporations have become the ruling political bodies of our era, setting

the agenda of globalization. We must confront them, in other words, because that is where the power is.

So although the media often describe campaigns like the one against Nike as

"consumer boycotts," that tells

only part of the story. It is more accurate to describe them as political campaigns that use consumer goods

as readily accessible targets, as public-relations levers and as popular-education tools. In contrast to the

consumer boycotts of the seventies, there is a more diffuse relationship between lifestyle choices (what to


eat, what to smoke, what to wear) and the larger questions of how the global corporation — its size, political

clout and lack of transparency - is reorganizing the world economy. Behind the protests outside Nike Town,

behind the pie in Bil Gates's face and the bottle shattering the McDonald's window in Prague, there is

something too visceral for most conventional measures to track — a kind of bad mood rising. And the

corporate hijacking of political power is as responsible for this mood as the brands'

cultural looting of public

and mental space. I also like to think it has to do with the arrogance of branding itself: the seeds of

discontent are part of its very DNA.

"Look, Mike, there's a real market for the truth about Nike.... Our debut product wil be a proprietary

database of Nike labour abuses! I see a Web presence and a CD-ROM of stats, worker affidavits, human

rights reports and hidden camera video clips."

"Kind of niche product, isn't it, babe?"

"No. This wil be huge!"™

So goes an exchange in Gary Trudeau's Doonesbury cartoon strip — and it's a joke with a strong sting to it.

The continuing attacks on brands like Nike, Shell and McDonald's not only reflect genuine indignation at

sweatshops, oil spil s and corporate censorship, they also reflect how large the antagonistic audience has

become. The desire (and ability) to back up free-floating anti-corporate malaise with legitimate facts, figures


and real-life anecdotes is so widespread that it even transcends old rivalries within the social and ecological

movements. The United Food and Commercial Workers' union, which started targeting Wal-Mart because

of its low wages and union-busting tactics, now collects and disseminates information on Wal-Mart stores

being built on sacred Native burial grounds. Since when did a grocery-store workers' union weigh in on

indigenous land claims? Since puncturing Wal-Mart became a cause in and of itself. Why did the London

eco-anarchists behind the McLibel Trial —who don't believe in working for the Man in any form -take up the

plight of teenage McDonald's workers? Because, for them, it's another angle from which to attack the golden

beast.

The political backdrop to this phenomenon is well known. Many citizens'

movements have tried to reverse

conservative economic trends over the last decade by electing liberal, labour or democratic-socialist

governments, only to find that economic policy remains unchanged or caters even more directly to the

whims of global corporations. Centuries of democratic reforms that had won greater transparency in

government suddenly appeared ineffective in the new climate of multinational power. What good was an

open and accountable Parliament or Congress if opaque corporations were setting so much of the global

political agenda in the back rooms?


Disil usionment with the political process has been even more pronounced on the international stage, where

attempts to regulate multinationals through the United Nations and trade regulatory bodies have been

blocked at every turn. A significant setback came in 1986 when the U.S.

government effectively kil ed the

little-known United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations. Started in the mid-seventies, the

commission set out to draft a universal code of conduct for multinational corporations. Its goals were

preventing corporate abuses such as companies dumping, in the Third World, drugs that are il egal in the

West; examining the environmental and labour impacts of export factories and resource extraction; and

pushing the private sector toward greater transparency and accountability.

The merit of these goals seems self-evident today but the commission, in many ways, was a casualty of its

time. American industry was opposed to its creation from the start and in the heat of Cold War mania

managed to secure their government's withdrawal on the grounds that the commission was a Communist

plot and that the Soviets were using it for espionage. Why, they demanded, were Soviet-bloc national

enterprises not subject to the same probing as American companies? During this era, criticisms of the

abuses of multinational corporations were so bound up in anti-Communist paranoia that when the Bhopal

tragedy happened in 1984, the immediate response of a U.S. embassy official in New Delhi was not to


express horror but to say, "This is a feast for the Communists. They'l go with it for weeks."

More recently, attempts to force the World Trade Organization to include enforcement of basic labour laws

as a condition of global trade have been dismissed by member nations who insist such enforcement is the

job of the UN's International Labour Organization. The 1LO "is the competent body to determine and deal

with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them,"

states the WTO's Singapore

Ministerial Declaration of December 13, 1996. However, when the 1LO embarked on an initiative to draft a

meaningful corporate code of conduct, it too was blocked.

At first, these failures to regulate capital left many reform and opposition movements in a state of nearparalysis:

citizens, it seemed, had lost their say. Slowly, however, a handful of nongovernmental

organizations and groups of progressive intellectuals have been developing a political strategy that

recognizes that multinational brands, because of their high profile, can be far more galvanizing targets than

the politicians whom they bankroll. And once the corporations are feeling the heat, they have learned, it

becomes much easier to get the attention of elected politicians. In explaining why he has chosen to focus

his activism on the Nike corporation, Washington-based labour activist Jeff Ballinger says bluntly, "Because

we have more influence on a brand name than we do with our own governments."

Besides, adds John Vidal,


"Activists always target the people who have the power...so if the power moves from government to industry

to transnational corporations, so the swivel wil move onto these people."

Already, a common imperative is emerging from the disparate movements taking on multinational

corporations: the people's right to know. If multinationals have become larger and more powerful than

governments, the argument goes, then why shouldn't they be subject to the same accountability controls

and transparency that we demand of our public institutions? So anti-sweatshop activists have been

demanding that Wal-Mart hand over lists of all the factories around the world that supply the chain with

finished products. University students, as we wil see in Chapter 17, are demanding the same information

about factories that produce clothing with their school insignia. Environmentalists, meanwhile, have used

the courts to X-ray the inner working of McDonald's. And all over the world, consumers are demanding that

companies like Monsanto provide clear labelling of genetically modified food and open their research to

outside scrutiny.

Placing demands like these on private companies, whose only legal duty is to their shareholders, has

generated a surprising number of successes. The reason is that many multinationals have a rather sizable

weak spot. As we wil see in the next chapter, activists around the world are making liberal use of the very


factor that has been the subject of this book so far: the brand. Brand image, the source of so much

corporate wealth, is also, it turns out, the corporate Achil es' heel.

[IMAGE]

Top: Bil board Liberation Front jams an Apple campaign on the streets of San Francisco. Bottom: The Gap

falls victim to a "skulling" epidemic on Toronto outdoor ads.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE BRAND BOOMERANG

The Tactics of Brand-Based Campaigns

It can take 100 years to build up a good brand and 30 days to knock it down.

-David D'Alessandro, president of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance, January 6, 1999

Branding, as we have seen, is a balloon economy: it inflates with astonishing rapidity but it is full of hot air.

It shouldn't be surprising that this formula has bred armies of pin-wielding critics, eager to pop the corporate

balloon and watch the shreds fall to the ground. The more ambitious a company has been in branding the

cultural landscape, and the more careless it has been in abandoning workers, the more likely it is to have

generated a silent battalion of critics waiting to pounce. Moreover, the branding formula leaves corporations

wide open to the most obvious tactic in the activist arsenal: bringing a brand's production secrets crashing

into its marketing image. It's a tactic that has worked before.

Though marketing and production have not always been separated by so many bodies of water and layers


of subcontractors, the two have never been exactly cozy. Ever since the first ad campaigns created folksy

mascots to lend a homemade feel to mass-produced goods, it has been the very business of the advertising

industry to distance products from the factories that make them. Helen Woodward, an influential copywriter

in the 1920s, famously warned her co-workers that "if you are advertising any product, never see the factory

in which it was made.... Don't watch the people at work... because, you see, when you know the truth about

anything, the real inner truth — it is very hard to write the surface fluff which sells it."'

Back then, Dickensian images like those from the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire were stil fresh in the minds of

Western consumers. They didn't need to be reminded of the dark side of industrialization when they were

buying soap, stockings, cars or any other product that promised happiness in the self and envy in everybody

else. Besides, many of the consumers being targeted by advertising were themselves factory workers, and

the last thing a fluff writer wanted to do was trigger a memory of the dreary monotony of the assembly line.

But as First World countries have shifted into "information economies," we have developed a certain

nostalgia for the gritty authenticity of Woodward's era of industrialization. And so the factory, long

marketing's greatest taboo, has recently found a place in advertising. The shop floor is featured in Saturn


car ads, for example, where we meet empowered auto workers who can "stop the line" just because

something looks a little dodgy. Interior shots of a factory also briefly appear in an early nineties Subaru ad

— there to make the trademark Wieden Kennedy point that cars really aren't about impressing your

neighbours but driving "the best machine."

However, the factories featured in both the Saturn and Subaru campaigns aren't the sweat shop floor that

Woodward warned her fellow ad writers to never lay eyes upon; these are New Age nostalgia factories —

about as realistic as Intel's dancing techno-technicians. The role of these factories, like that of Aunt Jemima

and the Quaker Oats mascot, is to associate Subaru and Saturn with a simpler time, a time when goods

were made in the countries where they were consumed, when people stil knew their neighbours and nobody

had heard of an export processing zone. In the early nineties, at a time when car factories were closing in

droves and the market was being flooded with cheap imports, the ads — though purporting to take us

behind the glitz of advertising — were there not to il uminate the manufacturing process, but to obscure it.

In other words, Helen Woodward's rule holds truer now than ever: at no point has the double life of our

branded goods been more conflicted. Despite the rhetoric of One Worldism, the planet remains sharply

divided between producers and consumers, and the enormous profits raked in by the superbrands are


premised upon these worlds remaining as separate from each other as possible. It is a tidy formula:

because the contract factory owners in the free-trade zones don't sell a single Reebok sneaker or Mickey

Mouse sweatshirt directly to the public, they have a limitless threshold for bad public relations. Building up a

positive relationship with the shopping public, meanwhile, is left entirely in the hands of the brand-name

multinationals. The only catch is that for the system to function smoothly, workers must know little of the

marketed lives of the products they produce and consumers must remain sheltered from the production

lives of the brands they buy.

The formula has worked for quite a while. For the first two decades of their existence, export processing

zones were indeed globalization's dirty little secret — secured "labour warehouses" where the unsightly

business of production was contained behind high walls and barbed wire. But the

"brands, not products"

mania that has gripped the business world since the early nineties is coming back to haunt the free-floating,

incorporeal corporation. And no wonder. Severing brands so decisively from their sites of production and

shuttling factories away into the industrial hellholes of the EPZs has created a potentially explosive

situation. It's as if the global production chain is based on the belief that workers in the South and

consumers in the North wil never figure out a way to communicate with each other — that despite the infotech


hype, only corporations are capable of genuine global mobility. It is this supreme arrogance that has

made brands like Nike and Disney so vulnerable to the two principal tactics employed by Anticorporate

campaigners: exposing the riches of the branded world to the tucked-away sites of production and bringing

back the squalor of production to the doorstep of the blinkered consumer.

Designer Activism: The Logo Is the Star

I'm sitting in a crowded classroom in Berkeley, California, and somebody is turning up my collar to see the

label. For a moment, I feel as if I am back in grade school with Romi the logo vigilante checking for

impostors. Instead, it's 1997 and the person examining my collar is Lora Jo Foo, president of Sweatshop

Watch. She is running a seminar called "Ending Sweatshops at Home and Abroad" as part of a conference

on globalization. Every time Foo runs a seminar on sweatshops, she pulls out a pair of scissors and asks

everyone to cut the labels off their clothing. She then unfurls a map of the world made of white cloth. Our

liberated brand names are sewn onto the map, which, over the course of many such gatherings in several

countries, has become a crazy patchwork quilt of Liz Claiborne, Banana Republic, Victoria's Secret, Gap,

Jones New York, Calvin Klein and Ralph Lauren logos. Most of the dense little rectangular patches are

concentrated in Asia and Latin America. Foo then traces a company's global travel routes: she begins with


when its products were stil being produced in North America (only a few labels remain on that part of the

map); then moves to Japan and South Korea; then to Indonesia and the Philippines; then to China and

Vietnam. According to Foo, clothing logos make a great teaching aid; they take faraway, complex issues

and plant them as close to home as the clothes on our backs.

It must be said that no one is more surprised by the power and appeal of brandbased activism than those

who have spearheaded the campaigns. Many of the people leading the anti-sweatshop movement are longtime

advocates on behalf of the Third World's poor and marginalized. In the eighties, they plugged away in

near-total obscurity on behalf of Nicaragua's Sandinista rebels and El Salvador's FMLN opposition party.

After the wars ended and the pace of globalization accelerated, they learned that the new war zone for

Central America's poor was the sweatshop factory locked inside the military-guarded free-trade zone. But

what they weren't prepared for was how sympathetic the public would be to this problem. "I think that what

gives this issue such widespread appeal —makes it so much more real to people than the Central American

wars were — is that people make a direct connection with their own lives; it's no longer something that's 'out

there,'" says Trim Bissell of the Washington-based Campaign for Labour Rights.

"If they eat at one of those

chain outlets, they may well be putting into their bodies food that in one way or another depends on the


oppression of someone else. If they buy toys for their children, those toys may have been made by children

who have no childhood. It is so direct and so emotional and so human that people contact us and say 'How

can I help?' In this work, we're not having to say 'There's a problem.' We're mostly saying, 'Here's a

productive way you can direct your outrage.'" American author Lorraine Dusky described the dynamics of

this personal connection in USA Today. Watching TV reports of the May 1998

riots in Indonesia, she found

herself wondering whether her logos had anything to do with a young Indonesian girl shown wailing over the

dead body of a fire victim. "Were my Nikes somehow to blame?" she writes. "That bereft young girl might

stil have a father if Nike had insisted that workers be better paid. Because if Nike had, other sweatshop

employers might have followed suit." It may seem like a leap —blaming one's sneakers for a death in an

Indonesian pro-democracy protest - but it did provide the connection necessary, as Dusky writes, to see that

"globalization means more than the easy exchange of currency and goods; it means that we are all our

sisters' and brothers' keepers."

But while the effectiveness of brand-based campaigns may be in their immediate relevance to our own

branded lives, there is another factor contributing to their appeal, particularly among young people.

Anticorporate activism enjoys the priceless benefits of borrowed hipness and celebrity —borrowed, ironically


enough, from the brands themselves. Logos that have been burned into our brains by the finest image

campaigns money can buy, and lifted a little closer to the sun by their sponsorship of much-loved cultural

events, are perpetually bathed in a glow — the "loglo," to borrow a term from science fiction writer Neal

Stevenson. As Alexis de Tocquevil e predicted, it is fantastical creations like this that have the power to

make us "regret the world of reality" — and no reality has come to seem more comparatively regrettable

than that of people suffering under poverty and oppression in faraway places. So in the late seventies, as

the loglo grew brighter, social-justice activism faded; its woefully unmarketable ways no longer held much

appeal for energetic young people or for media obsessed with slick aesthetics.

But today, with so many Anticorporate activists adopting the aesthetics and humour of culture jamming and

the irreverent attitude of street reclaiming, that is beginning to change. From their new "leech-like" vantage

point, the brands' detractors are benefiting from the loglo in an unanticipated way.

The loglo is so bright that

activists are able to enjoy its light, even as they are in the act of attacking a brand.

This vicarious branding

may seem to some like an erosion of their political purity but it also clearly helps to lure foot soldiers to the

cause. Like a good ad bust, Anticorporate campaigns draw energy from the power and mass appeal of

marketing, at the same time as they hurl that energy right back at the brands that have so successfully


colonized our everyday lives.

You can see this jujitsu strategy in action in what has become a staple of many Anticorporate campaigns:

inviting a worker from a Third World country to come visit a First World superstore

— with plenty of

cameras rolling. Few newscasts can resist the made-for-TV moment when an Indonesian Nike worker gasps

as she learns that the sneakers she churned out for $2 a day sell for $120 at San Francisco Nike Town.

Since 1994, there have been at least five separate tours of Indonesian Nike workers through North America

and Europe — Cicih Sukaesih, who lost her job for trying to organize a union in a Nike factory, has been

back three times, her trips sponsored by coalitions of labour, church and school groups. In August 1995, two

Gap seamstresses — seventeen-year-old Claudia Leticia Molina from Honduras and eighteen-year-old

Judith Yanira Viera from El Salvador— went on similar North American speaking tours, addressing crowds

outside dozens of Gap outlets. Perhaps most memorably, shoppers were able to put a face to the issue of

child labour when fifteen-year-old Wendy Diaz appeared before the U.S.

Congress. She had been working

in a Honduran factory sewing Kathie Lee Gifford pants since she was thirteen.

Diaz testified to the presence

of "about 100 minors like me — thirteen, fourteen, fifteen years old — some even twelve.... Sometimes they

kept us al night long, working.... The supervisors scream at us and yell at us to work faster. Sometimes they


throw the garment in your face, or grab and shove you.... Sometimes the managers touch the girls.

Pretending it's a joke they touch our legs. Many of us would like to go to night school but we can't because

they constantly force us to work overtime."

No group has taken advantage of the branding economy's various leaks and cracks with more laser-like

accuracy than the National Labour Committee, under its director, Charles Kernaghan. In the five years

between 1994 and 1999, the NLC's three-person office in New York has used Greenpeace-style media

antics to draw more public attention to the plight of sweatshop workers than the multimil ion-dollar

international trade union movement has achieved in almost a century. As the garment-industry bible

Women's Wear Daily put it, "Charles Kernaghan and his anti-sweatshop battle have been shaking up the

issue of labour abuses in the apparel industry like nothing since the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire."

The NLC didn't achieve this rather remarkable feat by lobbying government or even by organizing workers.

It did it by setting out to sully some of the most polished logos on the brandscape.

Kernaghan's formula is

simple enough. First, select America's most cartoonish icons, from literal ones like Mickey Mouse to virtual

ones like Kathie Lee Gifford. Next, create head-on collisions between image and reality. "They live or die by

their image," Kernaghan says of his corporate adversaries. "That gives you a certain power over them


...these companies are sitting ducks."

Like the best culture jammers, Kernaghan has a natural feel for the pitch. He knew that he could "sell"

overseas sweatshops to the U.S. media-notorious for its double-jeopardy bias against labour and problems

in places where people don't speak English. But what he needed to do was steer clear of obscure labour

laws and arcane trade agreements, and keep the focus squarely on the logos behind the violations. It's a

formula that has brought the sweatshop story under serious scrutiny on 60

Minutes and 20/20 and in The

New York Times — and ultimately even to Hard Copy, which sent a crew to accompany Kernaghan on a

tour of Nicaraguan sweatshops in fall 1997.

The tabloid news show and the gutsy labour group didn't make as strange bedfellows as one might think.

We are a celebrity-obsessed culture, and such a culture is never in finer form than when one of its most

loved icons is mired in scandal. What Kernaghan had seized upon is that the fanatical obsession with logos

extends not only to building them up, but also to tearing them down. Though on a vastly different scale,

Nike's sweatshops are to labour reporting what OJ. Simpson's trial was to the legal beat: designer dirt. And

the NLC, for better or for worse (definitely for worse, say its critics), is indeed the Hard Copy of the labour

movement, forever searching out that intersection between the dazzling celebrity stratosphere and real life

on the mean streets.


So Kernaghan lays out the facts and figures of the global economy in Disney pajamas, Mike running shoes,

Wal-Mart aisles and the personal riches of the individuals involved — and crunches the numbers into

homemade statistical contraptions that he then wields like a mallet. For example: all 50,000 workers at the

Yue Yen Nike Factory in China would have to work for nineteen years to earn what Nike spends on

advertising in one year. Wal-Mart's annual sales are worth 120 times more than Haiti's entire annual budget;

Disney CEO Michael Eisner earns $9,783 an hour while a Haitian worker earns 28

cents an hour; it would

take a Haitian worker 16.8 years to earn Eisner's hourly income; the $181 mil ion in stock options Eisner

exercised in 1996 is enough to take care of his 19,000 Haitian workers and their families for fourteen years.

A typical Kernaghanism is to compare and contrast the plush living conditions of the dogs on the set of 101

Dalmatians with the shacks in which the Haitian workers live who sewed Disney pajamas decorated with the

movie's characters. The animals, he says, stayed in "doggie condos" fitted with cushy beds and heat lamps,

were cared for by on-call vets and served beef and chicken. The Haitian workers live in malaria- and

dysentery-infested hovels, sleep on cots and can rarely afford to buy meat or go to the doctor. It is in this

collision between the life of brand and the reality of production that Kernaghan works his own marketing

magic.


The NLC's events — far from the usual grey labour rallies — take full advantage of the powers of the loglo.

An October 1997 rally in New York City was a case in point: it began in Times Square across from Disney's

flagship superstore, proceeded along Seventh Avenue, past Macy's Tommy Hilfiger window display, past

Barnes 8t Noble, and Stern's department store. As the kick-off of "The Holiday Season of Conscience," the

rally had as visual backdrop for the chants and speeches Manhattan's most enormous logos: a giant red

swoosh on the skyline, the Maxell guy in his armchair getting "blown away" by digital sound and 3-D

displays for The Lion King on Broadway. When Jay Mazur, president of UNITE, pronounced that

"sweatshops are back and we know why," he did so with a towering, neon-lit Little Mermaid forming a halo

over his head. At another NLC-sponsored protest, this one in March 1999, participants parked a giant rubber

rat outside the Disney store. And because Kernaghan's tactics don't demand popcultural asceticism in

exchange for participation, they have proven hugely appealing to students, many of whom show up for

these rallies as walking culture jams. Echoing the cartoonish aesthetics of rave culture, high-school kids and

college students dress in fuzzy animal costumes: a six-foot pink pig holding up a sign that reads "Pigs

Against Greed," the Cookie Monster sporting a "No Justice, No Cookie" placard.

For the NIC, logos are both targets and props. Which is why, when Kernaghan speaks to a crowd - at


college campuses, labour rallies or international conferences — he is never without his signature shopping

bag brimming with Disney clothes, Kathie Lee Gifford pants and other logo gear.

During his presentations,

he holds up the pay slips and price tags to il ustrate the vast discrepancies between what workers are paid

to make the items and what we pay to buy them. He also takes his shopping bag with him when he visits the

export processing zones in Haiti and El Salvador, pulling out items from his bag of tricks to show workers

the actual price tags of the goods they sew. In a letter to Michael Eisner, he describes a typical reaction:

Prior to leaving for Haiti, I went to a Wal-Mart store on Long Island and purchased several Disney garments

which had been made in Haiti. I showed these to the crowd of workers, who immediately recognized the

clothing they had made... I held up a size four Pocahontas T-shirt. I showed them the Wal-Mart price tag

indicating $10.97. But it was only when I translated the $10.97 into the local currency- 172.26 gourdes - that,

all at once, in unison, the workers screamed with shock, disbelief, anger, and a mixture of pain and sadness,

as their eyes remained fixed on the Pocahontas shirt.... In a single day, they worked on hundreds of Disney

shirts. Yet the sales price of just one shirt in the U.S. amounted to nearly five days of their wages!11

The moment when the Haitian Disney workers cried out in disbelief was captured by one of Kernaghan's


colleagues on video and included in the NLC-produced documentary Mickey Mouse Goes to Haiti. Since

then, the documentary has been shown in hundreds of schools and community centres in North America

and Europe, and many young activists say that scene played a critical role in persuading them to join the

global struggle against sweatshops.

Another Kind of Logo Traffic

Information about the disparity between wages and retail prices can also prove radicalizing to the workers in

the factories who, as I learned in Cavite, know little about the value of the goods they produce. At the Al

Asia factory in the Cavite Export Processing Zone, for instance, the boss used to leave the price tags for the

Sassoon skirts in plain view-$52, they said. "Those price tags were put beside the buttons, and we were able

to see the prices when we passed through the packing section," one seamstress told me. "So we computed

the amount in pesos and the workers were saying, 'So the company is having this kind of sales? Then why

are we getting this small pay?'" After management got wind of these covert discussions there were no more

price tags left lying around at Al Asia.

In fact, I discovered that even finding out which brand names are being produced behind the locked gates of

the Cavite zone requires a fair bit of detective work, work that has been embraced by the Workers'

Assistance Centre outside the zone. One of the centre’s walls is covered by a bulletin board that looks


remarkably like Lora Jo Foo's logo quilt. Clothing labels are pinned all over the board: Liz Claiborne, Eddie

Bauer, Izod, Guess, Gap, El en Tracy, Sassoon, Old Navy. Beside each label on the board is the name of

the factory it came from: V.T. Fashion, Al Asia, Du Young. The organizers at WAC believe that this

information connecting brands to work is crucial in their attempt to empower zone workers to stand up for

their legal rights, particularly since the factory bosses are forever crying poor.

When workers learn, for

instance, that the Old Navy jeans they are sewing for pennies apiece are sold by a famous company called

the Gap and wil sell for $50 in America, they are more likely to demand overtime pay, or even longpromised

health coverage. Many workers are eager for this information too, which is why they have taken

the great risk of smuggling these clothing tags out of their factories; they slip them into their pockets at work,

hope that the guards don't find the scraps when they get searched at the gate, and then bring them over to

the centre. The next task for WAC is to find out something about the company that owns these names —not

always easy since many of the brands aren't even available for sale in the Philippines, and those that are

can only be found in the high-priced malls of Manila's tourist district.

In the last few years, however, gathering this information has become a little easier, in part as a result of a

marked increase in activist traffic around the world. With the aid of travel subsidies from well-funded


nongovernmental organizations and unions, representatives from the tiny Workers' Assistance Centre in

Rosario have gone to conferences all over Asia as well as in Germany and Belgium. And only two months

after I first met her in Cavite, I saw WAC organizer Cecil e Tuico again in Vancouver at the November 1997

People's Summit on APEC. The conference was attended by several thousand activists from forty countries

and was timed to coincide with a meeting of the leaders of the eighteen Asia-Pacific economies — from Bil

Clinton to Jiang Zemin — who were gathering in Vancouver that week.

On the last day of the summit, Cecil e and I skipped out of the seminars and spent an afternoon on busy

Robson Street, popping in and out of chain stores that sell many of the brand names produced in the Cavite

zone. We scoured the racks of fleece Baby Gap sleepers and booties, Banana Republic jackets, Liz

Claiborne blouses and Izod Lacoste shirts, and when we came across a "Made in the Philippines" tag, we

scribbled down the style numbers and prices. When she returned to Cavite, Cecil e converted the prices into

pesos (taking into account her country's plummeting currency rate) and carefully pinned them next to the

labels on the bulletin board in the WAC office. She and her colleagues point to these figures when workers

drop by the centre distressed about an il egal firing, back wages owed or an endless string of overnight

shifts. Together, they calculate how many weeks a zone seamstress would have to work to be able to afford


one Baby Gap sleeper for her child, and workers whisper this shocking figure to each other when they return

to their cramped dormitory rooms, or break for lunch at their sweltering factories.

The news spreads through

the zone like wildfire.

I remembered our "sweatshopping" trip (as The Nation writer Eyal Press calls these odd excursions) when I

received an E-mail from Cecil e some months later telling me that WAC has finally succeeded in unionizing

two garment factories inside the zone. The logos on the labels? Gap, Arizona Jeans, Izod, J.C. Penney and

Liz Claiborne.

Act Globally

Ever since the politics of representation first captured the imagination of feminists in the early seventies,

there have been women urging their movement sisters to look beyond how the fashion and beauty

industries oppress Westerners as consumers, and to consider the plight of the women around the world who

sweated to keep them in style. During the twenties and thirties, Emma Goldman and the International

Ladies' Garment Workers' Union rallied the women's movement behind sweatshop workers, but in recent

decades, these connections have seemed somewhat out of step with the times.

Though there has always

been a component of second-wave feminism that sought to forge political connections with women in

developing countries, the struggle for internationalism never quite took hold of the movement in the way


that pay equity, media representation or abortion rights did. Somehow, the seventies rallying cry that "the

personal is political" seemed more related to the issue of how fashion made women feel about themselves

than to the global mechanisms of how the garment industry made other women work.

In 1983, the American academic Cynthia Enloe was one of the voices in the wilderness. She insisted that

the "Made in Hong Kong" and "Made in Indonesia" labels that were appearing with greater frequency inside

her clothing provided a non-abstract starting point for women who wanted to understand the complexities of

global economics. "We can become more able to talk about, and to make sense of such alleged

'abstractions' as 'international capital' and the 'international sexual division of labour.' Both of these

concepts, so long the presumed intellectual preserve of male theoreticians (most of whom never ask who

weaves and who sews) are in reality only as 'abstract' as the jeans in our closets and the underwear in our

dresser drawers," she wrote.

At the time, thanks to a combination of too little awareness, cultural barriers and First World parochialism,

few were ready to listen. But many are listening today. Once again, this shift may be an unexpected byproduct

of branding ubiquity. Now that the corporations have spun their own global rainbow of logos and

labels, the infrastructure for genuine international solidarity is there for everyone to see and use. The logo


network may have been designed to maximize consumption and minimize production costs, but regular

people can now turn themselves into "spiders" (as the members of the Free Burma Coalition call

themselves) and travel across its web as easily as the corporations that spun it.

Which is where Lora Jo

Foo's logo map comes in — and Cecil e Tuico's bulletin board and Charles Kernaghan's shopping bag and

Lorraine Dusky's sneaker epiphany. It's like the Internet in general: it may have been built by the Pentagon,

but it quickly became the playground of activists and hackers.

So while cultural homogenization — the idea of everyone eating at Burger King, wearing Nike shoes and

watching Backstreet Boys videos-may inspire global claustrophobia, it has also provided a basis for

meaningful global communication. Thanks to the branded web, McDonald's workers around the world are

able to swap stories on the Internet about working under the arches; club kids in London, Berlin and Tel Aviv

can commiserate about the corporate co-optation of the rave scene; and North American journalists can talk

with poor rural factory workers in Indonesia about how much Michael Jordan gets paid to do Nike

commercials. This logo web has the unprecedented power to connect students who face ad bombardment in

their university washrooms with sweatshop workers who make the goods in the ads and frustrated

McWorkers who sell them. They may not all speak the same language, but they now have enough common


ground to begin a discussion. Playing on the Benetton slogan, one Reclaim the Streets organizer described

these new global networks as the "United Colours of Resistance."

A world united by Benetton slogans, Nike sweatshops and McDonald's jobs might not be anyone's Utopian

global vil age, but its fibre-optic cables and shared cultural references are nonetheless laying the

foundations for the first truly international people's movement. That may mean fighting Wal-Mart when it

comes to town, but it also means using the Net to network with the other fifty-odd communities in North

America that have fought the same battle; it means bringing resolutions about global labour offences to the

local city council meeting, and joining the international fight against the Multilateral Agreement on

Investment. It also means making sure that the cries from a toy factory fire in Bangkok can be heard loud

and clear outside the Toys 'R' Us at the mall.

Following the Logo Trail

As global brand-based connections gain popularity, that trail from the mall to the sweatshop becomes better

travelled. I certainly wasn't the first foreign journalist to pick through the laundry of the Cavite Export

Processing Zone. In the few months before I arrived, there had been, among others, a German television

crew and a couple of Italian documentary filmmakers who hoped to dig up some scandal on their homegrown

brand, Benetton. In Indonesia, so many journalists have wanted to visit Nike's infamous factories that


by the time I arrived in Jakarta in August 1997 the staff at the labour-rights group Yakoma were starting to

feel like professional tour guides. Every week another journalist — or "human-rights tourist," as Gary

Trudeau calls them in his cartoons — descended upon the area. The situation was the same at a factory I

tried to visit outside Medan, where child labourers were stitching Barbie's itsy-bitsy party outfits. I met with

local activists at the Indonesian Institute for Children's Advocacy and they pulled out a photo album fil ed

with pictures of the NBC crew that had been there. "It won awards," program director Muhammad Joni

proudly informs me of the Dateline documentary. "They dressed up as importers.

Hidden cameras-very

professional." Joni glances down at my little tape recorder and at the batik sundress I bought the week

before on the beach, unimpressed.

After four years of research, what I find most shocking is that so many supposed

"dirty little secrets" are

crammed into the global broom closet with such a casual attitude. In the EPZs, labour violations are a dime

a dozen — they come tumbling out as soon as you open the door even a crack.

As The Wall Street

Journal's Bob Ortega writes, "in truth, the entire apparel industry was one continuing and underreported

scandal."

With such corporate carelessness at play, no public-relations budget has proved rich enough to clearly


dissociate the brand from the factory. And the wider the disparity between the image and the reality, the

harder the company seems to get hit. Family-oriented brands like Disney, Wal-Mart and Kathie Lee Gifford

have been forced to confront the conditions under which real families produced their wares. And when the

McLibel crew released many of their most gruesome titbits about McDonald's-tortured chickens, and

hamburgers infested with E. coli bacteria, they displayed these facts over an image of the manic plastic face

of Ronald McDonald. The logo adopted by the McLibel defendants was a cigar-chomping fat cat hiding

behind a clown mask because, as the McLibelers put it, "Children love a secret, and Ronald's is especially

disgusting."

When the brand being targeted is anchored by a well-known personality, as is increasingly the case in the

era of the superbrand, these collisions between image and reality are potentially even more explosive. For

instance, when Kathie Lee Gifford was exposed for using sweatshops, she didn't have the option of reacting

like a corporate CEO — whom we expect to be motivated exclusively by shareholder returns. The bubbly

talk-show host is the human Aspartame of daytime TV. She could hardly start talking like a callous capitalist

cowboy when fifteen-year-old Wendy Diaz publicly pleaded, "If I could talk to Kathie Lee I would ask her to

help us, to end al the maltreatment, so that they would stop yelling at us and hitting us, and so they would


let us go to night school and let us organize to protect our rights." After all, five minutes before, Gifford

might have been confessing to the free world that a child's il ness had moved her to such copious tears that

she was forced to reduce the swelling under her eyes with Preparation H. She is, as Andrew Ross writes, "a

perfect foil for revelations about child labour." Confronted with Diaz's words, Gifford had two options: throw

away her entire multimil ion-dollar TV-Mom persona, or become the fairy godmother of the maquiladoras.

The choice was simple enough. "It took Gifford only two weeks to ascend to the saintly rank of labour

crusader," Ross recounts.

In an odd twist of marketing fate, corporate sponsorship itself has become an important lever for activists.

And why shouldn't it? When the International Olympic Committee (10C) became mired in bribery and

doping scandals in late 1998, the media immediately focused on how the controversy would affect the

games' corporate sponsors — companies that claimed to be aghast at the IOC's innocence lost. "It goes to

the heart of why we're involved in the Olympics. Anything that affects the positive image of the Olympics

affects us," said a spokesperson for Coca-Cola.

But surely that theory cuts both ways: if sponsors can be tarnished by corruption in the events they sponsor,

those events can also be tarnished by the dubious activities of their sponsors.

This is a connection that is


being made with increasing frequency as the sponsorship industry balloons. In August 1998, Celine Dion's

concert tour was picketed by human-rights activists in Boston, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. Although

she was unaware of it, her tour sponsor — Ericsson cellular —was among Burma's most intransigent foreign

investors, refusing to cease its dealings with the junta despite the campaign for an international boycott. But

when the brand bashing moved beyond Ericsson proper and began to spil onto Dion's diva image, it took

only a week of protests to induce Ericsson to announce its immediate withdrawal from Burma. Meanwhile,

sponsors that fail to shield performers from Anticorporate campaigns being waged against them have also

found themselves under attack from all sides. For instance, at Suzuki's Rock 'n'

Roll Marathon in San Diego,

California, in May 1999, the bands mutinied against their corporate sponsor.

Hootie and the Blowfish —

hardly known for their radical political views — decided to join forces with the campaigners who were

targeting the event because of Suzuki's business dealings with the Burmese junta.

Band members insisted

that a Suzuki banner be taken down before they got on stage and then performed wearing "Suzuki out of

Burma" T-shirts and stickers.

In addition to aggressive sponsorship, another marketing trend that has begun to backfire is the commercial

co-optation of identity politics, discussed in Chapter 5. Rather than softening its image, Mike's feministthemed


ads and antiracist slogans have only served to enrage women's groups and civil-rights leaders, who

insist that a company that got rich off the backs of young women in the Third World has no business using

the ideals of feminism and racial equality to sell more shoes. "I think people feel uneasy about the

repackaging of social justice images as commercials from the start," U.S. media critic Makani Themba

explains, "but they're not sure why. Then you hear these charges and you're ready to pounce on Nike as

hypocritical."

Which might explain why the first company to feel the heat of the sweatshop police was one that had

seemed to be a paragon of ethical corporatism, Levi Strauss. In 1992 Levi's became the first company to

adopt a corporate code of conduct after some of its contractors overseas were found to be treating their

workers as indentured slaves. This was not the image the company had presented back home, with its

commitment to non-hierarchical collective decision making and, later, its highprofile sponsorship of such

girl-power events as the Lilith Fair festival. Similarly, the Body Shop — though it may well be the most

progressive multinational on the planet — stil has a tendency to display its good deeds in its store windows

before getting its corporate house in order. Anita Roddick's company has been the subject of numerous

damning investigations in the press, which have challenged the company's use of chemicals, its stand on


unions and even its claim that its products have not been tested on animals.

We have heard the same refrain over and over again from Nike, Reebok, the Body Shop, Starbucks, Levi's

and the Gap: "Why are you picking on us? We're the good ones!" The answer is simple. They are singled

out because the politics they have associated themselves with, which have made them rich — feminism,

ecology, inner-city empowerment —were not just random pieces of effective ad copy that their brand

managers found lying around. They are complex, essential social ideas, for which many people have spent

lifetimes fighting. That's what lends righteousness to the rage of activists campaigning against what they

see as cynical distortions of those ideas. Al Dunlap, the notorious job-slasher-for-hire who built his

reputation on ruthless layoffs, may be able to respond to calls for corporate accountability with a rev of his

chainsaw, but companies such as Levi's and the Body Shop can't shrug them off, because they publicly

presented social accountability as the foundation of their corporate philosophy from the first. Over and over

again, it is when the advertising teams creatively overreach themselves that —like Icarus — they fall.

Injustice —in Synergy

By some accident of fate, on February 25, 1997, the multiple layers of anticorporate rage converged over

the Mighty Ducks hockey arena in Anaheim, California. It was Disney's annual meeting and about 10,000


shareholders crowded into the arena to rake Michael Eisner over the coals. They were upset that he had

paid more than $100 mil ion in a severance package to Hollywood superagent Michael Ovitz, who'd lasted

only fourteen scandal-racked months at Disney as second in command. Eisner was further attacked for his

own $400 mil ion multiyear pay package, as well as for stacking the board with friends and paid Disney

consultants. As if shareholders weren't angry enough, the obscene amounts of money lavished on Ovitz and

Eisner were thrown into harsh relief by an unrelated shareholders' resolution chiding Disney for paying

starvation wages to workers in its overseas factories, and calling for independent monitoring of these

practices. Outside the arena, dozens of National Labour Committee supporters were shouting and waving

placards about the plight of Disney's Haitian workforce. Of course the monitoring resolution was trounced,

but the way the issues of sweatshop labour and executive compensation played off one another must have

been music to Charles Kernaghan's ears.

Eisner, who apparently expected the gathering to be little more than a pep rally, was clearly caught off

guard by this confluence of events. Wasn't he simply playing by the rules —

making his shareholders rich

and himself richer? Weren't profits up a healthy 16 percent from the year before?

Wasn't the entertainment

industry, as Eisner himself reminded the restless gathering, "extremely competitive"? Ever the expert at


speaking to children, Eisner ventured, "I don't think people understand executive compensation."

Or maybe they understood it all too well. As one shareholder commented — to much applause — "Nobody

argues that Mr. Eisner hasn't done a fantastic job. But that's more in one year than someone like me wil get

in a lifetime. It's more than the President of the United States makes — and look what he runs!" Stil ,

Eisner's confusion is understandable. He is by no means the only CEO paid truly goofy amounts of money -

compared to some executives, he's positively roughing it, with an annual base salary of only $750,000 (with

bonuses and stock options on top of that, of course). And Disney certainly isn't alone in its sweatshop woes.

According to the U.S. Investor Responsibility Research Centre, there were seventy-nine anti-sweatshop

shareholder resolutions on the books for major American multi-nationals between 1996 and 1998, including

Dayton Hudson, Nike, the Gap, Land's End, J.C. Penney and Toys 'R' Us. It's clear that what was being put

on trial at that rowdy meeting in Anaheim was far more than the excesses of a single company — at issue

was the central question of global economic disparity: disparity between executive and worker, between

North and South, between consumer and producer, and even between individual shareholders and the boss.

The Mouse's family values provided a helpful glass structure at which to lob stones, but the truth is that

virtually any Fortune 500 company could have been in the hot seat that day.


CHAPTER SIXTEEN

A TALE OF THREE LOGOS

The Swoosh, the Shell and the Arches

Dozens of brand-based campaigns have succeeded in rattling their corporate targets, in several cases

pushing them to substantially alter their policies. But three campaigns stand out for having reached well

beyond activist circles and deep into public consciousness. The tactics they have developed — among them

the use of the courts to force transparency on corporations, and the Internet to bypass traditional media —

are revolutionizing the future of political engagement. By now it should come as no surprise that the targets

of these influential campaigns are three of the most familiar and best-tended logos on the brandscape: the

Swoosh, the Shell and the Arches.

The Swoosh: The Fight for Good Jobs

Nike CEO Phil Knight has long been a hero of the business schools. Prestigious academic publications such

as The Harvard Business Review have lauded his pioneering marketing techniques, his understanding of

branding and his early use of outsourcing. Countless 1VIBA candidates and other students of marketing and

communications have studied the Mike formula of "brands, not products." So when Phil Knight was invited

to be a guest speaker at the Stanford University Business School-Knight's own alma mater— in May 1997,

the visit was expected to be one in a long line of Nike love-ins. Instead, Knight was greeted by a crowd of


picketing students, and when he approached the microphone he was taunted with chants of "Hey Phil, off

the stage. Pay your workers a living wage." The Nike honeymoon had come to a grinding halt.

No story il ustrates the growing distrust of the culture of corporate branding more than the international anti-Nike movement — the most publicized and tenacious of the brand-based campaigns. Nike's sweatshop

scandals have been the subject of over 1,500 news articles and opinion columns.

Its Asian factories have

been probed by cameras from nearly every major media organization, from CBS

to Disney's sports station,

ESPN. On top of all that, it has been the subject of a series of Doonesbury cartoon strips and the butt of

Michael Moore's documentary The Big One. As a result, several people in Nike's PR department work full

time dealing with the sweatshop controversy—fielding complaints, meeting with local groups and developing

Nike's response — and the company has created a new executive position: vice president for corporate

responsibility. Nike has received hundreds and thousands of letters of protest, faced hundreds of both small

and large groups of demonstrators, and is the target of a dozen critical Web sites.

For the last two years, anti-Nike forces in North America and Europe have attempted to focus all the

scattered swoosh bashing on a single day. Every six months they have declared an International Nike Day

of Action, and brought their demands for fair wages and independent monitoring directly to Nike's


customers, shoppers at flagship Nike Towns in urban centres or the less glamorous Foot Locker outlets in

suburban malls. According to Campaign for Labour Rights, the largest anti-Nike event so far took place on

October 18, 1997: eighty-five cities in thirteen countries participated. Not all the protests have attracted

large crowds, but since the movement is so decentralized, the sheer number of individual anti-Nike events

has left the company's public-relations department scrambling to get its spin onto dozens of local

newscasts. Though you'd never know it from its branding ubiquity, even Nike can't be everywhere at once.

Since so many of the stores that sell Nike products are located in malls, protests often end with a security

guard escorting participants into the parking lot. Jeff Smith, an activist from Grand Rapids, Michigan,

reported that "when we asked if private property rights ruled over free speech rights, the [security] officer

hesitated and then emphatically said YES!" (Though in the economically depressed city of St. John's,

Newfoundland, anti-Nike campaigners reported that after being thrown out of a mall, "they were approached

by a security guard who asked to sign their petition."') But there's plenty that can be done on the sidewalk or

in the mall parking lot.

SLOGANS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-NIKE MOVEMENT:

Just Don't Do It Just Don't Nike, Do It Just Justice. Do it, Nike The Swooshtika Just Boycott It Ban the Swoosh Nike - Fair Play?

Nike, Nein, Ich Kaufe Es Nicht! (Nike - No, I Don't Buy It!) Nike Soyez Sport! (Nike Be a Sport) Just Duit (It's just money) A TALE OF THREE LOGOS

Campaigners have dramatized Nike's labour practices through what they call

"sweatshop fashion shows,"

and "The Transnational Capital Auction: A Game of Survival" (the lowest bidder wins), and a global

economy treadmil (run fast, stay in the same place). In Australia, anti-Nike protestors have been known to

parade around in calico bags painted with the slogan "Rather wear a bag than Nike." Students at the

University of Colorado in Boulder dramatized the difference between the legal minimum wage and a living

wage by holding a fundraising run in which "participants pay an entrance fee of $1.60 (daily wages for a

Nike worker in Vietnam) and the winner wil receive $2.10 (the price of three square meals in Vietnam)."

Meanwhile, activists in Austin, Texas, made a giant papier-mâché Nike sneaker piñata, and a protest

outside a Regina, Saskatchewan, shopping centre featured a deface-the-swoosh booth. The last stunt is

something of a running theme in all the anti-Nike actions: Nike's logo and slogan have been jammed so

many times — on T-shirts, stickers, placards, banners and pins — that the semiotic bruises have turned

them black and blue (see list below).

Tellingly, the anti-Nike movement is at its strongest inside the company's home state of Oregon, even

though the area has reaped substantial economic benefits from Nike's success (Nike is the largest employer


in Portland and a significant local philanthropist). Phil Knight's neighbours, nonetheless, have not all rushed

to his defence in his hour of need. In fact, since the Life magazine soccer-ball story broke, many

Oregonians have been out for blood. The demonstrations outside the Portland Nike Town are among the

largest and most militant in the country, sometimes sporting a menacing giant Phil Knight puppet with dollar

signs for eyes or a twelve-foot Nike swoosh dragged by small children (to dramatize child labour). And in

contravention of the principles of non-violence that govern the anti-Nike movement, one protest in Eugene,

Oregon, led to acts of vandalism including the tearing-down of a fence surrounding the construction of a

new Nike Town, gear pulled off shelves at an existing Nike store and, according to one eyewitness, "an

entire rack of clothes...dumped off a balcony into a fountain below."

Local papers in Oregon have aggressively (sometimes gleefully) followed Knight's sweatshop scandals, and

the daily paper The Oregonian sent a reporter to Southeast Asia to do its own lengthy investigation of the

factories.

Mark Zusman, editor of the Oregon newspaper The Wil amette Week, publicly admonished Knight in a 1996

"memo": "Frankly, Phil, it's time to get a little more sophisticated about this media orgy... Oregonians

already have suffered through the shame of Tonya Harding, Bob Packwood and Wes Cooley. Spare us the


added humiliation of being known as the home of the most exploitative capitalist in the free world."

Even Mike's charitable donations have become controversial. In the midst of a critical fundraising drive to

try to address a $15 mil ion shortfall, the Portland School Board was torn apart by debate about whether to

accept Mike's gift of $500,000 in cash and swooshed athletic gear. The board ended up accepting the

donation, but not before looking their gift horse publicly in the mouth. "I asked myself," school board trustee

Joseph Tarn told The Oregonian, "Mike contributed this money so my children can have a better education,

but at whose expense? At the expense of children who work for six cents an hour?... As an immigrant and

as an Asian I have to face this moral and ethical dilemma."

Mike's sponsorship scandals have reached far beyond the company's home state.

In Edmonton, Alberta,

teachers, parents and some students tried to block Mike from sponsoring a children's street hockey program

because "a company which profits from child labour in Pakistan ought not to be held up as a hero to

Edmonton children." At least one school involved in the city-wide program sent back its swooshed

equipment to Mike headquarters. And when Mike approached the City of Ottawa Council in March 1998 to

suggest building one of its swooshed gymnasium floors in a local community centre, it faced questions

about "blood money." Mike withdrew its offer and gave the court to a more grateful centre, run by the Boys


and Girls Clubs. The dilemma of accepting Mike sponsorship money has also exploded on university

campuses, as we wil see in the next chapter.

At first, much of the outrage stemmed from the fact that when the sweatshop scandal hit the papers, Nike

wasn't really acting all that sorry about it. While Kathie Lee Gifford and the Gap had at least displayed

contrition when they got caught with their sweatshops showing, Phil Knight had practically stonewalled:

denying responsibility, attacking journalists, blaming rogue contractors and sending out flacks to speak for

the company. While Kathie Lee was crying on TV, Michael Jordan was shrugging his shoulders and saying

that his job was to shoot hoop, not play politics. And while the Gap agreed to allow a particularly

controversial factory in El Salvador to be monitored by local human-rights groups, Mike was paying lip

service to a code of conduct that its Asian workers, when interviewed, had never even heard of.

But there was a critical difference between Mike and the Gap at this stage. Mike didn't panic when its

scandals hit the middle-American mall, because the mall, while it is indeed where most Mike products are

sold, is not where Mike's image was made. Unlike the Gap, Mike has drawn on the inner cities, merging, as

we've seen, with the styles of poor black and Latino youth to load up on imagery and attitude. Mike's

branding power is thoroughly intertwined with the African-American heroes who have endorsed its products


since the mid-eighties: Michael Jordan, Charles Barkley, Scottie Pippen, Michael Johnson, Spike Lee, Tiger

Woods, Bo Jackson-not to mention the rappers who wear Mike gear on stage.

While hip-hop style was the

major influence at the mall, Phil Knight must have known that as long as Mike was King Brand with Jordan

fans in Compton and the Bronx, he could be stirred but not shaken. Sure, their parents, teachers and church

leaders might be tut-tut ting over sweatshops, but as far as Mike's core demographic of thirteen- to

seventeen-year-old kids was concerned, the swoosh was stil made of Teflon.

By 1997, it had become clear to Mike's critics that if they were serious about taking on the swoosh in an

image war, they would have to get at the source of the brand's cachet — and as Mick Alexander of the

multicultural Third Force magazine wrote in the summer of that year, they weren't even close. "Nobody has

figured out how to make Mike break down and cry. The reason is that nobody has engaged African

Americans in the fight.... To gain significant support from communities of colour, corporate campaigns need

to make connections between Mike's overseas operations and conditions here at home."

The connections were there to be made. It is the crudest irony of Mike's "brands, not products" formula that

the people who have done the most to infuse the swoosh with cutting-edge meaning are the very people

most hurt by the company's pumped-up prices and nonexistent manufacturing base. It is inner-city youth


who have most directly felt the impact of Mike's decision to manufacture its products outside the U.S., both

in high unemployment rates and in the erosion of the community tax base (which sets the stage for the

deterioration of local public schools).

Instead of jobs for their parents, what the inner-city kids get from Nike is the occasional visit from its

marketers and designers on "bro-ing" pilgrimages. "Hey, bro, what do you think of these new Jordans - are

they fresh or what?" The effect of high-priced cool hunters whipping up brand frenzy on the cracked asphalt

basketball courts of Harlem, the Bronx and Compton has already been discussed: kids incorporate the

brands into gang-wear uniforms; some want the gear so badly they are wil ing to sell drugs, steal, mug, even

kil for it. Jessie Collins, executive director of the Edenwald-Gun Hil Neighbourhood Centre in the northeast

Bronx, tells me that it's sometimes drug or gang money, but more often it's the mothers' minimum-wage

salaries or welfare checks that are spent on disposable status wear. When I asked her about the media

reports of kids stabbing each other for their $150 Air Jordans she said dryly, "It's enough to beat up on your

mother for... $150 is a hell of a lot of money."

Shoe-store owners like Steven Roth of Essex House of Fashion are often uncomfortable with the way socalled

street fashions play out for real on the post-industrial streets of Newark, New Jersey, where his store

is located.


I do get weary and worn down from it all. I'm always forced to face the fact that I make my money from poor

people. A lot of them are on welfare. Sometimes a mother wil come in here with a kid, and the kid is dirty

and poorly dressed. But the kid wants a hundred-twenty-buck pair of shoes and that stupid mother buys

them for him. I can feel that kid's inner need — this desire to own these things and have the feelings that go

with them — but it hurts me that this is the way things are.

It's easy to blame the parents for giving in, but that "deep inner need" for designer gear has grown so

intense that it has confounded everyone from community leaders to the police.

Everyone pretty much

agrees that brands like Nike are playing a powerful surrogate role in the ghetto, subbing for everything from

self-esteem to African-American cultural history to political power. What they are far less sure about is how

to fil that need with empowerment and a sense of self-worth that does not necessarily come with a logo

attached. Even broaching the subject of brand fetishism to these kids is risky. With so much emotion

invested in celebrity consumer goods, many kids take criticism of Nike or Tommy as a personal attack, as

grave a transgression as insulting someone's mother to his face.

Not surprisingly, Nike sees its appeal among disadvantaged kids differently. By supporting sports programs

in Boys and Girls Clubs, by paying to repave urban basketball courts and by turning high-performance


sports gear into street fashions, the company claims it is sending out the inspirational message that even

poor kids can "Just Do It." In its press material and ads, there is an almost messianic quality to Nike's

portrayal of its role in the inner cities: troubled kids wil have higher self-esteem, fewer unwanted

pregnancies and more ambition — all because at Nike "We see them as athletes."

For Nike, its $150 Air

Jordans are not a shoe but a kind of talisman with which poor kids can run out of the ghetto and better their

lives. Nike's magic slippers wil help them fly —just as they made Michael Jordan fly.

A remarkable, subversive accomplishment? Maybe. But one can't help thinking that one of the main

reasons black urban youth can get out of the ghetto only by rapping or shooting hoops is that Nike and the

other multinationals are reinforcing stereotypical images of black youth and simultaneously taking all the

jobs away. As U.S. Congressman Bernie Sanders and Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur stated in a letter to

the company, Nike has played a pivotal part in the industrial exodus from urban centres. "Nike has led the

way in abandoning the manufacturing workers of the United States and their families.... Apparently, Nike

believes that workers in the United States are good enough to purchase your shoe products, but are no

longer worthy enough to manufacture them."

And when the company's urban branding strategy is taken in conjunction with this employment record, Nike


ceases to be the saviour of the inner city and turns into the guy who steals your job, then sells you a pair of

overpriced sneakers and yells, "Run like hell!" Hey, it's the only way out of the ghetto, kid. Just do it.

That's what Mike Gitelson thought, anyway. A social worker at the Bronx's Edenwald-Gun Hil

Neighbourhood Centre, he was unimpressed with the swoosh's powers as a self-help guru in the projects

and "sick of seeing kids wearing sneakers they couldn't afford and which their parents couldn't afford.""

Nike's critics on college campuses and in the labour movement may be fuelled largely by moral outrage, but

Mike Gitelson and his colleagues simply feel ripped off. So rather than lecturing the kids on the virtues of

frugality, they began telling them about how Nike made the shoes that they wanted so badly. Gitelson told

them about the workers in Indonesia who earned $2 a day, he told them that it cost Nike only $5 to make

the shoes they bought for between $100 and $180, and he told them about how Nike didn't make any of its

shoes in the U.S. - which was part of the reason their parents had such a tough time finding work. "We got

really angry," says Gitelson, "because they were taking so much money from us here and then going to

other countries and exploiting people even worse.... We want our kids to see how it affects them here on the

streets, but also how here on the streets affects people in Southeast Asia." His colleague at the centre,


youth worker Leo Johnson, lays out the issue using the kids' own lingo. "Yo, dude," he tells his preteen

audiences, "you're being suckered if you pay $100 for a sneaker that costs $5 to make. If somebody did that

to you on the block, you know where it's going."

The kids at the centre were upset to learn about the sweatshops but they were clearly most pissed off that

Phil Knight and Michael Jordan were playing them for chumps. They sent Phil Knight a hundred letters

about how much money they had spent on Nike gear over the years — and how, the way they figured it,

Nike owed them big time. "I just bought a pair of Nikes for $100," one kid wrote.

"It's not right what you're

doing. A fair price would have been $30. Could you please send me back $70?"

When the company

answered the kids with a form letter, "That's when we got really angry and started putting together the

protest," Gitelson says.

They decided the protest would take the form of a "shoe-in" at the Nike Town at Fifth Avenue and Fiftyseventh

Street. Since most of the kids at the centre are full-fledged swoosh ah olics, their closets are jampacked

with old Air Jordans and Air Carnivores that they would no longer even consider wearing. To put the

obsolete shoes to practical use, they decided to gather them together in garbage bags and dump them on

the doorstep of Nike Town.

When Nike executives got wind that a bunch of black and Latino kids from the Bronx were planning to


publicly diss their company, the form letters came to an abrupt halt. Up to that point, Nike had met most

criticism by attacking its critics as members of "fringe groups," but this was different: if a backlash took root

in the inner cities, it could sink the brand at the mall. As Gitelson puts it, "Our kids are exactly who Nike

depends upon to set the trends for them so that the rest of the country buys their sneakers. White middleclass

adults who are fighting them, well, it's almost okay. But when youth of colour start speaking out

against Nike, they start getting scared."

The executives in Oregon also knew, no doubt, that Edenwald was only the tip of the iceberg. For the past

couple of years, debates have been raging in hip-hop scenes about rappers "label whoring for Nike and

Tommy" instead of supporting black-owned clothing companies like FUBU (For Us By Us). And rapper KRSOne

planned to launch the Temple of Hip Hop, a project that promised to wrest the culture of African-American youth away from white record and clothing labels and return it to the communities that built it. It

was against this backdrop that, on September 10, 1997 — two weeks before the shoe-in protest was

scheduled to take place — Nike's chief of public relations, Vada Manager, made the unprecedented move

of flying in from Oregon with a colleague to try to convince the centre that the swoosh was a friend of the

projects.


"He was working overtime to put the spins on us," says Gitelson. It didn't work. At the meeting, the centre

laid out three very concrete demands:

1. Those who work for Nike overseas should be paid a living wage, with independent monitoring to ensure

that it is occurring.

2. Nike sneakers should be sold less expensively here in America with no concessions to American

workforce (i.e. no downsizing, or loss of benefits)

3. Nike should seriously re-invest in the inner city in America, especially New York City since we have been

the subject of much of their advertising. Gitelson may have recognized that Nike was scared—but not that

scared. Once it became clear that the two parties were at an impasse, the meeting turned into a scolding

session as the two Nike executives were required to listen to Edenwald director Jessie Collins comparing

the company's Asian sweatshops with her experience as a young girl picking cotton in the share-cropping

South. Back in Alabama, she told Manager, she earned $2 a day, just like the Indonesians. "And maybe a

lot of Americans can't identify with those workers' situation, but I certainly can."

Vada Manager returned to Oregon defeated and the protest went off as planned, with two hundred

participants from eleven community centres around New York. The kids — most of whom were between

eleven and thirteen years old —hooted and hollered and dumped several clear garbage bags of smelly old


Nikes at the feet of a line of security guards who had been brought in on special assignment to protect the

sacred Nike premises. Vada Manager again flew to New York to run damage control, but there was little he

could do. Local TV crews covered the event, as did an ABC news team and The New York Times,

In a harsh bit of bad timing for the company, the Times piece ran on a page facing another story about Nike.

Graphically underlining the urgency of the protest, this story reported that a fourteen-year-old boy from

Crown Heights had just been murdered by a fifteen-year-old boy who beat him and left him on the subway

tracks with a train approaching. "Police Say Teenager Died for His Sneakers and Beeper," the headline

read. And the brand of his sneakers? Air Jordans. The article quoted the kil er's mother saying that her son

had got mixed up with gangs because he wanted to "have nice things." A friend of the victim explained that

wearing designer clothes and carrying a beeper had become a way for poor kids to "feel important."

The African-American and Latino kids outside Nike Town on Fifth Avenue — the ones swarmed by cameras

and surrounded by curious onlookers —were feeling pretty important, too. Taking on Nike "toe to toe," as

they said, turned out to be even more fun than wearing Nikes. With the Fox News camera pointed in his

face, one of the young activists — a thirteen-year-old boy from the Bronx —stared into the lens and

delivered a message to Phil Knight: "Nike, we made you. We can break you."


What is perhaps most remarkable about the Nike backlash is its durability. After four solid years in the

public eye, the Nike story stil has legs (so too, of course, does the Nike brand).

Stil , most corporate

scandals are successfully faced down with a statement of "regret" and a few glossy ads of children playing

happily under the offending logo. Not with Nike. The news reports, labour studies and academic research

documenting the sweat behind the swoosh have yet to slow down, and Nike critics remain tireless at

dissecting the steady stream of materials churned out by Nike's PR machine.

They were unmoved by Phil

Knight's presence on the White House Task Force on Sweatshops — despite his priceless photo op

standing beside President Clinton at the Rose Garden press conference. They sliced and diced the report

Nike commissioned from civil-rights leader Andrew Young, pointing out that Young completely dodged the

question of whether Nike's factory wages are inhumanely exploitative, and attacking him for relying on

translators provided by Nike itself when he visited the factories in Indonesia and Vietnam. As for Nike's

other study-for-hire — this one by a group of Dartmouth business students who concluded that workers in

Vietnam were living the good life on less than $2 a day — well, everyone pretty much ignored that one

altogether.

Finally, in May 1998, Phil Knight stepped out from behind the curtain of spin doctors and called a press


conference in Washington to address his critics directly. Knight began by saying that he had been painted

as a "corporate crook, the perfect corporate vil ain for these times." He acknowledged that his shoes "have

become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime and arbitrary abuse."

Then, to much fanfare, he

unveiled a plan to improve working conditions in Asia. It contained some tough new regulations on factory

air quality and the use of petroleum-based chemicals. It promised to provide classes inside some

Indonesian factories and promised not to hire anyone under eighteen years old in the shoe factories. But

there was stil nothing substantial in the plan about allowing independent outside monitors to inspect the

factories, and there were no wage raises for the workers. Knight did promise, however, that Nike's

contractors would no longer be permitted to appeal to the Indonesian government for a waiver on the

minimum wage.

It wasn't enough. That September the San Francisco human-rights group Global Exchange, one of the

company's harshest critics, released an alarming report on the status of Mike's Indonesian workers in the

midst of the country's economic and political crisis. "While workers producing Nike shoes were low paid

before their currency, the rupee, began plummeting in late 1997, the dollar value of their wages has

dropped from $2.47/day in 1997 to 80 cents/day in 1998." Meanwhile, the report noted that with soaring


commodity prices, workers "estimated that their cost of living had gone up anywhere from 100 to 300 per

cent." Global Exchange called on Nike to double the wages of its Indonesian workforce, an exercise that

would cost it $20 mil ion a year — exactly what Michael Jordan is paid annually to endorse the company.

Not surprisingly, Nike did not double the wages, but it did, three weeks later, give 30 percent of the

Indonesian workforce a 25 percent raise. That, too, failed to silence the crowds outside the superstores, and

five months later Nike came forward again, this time with what vice president of corporate responsibility

Maria Eitel called "an aggressive corporate responsibility agenda at Nike." As of April 1, 1999, workers

would get another 6 percent raise. The company had also opened up a Vietnamese factory near Ho Chi

Minh City to outside health and safety monitors, who found conditions much improved. Dara O'Rourke of

the University of California at Berkeley reported that the factory had "implemented important changes over

the past 18 months which appear to have significantly reduced worker exposures to toxic solvents,

adhesives and other chemicals." What made the report all the more remarkable was that O'Rourke's

inspection was a genuinely independent one: in fact, less than two years earlier, he had enraged the

company by leaking a report conducted by Ernst Young that showed that Nike was ignoring widespread

violations at that same factory.


O'Rourke's findings weren't all glowing. There were stil persistent problems with air quality, factory

overheating and safety gear —and he had visited only the one factory. As well, Nike's much-heralded 6

percent pay raise for Indonesian workers stil left much to be desired; it amounted to an increase of one cent

an hour and, with inflation and currency fluctuation, only brought wages to about half of what Nike pay

checks were worth before the economic crisis. Even so, these were significant gestures coming from a

company that two years earlier was playing the role of the powerless global shopper, claiming that

contractors alone had the authority to set wages and make the rules.

The resilience of the Nike campaign in the face of the public-relations onslaught is persuasive evidence that

invasive marketing, coupled with worker abandonment, strikes a wide range of people from different walks

of life as grossly unfair and unsustainable. Moreover, many of those people are not interested in letting Nike

off the hook simply because this formula has become the standard one for capitalism-as-usual. On the

contrary, there seems to be a part of the public psyche that likes kicking the most macho and extreme of all

the sporting-goods companies in the shins — I mean really likes it. Nike's critics have shown that they don't

want this story to be brushed under the rug with a reassuring bit of corporate PR; they want it out in the

open, where they can keep a close eye on it.


In large part, this is because Nike's critics know that the company's sweatshop scandals are not the result of

a series of freak accidents: they know that the criticisms levelled at Nike apply to all the brand-based shoe

companies contracting out to a global maze of firms. But rather than this serving as a justification, Nike —as

the market leader-has become a lightning rod for this broader resentment. It has been latched on to as the

essential story of the extremes of the current global economy: the disparities between those who profit from

Nike's success and those who are exploited by it are so gaping that a child could understand what is wrong

with this picture and indeed (as we wil see in the next chapter) it is children and teenagers who most readily

do.

So, when does the total boycott of Nike products begin? Not soon, apparently. A cursory glance around any

city in the world shows that the swoosh is stil ubiquitous; some athletes stil tattoo it on their navels, and

plenty of high-school students stil deck themselves out in the coveted gear. But at the same time, there can

be little doubt that the mil ions of dollars that Nike has saved in labour costs over the years are beginning to

bite back, and take a toll on its bottom line. "We didn't think that the Nike situation would be as bad as it

seems to be," said Nikko stock analyst Tim Finucane in The Wall Street Journal in March 1998. Wall Street

really had no choice but to turn on the company that had been its darling for so many years. Despite the fact


that Asia's plummeting currencies meant that Mike's labour costs in Indonesia, for instance, were a quarter

of what they were before the crash, the company was stil suffering. Mike's profits were down, orders were

down, stock prices were way down, and after an average annual growth of 34

percent since 1995, quarterly

earnings were suddenly down 70 percent. By the third quarter, which ended in February 1999, Mike's profits

were once again up 70 percent—but by the company's own account, the recovery was not the result of

rebounding sales but rather of Mike's decision to cut jobs and contracts. In fact, Mike's revenues and future

orders were down in 1999 for the second year in a row.

Mike has blamed its financial problems on everything but the human-rights campaign. The Asian currency

crisis was the reason Mikes weren't selling well in Japan and South Korea; or it was because Americans

were buying "brown shoes" (walking shoes and hiking boots) as opposed to big white sneakers. But the

brown-shoe excuse rang hollow. Mike makes plenty of brown shoes — it has a line of hiking boots, and it

owns Cole Haan (and recently saved mil ions by closing down the Cole Haan factory in Portland, Maine, and

moving production to Mexico and Brazil). More to the point, Adidas staged a massive comeback during the

very year that Mike was free-falling. In the quarter when Mike nose-dived, Adidas sales were up 42 percent,

its net income was up 48 percent, to $255 mil ion, and its stock price had tripled in two years. The German


company, as we have seen, turned its fortunes around by copying Mike's production structure and all but

Xeroxing its approach to marketing and sponsorships (the political implications of that wil be dealt with in

Chapter 18). In 1997-98, Adidas even redesigned its basketball shoes so they looked just like Mikes: big,

white and ultra high tech. But unlike Mikes, they sold briskly. So much for the brown-shoe theory.

Over the years Mike has tried dozens of tactics to silence the cries of its critics, but the most ironic by far

has been the company's desperate attempt to hide behind its product. "We're not political activists. We are

a footwear manufacturer," said Nike spokeswoman Donna Gibbs, when the sweatshop scandal first began to

erupt. A footwear manufacturer? This from the company that made a concerted decision in the mid-eighties

not to be about boring corporeal stuff like footwear — and certainly nothing as crass as manufacturing. Nike

wanted to be about sports, Knight told us, it wanted to be about the idea of sports, then the idea of

transcendence through sports; then it wanted to be about self-empowerment, women's rights, racial equality.

It wanted its stores to be temples, its ads a religion, its customers a nation, its workers a tribe. After taking

us all on such a branded ride, to turn around and say "Don't look at us, we just make shoes" rings laughably

hollow.

Mike was the most inflated of all the balloon brands, and the bigger it grew, the louder it popped.


The Shell: The Fight for Open Space

In North America, Nike has been at the forefront of the burgeoning political movement taking aim at the

power of multinationals, but in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, that dubious honour has belonged to

Royal Dutch/Shell.

It began in February 1995 when Shell finalized its plans to dispose of a rusted and obsolete oil-storage

platform, known as Brent Spar, by sinking it in the Atlantic Ocean, 150 miles off the coast of Scotland. The

environmental group Greenpeace was against the plan, claiming the 14,500-ton rig should be towed to land,

where the oil sludge could be contained and the rig's parts recycled. Shell countered that land disposal was

unsafe, not to mention impossible. Then, on April 30, just as Shell began towing the platform to its watery

grave, a group of Greenpeace activists showed up in a helicopter and tried to land on the Brent Spar. Shell

fended off the aircraft with water cannons, but the entire episode was captured on videotape, and the

images were sent via satellite to TV stations around the world.

It was vintage Greenpeace, ever the made-for-TV activists. But the impact those images from the Brent

Spar had on the European public took even Greenpeace by surprise. Before the Brent Spar incident, the

group was teetering on the brink of obsolescence — the eco movement had been under attack, and

appeared to be sputtering out in the wake of recession, and Greenpeace itself had lost credibility because of


internal divisions and questionable financial and tactical policies. When Greenpeace decided to launch a

campaign against the sinking of the Brent Spar, it had no idea that this rather arcane issue would become a

cause celebre. As Robin Grove-White, chairman of Greenpeace U.K., readily admits, "No one, and certainly

not people within Greenpeace, anticipated the profound and continuing reverberations."

Unlike the environmentally disastrous Exxon Valdez oil spil four years earlier (a clear-cut case of

negligence involving a drunken captain), it wasn't as if Shell was doing anything il egal. The plan had

received full approval from John Major's governing Conservatives, and sinking had become a standard way

of disposing of old platforms. Besides, it was even debatable whether Greenpeace's land-disposal

alternative was more ecologically sound than Shell's proposed deep-sea dunk.

But the image that

Greenpeace generated -of an ugly, giant, rusted pollution generator fending off the good green activists that

were buzzing it like dogged mosquitoes — caught people's attention, and gave them a timely and rare

opportunity to stop and think about what was being proposed. And much of the public decided that Shell

wanted to sink its hunk of metal and sludge because the most profitable corporation in the world was too

cheap to come up with a better plan to dispose of its garbage. This view was reinforced by a damning study


that found that land disposal of the Brent Spar would cost Shell US$70 mil ion, while sinking it would cost a

mere US$16 mil ion. Coming from a $128 bil ion company, this apparent penny-pinching did not impress the

gasoline-buying public at all.

That Shell's actions were legal and Greenpeace's were not seemed to be entirely beside the point. In the

eyes of many Europeans, Shell was morally wrong. Thousands of people protested outside its gas stations,

and in Germany the Shell office reported a sales drop of between 20 and 50

percent after the scandal

began - "the worst we have experienced," said the oil multinational's German head, Peter Duncan. A

firebomb exploded at a Shell station in Hamburg ("Don't sink the Brent Spar Oil Platform" was the message

left behind), and there was a drive-by shooting at a Frankfurt outlet. {No one was injured.) The unofficial

boycott also spread through Britain to Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands.

Four months after the protests began, on June 20, 1995, something unprecedented happened: Shell backed

down. It would spend the extra mil ions to tow the platform to Norway, where it would be dismantled on land.

According to The Wall Street Journal, it was "a humiliating and painful U-turn."

Grove-White articulates the

extent of the Brent Spar victory: "For the first time, an environmental group had catalyzed international

opinion to bring about the kind of change of policy that unsettled the very basis of executive authority.

However briefly, the world turned upside down-the rule book had been rewritten."


Before the Brent Spar campaign was launched, there had been internal battles within Greenpeace about

whether the group could "sell" the disposal of an old industrial hunk of junk as a galvanizing, media-friendly

issue. Dutch Greenpeace campaigner Giys Thieme recalls the concerns inside the organization: "It wasn't

an oil campaign, it wasn't an atmosphere campaign, it wasn't a chlorine campaign." Neither was it a fight for

fish, or whales, or even cute baby seals. Brent Spar, it turns out, was about the idea of preserving

untouched space, just as the anti-logging protests in British Columbia's Clayoquot Sound a year earlier had

been about protecting one of the last remaining stands of ancient, virgin forest.

Clayoquot was about

biodiversity, but it was also about preserving the idea of wilderness, and Brent Spar was much the same.

Although Greenpeace presented scientific studies on the ecological impact the oil platform would have on

the ocean floor (getting some of its facts wrong along the way), the fight was not so much about

environmental protection in the traditional sense as it was about the need to keep the Atlantic Ocean floor

from being used as a junkyard. Shell's plans to bury the monstrosity in the depths of the sea resonated in

the public psyche worldwide: here was proof that if multinationals were left to their own devices, there would

be no open space left on earth — even the depths of the ocean, the last great wilderness, would be

colonized.


Shell, the British government and much of the business press pointed out that this reaction was entirely

irrational. "Science Loses to Joe Six-Pack" a headline in The Wall Street Journal announced, while The

Economist declared "A Defeat for Rational Decision Making." They were right, in a way. This concept of

protecting the unknowable — for no empirical reason in the short term except that it comforts us that it is

there —was indeed amorphous, but it was also powerful. As Guardian columnist Suzanne Moore wrote,

Brent Spar had at least as much to do with mysticism as with science: "In the depths strange species lurk,

and though we may never ever see them, we feel in our hearts that they should be left alone. Why must

they share the great dark deep with bits and bobs from a dismembered oil platform?"

The lesson Greenpeace took away from its Brent Spar victory, writes Grove-White, was about the sanctity

of "the global commons" — places not named on any map, not owned by any private interest and thus

belonging to everybody. The group also learned another lesson, something the anti-Mike campaigners had

also discovered: targeting a big, rich, ubiquitous multinational corporation is to the late nineties what saving

the whales was to the late eighties. It is populist and it is popular, and it was enough to bring Green-peace

back from the brink of death. After Brent Spar, the group was showered with members and money and, as


The Guardian reported, it was even bequeathed estates. "One woman had phoned to say she had changed

her wil . 'LefLall estate to Greenpeace,' says the note. Wants us to 'buy an inflatable with it and bash Shell.'"

In its Brent Spar post-mortem The Wall Street Journal noted gravely that in the current climate, "economic

warfare may be the best way to wage eco-warfare."

Shell's capitulation also provided activists with another lesson. After going to the wall defending the

appropriateness and inescapability of Shell's original plan, Prime Minister John Major was left looking like a

corporate lap dog — and an unloved one at that. When Shell reversed its position, Major could only mutter

that the executives were "wimps" for caving in to public pressure. His position was so compromised that it

may well have played a role in his decision, only two days after Shell's U-turn, to step down as head of the

Conservative Party and force a vote on his leadership. In this way, Brent Spar proved that corporations —

even a notoriously cagey and cloistered company like Royal Dutch/Shell — are sometimes as vulnerable to

public pressure as democratically elected governments (occasionally more so).

The lesson proved particularly relevant in the next Shell challenge — the need to focus world attention on

the multinational's role in the despoliation of Nigeria, under the protection of the corrupt government of the

late General Sani Abacha. If the general wasn't vulnerable to pressure, Shell certainly was.

From the Ocean as Trash Pit to the Land as Oil Slick


Since the 1950s, Shell Nigeria has extracted $30 bil ion worth of oil from the land of the Ogoni people, in

the Niger Delta. Oil revenue makes up 80 percent of the Nigerian economy —$10

bil ion annually —and, of

that, more than half comes from Shell. But not only have the Ogoni people been deprived of the profits from

their rich natural resource, many stil live without running water or electricity, and their land and water have

been poisoned by open pipelines, oil spil s and gas fires.

Under the leadership of the writer and Nobel Peace Prize nominee Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Movement for the

Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) campaigned for reform, and demanded compensation from Shell.

In response, and in order to keep the oil profits flowing into the government's coffers, General Sani Abacha

directed the Nigerian military to take aim at the Ogoni. They kil ed and tortured thousands. The Ogoni not

only blamed Abacha for the attacks, they also accused Shell of treating the Nigerian military as a private

police force, paying it to quash peaceful protest on Ogoni land, in addition to giving financial support and

legitimacy to the Abacha regime.

Facing mounting protests within Nigeria, Shell withdrew from Ogoni land in 1993

— a move that only put

further pressure on the military to remove the Ogoni threat. A leaked memo from the head of the Rivers

State Internal Security Force of the Nigerian Army was quite explicit: "Shell operations stil impossible


unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence....

Recommendations: Wasting operations during MOSOP and other gatherings making constant military

presence justifiable. Wasting targets cutting across communities and leadership cadres especially vocal

individuals of various groups."

On May 10, 1994 —five days after the memo was written —Ken Saro-Wiwa said,

"This is it. They [the

Nigerian military] are going to arrest us all and execute us. Al for Shell." Twelve days later, he was arrested

and tried for murder. Before receiving his sentence, Saro-Wiwa told the tribunal, "I and my colleagues are

not the only ones on trial. Shell is here on trial.... The company has, indeed, ducked this particular trial, but

its day wil surely come." Then, on November 10, 1995 —despite pressure from the international

community, including the Canadian and Australian governments, and to a lesser extent the governments of

Germany and France — the Nigerian military government executed Saro-Wiwa along with eight other Ogoni

leaders who had protested against Shell. It became an international incident and, once again, people took

their protests to their Shell stations, widely boycotting the company. In San Francisco Greenpeaceniks

staged a re-enactment of Saro-Wiwa's murder, with the noose fastened around the towering Shell sign.

As Reclaim the Streets' John Jordan said of multinationals: "Inadvertently, they have helped us see the


whole problem as one system." And here was that interconnected system in action: Shell, intent on sinking a

monstrous oil platform off the coast of Britain, was simultaneously entangled in a human-rights debacle in

Nigeria, in the same year that it laid off workers (despite earning huge profits), all so that it could pump gas

into the cars of London — the very issue that had launched Reclaim the Streets.

Because Ken Saro-Wiwa

was a poet and playwright, his case was also claimed by the international freedom-of-expression group,

PEN. Writers, including the English playwright Harold Pinter and the Nobel Prize-winning novelist Nadine

Gordimer, took up the cause of Saro-Wiwa's right to express his views against Shell, and turned his

persecution into the highest-profile free-expression case since the government of Iran declared a fatwa

against Salman Rushdie, offering a bounty on his head. In an article for The New York Times, Gordimer

wrote that "to buy Nigeria's oil under the conditions that prevail is to buy oil in exchange for blood. Other

people's blood; the exaction of the death penalty on Nigerians."

The convergence of social-justice, labour and environmental issues in the two Shell campaigns was not a

fluke — it goes to the very heart of the emerging spirit of global activism. Ken Saro-Wiwa was kil ed for

fighting to protect his environment, but an environment that encompassed more than the physical landscape

that was being ravaged and despoiled by Shell's invasion of the delta. Shell's mistreatment of Ogoni land is


both an environmental and a social issue, because natural-resource companies are notorious for lowering

their standards when they dril and mine in the Third World. Shell's opponents readily draw parallels

between the company's actions in Nigeria, its history of collaborating with the former apartheid government

in South Africa, its ongoing presence in the Timor Gap in Indonesian-occupied East Timor and its violent

clashes with the Nahua people in the Peruvian Amazon - as well as its standoff with the U'wa people of the

Colombian Andes, who threatened in January 1997 to commit mass suicide if Shell went ahead with its

dril ing plans.

In Saro-Wiwa, civil liberties came together with antiracism; anticapitalism with environmentalism; ecology

with labour rights. The bright yellow bulbous logo of Shell —Saro-Wiwa's Goliath of an opponent —became

a common enemy for all concerned citizens, to the extent that their governments around the world were

required to put the matter on the international agenda. PEN protested against Shell, as did the campaign

department at the Body Shop, the activist shareholders who placed the Ogoni plight on the agenda of three

consecutive Shell annual meetings and thousands upon thousands of others. In June 1998, Owens Wiwa,

Ken's brother, wrote this of the company's situation:

For centuries, corporations have declared huge profits from evil practices like the trans-Atlantic slave trade,


colonialism, Apartheid and [from] dictatorships whose actions are genocidal. They have often gotten away

with their loot, leaving governments to apologize. In this case, at the twilight of the 20th century, Shell has

been caught in the triangle of ecosystem destruction, human rights abuse and health impairment of the

Ogoni people. An apology wil not be enough. We anticipate a clean-up of our soil, water and air; adequate,

fair and equitable compensation for (a) the environmental damages, (b) human rights abuses due directly

and indirectly to Shell activities and (c) the negative health impacts their services have on the people.

To hear Shell tell it, these reparations are already well under way. "Shell continues to invest in community

and environmental projects in Nigeria," R.B. Blakely, a spokesperson for Shell Canada, informed me. "Last

year, Shell spent $20 mil ion establishing hospitals, schools, educational programs and scholarships"

(MOSOP put the figure at closer to $9 mil ion, and says only a fraction of this amount was spent on Ogoni

land). The company has also, according to Blakely, revised its "statement of business principles. These

principles, which include the company's environmental performance as well as its responsibilities to the

communities where we operate, apply to all companies in the Shell Group in all parts of the world."

To arrive at these principles, Shell has looked deep into its corporate psyche and has focus grouped and


deconstructed itself into a pulp. It has put its employees through a kind of New Age-consultancy boot camp,

resulting in some awfully sil y displays from such a grand old firm. In the interest of reinvention, Shell

executives, according to Fortune magazine, have "helped each other climb walls in the freezing Dutch rain.

They've dug dirt at low-income housing projects and made videotapes of themselves walking around

blindfolded. They've tracked their time to figure out whether they're adding any value. They've even taken

Myers-Briggs personality tests to see who fits in at the new Shell and who doesn't."

Part of Shell's image overhaul has involved reaching out to black communities in Europe and North

America, a strategy that has created bitter divisions in poor neighbourhoods that are desperate for funding

but suspicious of Shell's motives. For instance, in August 1997, the Oakland School Board in California

hotly debated the ethics of accepting a donation from Shell worth $2 mil ion -

$100,000 for scholarships and

the rest for the creation of a Shell Youth Training Academy. Since Oakland has a large African-American

population that includes exiled Nigerians, the debate was wrenching. "Children in Nigeria don't have an

opportunity to get a scholarship from Shell," said Tunde Okorodudu, an Oakland parent and a Nigerian prodemocracy

activist. "We really need money for the children but we don't want blood money."

After months


of stalemate, the board (like the Portland School Board that debated whether or not to accept Nike's

donation) eventually voted to accept the money.

But even as the new Shell goes Zen, tossing around trendy management terms like the "new ethical

paradigm," "change agents," the "third bottom line," and the "stakeholder economy," and even as Shell

Nigeria speaks of "healing the wounds," the old Shell remains. Although it has not yet succeeded in

returning to Ogoni land, Shell continues to operate in other parts of the Niger Delta, and in the fall of 1998

tensions in the area once again erupted. The issues were all too familiar: communities complained of

polluted lands, devastated fisheries, gas fires and flaring, and of seeing enormous profits pumped out of

their oil-rich land while they continued to live in poverty. "You go to the flow stations, you see they are very

well equipped, with all modern facilities. You go to the neighbouring vil age, there is no water to drink, no

food to eat. That is bringing about the protests," explained Paul Orieware, a local politician. Only this time,

Shell was up against foes far less committed to non-violence than the Ogoni. In October, Nigerian

protestors seized two Shell helicopters, nine Shell relay stations and a dril ing rig, halting, according to

Associated Press, "the transfer of some 250,000 barrels of crude a day." More Shell stations were stormed

and occupied in March 1999. Shell denied any wrongdoing and blamed the violence on ethnic conflicts.


The Arches: The Fight for Choice

At the same time as the anti-Shell campaigns were breaking out, the McLibel Trial, which had been in the

docket for a few years already, was turning into an international situation. In June 1995, the trial was coming

up to its first anniversary in court, when the two defendants, Helen Steel and Dave Morris, held a press

conference outside the London courthouse. They announced that McDonald's (which had sued them for

libel) had made a settlement offer. The company offered to donate money to a cause of Steel and Morris's

choice if the two outspoken environmentalists on trial would stop criticizing McDonald's; then everyone

would leave the whole messy nightmare behind them.

Steel and Morris defiantly refused the offer. They saw no reason to give in now.

The trial, which had been

designed to stem the flow of negative publicity—and to gag and bankrupt Steel and Morris —had been an

epic public-relations disaster for McDonald's. It had done almost as much as mad cow disease to promote

vegetarianism, had certainly done more to raise the issue of labour conditions in the McJob sector than any

union drive and had sparked a more profound debate about corporate censorship than any other freespeech

case in recent memory.

The pamphlet at the centre of the suit was first published in 1986 by London Greenpeace, a splinter group

of Greenpeace International (which the hardcore Londoners deemed too centralized and mainstream for


their tastes). It was an early case study in using a single brand name to connect all the dots on the social

agenda: issues of rain-forest depletion (to raise the cattle), Third World poverty (forcing peasants off their

farms to make way for export crops and McDonald's livestock needs), animal cruelty (in treatment of the

livestock), waste production (disposable packaging and litter), health (fried fatty foods), poor labour

conditions (low wages and union busting in the McJob sector) and exploitative advertising (in McDonald's

target marketing to children).

But the truth is, McLibel was never really about the contents of the pamphlet. In many ways, the case

against McDonald's is less compelling than the ones against Nike and Shell, both of which are supported by

hard evidence of large-scale human suffering. With McDonald's the evidence was less direct and, in some

ways, the issues more dated. The concern about litter-producing fast-food restaurants reached its peak in

the late eighties and London Green-peace's campaign against the company clearly came from the

standpoint of meat-is-murder vegetarianism: a valid perspective, but one for which there is a limited political

constituency. What made McLibel take off as a campaign on a par with the ones targeting Nike and Shell

was not what the fast-food chain did to cows, forests or even its own workers. The McLibel movement took

off because of what McDonald's did to Helen Steel and Dave Morris.


Franny Armstrong, who produced a documentary about the trial, points out that Britain's libel law was

changed in 1993 "so that governmental bodies such as local councils are no longer able to sue for libel. This

was to protect people's right to criticize public bodies. Multinationals are fast becoming more powerful than

governments — and even less accountable —so shouldn't the same rules apply?

With advertising budgets

in the bil ions, it's not as though they need to turn to the law to ensure their point of view is heard." In other

words, for many of its supporters, Steel and Morris's case was less about the merits of fast food than about

the need to protect freedom of speech in a climate of mounting corporate control.

If Brent Spar was about

loss of space, and Nike was about the loss of good jobs, McLibel was about loss of voice - it was about

corporate censorship.

When McDonald's issued libel writs against five Greenpeace activists in 1990 over the contents of the nownotorious

leaflet, three members of the group did what most people would do when faced with the prospect

of going up against an $11 bil ion corporation: they apologized. The company had a long and successful

history with this strategy. According to The Guardian: "Over the past 15 years, McDonald's has threatened

legal action against more than 90 organizations in the U.K., including the BBC, Channel 4, the Guardian, the

Sun, the Scottish TLIC, the New Leaf Tea Shop, student newspapers and a children's theatre group. Even


Prince Philip received a stiff letter. Al of them backed down and many formally apologised in court."

But Helen Steel and Dave Morris made another choice. They used the trial to launch a seven-year

experiment in riding the golden arches around the global economy. For 313 days in court — the longest trial

in English history-an unemployed postal worker (Morris) and a community gardener (Steel) went to war with

chief executives from the largest food empire in the world.

Over the course of the trial, Steel and Morris meticulously elaborated every one of the pamphlet's claims,

with the assistance of nutritional and environmental experts and scientific studies.

With 180 witnesses called

to the stand, the company endured humiliation after humiliation as the court heard stories of food poisoning,

failure to pay legal overtime, bogus recycling claims and corporate spies sent to infiltrate the ranks of

London Greenpeace. In one particularly telling incident, McDonald's executives were challenged on the

company's claim that it serves "nutritious food": David Green, senior vice president of marketing, expressed

his opinion that Coca-Cola is nutritious because it is "providing water, and I think that is part of a balanced

diet." In another embarrassing exchange, McDonald's executive Ed Oakley explained to Steel that the

McDonald's garbage stuffed into landfil s is "a benefit, otherwise you wil end up with lots of vast empty

gravel pits all over the country."


On June 19, 1997, the judge finally handed down the verdict. The courtroom was packed with an odd

assortment of corporate executives, pink-haired vegan anarchists and rows of journalists. It felt like an

eternity to most of us sitting there, as Judge Rodger Bell read out his forty-five-page ruling —a summary of

the actual verdict, which was over a thousand pages long. Although the judge deemed most of the

pamphlet's claims too hyperbolic to be acceptable (he was particularly unconvinced by its direct linking of

McDonald's to "hunger in the Third World'"), he deemed others to be based on pure fact. Among the

decisions that went in Steel and Morris's favour were that McDonald's "exploit(s) children" by "using them,

as more susceptible subjects of advertising"; that its treatment of some animals has been "cruel"; that it is

anti-union and pays "low wages"; that its management can be "autocratic" and

"most unfair"; and that a

consistent diet of McDonald's food contributes to the risk of heart disease. Steel and Morris were ordered to

pay damages to McDonald's in the amount of US$95,490. But in March 1999 an appeals court judge found

that Judge Bell had been overly harsh and sided more forcefully with Steel and Morris on the claims

"concerning nutrition and health risks and on the allegations about pay and conditions for McDonald's

employees." Stil finding that their claims about food poisoning, cancer and world poverty were unproven,


the court nonetheless lowered the amount of damages to $61,300.46 McDonald's has never tried to collect

its settlement and has decided not to apply for an injunction to halt the further dissemination of the leaflet.

After the first verdict, McDonald's was quick to declare victory, but few were convinced. "Not since Pyrrhus

has a victor emerged so bedraggled," read The Guardian's editorial the next day.

"As P.R. fiascos go, this

action takes the prize for il -judged and disproportionate response to public criticism." In fact, while all this

was going on, the original pamphlet had gathered the cachet of a collector's item, with three mil ion copies

distributed in the U.K. alone. John Vidal had published his critically acclaimed book McLibel: Burger Culture

on Trial; 60 Minutes had produced a lengthy segment about the trial; England's Channel 4 had run a threehour

dramatization of it; and Franny Armstrong's documentary McLibel: Two Worlds Collide had made the

rounds of the independent film circuit (having been turned down by every major broadcaster because

of—ironically —libel concerns).

For Helen Steel, Dave Morris and their supporters, McLibel was never solely about winning in court —it was

about using the courts to win over the public. And judging by the crowds outside the McDonald's outlets two

days after the verdict came down, they had every right to be declaring victory.

Standing outside their

neighbourhood McDonald's in North London on a Saturday afternoon, Steel and Morris could barely keep up


with the demand for "What's wrong with McDonald's?" the leaflet that started it all.

Passers-by requested

copies, drivers pulled over to get their McLibel mementos and mothers with toddlers stopped to talk to

Helen Steel about how difficult it can be for a busy parent when her child demands unhealthy food — what

can a mother do?

Across the United Kingdom, a similar scene was playing itself out at more than five hundred McDonald's

outlets, al of which were simultaneously picketed on June 21, 1997, along with thirty in North America. As

with the Nike protests, every event was different. At one British franchise, the community put on a street

performance featuring an axe-wielding Ronald McDonald, a cow and lots of ketchup. At another, people

passed out free vegetarian food. At all of them, supporters handed out the famous leaflet: 400,000 copies

that weekend alone. "They were flying out of their hands," said Dan Mil s of the McLibel Support Campaign,

amused at the irony: before McDonald's decided to sue, London Greenpeace's campaign was winding down,

and only a few hundred copies of the contentious leaflet had ever been distributed. It has now been

translated into twenty-six languages and is one of the hottest properties in cyberspace.

Lessons of the Big Three: Use the Courts as a Tool

It's a good bet that many brand-name giants besides McDonald's have paid close attention to the goings-on


in that British courtroom. In 1996, Guess dropped a libel suit it had launched against the L.A. women's group

Common Threads, in response to a poetry reading about the plight of garment workers sewing Guess jeans.

Similarly, though Nike consistently accuses its critics of fabrication, it has stayed away from trying to clear

its name in court. And no wonder: the courtroom is the only place where private corporations are forced to

open shuttered windows and let the public look in. As Helen Steel and Dave Morris write,

If companies do choose to use oppressive laws against their critics then court cases do not have to only be

about legal procedures and verdicts. They can be turned into a public forum and focus for protest, and for

the wider dissemination of the truth. This is what happened with McLibel ...Maybe for the first time in history,

a powerful institution (it just happened to be a fast-food chain, but in some ways could've been any financial

organization or state department) was subject to lengthy, detailed and critical public scrutiny. That can only

be a good thing!

The message has not been lost on Steel and Morris's fellow activists around the world; everyone who

followed McLibel saw how effective a long, dramatic trial could be at building up a body of evidence and

stoking sentiment against a corporate opponent. Some campaigners, not waiting to be sued themselves, are

taking their corporate opponents to court instead. For instance, in January 1999, when U.S. labour activists


decided they wanted to draw attention to the ongoing sweatshop violations in the U.S. territory of Saipan,

they launched an unconventional lawsuit in California court against seventeen American retailers, including

the Gap and Tommy Hilfiger. The suit, filed on behalf of thousands of Saipan garment workers, accuses the

brand-name retailers and manufacturers of participating in a "racketeering conspiracy" in which young

women from Southeast Asia are lured to Saipan with promises of well-paid jobs in the United States. What

they get instead is wage cheating and "America's worst sweatshop," in the words of Al Meyerhoff, lead

attorney on the case. A companion lawsuit further alleges that by labelling goods from Saipan "Made in the

U.S.A." or "Made in the Northern Marianas, U.S.A.," the companies are engaging in false advertising,

leaving customers with the impression that the manufacturers were subject to U.S.

labour laws, when they

were not.

Meanwhile, the Centre for Constitutional Rights has taken a similar tack with Royal Dutch/Shell, filing a

federal lawsuit against the company in a New York court on the first anniversary of Ken Saro-Wiwa's death.

According to the Centre’s David A. Love, "The suit — filed on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other Ogoni

activists who were executed by Nigeria's military regime in November 1995-alleges that the executions were

carried out with 'the knowledge, consent, and/or support' of Shell Oil." It further alleges that the hangings


were part of a conspiracy "to violently and ruthlessly suppress any opposition to Royal Dutch/Shell's conduct

in its exploitation of oil and natural gas resources in Ogoni and in the Niger Delta."

Shell denies the charges

and is challenging the legitimacy of the suit. At the time of writing, neither the Saipan case nor the Shell

case had been settled.

Lessons of the Big Three: Use the Net to Shine a McSpotlight If the courts are becoming a popular tool to pry open closed corporations, it is the Internet that has rapidly

become the tool of choice for spreading information about multinationals around the world. Al three of the

campaigns described in this chapter have distinguished themselves by a pioneering use of information

technologies, an approach that continues to unnerve their corporate targets.

Each day, information about Nike flows freely via E-mail between the U.S.

National Labour Committee and

Campaign for Labour Rights; the Dutch-based Clean Clothes Campaign; the Australian Fairwear Campaign;

the Hong Kong-based Asian Monitoring and Resource Centre; the British Labour Behind the Label Coalition

and Christian Aid; the French Agir lei and Artisans du Monde; the German Werkstatt Okonomie; the Belgian

Les Magasins de Monde; and the Canadian Maquila Solidarity Network —to name but a few of the players.

In a September 1997 press release, Nike attacked its critics as "fringe groups, which are again using the

Internet and fax modems to promote mistruths and distortions for their own purposes." But by March 1998,


Nike was ready to treat its on-line critics with a little more respect. In explaining why it had just introduced

yet another package of labour reforms, company spokesman Vada Manager said,

"You make changes

because it's the right thing to do. But obviously our actions have-clearly been accelerated because of the

World Wide Web."

Shell was similarly humbled by the mobility of both the Brent Spar campaign and the Ogoni support

movement. Natural-resource companies had grown accustomed to dealing with activists who could not

escape the confines of their nationhood: a pipeline or mine could spark a peasants' revolt in the Philippines

or the Congo, but it would remain contained, reported only by the local media and known only to people in

the area. But today, every time Shell sneezes, a report goes out on the hyperactive "shell-nigeria-action"

listserve, bouncing into the in-boxes of all the far-flung organizers involved in the campaign, from Nigerian

leaders living in exile to student activists around the world. And when a group of activists occupied part of

Shell's U.K. headquarters in January 1999, they made sure to bring a digital camera with a cellular linkup,

allowing them to broadcast their sit-in on the Web, even after Shell officials turned off the electricity and

phones.

Shell has responded to the rise of Net activism with an aggressive Internet strategy of its own: in 1996, it


hired Simon May, a twenty-nine-year-old "Internet manager." According to May,

"There has been a shift in

the balance of power, activists are no longer entirely dependent on the existing media. Shell learned it the

hard way with the Brent Spar, when a lot of information was disseminated outside the regular channels." But

if the power balance has shifted, it is May's job to shift it back in Shell's favour: he oversees the monitoring

of all online mentions of the company, responds to E-mail queries about social issues and has helped to

establish Shell's on-line "social concerns" discussion forum on the company Web site.

The Internet played a similar role during the McLibel Trial, catapulting London's grassroots anti-McDonald's

movement into an arena as global as the one in which its multinational opponent operates. "We had so

much information about McDonald's, we thought we should start a library," Dave Morris explains, and with

this in mind, a group of Internet activists launched the McSpotlight Web site. The site not only has the

controversial pamphlet online, it contains the complete 20,000-page transcript of the trial, and offers a

debating room where McDonald's workers can exchange horror stories about McWork under the Golden

Arches. The site, one of the most popular destinations on the Web, has been accessed approximately sixtyfive

mil ion times. Ben, one of the studiously low-profile programmers for McSpotlight told me that "this is a


medium that doesn't require campaigners to jump through hoops doing publicity stunts, or depend on the

good wil of an editor to get their message across." It's also less vulnerable to libel suits than more

traditional media. Ben explains that while McSpotlight's server is located in the Netherlands, it has "mirror

sites" in Finland, the U.S., New Zealand and Australia. That means that if a server in one country is targeted

by McDonald's lawyers, the site wil stil be available around the world from the other mirrors. In the

meantime, everyone visiting the site is invited to give their opinion on whether or not McSpotlight wil get

sued. "Is McSpotlight next in court? Click on yes or no."

Once again, the broader corporate world is scrambling to learn the lessons of these campaigns. Speaking in

Brussels at a June 1998 conference on the growing power of Anticorporate groups, Peter Verhil e of the PR

firm Entente International noted that "one of the major strengths of pressure groups —in fact the levelling

factor in their confrontation with powerful companies —is their ability to exploit the instruments of the

telecommunication revolution. Their agile use of global tools such as the Internet reduces the advantage

that corporate budgets once provided." Indeed, the beauty of the Net for activists is that it allows

coordinated international actions with minimal resources and bureaucracy. For instance, for the International

Nike Days of Action, local activists simply download information pamphlets from the Campaign for Labour


Rights Web site to hand out at their protests, then file detailed E-mail reports from Sweden, Australia, the

U.S. and Canada, which are then forwarded to all participating groups.

A similar electronic clearinghouse model was used to coordinate both the Reclaim the Streets global street

parties and the picketing outside McDonald's outlets after the McLibel verdict. The McSpotlight

programmers posted a list of all 793 McDonald's franchises in Britain and in the weeks before the verdict

came down, local activists signed up to "adopt a store (and teach it some respect)" on the day of protest.

More than half were adopted. I had been following all of this closely from Canada, but when I finally got a

chance to see the London headquarters of the McLibel Support Campaign —the hub from which hundreds

of political actions had been launched around the world, linking up thousands of protestors and becoming a

living archive for all things anti-McDonald's — I was shocked. In my mind, I had pictured an office crammed

with people tapping away on high-tech equipment. I should have known better: McLibel's head office is

nothing more than a tiny room at the back of a London flat with graffiti in the stairwells. The office walls are

papered in subvertisements and anarchist agitprop. Helen Steel, Dave Morris, Dan Mil s and a few dozen

volunteers had gone head to head with McDonald's for seven years with a rickety PC, an old modem, one

telephone and a fax machine. Dan Mil s apologized to me for the absence of an extra chair.


Tony Juniper of Britain's environmental group Friends of the Earth calls the Internet "the most potent

weapon in the toolbox of resistance." That may well be so, but the Met is more than an organizing tool — it

has become an organizing model, a blueprint for decentralized but cooperative decision making. It

facilitates the process of information sharing to such a degree that many groups can work in concert with

one another without the need to achieve monolithic consensus (which is often impossible, anyway, given the

nature of activist organizations). And because it is so decentralized, these movements are stil in the

process of forging links with their various wings around the world, continually surprising themselves with

how far unreported little victories have travelled, how thoroughly bits of research have been recycled and

absorbed. These movements are only now starting to feel their own reach and, as the students and local

communities profiled in the next chapter wil show, their own power.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

LOCAL FOREIGN POLICY

Students and Communities Join the Fray

Pretty soon we'l have to do our own offshore dril ing.

-Berkeley, California, city council or Polly Armstrong on her council's decision to outlaw municipal gasoline purchases from all the major oil companies

"Okay. I need people on each door. Let's go!" shouted Scan Hayes in the distinctive clipped baritone of a


high-school basketball coach, which, as it happens, he is. "Let's go!" Coach Hayes bellowed again, clapping

his meaty hands loud enough for the sound to bounce off the walls of the huge gymnasium of St. Mary's

Secondary School in Pickering, Ontario (a town best known for its proximity to a nuclear power plant of

questionable quality).

Hayes had invited me to participate in the school's first "Sweatshop Fashion Show," an event he began

planning when he discovered that the basketball team's made-in-lndonesia Nike sneakers had likely been

manufactured under sweatshop conditions. He's an unapologetic jock with a conscience and, together with a

handful of do-gooder students, had organized today's event to get the other two thousand kids at St. Mary's

to think about the clothes they wear in terms beyond "cool" or "lame."

The plan was simple: as student models decked out in logowear strutted down a makeshift runway, another

student off to the side would read a prepared narration about the lives of the Third World workers who made

the gear. The students would quickly follow that with scenes from Mickey Mouse Goes to Haiti and a skit

about how teenagers often feel "unloved, unwanted, unacceptable and unpopular if you do not have the

right clothes." My part would come at the end, when I was to give a short speech about my research in

export processing zones, and then facilitate a question-and-answer period. It sounded straightforward

enough.


While we were waiting for the bell to ring and the students to stream in, Hayes turned to me and said, with a

forced smile: "I hope the kids actually hear the message and don't think it's just a regular fashion show."

Having read the students' prepared narration I couldn't help thinking that his concern sounded, frankly,

paranoid. True, fashion shows have become such a high-school stalwart that they now rival car washes as

the prom fundraiser of choice. But did Hayes actually think his students were so heartless that they could

listen to testimony about starvation wages and physical abuse and expect that the clothing in question would

be on sale at a discount after the assembly? Just then, a couple of teenage boys poked their heads in the

door and checked out the frantic preparations. "Yo, guys," one of them said. "I'm guessing fashion show

—this should be a joke." Coach Hayes looked nervous.

As two thousand students piled onto the bleachers, the room came alive with the giddiness that

accompanies all mass reprieves from class, whether for school plays, AIDS

education lectures, teachers'

strikes or fire alarms. A quick scan of the room turned up no logos on these kids, but that was definitely not

by choice. St. Mary's is a Catholic school and the students wear uniforms —bland affairs that they were

nonetheless working for all they were worth. It's hard to make grey flannel slacks and acrylic navy sweaters

look like gangsta gear but the guys were doing their best, wearing their pants pulled down halfway to their


knees with patterned boxer shorts bunched over their belts. The girls were pushing the envelope too, pairing

their drab tunics with platform loafers and black lipstick.

As it turned out, Coach Hayes's concerns were well founded. As the hip-hop started playing and the first kids

bounded down the runway in Nike shoes and workout wear, the assembly broke into cheers and applause.

The moment the young woman saddled with reading the earnest voice-over began, "Welcome to the world

of Nike..." she was drowned out by hoots and whistles. It didn't take much to figure out that they weren't

cheering for her but rather at the mere mention of the word Nike — everyone's favourite celebrity brand.

Waiting for my cue, I was ready to flee the modern teenage world forever, but after some booming threats

from Coach Hayes, the crowd finally quieted down. My speech was at least not booed and the discussion

that followed was among the liveliest I've ever witnessed. The first question (as at all Sweatshop 101

events) was "What brands are sweatshop-free?" —Adidas? they asked. Reebok?

The Gap? I told the St.

Mary's students that shopping for an exploitation-free wardrobe at the mall is next to impossible, given the

way all the large brands produce. The best way to make a difference, I told them, is to stay informed by

surfing the Net, and by letting companies know what you think by writing letters and asking lots of questions

at the store. The St. Mary's kids were deeply sceptical of this non-answer. "Look, I don't have time to be


some kind of major political activist every time I go to the mall," one girl said, right hand planted firmly on

right hip. "Just tell me what kind of shoes are okay to buy, okay?"

Another girl, who looked about sixteen, sashayed to the microphone. "I'd just like to say that this is

capitalism, okay, and people are allowed to make money and if you don't like it maybe you're just jealous."

The hands shot up in response. "No, I'd just like to say that you are totally screwed up and just because

everyone is doing something doesn't mean it's right —you've got to stand up for what you believe in instead

of just standing in front of the mirror trying to look good!"

After watching thousands of Ricki and Oprah episodes, these kids take to the talk-show format as naturally

as Elizabeth Dole. Just as they had cheered for Nike moments before, the students now cheered for each

other —dog-pound style, with lots of "you-go-girls." Moments before the bell for next period, Coach Hayes

made time for one last question. A boy in saggy slacks sauntered across the gym holding his standard-issue

navy blue sweater away from his lanky body with two fingers, as if he detected a foul odour. Then, he

slouched down to the mike and said, in an impeccable teenage monotone, "Umm, Coach Hayes, if working

conditions are so bad in Indonesia, then why do we have to wear these uniforms?

We buy thousands of

these things and it says right here that they are 'Made in Indonesia.' I'd just like to know, how do you know

they weren't made in sweatshops?"


The auditorium exploded. It was a serious burn. Another student rushed to the mike and suggested that the

students should try to find out who makes their uniforms, a project for which there was no shortage of

volunteers. When I left St. Mary's that day, the school had its work cut out for it.

There's no denying that the motivation behind the St. Mary's students' new-found concern over Indonesian

labour conditions was that they had just discovered a high-minded excuse to refuse to wear their lame-ass

uniforms — not an entirely selfless concern. But even if it was inadvertent, they had also stumbled across

one of the most powerful levers being used to pry reform out of seemingly amoral multinational

corporations.

When high schools, universities, places of worship, unions, city councils and other levels of government

apply ethical standards to their bulk purchasing decisions, it takes Anticorporate campaigning a significant

step beyond the mostly symbolic warfare of adbusting and superstore protesting.

Such community

institutions are not only collections of individual consumers, they are also consumers themselves — and

powerful ones at that. Thousands of schools like St. Mary's ordering thousands of uniforms each — it adds

up to a lot of uniforms. They also buy sports equipment for their teams, food for their cafeterias and drinks

for their vending machines. Municipal governments buy uniforms for their police forces, gas for their


garbage trucks and computers for their offices; and they also invest their pension funds on the stock market.

Universities, for their part, select telecommunications companies for their Internet portals, use banks to hold

their money and invest endowments that can represent bil ions of dollars. And, of course, they are also

increasingly involved in direct sponsorship arrangements with corporations. Most important, bulk institutional

purchases and sponsorship deals are among the most sought after contracts in the marketplace, and

corporations are forever trying to outbid one another to land them.

What all these business arrangements have in common is that they exist at a distinctive intersection

between civic life (ostensibly governed by principles of "public good") and the corporate profit-making

motive. When corporations sponsor an event on a university campus or sign a deal with a municipal

government, they cross an important line between private and public space - a line that is not part of a

consumer's interaction with a corporation as an individual shopper. We don't expect morality at the mall but,

to some extent, we do stil expect it in our public spaces —in our schools, national parks and municipal

playgrounds.

So while it may be cold comfort to some, there is a positive side effect of the fact that, increasingly, private

corporations are staking a claim to these public spaces. Over the past four years, there has been a


collective realization among many public, civic and religious institutions that having a multinational

corporation as a guest in your house —whether as a supplier or a sponsor —

presents an important political

opportunity. With their huge buying power, public and non-profit institutions can exert real public-interest

pressure on otherwise freewheeling private corporations. This is nowhere more true than in the schools and

universities.

Students Teach the Brands a Lesson

As we have already seen, soft-drink, sneaker and fast-food companies have been forging a flurry of

exclusive logo allegiances with high schools, colleges and universities. Like the Olympic games, many

universities have "official" airlines, banks, long-distance carriers and computer suppliers. For the sponsoring

companies, these exclusive arrangements offer opportunities to foster warm and fuzzy logo loyalties during

those formative college years - not to mention a chance to pick up some quasi-academic legitimacy. (Being

the official supplier of a top-flight university sounds almost as if a panel of tenured professors got together

and scientifically determined that Coke Is It! or Our Fries Are Crispier! For some lucky corporations, it can

be like getting an honorary degree.)

However, these same corporations have at times discovered that there can be an unanticipated downside to

these "partnerships": that the sense of ownership that goes along with sponsoring is not always the kind of


passive consumer allegiance that the companies had bargained for. In a climate of mounting concern about

corporate ethics, students are finding that a great way to grab the attention of aloof multinationals is to kick

up a fuss about the extracurricular activities of their university's official brand -

whether Coke, Pepsi, Nike,

McDonald's, Starbucks or Northern Telecom. Rather than simply complaining about amorphous

"corporatization," young activists have begun to use their status as sought-after sponsorees to retaliate

against forces they considered invasive on their campuses to begin with. In this volatile context, a

particularly aggressive sponsorship deal can act as a political catalyst, instigating wide-ranging debate on

everything from unfair labour conditions to trading with dictators. Just ask Pepsi.

Pepsi (as we saw in Chapter 4) has been at the forefront of the drive to purchase students as a captive

market. Its exclusive vending arrangements have paved the way for copycat deals, and fast-food outlets

owned by PepsiCo were among the first to establish a presence in high schools and on university campuses

in North America. One of Pepsi's first campus vending deals was with Ottawa's Carleton University in 1993.

Since marketing on campus was stil somewhat jarring back then, many students were immediately resentful

at being forced into this tacit product endorsement, and were determined not to give their official drink a

warm welcome. Members of the university's chapter of the Public Interest and Research Group — a network


of campus social-justice organizations stretching across North America known as PIRGs — discovered that

PepsiCo was producing and selling its soft drinks in Burma, the brutal dictatorship now called Myanmar. The

Carleton students weren't sure how to deal with the information, so they posted a notice about Pepsi's

involvement in Burma on a few on-line bulletin boards that covered student issues. Gradually, other

universities where Pepsi was the official drink started requesting more information.

Pretty soon, the Ottawa

group had developed and distributed hundreds of "campus action kits," with pamphlets, petitions, and "Gotta

Boycott" and "Pepsi, Stuff It" stickers. "How can you help free Burma?" one pamphlet asks. "Pressure

schools to terminate food or beverage contracts selling PepsiCo products until it leaves Burma."

Many students did just that. As a result, in April 1996 Harvard rejected a proposed $1 mil ion vending deal

with Pepsi, citing the company's Burma holdings. Stanford University cost Pepsi an estimated $800,000

when a petition signed by two thousand students blocked the construction of a PepsiCo-owned Taco Bell

restaurant. The stakes were even higher in Britain where campus soft-drink contracts are coordinated

centrally through the National Union of Students' services wing. "Pepsi had just beat out Coke for the

contract," recalls Guy Hughes, a campaigner with the London-based group Third World First. "Pepsi was


being sold in eight hundred student unions across the U.K., so we used the consortium as a lever to

pressure Pepsi. When [the student union] met with the company, one factor for Pepsi was that the boycott

had become international."

Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of Burma's opposition party that was elected to power in 1990, only to be

prevented from taking office by the military, has offered encouragement to this nascent movement. In 1997,

in a speech read by her husband (who has since died) at the American University in Washington, D.C., she

singled out students in the call to put pressure on multinational corporations that are invested in Burma.

"Please use your liberty to promote ours," she said. "Take a principled stand against companies which are

doing business with the military regime of Burma.”

After the campus boycotts made it into The New York Times, Pepsi sold its shares in a controversial

Burmese bottling plant whose owner, Thien Tun, had publicly called for Suu Kyi's democracy movement to

be "ostracized and crushed." Student activists, however, dismissed the move as a

"paper shuffle" because

Pepsi products were stil being sold and produced in Burma. Finally, facing continued pressure, Pepsi

announced its "total disengagement" from Burma on January 24, 1997. When Zar Ni, the coordinator of the

American student movement, heard the news, he sent an E-mail out on the Free Burma Coalition listserve:


"We finally tied the Pepsi Animal down! We did it!! We all did it!!!... We now KNOW

we have the grassroots

power to yank one of the most powerful corporations in the world."

If there is a moral to this story, it is that Pepsi's drive to capture the campus market landed the company at

the centre of a debate in which it had no desire to participate. It wanted university students to be its poster

children — its real live Generation Next —but instead, the students turned the tables and made Pepsi the

poster corporation for their campus Free Burma movement. Sein Win, a leader in exile of Burma's elected

National League for Democracy, observed that "PepsiCo very much takes care of its image. It wanted to

press the drink's image as 'the taste of a young generation,' so when the young generation participates in

boycotts, it hurts the effort." Simon Bil enness, an ethical investment specialist who spearheaded the Burma

campaign, is more blunt: "Pepsi," he says, "was under siege from its own target market." And Reid Cooper,

coordinator of the Carleton University campaign, notes that without Pepsi's thirst for campus branding,

Burma's plight might never have become an issue on campuses. "Pepsi tried to go into the schools," he tells

me in an interview, "and from there it was spontaneous combustion."

Not surprisingly, the Pepsi victory has emboldened the Free Burma campaign on the campuses. The

students have adopted the slogan "Burma: South Africa of the Nineties" and claim to be "The largest human


rights campaign in cyberspace." Today, more than one hundred colleges and twenty high schools around

the world are part of the Free Burma Coalition. The extent to which the country's liberty has become a

student cause celebre became apparent when, in August 1998, eighteen foreign activists — most of them

university students —were arrested in Rangoon for handing out leaflets expressing support for Burma's

democracy movement. Not surprisingly, the event caught the attention of the international media. The court

sentenced the activists to five years of hard labour, but at the last minute deported them instead of

imprisoning them.

Other student campaigns have focused on different corporations and different dictators. With Pepsi out of

Burma, attention began to shift on campuses to Coca-Cola's investments in Nigeria. At Kent State

University and other schools where Coke won the campus cola war, students argued that Coke's high-profile

presence in Nigeria offered an air of legitimacy to the country's il egitimate military regime (which, at the

time, was stil in power). Once again, the issue of Nigerian human rights might never have reached much

beyond KSU's Amnesty International Club, but because Coke and the school had entered into a

sponsorship-style arrangement, the campaign took off and students began shouting that their university had

blood on its hands.


There have also been a number of food fights, most of them related to McDonald's expanding presence on

college campuses. In 1997, the British National Union of Students entered into an agreement with

McDonald's to distribute "privilege cards" to all undergraduates in the U.K. When students showed the card,

they got a free cheeseburger every time they ordered a Big Mac, fries and drink.

But campus

environmentalists opposed the deal, forcing the student association to bow out of the marketing alliance in

March 1998. In providing its reasons for the change of heart, the association cited the company's "anti-union

practices, exploitation of employees, its contribution to the destruction of the environment, animal cruelty

and the promotion of unhealthy food products" — all carefully worded references to the McLibel judge's

findings.

As the brand backlash spreads, students are beginning to question not only sponsorship arrangements with

the likes of McDonald's and Pepsi, but also the less flashy partnerships that their universities have with the

private sector. Whether it's bankers on the board of governors, corporate-endowed professorships or the

naming of campus buildings after benefactors, all are facing scrutiny from a more economically politicized

student body. British students have stepped up a campaign to pressure their universities to stop accepting

grant money from the oil industry, and in British Columbia, the University of Victoria Senate voted in


November 1998 to refuse scholarship money from Shell. This agenda of corporate resistance is gradually

becoming more structured, as students from across North America come together at annual conferences

such as the 1997 "Democracy Teach-in: Campus Democracy vs. Corporate Control" at the University of

Chicago, where they attend seminars like "Research: For People or Profit?"

"Investigating Your Campus"

and "What Is a Corporation and Why Is There a Problem?" In June 1999, student activists again came

together, this time in Toledo, Ohio, in the newly formed Student Al iance to Reform Corporations. The

purpose of the gathering was to launch a national campaign to force universities to invest their money only

with companies that respect human rights and do not degrade the environment.

It should come as no surprise that by far the most controversial campus-corporate partnerships have been

ones involving that most controversial of companies: Nike. Since the shoe industry's use of sweatshop

labour became common knowledge, the deals that Nike had signed with hundreds of athletic departments in

universities have become among the most contentious issues on campuses today, with "Ban the Swoosh"

buttons rivalling women's symbols as the undergraduate accessory of choice. And in what Nike must see as

the ultimate slap in the face, college campuses where the company has paid out mil ions of dollars to

sponsor sports teams (University of North Carolina, Duke University, Stanford, Penn State and Arizona


State, to name just a few) have become the hottest spots of the international anti-Mike campaign. According

to the Campaign for Labour Rights, "These contracts, which are a centrepiece of Nike marketing, have now

turned into a public relations nightmare for the company. Nike's aggressive campus marketing has now

been forced into a defensive posture."

At the University of Arizona, students attempted to get their university president to reconsider the school's

endorsement of Nike products by delivering a pile of old Nike shoes to his office (followed by cameras from

two local television stations). According to a student organizer, James Tracy,

"each pair of shoes had a tale

of Nike's abuse attached to them for the president to consider." At Stanford University, similar protests

greeted the athletic department's decision to sign a four-year, $5 mil ion contract with Nike. In fact, bashing

Nike has become such a popular sport on campus that at Florida State University

— a major jock college

—a group of students built an anti-Nike float for the 1997 homecoming parade.

Most of these universities are locked into multiyear sponsorship deals with Nike, but at the University of

California at Irvine, students went after the company when its contract with the women's basketball team

was up for renewal. Faced with mounting pressure from the student body, the school's athletic department

decided to switch to Converse. On another campus, soccer coach Kim Keady was unable to persuade his


employer, St. John's University, to stop forcing its team to use Nike gear. So, in the summer of 1998, he

quit his job as assistant coach in protest.

University of North Carolina student Marion Traub-Werner explains the appeal of this new movement:

"Obviously there's the labour issue. But we're also concerned about Nike's intrusion into our campus culture.

The swoosh is everywhere — in addition to all the uniforms, it's on the game schedules, it's on all the

posters and it dominates the clothing section in the campus store." Like no other company, Nike has

branded this generation, and so if students now have the chance to brand Nike as an exploiter —well, the

chance is too good to pass up.

The Real Brand U

While many campuses are busily taking on the brand-name interlopers, others are realizing that their

universities are themselves brand names. Ivy League universities, and colleges with all-star sports teams,

have extensive clothing lines, several of which rival the market share of many commercial designers. They

also share many of the same labour problems. In 1998, the UNITE garment workers union published a

report on the BJB factory in an export processing zone in the Dominican Republic. Workers at BJB, one

of the world's largest manufacturers of baseball hats, embroider the school logos and crests of at least nine

large American universities, including Cornell, Duke, Georgetown, Harvard and University of Michigan. The


conditions at BJB were signature free-trade-zone ones: long hours of forced overtime, fierce union busting

(including layoffs of organizers), short-term contracts, pay checks insufficient to feed a family, pregnancy

tests, sexual harassment, abusive management, unsafe drinking water and huge mark-ups (while the hats

sold, on average, for $19.95, workers saw only 8 cents of that)." And of course, most of the workers were

young women, a fact that was brought home when the union sponsored a trip to the U.S. for two former

employees of the factory: nineteen-year-old Kenia Rodriguez and twenty-year-old Roselio Reyes. The two

workers visited many of the universities whose logos they used to stitch on caps, speaking to gatherings of

students who were exactly their age. "In the name of the 2,050 workers in this factory, and the people in this

town, we ask for your support," Reyes said to an audience of students at the University of Il inois.

These revelations about factory conditions were hardly surprising. College licensing is big business, and the

players —Fruit of the Loom, Champion, Russell — have all shifted to contract factories with the rest of the

garment industry, and make liberal use of free-trade zones around the world. In the U.S., the licensing of

college names is a $2.5 bil ion annual industry, much of it brokered through the Collegiate Licensing

Company. Duke University alone sells around $25 mil ion worth of clothing associated with its winning


basketball team every year. To meet the demand, it has seven hundred licensees who contract to hundreds

of plants in the U.S. and in ten other countries.

Because of Duke's leading role as a campus apparel manufacturer, a group of activists decided to turn the

school into a model of ethical manufacturing — not only for other schools, but for the scandal-racked

garment industry as a whole. In March 1998, Duke University unveiled a landmark policy requiring that all

companies making T-shirts, baseball hats and sweatshirts bearing the "Duke"

name agree to a set of clear

labour standards. The code required that contractors pay the legal minimum wage, maintain safe working

conditions and allow workers to form unions, no matter where the factories were located. What makes the

policy more substantial than most other codes in the garment sector is that it requires factories to undergo

inspections from independent monitors — a provision that sent Nike and Shell screaming from the

negotiating table, despite overwhelming evidence that their stated standards are being disregarded on the

ground. Brown University followed two months later with a tough code of its own.

Tico Almeida, a senior at Duke University, explains that many students have a powerful reaction when they

learn about the workers who produce their team clothing in free-trade zones. "You have two groups of

people, roughly the same age, who are getting such different experiences out of the same institutions," he


says. And once again, says David Tannenbaum, an undergraduate at Princeton, the logo (this time a school

logo) provides the global link. "While the workers are making our clothes thousands of miles away, in other

ways we're close to it —we're wearing these clothes every day."

The summer after the Duke and Brown codes were passed was fil ed with activity.

In July, anti-sweatshop

organizers from campuses across the country gathered in New York and organized themselves into a

coalition, United Students Against Sweatshops. In August, a delegation of eight students, including Tico

Almeida, went on a fact-finding mission to free-trade zones in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.

Almeida told me he was hoping to find Duke sweatshirts because he had seen the

"Made in Honduras" tag

on clothing sold on his campus. But he soon discovered what most people do when they visit free-trade

zones: that a potent combination of secrecy, deferred responsibility and militarism forms a protective

barricade around much of the global garment industry. "It was like taking random stabs in the dark," he

recalls.

When classes resumed in September 1998 and the student travellers were back on campus, the issue of

sweatshop labour exploded into what The New York Times described as "the biggest surge in campus

activism in nearly two decades." At Duke, Georgetown, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Arizona, Michigan,


Princeton, Stanford, Harvard, Brown, Cornell and University of California at Berkeley there were

conferences, teach-ins, protests and sit-ins — some lasting three and four days.

At Yale University, students

held a "knit-in." Al the demonstrations led to agreements from school administrators to demand higher

labour standards from the companies that manufacture their wares.

This fast-growing movement has a somewhat unlikely rallying cry: "Corporate disclosure." The central

demand is for the companies that produce college-affiliated clothing to hand over the names and addresses

of all their factories around the world and open themselves up to monitoring. Who makes your school

clothing, the students say, should not be a mystery. They argue that with the garment industry being the

global, contracted-out maze that it is, the onus must be on companies to prove their goods aren't made in

sweatshops — not on investigative activists to prove that they are. The students are also pushing for their

schools to demand that contractors pay a "living wage," as opposed to the legal minimum wage. By May

1999, at least four administrations had agreed in principle to push their suppliers on the living-wage issue.

As we wil see in the next chapter, there is no agreement about how to turn those well-meaning

commitments into real changes in the export factories. Everyone involved in the anti-sweatshop movement

does agree, however, that even getting issues like disclosure and a living wage on the negotiating table with


manufacturers represents a major victory, one that has eluded campaigners for many years.

In a smaller but equally precedent-setting initiative, Archbishop Theodore McCarrick announced in October

1997 that his Newark, New Jersey, archdiocese would become a "no sweat" zone.

The initiative includes

introducing an anti-sweatshop curriculum into all 185 Catholic schools in the area, identifying the

manufacturers of all their school uniforms and monitoring them to make sure the clothes are being produced

under fair labour conditions -just as the students at St. Mary's in Pickering, Ontario, decided to do.

Al in all, students have picked up the gauntlet on the sweatshop issue with an enthusiasm that has taken

the aging labour movement by storm. United Students Against Sweatshops, after only one year in

existence, claimed chapters on a hundred U.S. campuses and a sister network in Canada. Free the

Children, young Craig Kielburger's Toronto-based anti-child-labour organization (he was the thirteen-yearold

who challenged the Canadian prime minister to review child-labour practices in India) has meanwhile

gained strength in high schools and grade schools around the world. Charles Kernaghan, with his "outing"

of Kathie Lee Gifford and Mickey Mouse, may have started this wave of labour organizing, but by the end of

the 1998-99 academic year, he knew he was no longer driving it. In a letter to the United Students Against


Sweatshops, he wrote: "Right now it is your student movement which is leading the way and carrying the

heaviest weight in the struggle to end sweatshop abuses and child labour. Your effectiveness is forcing the

companies to respond."

Times have changed. As Wil iam Cahn writes in his history of the Lawrence Mil sweatshop strike of 1912,

"Nearby Harvard University allowed students credit for their midterm examinations if they agreed to serve in

the militia against the strikers. Insolent, well-fed Harvard men,' the New York Call reported, 'parade up and

down, their rifles loaded ...their bayonets glittering.'" Today, students are squarely on the other side of

sweatshop labour disputes: as the target market for everything from Guess jeans to Nike soccer balls and

Duke-embossed baseball hats, young people are taking the sweatshop issue personally.

Community Action: Pulling the Selective Purchasing Lever Since federal governments in North America and Europe have been largely unwil ing to impose meaningful

sanctions on such documented human-rights violators as Burma, Nigeria, Indonesia and China, preferring

instead to "constructively engage" these nations with trade, there has been a move for more local levels of

government to step in where the feds have stepped aside. In the U.S., town councils, city councils, school

boards and even some individual state governments have been quietly doing an end run around the trademission


cheerleading that now passes for foreign policy, and drafting their own, local, foreign policy.

Local legislators know that they can't keep multinationals from channeling funds to dictatorships in Nigeria

and Burma, and they cannot prevent imports from companies that use child and prison labour in Pakistan

and China, but they can do something else. They can collectively refuse to buy goods and services from

these companies when they select their business partners for everything from cellular services to Little

League soccer balls. The goal of "selective purchasing agreements," as these ethical trading policies are

called, is twofold. First, the agreements may lead individual companies to decide that it is not cost-effective

to continue to do business under unethical conditions abroad — for instance, if it is going to cost them

contracts at home. Second, actions by local governments can put pressure on federal governments to take

more principled positions in their foreign policy agendas.

Modelled after similar initiatives during the anti-apartheid years, the current local foreign policy "fad" (as one

Republican commentator snidely called it) began, like so many other U.S. social-justice movements, in

Berkeley, California. In February 1995, Berkeley's city council passed a resolution barring the purchase of

goods or services from companies invested in Burma. Of course such companies could stil sell their wares

inside Berkeley —just not to municipal agencies, such as the police force or sanitation services. The move


set off a domino effect across the country — at last count, twenty-two cities, one county and two states had

selective purchasing agreements relating to companies in Burma, and a handful of cities had disqualified

purchases from companies with investments in Nigeria.

Though each law has slight variations in wording, the gist is summed up in this one, passed unanimously by

the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts, on June 8, 1998: WHEREAS

The city of Cambridge declares the right to measure the moral character of its business partners in

determining with whom it seeks to have business relationships; now therefore be it RESOLVED

That as a matter of public policy the City of Cambridge declares that it wil not purchase goods, services or

commodities from any company or corporation that does business in the nation of Burma...

The most significant move came in June 1996 when the Massachusetts State Legislature passed the

Massachusetts Burma Law, making it far more difficult for companies doing business in the dictator-run

country to land a government contract in the state. As the influential Journal of Commerce noted, "The

targets are far from home, but suddenly local governments are showing they can reach around the world."

Another popular purchasing restriction is one that does not broadly target all corporations in particular

countries, but rather corporations engaged in a particularly objectionable practice

— for instance, the


practice of employing sweatshop or child labour. One such case involved the Los Angeles Monroe High

School. After reading the Life magazine article on the Pakistani soccer-ball industry, a Monroe student,

Sharon Paulson, recalled that she and her classmates "ran out during one practice and we were checking all

the balls and they all said, 'Made in Pakistan.' That kind of made everything more real. Before, it was

something that we read about, but then it was like, 'We won a city championship using these balls!' It gave

us something to fight for." What they fought for — and won —was a commitment from the Los Angeles

Board of Education to halt an order of balls made in Pakistan, and another from Los Angeles City Council

"to investigate the production of soccer balls made in countries using child labour."

According to the Investor

Responsibility Research Centre, "in 1997, some 20 U.S. cities and towns...

adopted 'anti-sweatshop'

ordinances that require that goods purchased by those city governments —

including uniforms for police,

fire and public works personnel—be made without sweatshop labour."

Though selective purchasing agreements have been primarily an American phenomenon, they are

beginning to pop up elsewhere. The city of St. John's, Newfoundland, passed an anti-sweatshop resolution

in June 1998, and a group of kids in Fort McMurray, Alberta, succeeded in getting their city council to pass a

resolution banning the use of child-made soccer balls and fireworks on public property. Free Burma


resolutions, meanwhile, are reaching even farther —on March 17, 1998, the Marrickvil e Council in New

South Wales, Australia, "voted unanimously to become the first local authority outside the United States to

enact a Burma selective purchasing law."

In the past four years, the Berkeley City Council has passed so many boycott resolutions —against

companies doing business in Burma, Nigeria, Tibet; companies associated with the arms industry or with

nuclear power -that, as Council or Polly Armstrong joked, "Pretty soon we'l have to do our own offshore

dril ing." It's true that between the Nigeria and Burma resolutions, and one about the Exxon Valdez oil spil ,

the council is prevented from using every single major oil company and is forced to fuel its ambulances and

street-cleaning vehicles with gas from the little-known Golden Gate Petroleum Company. Berkeley banished

Pepsi from its municipal vending machines because of its investment in Burma, returned to the company

after it cut ties with Rangoon and then decided to boycott Coke because of its involvement in Nigeria.

It may all sound like Alice in Wonderland, but the boycotts do affect the multinationals. They may smile at a

tie-dyed college town like Berkeley boycotting everything but hemp paper and Bridgehead coffee, but when

rich states like Massachusetts and Vermont get in on the action, the corporate sector is not amused. In May

1999, three more states — Texas, Washington and New York —had Burma laws pending. And it was


beginning to cost. For instance, before it pulled out of Burma over the Celine Dion controversy, the

telecommunication firm Ericsson lost a major bid to upgrade San Francisco's 911

services because of its

business ties with Burma, and Hewlett-Packard is alleged to have lost several large municipal contracts as

well.

Understandably, many companies have bowed to the demands of the human-rights campaigners. Since

Massachusetts adopted its Burma Law in June 1996, there has been an exodus of big-name multinationals

from the dictatorship, including Eastman Kodak, Hewlett-Packard, Philips Electronics, Apple computers and

Texaco. But just because these companies decided to give in does not mean they plan to accept these new

local roadblocks in international commercial transactions without a fight. As Robert S. Greenberger explains

in The Wall Street Journal, "Procurement contracts in California alone, for example, are worth more to

some U.S. companies than any business they could secure in many countries, but they don't want to have to

choose".

Precisely because it forces such a stark choice, many people are convinced that localized foreign policy

initiatives are the most effective political tool available for wresting back some control over transnational

corporations. "Selective purchasing based on the Burma model," says Danny Kennedy, coordinator of

mining lobby group Project Underground, "is our greatest hope."


It's the kind of statement that has come to enrage the business community, which, after being caught off

guard by the sudden rise of selective purchasing laws, is determined not to make the same mistake twice. A

coalition of companies, including key Burma investors such as Unocal, and Nigeria investors such as Mobil,

have banded together under the National Foreign Trade Council to launch an all-out assault on local

selective purchasing agreements. In April 1997, the council formed USA*Engage, claiming to represent over

670 corporations and trade associations. Its express purpose is to fight these laws collectively, allowing

individual corporations to avoid putting their own practices in the firing line. Frank Kittredge, who is both

president of the NFTC and vice chairman of USA*Engage, explains that "a lot of companies are not anxious

to be spotlighted as supporters of countries like Iran or Burma. The way to avoid that is to band together in a

coalition."

The group argues that foreign policy is a federal matter, and municipal and state governments have no

business wading into the fray. To these ends, USA*Engage has developed a

"State and Local Sanctions

Watch List" to monitor all the towns, cities and states where selective purchasing agreements have passed,

as well as communities that are considering passing them and are therefore stil vulnerable to outside

pressure. Aggressive lobbying by USA*Engage members has already succeeded in squashing a proposed


law on Nigeria that was about to be adopted by the State of Maryland (in March 1998); and Unocal (which

has not managed to keep its name out of this debate) succeeded in convincing the California state

legislature not to adopt a Massachusetts-style Burma law.

The attacks have also come from farther afield. Acting at the behest of multinationals based in Europe, the

European Union has launched an official challenge to the Massachusetts Burma Law at the World Trade

Organization. At issue is the allegation that the law violates a WTO regulation that prohibits government

purchases from being made on "political" grounds. There has even been talk that municipal and state

governments in the U.S. could be sued by their own federal government for violating the WTO clause.

Though federal legislators categorically deny that is their intention, on August 5, 1998, Congress narrowly

defeated a resolution that would have barred the government from using public money for such a court

challenge.

While this trade wrangling went on, the multinationals didn't wait around to see if the selective purchasing

agreements would survive. In April 1998, the National Foreign Trade Council filed a lawsuit in the federal

district court in Boston that challenged the Massachusetts Burma Law as unconstitutional. The NFTC

argued that "the Massachusetts Burma Law directly intrudes on the exclusive power of the national


government to determine foreign policy, discriminates against companies engaged in foreign commerce,

and conflicts with the policies and objectives of the federal statute imposing sanctions on the Union of

Myanmar." Though the NFTC succeeded in winning a protective order that concealed the identities of the

individual corporations funding the case, it claimed in court that thirty of its members had been affected by

the law. And in November 1998, the NFTC won: the court ruled the Massachusetts Burma Law

unconstitutional because it "impermissibly infringes on the federal government's power to regulate foreign

affairs."

The state has already lost one appeal, but both sides have said they are wil ing to take the case all the way

to the Supreme Court. The NFTC openly acknowledges that the court challenge is an attempt to set a

precedent that would effectively stamp out all municipal selective purchasing agreements, as well as

campus and school-board bans. "We regard this law suit to be an important test case that wil determine the

very significant, perplexing and continuing issue concerning the constitutionality of state and local

sanctions," said Frank Kittredge.

For their part, proponents of selective purchasing argue that they are not trying to implement their own

foreign policy. They say calling these laws "sanctions," as their critics invariably do, is a misnomer because


selective purchasing agreements are not regulations placed on businesses, they are simply large-scale

consumer pressure. Simon Bil enness, the Burma campaigner who has helped draft these pieces of

legislation, characterizes them colourfully as "boycotts on steroids." Just as consumers have the right to

personal choice in the marketplace, so too do they have the right collectively, whether as schools, town

councils or state governments. He also points out that the agreements have a proven track record of

meaningful human-rights victories. During the anti-apartheid movement, five U.S.

states, nine cities and

fifty-nine universities passed resolutions that either barred purchases from companies in South Africa

outright, or compelled them to adopt the Sullivan principles. "If USA*Engage had succeeded with their

tactics during the apartheid years, Nelson Mandela might stil be in prison," says Simon Bil enness. Perhaps

most important, the assault on selective purchasing agreements has turned what were campaigns on behalf

of citizens in faraway lands into battles for local rights and liberties as well.

Bil enness, for his part, describes

the attempt to criminalize selective purchasing as "a violation of state sovereignty and local democracy." It

may also prove a tactical miscalculation. In taking aim at these locally based actions, the NFTC has actively

reinforced the very beliefs that led to their enactment in the first place: that corporations have become more


powerful than governments; that federal governments have stopped serving the interests of people; and that

in the light of these two facts, citizens have no choice but to confront corporate power themselves.

The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment would not help matters. The MA1 is stalled for the

moment, but its supporters have in no way abandoned the project. According to a draft leaked in 1997,

selective purchasing agreements could become instantly il egal. The agreement explicitly bans

"discrimination" against corporations based on their trade relations with other countries, and states clearly

that this clause would override any pre-existing laws at al levels of government —

including municipalities.

Not only that, but multinationals would be granted the legal standing to sue governments directly for any

alleged discrimination on this basis. Many now believe that these parts of the MA1

wil be part of the next

round of World Trade Organization negotiations.

In the same way that citizens' groups from around the world mobilized against the MA1 in 1998, many such

groups have declared themselves ready to resist the business community's frontal assault on selective

purchasing. Free Burma campaigners are vowing to "out" the corporations behind the NFTC lawsuit and

target them for boycott campaigns. They also point out that local governments can easily carry out their

"boycotts on steroids" with or without formal resolutions on the books. The city of Vancouver is a case in


point. In 1989, at the tail end of the apartheid boycott, Vancouver passed a selective purchasing resolution

that banned Shell gasoline from city-owned vehicles because of the company's controversial dealings in

South Africa. Similar resolutions were passed — mostly relating to banks that issued loans to South Africaby

councils in Toronto, Ottawa and Victoria. But Shell Canada decided to take the City of Vancouver to

court for discrimination. The case dragged on for nearly five years and in February 1994 the Supreme Court

of Canada ruled, by a margin of five to four, in Shell's favour. Judge John Sopinka wrote that the council

had indeed discriminated against Shell, and that council ors only had the jurisdiction to make procurement

decisions based on concerns for Vancouver residents — not for people in South Africa. The purpose of the

Shell boycott, he concluded, "is to affect matters beyond the boundaries of the City without any identifiable

benefit to its inhabitants."

Shell got what it wanted: the City of Vancouver's gas contract. But the company's problems were far from

over. When Shell again became the subject of international approbation after the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa, local Sierra Club activists again began lobbying the Vancouver council to cut its ties to Shell. In light

of the Supreme Court ruling, the council could not formally pass another selective purchasing resolution but,

coincidentally, on July 8, 1997, it handed over a $6 mil ion contract to fuel the fleet of ambulances and


police and fire vehicles for the entire Greater Vancouver Regional District to Shell's competitor, Chevron. It

is possible that the city's decision was based solely on the merits of each company's bid, but there is little

doubt that the human-rights issue was also a factor. Included in the Greater Vancouver catchment area is

the smaller municipality of North Vancouver; less than four months before the contract went to Chevron,

North Vancouver council ors had voted unanimously to condemn Shell's behaviour in Ogoniland and to

direct its staff not to buy Shell gas. "We have to take a stand on corporations, against the way Shell has

raped the Ogoni people," one council or said at the time. But since the North Vancouver resolution was

simply an expression of council's beliefs —with no mention of municipal contracts

— Shell could not appeal

legally. When the contract went to Chevron, local environmentalists, who had been keeping weekly vigils

outside Shell gas stations in Vancouver for over a year, celebrated it as a victory.

But was it a victory? Less than a year later, Bola Oyinbo, a thirty-three-year-old activist who led an

occupation of a Chevron oil barge in Nigeria's Ondo State, would be writing the following report:

Just as we were preparing to leave we saw three helicopters (choppers). They came like eagles, swooping

on chickens. We never expected what followed. As the choppers landed one after the other discharging

soldiers, what we heard were gunshots and fire. In fact they started shooting commando style at us even


before they landed. They shot everywhere. Arulika and Jolly fell. They died instantly. Larry who was near

him rushed to his aid, wanting to pick him up, he was also shot. More soldiers came and more shooting

followed. Some of my colleagues jumped over board into the Atlantic, others ran into the platform. There

was pandemonium. They shot teargas. White men flew all the helicopters...We were defenceless, harmless.

The protest had begun peacefully on May 25, 1998, and it ended three days later in a bloodbath, with two

activists dead. The circumstances were eerily similar to those that had prompted Ken Saro-Wiwa's

campaign against Shell five years earlier. "Go to Awoye community and see what they have done," Oyinbo

writes. "Everything there is dead: mangroves, tropical forests, fish, the freshwater, wildlife etc. Al kil ed by

Chevron.... our people complain of 'dead creeks.'" According to Oyinbo, the community attempted on

several occasions to negotiate with Chevron, but its executives never showed up at the meetings. The

occupation of the moored barge was a last resort, they say, and the only demand was for a formal meeting

with Chevron.

Oyinbo and his comrades accuse the company of hiring the soldiers who raided the barge, kil ing two men

and injuring as many as thirty others.

Chevron says it is not responsible for the actions taken by police officers on its rig

— they were simply


enforcing the law against "pirates." Chevron spokesperson Mike Libbey denies that the company paid the

security officers to intervene, though he admits to alerting the authorities and providing transportation to the

platform. "We think it is unfortunate that people died, perhaps unnecessarily, but that doesn't change the

fact that in order for Chevron to do business in ninety countries around the world, we must cooperate with

governments of many kinds," he told reporters. The company has further enraged the community by

refusing to pay damages to the families of the deceased — only burial costs. "If they want other

compensations, they should write to us and the company may decide to assist them on compassionate

grounds," said Deji Haastrup, Chevron's community relations manager. Perhaps fittingly, Chevron's CEO,

Ken Derr, is one of the most active members of l)SA*Engage and its crusade against sanctions and

selective purchasing.

Unlike Shell, Chevron has not yet become the subject of an international brand boycott, though there is a

growing public awareness about the deaths that took place on May 28. Perhaps because Bola Oyinbo lacks

Ken Saro-Wiwa's international connections, the deaths of his two colleagues were at first not even reported

outside the Nigerian press. And it is sadly ironic that Chevron has undoubtedly benefited from the fact that

activists have made a strategic decision to focus their criticism on Shell, rather than on the Nigerian oil


industry as a whole. It points to one of the significant, at times maddening, limitations of brand-based

politics.

[IMAGE]

Top: Craig Kielburger, the teenager who successfully brought child labour to the world's attention, receives

an award from Reebok, a company that has been embroiled in several sweatshop scandals. Bottom:

"Certified Organic," "Recycled" and "Dolphin Friendly." Wil "No Sweat" become just another logo for the

conscientious consumer?

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

BEYOND THE BRAND

The Limits of Brand-Based Politics

In this industry, the only reason to change is because someone has got a great cattle prod that keeps

jabbing you in the rear end.

-Bud Konheim, president of Nicole Mil er Inc. clothing company, September 4, 1997

When Good Things Happen to Bad Brands

In One World, Ready or Not, Wil iam Greider writes that "focusing on the moral values of particular

companies —or their immorality — invites a self-righteous response among readers that is too easy and

undeserved.... Mike has concocted a particularly sick ideology to sell its shoes —

glamorous images of

superstar athletes concealing the human brutalities —but why single out Mike or Michael Jordan when the


U.S. government itself is implicated in the same sickness?" Greider has a valid point. The conduct of the

individual multinationals is simply a by-product of a broader global economic system that has steadily been

removing almost all barriers and conditions to trade, investment and outsourcing.

If companies make deals

with brutal dictators, sell off their factories and pay wages too low to live on, it's because there is nothing in

our international trading rules to prevent them. But eliminating the inequalities at the heart of free-market

globalization seems a daunting task for most of us mortals. On the other hand, focusing on a Mike or a Shell

and possibly changing the behaviour of one multinational can open an important door into this complicated

and challenging political arena.

The all-star multinationals that have been the focus of this book are the celebrity face of global capitalism,

but when they come under close public scrutiny, the entire system is hauled under the microscope as well.

This is often a quite conscious strategy on the part of brand-based campaigns.

The Campaign for Labour

Rights, for instance, openly admits that "when we debate Nike, we are debating the new global economy.”

Click on the Beyond McDonald's icon on the McSpotlight Web site and you'l learn that "due to its massive

public prominence and indisputable arrogance [McDonald's] has simply been used as a symbol of all

corporations pursuing their profits at any price." And Stephen Coats, in explaining why he chose to make


Starbucks the centre of a drive to improve conditions in the Guatemalan coffee industry, said simply: "You

have to start somewhere. You start with one company.” Even the small-town battles against Wal-Mart take

place at least partly on this symbolic level. John Jarvis, a historical preservationist and one of Wal-Mart's

most vocal foes, explains that "the good thing about Wal-Mart was that it was big enough, nasty enough,

and aggressive enough to make the problem of uncontrolled growth clear."

But when one logo gets all the attention, even when it is being used tactically to il ustrate broader issues,

others are unquestionably let off the hook. As we have seen, Chevron has been awarded contracts that

Shell lost, and Adidas has enjoyed a massive market comeback by imitating Nike's labour and marketing

strategies, while sidestepping all of the controversy. The most hypocritical of all is Reebok, which has

rushed to capitalize on Nike's controversies by positioning itself as the ethical shoe alternative. "Consumers

are looking for what a company stands for," Jo Harlow, Reebok's vice president of marketing, says in

relation to Nike's fall from grace. And to make sure that consumers find what they are looking for in Reebok,

the company has taken to handing out high-profile Reebok Human Rights Awards to activists who fight

against child labour and repressive dictatorships. This is all rather sanctimonious, coming from a company

that produces many of its shoes in the very same factories as Nike, and that has seen more than its own


share of human-rights violations, though with less attendant publicity.

Gerard Greenfield, whose firsthand research into garment, shoe and toy factories in Asia has been the

backbone of dozens of international campaigns, admits that he has become tired of the double standard. He

points out that in March 1997, the international community was outraged by a report that a group of women

at a Nike factory called Pou Chen in Vietnam were beaten by a supervisor and forced to run laps around the

grounds. But, he writes, "less than a month later the same severe punishment was imposed on workers at

another Taiwanese-invested shoe factory, Giant V.... News of this case was sent out to the groups

campaigning on labour practices at Pou Chen. However, despite the similarity in these cases, it was not

taken up by human-rights and labour-rights campaign groups in Europe, North America and Australia,

simply because the factory does not produce Nike shoes.... It seems that unless the Nike connection is

made, such incidents are irrelevant." And so a warped hierarchy of oppression is emerging from the

factories of the Third World: when it comes to seeking international solidarity, only designer injustices need

apply. Bob Ortega makes a similar point about the anti-Wal-Mart movement in his book In Sam We Trust.

There is a terrific irony —if one not much appreciated by Wal-Mart executives —

in the fact that hundreds

of towns and suburbs across North America wil fight mightily to keep the dreaded Wal-Mart at bay, even as


many of these communities let in scores of other superstore retailers that try to ape Wal-Mart in every way

they can.... To the extent that Wal-Mart's critics blast it for wiping out Main Street businesses, for

homogenizing communities, for trying to crush any and all rivals, for selling goods made in sweatshops here

and abroad, they are missing the forest for the biggest tree.

But there is also a clear value in the big-tree approach. Ken Saro-Wiwa's brother Owens points out that

although all the gas companies have skeletons in their closets, focusing on one company —Shell Oil in the

case of Nigeria — can have concrete advantages. "It is important not to make people feel powerless. After

all, they need to fil their cars with something. If we tell them all companies are guilty, they wil feel they can

do nothing. What we are trying to really do, now that we have this evidence against this one company, is to

let people have the feeling that they can at least have the moral force to make one company change." He

also says that since Shell controls more than half of Nigeria's oil, whatever happens to Shell wil serve as a

lesson to all the other oil companies, including Chevron.

When Bad Things Happen to the Unbrandables

Wiwa is convinced that with continued pressure, Shell wil eventually meet the campaign's demands for

economic and environmental reparations in Ogoniland. The mil ions Shell has poured into public relations

and restructuring already show how seriously even the most profitable company in the world must take its


public image. But much of that has to do with the visibility and vulnerability of the Shell brand. Shell extracts

a raw resource from the land and water in Nigeria, but it brands that resource with its logo and sells it at its

own branded gas stations around the world. And it is at that point that consumers make a choice between

Shell and Texaco or Shell and Chevron — a choice that is as arbitrary and image based as the one between

Coke and Pepsi, McDonald's and Burger King. Oil is a raw resource, but it only really becomes accessible to

most people as a brand.

The same cannot be said of most multinationals in the natural-resource industries.

Mining, natural gas, seed

and logging multinationals all trade in virtually unbranded commodities that they sell to governments and

corporate clients who then transform them into consumer goods. Since resource companies don't sell

directly to the public, they barely have to worry about their public image - a factor that brings up what is

perhaps the most significant limitation of brand-based campaigns: they can be powerless in the face of

corporations that opt out of the branding game.

So all over the world, children work in fields with toxic pesticides, in dangerous mines and in rubber and

steel factories where small fingers and hands are sliced off or mangled in heavy machinery. Many of these

children are producing goods for the export market: canned fish, tea, rice, rubber for tires. But their plight


has never captured the world's imagination like that of the kids who make soccer balls with swooshes on

them or clothing for Barbie dolls, because their exploitation is unbranded, and therefore less identifiable,

less visible, in our image-obsessed world.

The Free Burma movement has felt this limitation keenly. The campaign has been astonishingly successful

at shaming nearly every brand-name company out of the country, from Pepsi to Texaco. When Heineken

pulled out in July 1996, CEO Karel Vuursteen minced no words in explaining his decision: "Public opinion

and issues surrounding this market have changed to a degree that could have an adverse effect on our

brand and corporate reputation" — another casualty of the branding boomerang.

Relatively speaking,

however, beer, soft-drink and clothing companies were never major players on the Burmese scene. The

largest foreign development — accounting for half of all foreign investment — is a $1.2 bil ion gas line

financed by Unocal, which is U.S. based, and Total, which is French-owned. But

"Unocal," as Human Rights

Watch noted in its 1997 World Report, "remained indifferent to protests." CEO

Roger Beach defiantly told

the press: "Let me say unequivocally that the only way we wil leave is if we are forced to by the enactment

of law." And why should Beach care what a bunch of university students and church groups have to say? In

1997, Unocal sold the last of its U.S. retail outlets and refiners. So we don't go and buy our bottles of Unocal


at Wal-Mart, or slap the Unocal logo on baseball hats and T-shirts. Activists have tried to fight the gas

company through the courts, but so far without luck. When brand image is the weapon, an unbranded

company can get off the hook entirely.

Secondary Boycotts

There are, however, ways around this obstacle, as the Lubicon Cree discovered when the Japanese pulpand-paper giant Daishowa Marubeni-International unveiled plans for a major logging and mil operation on

land that the Cree claimed was rightfully theirs. The area in Northern Alberta has been the subject of a

fierce land-claim dispute in which the Canadian government has managed to avoid negotiating a settlement

for sixty-five years. In the meantime, logging and mining have caused massive damage to the ecosystem

and to the Lubicon way of life. So when Daishowa refused to withdraw its $500

mil ion logging operation

until the land claim was settled, the Lubicon saw it as the final straw. If neither the government nor the

company would listen, they would have to go after Daishowa directly. But how?

Daishowa is hardly a

household name — it cuts down trees and turns them into paper goods that it then sells in bulk to other

large corporations. How can you target a company that has absolutely no interaction with the general

public?

The Friends of the Lubicon, an activist support group, were struggling with that very question over pizza one


night in 1989 when one member of the group looked down at the Pizza Pizza paper bag on the table and

saw, printed in small lettering at the bottom, the Daishowa trademark. There it was. The campaign strategy,

the Lubicon soon decided, would be to call for a "secondary boycott": they would ask Daishowa's clients

—among them Pizza Pizza, the Canadian clothing retailer Roots and Woolworths to sever their ties to

Daishowa or face boycotts themselves. Though Daishowa has no brand image itself, many of its clients do,

and good customer relations are of central importance to them. It wasn't long before many of them started

getting their paper bags elsewhere. The strategy proved so successful that in 1995, Daishowa took the

Friends of the Lubicon to court, claiming the boycott was unlawful and had cost the company $14 mil ion in

lost revenue." But on April 14, 1998, an Ontario court judge ruled in favour of the Friends of the Lubicon.

After the ruling, the Lubicon vowed to bring back the boycott with renewed force unless Daishowa agreed to

stay off the disputed land. Two weeks later, Daishowa pledged "not to harvest or purchase timber" in the

entire contested area until the land claim was resolved.

From the beginning of its clash with the Lubicon Cree, Daishowa insisted it was being unfairly targeted,

caught in the crossfire of a dispute between the band and government. In many ways, that is true. The

targeting of the multinational and its clients was an act of desperation. As Kevin Thomas, spokesperson of


the Friends of the Lubicon, says, "The government was never going to settle so long as the Lubicon people

were the only ones suffering — the only ones unable to carry on with business as usual." By making sure

that Daishowa was also unable to carry out its business, the Lubicon drew one step closer to achieving a

sustainable political solution. Greider is right: individual corporations are only one piece of the puzzle. But

as the Daishowa case shows, they can be a piece of the puzzle that acts as a lever to achieve broader and

more lasting political change.

The Daishowa precedent serves as a powerful warning to al the other faceless, resource-based

corporations that conduct their operations in relative obscurity. Investigative activists are starting to track

the progress of harvested natural resources through the economy to the point that they turn into consumer

goods; at that stage public pressure can be applied at the mall, superstore or grocery chain. Nickel turns into

batteries, genetically modified agricultural crops into packaged foods, old-growth wood into furniture, gold

into jewellery.... There is no harvested resource that does not, eventually, turn into a brand.

This strategy has already proved enormously successful in the European campaign against genetically

modified foods. For years campaigners had been railing against agribusiness giant Monsanto (that most

impenetrable of multinationals) and its refusal to label which foods had been modified and which had not —


and, in the case of soybeans, actually mixing the two together. But when campaigners broadened their

focus to include not just companies like Monsanto and Novartis, responsible for the genetic engineering, but

also the supermarkets that sold their foods, the issue finally grabbed the world's attention. With shoppers

shouting about "Frankenfoods" on their doorsteps and Greenpeace campaigners leading customers on

"gene food tours" through their aisles, the supermarkets could not afford to share Monsanto's cloistered

attitude. Eventually, several large British supermarket chains including Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway all

removed bio-engineered foods from their private-label brands. Marks Spencer went further, banning from

its stores, in March 1999, all foods containing genetically modified ingredients.

Chains across Western

Europe followed suit, as did food giants Unilever U.K., Nestle U.K. and Cadbury.

Environmentalists have taken a similar tack with the forestry companies logging old-growth trees in British

Columbia. Rather than continuing to face off against loggers in the deep woods —

as was the strategy during

the Clayoquot Sound demonstrations of 1993 —Greenpeace and the Rainforest Action Network now target

high-profile brands that buy products derived from old-growth timber. In response to this pressure, in

December 1998, twenty Fortune 500 companies —including 3M, Kinko's, Hallmark, IBM and Nike — agreed

to phase out their use of old-growth products, and they made their commitment public in a full-page ad in


The New York Times. But Home Depot —"the world's largest retailer of ancient forest products," according

to the campaign — refused to sign on, sparking a wave of protests at dozens of Home Depot outlets across

North America, as well as at the company's annual general meeting in Atlanta, in May 1999. The strategy

proved successful: in August 1999, Home Depot announced it would phase out old-growth wood products by

2002.

The Writing on the Wall

Despite the success of these strategies, it nonetheless seems odd that we need to go to such great lengths

to reshape social and environmental injustices just so that they can be brought home to us shoppers. In a

way, these campaigns help us to care about issues not because of their inherent justice or importance but

because we have the accessories to go with them: Nike shoes, Pepsi, a sweater from the Gap. If we truly

need the glittering presence of celebrity logos to build a sense of shared humanity and collective

responsibility for the planet, then maybe brand-based activism is the ultimate achievement of branding.

According to Gerard Greenfield, international political solidarity is becoming so dependent on logos that

these corporate symbols now threaten to overshadow the actual injustices in question. Talk about

government, talk about values, talk about rights — that's all well and good, but talk about shopping and you


really get our attention. "If we can only talk about workers' collective rights and struggles in the context of

what people choose to buy as consumers," writes Greenfield, "then it seems we face a greater challenge to

building a critical, popular social consciousness than we might imagine."

There is no doubt that Anticorporate activism walks a precarious line between self-satisfied consumer rights

and engaged political action. Campaigners can exploit the profile that brand names bring to human-rights

and environmental issues, but they have to be careful that their campaigns don't degenerate into glorified

ethical shopping guides: how-to's on saving the world through boycotts and personal lifestyle choices. Are

your sneakers "Mo Sweat"? Your rugs "Rugmark"? Your soccer balls "Child Free"? Is your moisturizer

"Cruelty-Free"? Your coffee "Fair Trade"? Some of these initiatives have genuine merit, but the challenges

of a global labour market are too vast to be defined — or limited —by our interests as consumers.

It took almost no time, for instance, for the White House Task Force on Sweatshops, set up in response to

the Kathie Lee Gifford scandal, to become just another shopping exercise. Any substantial demands for

labour-law reform were immediately hijacked by a new agenda: what provisions would U.S. companies have

to meet before they could sew a "No Sweat" label on their garments? The immediate priority was finding a

quick and easy way to protect the right of Westerners to buy branded goods without guilt. Tellingly, Bil


Clinton's "No Sweat" labelling initiative is modelled after the "Dolphin Safe" stamp on cans of tuna, which

reassures buyers that the much-loved dolphin was not kil ed in the canning of the fish. What this proposal

fails to grasp is that the rights of garment workers, unlike dolphins, cannot be assured by a symbol on a

label, the equivalent of a best-before date; and that trying to do so represents nothing less than the

wholesale privatization of their (and our) political rights. The whole charade reminds me of a New Yorker

cartoon that shows a Norman Rockwell-esque family unwrapping gifts under a Christmas tree. The parents

are pulling out a new pair of sneakers, as the mother asks: "How are the human rights on these?"

There is another problem with the consumer-based approach. We are living, as Susan Sontag said, in the

"Age of Shopping" and any movement that is primarily rooted in making people feel guilty about going to the

mall is a backlash waiting to happen. Besides, the activists who are leading this movement aren't austere

Luddites who are against shopping on principle. Many of them are creative twenty-something’s designing ad

jams on their Mac laptops who happen to believe that there should be some space left over that isn't trying

to sell them something or cluttered with the debris of our consumer culture. They are young men and

women in Hong Kong and Jakarta who wear Nikes and eat at McDonald's, and tell me they are too busy


organizing factory workers to bother with Western lifestyle politics. And while Westerners sweat over what

kinds of shoes and shirts are most ethical to buy, the people sweating in the factories line their dorm rooms

with McDonald's advertisements, paint "NBA Homeboy" murals on their doors and love anything with

"Meeckey." The organizers in the Cavite zone often dress for work in ersatz Disney or Tommy T-shirts —

cheap knockoffs from the local market. How do they reconcile the contradiction between their clothes and

their anger at these multinationals? They told me they had never really thought about it like that; politics in

Cavite is about fighting for concrete improvements in workers' lives — not about what name happens to be

on a T-shirt you happen to have on your back.

Corporate codes of conduct are in many ways the most controversial by-product of brand-based activism.

The moment multinational companies like Mike, Shell, Mattel and the Gap stopped denying the existence of

abuses at their sites of production and resource extraction, they began drafting statements of principles,

codes of ethics, memorandums of understanding and other non-legally-binding documents of good

intentions. These pieces of paper espoused high standards of business ethics: non-discrimination, respect

for the environment and for the rule of law. If any busybody customer wanted to know how their products

were made, the public-relations department simply mailed them a copy of the code, as if it were the list of


nutritional information on the side of a box of Lean Cuisine.

When you read the codes, it's difficult not to get swept up in the starry-eyed idealism of it all. These

documents stare back at their readers with a look of perfect ahistorical innocence as if to ask, Why are you

surprised? We have been like this all along.... And the reader would be forgiven for wondering, at least for a

moment, if perhaps it is just as the companies say: one big misunderstanding, a

"communication

breakdown" with a rogue contractor, something lost in the translation.

Codes of conduct are awfully slippery. Unlike laws, they are not enforceable. And unlike union contracts,

they were not drafted in cooperation with factory managers in response to the demands and needs of

employees. Without exception, they were drafted by public-relations departments in cities like New York and

San Francisco in the immediate aftermath of an embarrassing media investigation: Wal-Mart's code arrived

after reports surfaced that its supplier factories in Bangladesh were using child labour; Disney's code was

born of the Haitian revelation; Levi's wrote its policy as an answer to prison labour scandals. Their original

purpose was not reform but to "muzzle the offshore watchdog" groups, as Alan Rolnick, lawyer for the

American Apparel Manufacturers Association, advised his clients.

But the companies who rushed to adopt these codes made a serious miscalculation: they underestimated,

once again, the amount of information flowing between workers and vil agers in Africa, Central America and


Asia and campaigns in Europe and North America — and so rather than

"muzzling" anyone, the documents

have only raised more questions. Why did Shell fail to translate its manifesto, Profits and Principles, into

any language other than English and Dutch? Why, until two years ago, were Nike and the Gap's codes

available only in English? Why weren't they distributed to workers in the factories?

Why was there such a

great discrepancy between the intentions espoused in the codes and the firsthand reports coming out of the

zones and the oil fields? Who is supposed to monitor these codes through all the layers of contracting and

subcontracting? Who wil enforce them? What is the penalty of failure?

In short, these hybrids of advertising copy and the Communist Manifesto backfired. The offshore watchdogs

kept on barking — and no wonder. Anti-corporate campaigns are fuelled, at least in part, by people's deep

sense of marketing overload — and for this reason, the last thing likely to mollify them is more marketing. A

group of anti-Shell campaigners made that point dramatically in March 1999 after Shell launched a $32

mil ion marketing campaign that flawlessly absorbed the rhetoric of both the Brent Spar and the Ogoni

campaigns. "Exploit or Explore?" asks the glossy Shell ad.

Every business wants to make its mark. However, in the sensitive regions of the world, like our tropical

rainforests and our oceans, the scars of industrialisation are all too apparent. Our shared climate and finite


natural resources concern us as never before, and there's no room for an attitude of "It's in the middle of

nowhere, so who's to know?" Time and again at Shell, we're discovering the rewards of respecting the

environment when doing business. If we're exploring for oil and gas reserves in sensitive areas of the world,

we consult widely with the different local and global interest groups. Working together, our aim is to ensure

that bio-diversity in each location is preserved. We also try to encourage these groups to monitor our

progress so that we can review and improve the ways in which we work.

But rather than stemming the flow of criticism, Shell's extravagant spending on public relations — with the

Ogoni's grievances left unresolved and demands for outside monitoring repeatedly rejected — sparked its

own kind of backlash: a backlash against "greenwash." Essential Action, the hub of the Shell boycott,

launched a postcard campaign urging Shell's executives to "Spend the money cleaning up your mess, not

your image!" And, in April 1999, activists in London threw green and red paint on the doors of the

company's international headquarters. The green paint, said the anonymous perpetrators, was an attempt to

give Shell "a taste of its own greenwash."

Throwing paint is one approach. Another, and one that has become increasingly popular, is throwing the

promises in the codes of conduct back in the face of the corporations who drafted them. Once again, it's the


Saul Alinsky theory of political jujitsu: "No organization ...can live up to the letter of its own book. You can

club them to death with their 'book' of rules and regulations." Bama Athreya of the U.S.-based International

Labour Rights Fund explains how this strategy can work with relation to dike's high-minded code of conduct:

"Let's face it, hypocrites are far more interesting than mere wrongdoers, and it's been much easier to

sensitize press and public to Mike's failure to implement its own code of conduct than to its failure to comply

with Indonesian labour law."

As it became clear that these flimsy codes of conduct had failed to quiet dissent (and may have

exacerbated it), several multinationals moved on to a more advanced brand of corporate code. These

codes, while stil not legally binding and stil implemented on a voluntary basis with little monitoring, are

nonetheless more substantial than a simple statement of good intentions. And by 1998, there were so many

different models of these codes floating around that even the most committed anti-sweatshop campaigners

had to admit that they had lost track. Some were drafted in cooperation with human-rights groups or ethical

investment specialists in the West. Others, like Bil Clinton's Apparel Industry Partnership's code, were

organized according to where the multinationals were headquartered. The Gap has a code that applies to

one factory in El Salvador, allowing it to be monitored by local human-rights activists; a code adopted by


Levi's, Mattel and Reebok refers specifically to doing business in China. A code on child labour drafted by

Unicef, the International Labour Organization and an association of Pakistani manufacturers was signed by

all the major soccer-ball manufacturers; it provides for outside monitoring as well as education and

rehabilitation for the child labourers. Following the wave of anti-sweatshop student activism in 1998 and

1999, dozens of universities adopted their own codes, only to decide subsequently to sign on to the Clinton

Apparel Industry Partnership's code en masse —a totally different text.

Meanwhile, the Collegiate Licensing

Company proposed its own anti-sweatshop code, to apply to all 160 American schools it represents

—meaning that some schools were looking at three tiers of codes. And unlike the tough codes adopted by

universities like Duke, the CLC code has no provision for disclosure and does not require contractors to pay

a living wage, only the minimum wage.

Layered on top of these stacks of codes was one drafted by the Council on Economic Priorities, a consumer

watchdog group in New York, along with several large corporations. The CEP plan would inspect factories

for adherence to a set of standards covering key issues such as health, safety, overtime, child labour and

the like. Under this model, brand-name multinationals like Avon and Toys 'R' Us, rather than trying to

enforce their own codes around the world, simply place their orders with factories that have been found to


be in compliance with the code. Then, the factories are monitored by a private auditing company, which

certifies factories that meet the code as "SA8000" (SA stands for "Social Accountability"). For many

multinationals, this plan was far too demanding; the American Apparel Manufacturers Association, for

instance, launched its own, less stringent, voluntary code, which would also certify factories "sweatshop

free."

Not surprisingly, by mid-